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History is an enigma to man.' In history he is compelled to question his 
very existence. But no amount of objective observation of history ultimately provides 
him with an evidence of its meaning. History presents perennial and excruciating 
problem to man, because man seeks the meaning of his existence in history, while 
history often thwarts his every attempt to do so. 
Though "predetermined" by historical forces in many ways,' man feels 
called to justify his existence. He feels that he is a bearer of responsibility, even if on 
the rational basis he can argue for his freedom from it. What underlies all the enigma 
'The term "history" basically means two things: the objective events 
themselves and man's understanding of their meaning. When we here speak of 
history, we mean by the term man's opaque existential conditions about which man 
learns when he tries to grasp the meaning of the historical experience. History in this 
sense constantly goes against man's longing and dream for self-realization. Speaking 
of the collapse of the optimism of the nineteenth century after the experience of the 
two World Wars, Erich Frank says: "To the extent to which man, through his reason, 
has learned to control nature, he has fallen victim to the catastrophe of history. Thus, 
his dream that he may be entirely free to shape his future according to the ideals of his 
own reason is frustrated by history. Man is thwarted by man himself, by his own 
nature" (Philosophical Understanding of Religious Truth [London: Oxford University 
Press, 1959], 121). 
"Yet," says Frank, "in his endeavor to fulfill his destiny man does not stand 
alone; he is inextricably entangled in the loves of others. He is determined by the 
social, economic and intellectual conditions into which he is born; in short he is 
molded by history" (ibid., 116). 
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man experiences in history is his disquieting notion of his inner disorder and 
contradiction, "something wrong" in him. 
The enigma of history and man's accountability in it is the basic feature of 
man's existence. Man longs to come to terms with his existence. He can do so by 
negating either one or both of these aspects, but in so doing he is called back, after 
all, to the same tribunal that demands that he justify himself. History and existence is 
man's remaining agony. The agony eventually leads him to seek redemption which 
lies beyond the possibilities of history. 
The Gospel became part of history when "the fullness of time came," when 
"the Son was born of woman, under the law."' By this Pauline verse the Gospel's 
intrinsic relatedness to a historical reality is declared as the paradigm of the Christian 
understanding of history.' The Gospel had in its beginning a historical situation as its 
constituent counterpart. 
If "the fullness of time" is the setting for the Gospel's becoming a historical 
reality, we find another aspect of this in the Johannine proclamation that "the Word 
'Gal. 4:4. 
'Many established textbooks of church history describe that initial 
circumstance under this Pauline viewpoint. Hans v. Schubert is one who begins his 
own presentation of Church history with this Pauline verse, a locus classicus. He 
writes: "Indeed, we cannot properly appreciate the wisdom of God's guidance until 
we realize in how many ways the gospel formed a link in a chain, to what an extent 
the growth of a universal religion had been prepared by the conditions of the age." 
(Outline of Church History trans. Maurice A. Canney [New York: Williams & 
Norgate, 1907], 1). 
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became flesh and dwelt among us, full of grace and truth; we have beheld his glory."' 
This means the Gospel actively takes initiative in its interaction with historical reality. 
Throughout history the Gospel has actualized itself only by becoming "flesh," that is, 
part of historical reality, while assuming current cultural aspirations and longings as 
"earthen vessels." Without a continuous interaction with historical reality, the Gospel 
has never become gospel. 
The Gospel approaches man in a cultural garment. Being the incarnate 
Logos, Christ himself was "determined" while on earth by historical traditions of 
Judaism.' But, as Christ transcended that historical determination,' so the Gospel 
'John 1, 14. The "flesh" (crag), according to R. H. Lightfoot, signifies 
"humanity" "in its transitoriness, weakness, and purposelessness" (St. John's Gospel: 
A Commentary, ed. C. F. Evans [London: Oxford University Press] 84). The 
humanity of these characteristics is the typical feature of history. Lightfoot then 
identifies the logos' become flesh with "becom[ing] historical" (ibid.). Humanity sees 
the Logos incarnate in history, "full of grace and truth." By this event of the Logos' 
incarnation, history is qualitatively changed. Though history still retains the character 
of "flesh," it is, in faith, no longer merely "die innerweltliche Existenz der 
Verldufigkeit and Nichtigkeit" (Siegfried Schultz Johannesevangelium [NTD] 
[Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1972], 30). Rather, history is carried by the 
Logos. It is thus radically qualified by the Gospel as filled with hope and meaning. 
Cf. basar in Isa. 46:6. 
'This relativization of Judaism as "a culture" is to be made in light of the 
Gospel as the crucifixion and resurrection of the incarnate Logos of the Father (cf. 1 
Cor. 2:9). If the disciples had rigidly remained within the confines of traditional 
Judaism, it would have been impossible for any of them to confess Jesus Christ as 
"my Lord and my God" (John 20:17). An interpretative point of view (e.g., of A. C. 
McGiffert, A History of Christian Thought [New York: Scribners, 1953]; 15) that this 
confession was a later Pauline Hellenistic development points, by way of refutation, to 
a clear historical discontinuity between the traditions of Judaism and the Gospel. 
According to Bernhard Lohse, the primitive church, though displaying "great reserve" 
toward calling Jesus "God," "regarded Jesus as God from the very beginning" (A 
Short History of Christian Doctrine, trans. F. E. Stoeffler [Philadelphia: Fortress 
Press, 1988], 73). 
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transcends historical particularities. Because of this, it has universal validity and 
actuality. When the Gospel broke the Judaen boundary into the Hellenistic world, it 
met an audience that had a totally different metaphysical orientation.' It found, 
however, more and more responses from that expectant world and, in the course of a 
few centuries,. it established itself as the dominant historical power in that world. The 
Gospel proved itself as a historical power.' 
This particular assimilation of the Gospel was designated by Adolf von 
Haniack as the "Hellenization" of the Gospel.' This is a paradigm of all the 
subsequent interactions between the Gospel and the historical reality. The Gospel 
'The Messianic figures in the traditions of the Old Testament and later 
Judaism—namely, the Son of David, the Suffering Servant, the Son of man and the 
others—are in themselves not fully direct types of the Messiah who actually entered 
into history. Certainly they contributed to understanding who Jesus is, but Jesus 
transcends all of them. He is sui generis. That both the Ebionite adoptionistic 
Christology and the Hellenistic Gnostic Christology failed, each in its own way, to do 
justice to the reality of Jesus Christ points to his sui generis quality. 
'Edwin Hatch, The Influence of Greek Ideas and Usages upon the Christian 
Church, (London and Edinburgh: Williams and Norgate, 1890), 1-3). Hatch held the 
view that Christ came "not to destroy but to fulfill" the "beliefs and usages" existent 
in a given people's tradition. With this conviction he wrote "classically" that no one 
would "fail to notice a difference of both form and content between the Sermon on the 
Mount and the Nicene Creed." However, this difference cannot be established 
categorically between the New Testament as a whole and the Nicene Creed. One 
finds the Hellenistic elements in the Johannine and the Pauline theology. 
'The German term geschichtsmachtig would be a pertinent expression for the 
Gospel's power in history. What we are saying here, however, is not that the 
development leading to the Constantinian turn is an empirical evidence of the Gospel's 
power (for it has proved a mixed blessing to the church), but that the Gospel is 
capable of shaping the course of history while always remaining critical toward the 
development of history, even that of the church. 
`Quoted here from Hans V. Schubert, Outline of Church History, translated 
by Maurice A. Canney. (New York: Williams & Norgate, 1907), 51. 
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allowed itself to be assimilated with the longings of the recipient culture. The 
Gospel's "Romanization," "Germanization"" (and "Anglicanization" and 
"Americanization" for that matter) necessarily follow' if the Gospel should become 
actual and relevant." 
But this historical movement of the Gospel had never been without tension. 
The Hellenistic world, for example, with its metaphysical concept of salvation, 
"absorbed" the Gospel accordingly. It was not so much interested in the forgiveness 
of sins and in the earthly Lord; its occupation was rather with the incarnate Logos 
who revealed the truth and, through the impartation of the gnosis, liberates man from 
the entanglement of the visible world into a union with the highest God. Thus 
emerged a gap between the Gospel of the New Testament and Hellenistic soteriology. 
"Ibid. 
'Although Edwin Hatch's above-mentioned work is a century old, his 
observation made there concerning the Gospel's taking root in a different culture is 
still objectively valid: "[N]o permanent change takes place in the religious beliefs or 
usages of a race which is rooted in the existing beliefs and usages of that race. . . . A 
religious change is, like a physiological change, of the nature of assimilation by, and 
absorption into, existing elements" (4). 
"We note at once that the inevitability of the Gospel's Hellenization, 
Romanization, and so on should be considered as not caused by the Gospel's own 
cultural identity that would be alien to a recipient culture, but rather by the historical 
power of the Gospel which infiltrates into any recipient culture. The historical process 
of Hellenization, and so on, is not something which deprives the gospel's dynamic 
identity, but the Gospel's own self-actualization in history. This process is carried on 
by the Gospel's Geschichtsmochtigkeit. The much-discussed issue of contextualization 
of the Gospel seems tantamount to man's encounter with the Gospel in his own 
cultural existence, and this encounter must be a primary encounter with the Gospel, 
even if it needs to be led by theological traditions. Put in an analogy, a contextual 
theology is not a copy of another copy of the original, but it must be a primary copy 
of the original (though the previous "copies" would be indispensable for correctives 
and enrichments of the copy made). 
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The same paradigm applies also to Romanization, Germanization, and so forth. 
Under those assimilation processes the Gospel itself remains an ever-actual, 
ever-transcendent and ever-salvific power. It "reacts critically" to particular 
interpretations of the Gospel and constantly urges them to modify their interpretations 
lest they be petrified. For no culture under any historical circumstances can be 
identified with the living Gospel; culture by its own nature is bound to be a spatio-
temporal particularity." Only in this critical distance from, and continuous 
interaction with, a historical reality, the Gospel actualizes itself as the power of 
salvation.' A "synthesis" of the Gospel and a particular historical reality remains 
"The term "culture" is always used with a spatio-temporal definition once 
discussions on culture begin. When we speak, for example, of Japanese culture, it 
always involves a definite space, Japan, and a definite time, the culture of the Nara 
era, of the Tokugawa era, of the pre-Pacific War modern era, and so on. Although it 
is possible to abstract a set of common traits of a nation's culture, these traits are also 
constantly under modification. Just as every given point in time is particular, so the 
culture it produces in a given space is also particular. A given culture remains 
therefore within a limited validity as "a working hypothesis" for the existence of a 
particular group of people. 
"Gustaf Aulen, Christus Victor. Trans. A. G. Hebert (New York: 
Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1969), 17. As an historical case of this statement we 
mention Irenaeus. "His [Irenaeus'] strength lies," says Aulen, "in the fact that he did 
not, like the Apologists and the Alexandrians, work along some philosophical line of 
approach to Christianity, but devoted himself altogether to the simple exposition of the 
central ideas of the Christian faith itself." Aulen is somewhat one-sided in arguing for 
a non-speculative, non-philosophical line, and therefore a less typically Greek line of 
Irenaeus' theology. According to Schubert, Irenaeus warned against the Greek 
curiosity to pierce through hidden mysteries, but he himself, without knowing it, was 
true to his Greek nature, putting forward speculative statements (100). It seems that 
in Irenaeus the Gospel and his Greek context lie side by side, the former constantly 
penetrating the latter. The Gospel explodes the framework of recipient 
presuppositions from inside out. The same can be observed even in Origen, as when 
this great Alexandrian, whose theological axiom includes God's impassibility, wrote: 
"The Father Himself and God of all is long-suffering, merciful and pitiful. Has he not 
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temporal with its own limited validity. A "successful" theology is necessarily 
historically limited,' for human responses to the Gospel change, but the Gospel alone 
is ever-actual and ever-dynamic. 
The first Japanese converts of Protestant Christianity," mainly recruited 
then in a sense passions? The Father Himself is not impassible. He has the passion 
of love" (quoted in: William Fairweather, Origen and Greek Patristic Theology [New 
York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1901], 144). 
bsik once-powerful theology often possesses influences over centuries: e.g., 
the theologies of Augustine, Aquinas, Luther, and Calvin. However, a theology in 
the past never replaces contemporary theologizing. The so-called repristination of 
theological traditions involves the risk of making theology abstract. A fresh 
theologizing is therefore always required for the Church to go on in history with the 
ministerium verbi. A theology with lasting significance is a theology that allows and 
challenges contemporary theologizing in the light of what it once pointed to, namely 
the Gospel of the living Lord. 
"Early in the middle of the 16th century, prior to Japan's encounter with 
Protestantism, the Jesuit missionary pioneer, Francis Xavier, with his daring . 
missionary ambition, initiated the so-called "Christian Century" in Japan (1549-1650). 
Successful and apparently prospectfut in the beginning, but desperate and virtually 
exterminated in the end, the nascent church was the setting for a deeply moving and 
highly tense drama, filled with both the uplifting heroism of martyrdom and the 
saddening weakness of apostasy. Ruthless persecution, with refined methods of 
torture, was conducted by the Shogunate which conceded no toleration of whatever 
was potentially dangerous to the realm's stability. Memorable endurance was shown 
by the believers--the missionaries and the Japanese, the learned and the unlearned. It 
would be the deepest interest, in view of the appropriation of the Gospel by the first 
Christians' (the so-called Kirishitans'), to study how those who offered their lives for 
the faith and those who apostatized understood the tidings of Christ brought by the 
Catholic missionaries. We must be content here, though, with the following 
references: C. R. Boxer, The Christian Century in Japan 1549-1650)' (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1951); Hubert Cieslik, "S1. Sebastian Kimura (1565-
1622): Der erste japanischer Priester," Neue Zeitschnfifftir Missionswissenshaft 
(1959): 15, 81-98; George Elison, Deus Destroyed: the Image of Christianity in 
Early Japan (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1973) [which to a large 
extent deals with a well-known Japanese apostate, Fabian Fucan (1565?-1621), who in 
his Christian years wrote an apologia of the faith but later refuted the apologia "word 
by word" in his Deus Destroyed, the English translation of which is included in 
Elson's book]. In this study, however, we admittedly cannot trace the development of 
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from the disfavored group of the ruling samurai class, found their longing and need 
fulfilled in the Gospel. High ethical standards, new ideals of the nation, a concept of 
universal human solidarity, equal value of every human individual were the marks of 
the Gospel they found valuable for their new existence. Above all, they met in the 
Gospel the one God who is the Father and the Lord of heaven and earth; they found a 
new Lord to live and die for. Protestant Christianity appealed to them as the belief 
which should be their new "guiding principle" and bring their traditional values to 
higher fulfillment. By this belief, they were convinced, they could chart their own life 
and serve the building up of their feudal nation into a modern state.' 
These "points of contact" may be peripheral aspects of the Gospel when seen 
from an evangelical faith. One could ask to what extent their Christian faith was 
the Roman Catholic Church in modern Japan. There have been many forms of 
cooperation between the Protestant churches and the Roman Catholic Church. 
Catholic writers often contribute to Protestant publications. A significant testimony to 
this ecumenical cooperation is the completion of the Common Translation of the Bible 
in 1988 which has been achieved as the joint project of the Protestant churches and the 
Catholic Church, after the assiduous work of eighteen years. 
'Yasushi Kuyama, ed., Modern Japan and Christianity: the Meiji Era 
(Tokyo: Sobunsha, 1968), 54-56. A bibliographical note is due here: This work 
(together with the succeeding volume on the Tasho-Showa Era and the Contemporary 
Era [Gendai]) is the result of symposia, held under the auspices of the editor, 
Kuyama, where both Christian scholars and non-Christian scholars with a sympathetic 
understanding of Christianity exchanged their views on various aspects of interaction 
between modern Japan and Christianity. Kazoh Kitamori himself was a participant in 
the symposia. The works are in many ways informative in terms of description, 
analysis, and interpretation. When a participant's specific view is cited, his or her 
name is given. When citing a general view, we give only the page(s) concerned. 
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evangelical and orthodox.19 Historically, however, the question would be irrelevant, 
for with their little experience in the Gospel and their ethically "optimistic" Confucian 
background, the first Christians "were not able to have any deeper understanding of 
the Gospel of sin and grace.' A deeper appropriation of the Gospel by them and 
later generations was a gradual, historical process. Masahisa Uemura (1857-1925), an 
able, deeply-spirilual church leader in the history of Japanese Protestantism, was 
aware of the need for time in order for the Christians to grow to the depth and 
maturity of faith. Instead of jumping into sophisticated theological speculations at 
once, he argued for a "natural order" to be followed in the process of spiritual and 
theological maturity.21 
'Ibid., 85ff. In the discussion on the conversion of the first Christians, it is 
Kitamori who tries to understand, in the light of "Orthodoxy," what was the main 
motive for embracing the new faith: "So the first missionaries [from the United 
States] brought an orthodox faith with them but the question is whether their 
conversion was made in an orthodox way or in a quite different way. . . ." 
"The faith of the first converts had "God the Lord" as its center, and was not 
yet "Christological." One convert of a samurai son, Kaiseki Matuniura, found an 
identity between the God of Christian faith and the Jo-Tei [ ±* ] of 
Confucianism: "Is not the so-called God in the teaching of Jesus the so-called Ten- 
Tei, Jo-Tei, Ko-Ten [r, it ]? If so, we must have been believing in 
this God from our childhood" (quoted in Kuyama, ibid., 66). "They [the first 
converts] might think that they understood God well. Their feeling was that, though 
they had difficulty in understanding the divinity of Christ, God is understandable in 
the essential. . ." (Seigo Yamaya in Kuyama, ibid., 70). 
21"Thus, it is not a strange thing that there is yet nothing noteworthy in 
matters of doctrine and theology in Christianity in Japan," and without the real and 
deep experience of a Paul, a Luther, a Bunyan, or an Augustine, says Uemura, "how 
can one personally regard the doctrine of redemption as all-important and elucidate its 
real meaning?" If one has not had the deep experience in his own spirit and still tries 
to cry it out, he is like a man "groaning without being really ill [ NIP** ]" 
(quoted in Yoshitaka Kumano, A History of Theological Thoughts in Japanese 
Christianity [Tokyo: Shinkyo Shuppansha, 1968], 4-5). 
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The kairos of Kitamori's theology of the Pain of God came in the early 
1930s.n  As will be seen in more detail in what follows, the nation was then going 
through a highly fluid process of modernization. During the process, individuals' 
uncertainty was steadily being exacerbated. A conflict between traditional and modern 
values tormented the individual's soul. Caught between personal aspirations for 
freedom and government pressures toward national uniformity, the individual found 
himself in an agonizing situation. This tended to deepen philosophical and religious 
thought in Japan. The nascent Protestant theology was called on to make intensive 
efforts to articulate the Gospel as a relevant and meaningful message to the situation. 
It did this first by voraciously digesting incoming theologies from the West both 
"classic" and "liberal." Protestant theology in Japan then rapidly reached 
sophistication within half a century from its start. These factors were, in a 
preliminary sketch, the stage setting of the emergence of the theology of the "Pain of 
God." 
Kitamori's theology began with the discovery of a suffering God as the 
Gospel itself. In a mystical vision, engendered by the tangible image of the crucified 
Christ, Kitamori envisaged that God was suffering pain for man. Through this vision 
of a God in pain, Kitamori appropriated the Gospel. He was then firmly convinced 
that the Gospel is the fact itself that God is suffering pain for man. Further, Kitamori 
'Since a more extensive description of the circumstance under which 
Kitamori's theology emerged will be given in the following chapter, footnotes for the 
substantiation are omitted in the introductory presentation concerning the general 
circumstance and Kitamori's place in it. Exceptions are made where it is pertinent to 
the Introduction. 
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held that this vision of a suffering God is an experience of the God of the Bible 
through a specifically Japanese sensitivity, kankaku his own term for a spiritual 
sensitivity for the tragic undertones of human reality. Later he came to assert this 
sensitivity as most congenial with the Biblical image of God in pain, and considered it 
as the ultimate key to the understanding of "the holy of holies" of God's essence as 
love. Explicating the Gospel as the truth of a God suffering for man, Kitamori's 
theology made its name as perhaps the most successful theology in modern Japan in its 
attempt to formulate the Gospel in the spiritual and cultural terms indigenous to the 
Japanese. The Theology of the Pain of God, published in 1946, became the "classic" 
work of Kitamori that has been printed six times since World War IL' Winning also 
a wide non-Christian readership, Kitamori's theology has been generally considered as 
a unique Japanization of the Gospel.' 
It is Carl Michalson who, in the early 1960s, characterized Kitamori's 
theology as "the most self-consciously Japanese of the current theological tendencies in 
Japan."' This theology proved its ecumenical relevance early as well as its ability to 
draw attention to itself from the Euro-American theological community. Prior to 
"The second edition was published in 1947. Succeeding editions were 
published in the years 1951, 1954, 1958, 1972 and 1986. 
'The last two editions mentioned in the above note were from one of the 
leading "secular" publishing companies in Japan, that is, Kodansha. The last edition 
is in a "bunko" (pocket book) form, of which Dr. Kitamori told me in a personal 
meeting (June 30, 1987): "Being included in a bunko-series, the Theology of the Pain 
of God has become a classic of Japan." 
"Carl Michalson, Japanese Contributions to Christian Theology (Philadelphia: 
The Westminster Press, 1961), 73. 
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Michalson, Emil Brunner had commented that Kitamori's theology was "opening a 
new line."' The English translation of The Theology of the Pain of God was made 
in 1965," and the German version became available in 1972. According to one 
estimate, this theology obtained its second kairos in Germany and in Europe, three 
decades after its initial publication, in connection with "gengenwirtigen Diskussion 
einer Theologie des gekreurtigten Gottes (E. Jingel, J. Moltmann, K. Rahner, H. 
Milhlen among others)." Kitamori's idea of the Pain of God is considered by. J. 
Moltmann to be an anticipation of the latter's idea of "der gekreutigte Gott," and to be 
developed further as the only legitimate theological conception of God.' As a 
'Kitamori noted this comment of Brunner in the preface to the third edition 
of The Theology of The Pain of God. 
"The name of the translator is not given in the English version. According to 
I. J. Hesselink, it is "a Canadian veteran missionary, Dr. Howard Norman. An 
account of the unfortunate background for the absence of the translator's name in the 
book is given by Hesselink in "Windows of Japanese Christian Thought Opened for 
the West," Theological Studies in Japan 5 (1966): 96-103. 
Rudolf Weth, "fiber den Schmerz Gottes: Zur Theologie des Schmerzes 
Gottes von Kazoh Kitamori" Evangelische Theololgie, 34 (1974): 431-436. He writes 
among other things: "K. Kitamoris Buch, wihrend des Zweiten Weltkriegs 
geschrieben und 1946 abgeschlossen, hatte seinen japanischen Kairos in einer auB 
erordentlichen 'Zeit des Schmerzes'. Manches spricht dafiir, daB nun seinen deutchen 
Kairos haben 
"J. Moltmann, Der gekreutigte Gott (Munich: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1987), 
49. Moltmann also finds in Bonhoeffer's thought a German parallel of the idea of a 
God who saves man through His own suffering in weakness and powerlessness: "Gott 
sich aus der Welt heraus driingen ans Kreuz, Gott is ohnmiichtig und schwah in 
• der Welt und gerade und nur so ist er bei uns und hilft uns. Es ist nach Matt. 8,17 
ganz deutlich daB Christus nicht hilft kraft seiner Allmacht, sondem kraft seiner 
Schwachheit, seines Leidens! . . . nur der leidende Gott kann helfen. . ." 
(Bonhoeffer, Widerstand und Ergebung [Munich: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1951], 242, 
244; quoted in Moltmann, ibid). 
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theology that was particular, due to the Japanese spirituality, Kitamori's theological 
conception has also proven to possess an ecumenical actuality. 
Though originating in the Japanese spiritual soil, the theology of the Pain of 
God is not a theology in church-historical isolation. Kitamori absorbed much from the 
traditions of the Church in his attempt to elucidate the idea of the Pain of God. Even 
his initial experience of the Pain of God was not one "out of the blue"; in particular, 
Luther's experience of sin and of God in His wrath and love toward a sinner has been 
instrumental for Kitamori's experience of the Gospel.' But at the same time the 
pristine vigor in Kitamori's initial writings strongly suggests that the basis of his 
theology has been an "original" experience of God who suffers pain." Tradition and 
'Besides Luther's influence (which will be substantiated adequately later) a 
note on other influences is in order here. We are informed by Kitamori's essay "My 
Encounter with the Bible" (in An Introduction to the Bible [Tokyo: Kawade Shobo, 
1954], 171) that, prior to his experience of the Gospel, Kitamori read the books of 
Kanzo Uchimura (1861-1930), who particularly struggled with the problem of his 
sinfulness. Kitamori's ambivalent relationship to Uchimura's thought suggests the 
former's extensive reading of the latter (see The Theology of the Pain of God 
[Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1965], 91-92.) At the same time, Kitamori 
seems to have been well acquainted with Blaise Pascal, in addition to "[Raphael] 
Koeber, [Henri F.] Amiel, [Carl] Hilty" (in the essay mentioned above, ibid.) to 
whose thought Kitamori refers when he substantiates the centrality of pain in the 
Christian faith (cf. The Theology of the Pain of God, 64, 79, 80). Other writers must 
have been in his mind as well, e.g., Siiren Kierkegaard, Fyodor Dostoyevsky, Leo N. 
Tolstoy, according to his references to them in his above-mentioned magnum opus and 
Literature and God (Tokyo: Nihon no Barasha, 1983). 
"An example from Kitamori's first work, The Lord of the Crosi (Tokyo: 
Shinseido, 1940), will suffice here: "[On the publication of this book without the 
extensive footnotes I have provided] I feel an uncertainty, but I decided to put all my 
trust not in my presentational competence of the issue but in the power of the issue 
itself. . . I am not confident in my competence, but I am fully convinced 
[ 11.6 g* ] of the issue I am now seeing" (2). Yasushi Kuyama, 
a close friend of Kitamori, once said: "In The Theology of the Pain of God one finds 
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originality co-exist in Kitamori's thought. Here a dynamic interaction takes place 
between an indigenous spirituality and church-historical traditions in a person, and 
leads him to a primal experience of the Gospel. 
Special mention is to be made of Luther's thought in Kitamori's theology." 
Kitamori has constantly endeavored to penetrate deeper into the mystery of the Pain of 
God and to formulate his understanding of it into a theological system. In so doing, 
he uses theological as well as non-theological sources extensively. But it is said that 
Luther's thought has been the basic source of Kitamori's concept of the Pain of God. 
Our preliminary observation, then, is that Luther's thought is appropriated by 
Kitamori through his experience of the Pain of God, while the Pain of God is 
formulated into a theology with the categories of Luther's basic understanding of the 
dialectic between God's wrath and His love. What result this interaction produced 
remains to be seen. For Kitamori, the Lutheran understanding of the Gospel and the 
Pain of God as the Gospel coincide in the essential. Kitamori means that the theology 
of the Pain of God is the Gospel actualized by the Japanese sensitivity through the 
a [burning] passion filled, as often is the case with a virgin work. A clear logic 
peculiar to Mr. Kitamori penetrates the very heart of the Gospel, which is such a 
feature as to evoke even an emotional excitement in the reader. His work is not a 
kind of cool and detached introduction of foreign theologies, but a work filled with the 
hot blood that runs in the whole body of Kitamori. And a commanding authority is 
prevailing throughout the work. . ." (A Companion of the Faith [Tokyo: Sobunsha, 
1953], 100). 
n"I may say that I have spoken of [the Gospel in] The Lord of the Cross in a 
Lutheran way [ /le 9 — ]" (The Lord of the Cross, 75). 
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mediation of Lutheran theology.' 
Kitamori's theology has been concerned with the doctrinal traditions and 
heritage of the Church.' This fact is important, indicating that, as a consciously 
original theology, Kitamori's conception of the Pain of God earnestly aspires to be a 
theology of the Church in Japan. In other words, it is not attempted as a free-lance 
theological "experiment" outside the Church, but it tries to be a responsible theology 
both for the universal Church and for the particular Church existing in Japan. 
The Sitz im Leben of Kitamori's theology is another significant factor. It has 
"In an essay attached to The Lord of the Cross, "The Gospel and Japan," 
Kitamori writes: "In the above I spoke of the two things I love, Lutheranisni and 
Japan. As to the first, it is concerned with 'the love based upon the Pain of God as 
the theological axiom,' while the second [Japan] as the theological actuality. Truth 
lies in 'the love based upon the Pain of God' as the identity of 'axiom and actuality' 
with each other" (94). Kitamori here speaks of a dialectic of the "theological axiom" 
and the "theological actuality." With the former, in this connection he means the 
Lutheran sola fide, while with the latter, he means, the "Pain of God" as an 
understanding of the Gospel which is to cover the whole human reality. We shall deal 
with this dialectic further in due course, but here it suffices to call attention to this 
dialectical synthesis between Lutheranism and the Pain of God. 
"There is a dilemma between the identity of the Gospel and the bringing forth 
of its actuality and relevance in a given historical-cultural context. Trying to 
actualize the Gospel in a concrete situation, one may easily reinterpret (umdeuten) it 
and lose the identity of the Gospel. Trying to preserve the identity of the Gospel, one 
may easily become victim of traditionalism. It is Kitamori's intention, at least, to 
have both. How he does this will be discussed later. A contemporary New Testament 
scholar, Seiichi Yagi, is an opposite example to Kitamori. According to Heinz 
Guenther, "Kitamori and Yagi appropriate Christianity for Japan, just as Sho toku 
Taishi and Fujita T618 had adapted Buddhism and Confucianism for Japan"; Guenther 
means that in both Kitamori and Yagi Japanese religiosity plays a dominant role 
("Overtones of Japanese Religion in Japanese Theology: Kazoh Kitamori and Seiichi 
Yagi," Studies in Religion 6 [19761: 17-31). Still there is a distinctive difference in 
their respective understandings of the Bible and the ecclesiastical traditions. On this, 
see John 0. Barksdale, "Seiichi Yagi's Typology of New Testament Thought," The 
Northeast Asia Journal of Theology 17 (1976): 49-50. 
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been a Lutheran theology in the midst of the strongly Reformed-Barthian theological 
milieu.' Kitamori intended to "balance" the two great streams of the Reformation for 
the formation of a solid evangelical Church in Japan. His holy ambition was to 
"Lutheranize" the theological substance of Japanese Protestantism. 
But what have been the actual responses to Kitamori's endeavor? His 
theology has not been favorably recognized by the theological community in Japan. It 
has been ignored by a majority of "academic" theologians in Japan.' However, in 
terms of its theological impact, "fair" and objective criticisms were due to Kitamori by 
the theological community. But an academic willingness to take his theology seriously 
has been largely denied. Instead, even to the present day, his opponents react with 
tacit contempt' or cynically ignore' his theology. 
Why is this? Has he been overly confident and assertive in his theology, 
'See below, Chapter 2, 45 and 65. 
'We read, e.g., "The theology of pain, although hailed by Western 
Christianity as the 'most self-conscious Japanese theology of the post-war era,' 
exercised practically no influence on Japanese scholarship itself" (Guenther, 20). 
'That theology [of the Pain of God] with an empty logic turning around 
itself, which under routine circumstances has been even despised 
[ t, tx1,10NI .5t ]. . .": a denouncing word from a leader of the 
student protest of Tokyo Union Theological Seminary, Hajime Hibun'ya (Gospel and 
World [January 1970]: 4). 
"A Luther scholar, Isao Kuramatsu, who is one of a few supporters of 
Kitamori, writes that until well-nigh 1970 "this theology has been either negatively 
evaluated or cynically ignored by [Japanese] theology and theologians" (Introduction 
to the pocket book edition of The Theology of the Pain of God [Tokyo: Kodansha, 
1986], 301). 
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thus giving a quixotic impression of himself?" Has this "overconfident" tone of his 
argumentation sounded arrogant to some and thus offended them?* Has his way of 
developing theological logic been judged as pedantic and even sophistic?" To some, 
an enthusiastic international hailing of this theology as a genuinely Japanese 
formulation of the Gospel seems to have been based upon ignorance and therefore 
unwarranted.' His theological work may not have followed ordinary academic rules 
'Although his theological work is filled with vividness and a very personal 
character, making itself a unique work, it may be offensive to some. One has an 
impression that the author has received a completely new revelation about God and 
His nature. . . . At some places it appears that he is so passionate as to initiate a 
crusade" (Hesselink, 97-98). 
""Only the Japanese religious mind, Kitamori maintains, can penetrate what 
the Christian Bible truly signifies by love rooted in and authenticated by pain. . . . In 
Kitamori's system of Christian theology, the Japanese way of appropriating religious 
truth thus has received a distinct place in the hermeneutics of religion. . . . After all, 
is Japanese religion [in Kitamori's thought] a sublime form of religious arrogance?" 
(Guenther, 24). 
'According to Katsumi Takizawa, a university professor with philosophical 
training in the Kyoto School of Philosophy (as is the case with Kitamori) and 
theological studies under Karl Barth, Kitamori's eye is not really opened yet for the 
living truth called Jesus Christus. Kitamori's theology is only a theology conceived by 
a deficient Western scheme of thought and filled with "his casual and self-complacent 
fancies [ A, 1z , Eigkftgtx,Egt,)--) ]" (A Problematization of "Religion 
[Tokyo: San'ich Shobo, 1976], 123-126). Prof. Masami Ishii of Japan Lutheran 
Seminary writes: "His [Kitamori's] view seems quite sound, but his supremacy of 
logic may be questioned" ("Systematic Theology in Japan," Wi Jo Kang and Masaru 
Mori eds., Christian Presence in Japan [Tokyo: Seibunsha, 1981], 150). 
'See Takizawa, 123. Keiji Ogawa, who wrote an introduction to Kitamori's 
theology in German, Die Aufgabe der neueren evangelischem Theologie in Japan 
(Basel: Friedlich Reinhardt, 1965), criticizes elsewhere an attitude of exotic curiosity 
in theology in Europe and America. From such an attitude "no productive theological 
dialogue would originate" between the East and the West ("On a Formation of 
Japanese 'Indigenous Theology' — in the Case of the Theology of the Pain of God 
Gospel and World 38 [Tokyo, March 1983]: 79). 
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and discipline so that even if one tries to work with his theology, it is not easy to keep 
pace with Kitamori's thought.' Perhaps his declared Lutheranism may have been the 
main reason for his theological isolation." Is it because of his attempt to 
"Lutheranize" the mainstream of Japanese Protestantism that he remained a "loner" in 
that Sitz im Leben throughout his career as a professor and church-leader? 
The overall negative appraisal of Kitamori must be considered as a critical 
reaction to various aspects of his own theology. Perhaps not one or two aspects of his 
theology alone are responsible for this. The reason for the negative responses is 
surely of a composite nature. However, it is not the main concern of this study to 
find answers individually to the questions raised above. The intention of this study is 
to analyze and assess Kitamori's theology as a whole. But to try to find the answers 
to the questions is useful for the purpose here: they provide methodological clues. 
An approach to the appraisal of Kitamori's theology can be taken from 
various points of view, but the one congenial with Kitamori's theology would be that 
of Lutheranism. He has never doubted that his basic orientation in theology is given 
""Some of us who tried to read through this book [The Theology of the Pain 
of God] have been often tempted to stop on the way, because there seemed to have 
been no development [of thought] in the book. . . . This book gives occasionally an 
impression of a believer's diary rather than of an academic work of theology" 
(Hesselink, 98). 
"Simon Bayens, showing a sympathetic understanding of "the cross" in the 
Japanese soul, critically remarks that Kitamori's theology as a "pure theology" is not 
sufficiently related to the actual situation, and comments: "One cannot escape the 
impression that Luther and Lutheran tradition means more to the author than Japan 
and its understanding of the Gospel" ("The Japanese and the Cross," Japan Christian 
Quarterly 46 [Summer 1980]: 148). 
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by Lutheranism. Kitamori is entitled to be understood on the basis of his confessed 
premises before any criticism. The following questions have the priority. To what 
degree can Kitamori's theology be considered a Lutheran theology? In what does he 
stand in the Lutheran tradition, and in what does he not? In other words, to what 
degree and in. what sense is the theology of the Pain of God a Lutheran theology? 
Now we state the objective of this study. In this study we investigate: in 
what sense and to what extent the theology of the Pain of God, as a Lutheran 
theology, has been an actualization of the Gospel in Japan; what course it took in the 
theological milieu of Japanese Protestantism during the last decades; and what 
contributions it actually made to the development of Japanese Protestantism and its 
theology. 
Before we proceed with out investigation, a set of methodological notes is 
appropriate here. It consists of notes on the sequence of our investigation, doctrinal 
points of evaluation, the criteria of evaluation, and technicalities. 
After this introductory chapter, we shall explore the historical context of 
Kitamori's theology. We shall elaborate on what we have touched upon in this 
introduction: we shall give a brief presentation of the line of development of 
Protestant theology in Japan, and along with it, historical data about modern Japan, 
from the middle of the nineteenth century on. This sketch is intended historically to 
"contextualize," in a more focused way, the presentation that will follow it. 
Our next step will be a study of the man Kitamori, his Lebenslauf and his 
theological development: his formative years, his most productive theological years, 
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and his years as professor of theology and as church leader in the post-War history of 
Japanese Protestantism (within the so-called Kyodan'). Following this, we shall 
proceed to an assessment of Kitamori's theology proper. First we give a descriptive 
presentation of the basic feature of Kitamori's notion of the Pain of God. Then we 
shall attempt to understand, while interpreting, what Kitamori primarily means by the 
notion of the Pain of God, and analyze what theological structure the notion of the 
Pain of God has in Kitamori's thought. We shall do this under the two main themes: 
"God in Pain" and "Man in the Pain of God." 
Once we develop a cohesive picture of the Pain of God in Kitamori's 
theology, we shall go into the question of his theological methodology. This 
methodological question is placed after the question of the theological content of the 
Pain of God. According to Kitamori, it is the Pain of God that provides a 
methodology of theological endeavor.' We investigate his theological epistemology, 
his principle of building a system and his understanding of the nature of theology, and 
his conviction of the mandates placed upon theology. 
Next, we place our assessment. We see his theology first in its Sitz im 
Leben in order to recognize the extent of the contribution Kitamori has made to 
'Kyodan is short for Nihon Kirisuto Kyodan, that is, the United Church of 
Christ in Japan. For more about this church body, see 69-70, Chap. 2 and 145-149, 
Chap. 3. 
'It is Kitamori's firm position that the content of the Gospel sheds light on 
the form of theology (methodology). He says: "This content [the Gospel] should 
determine the formal issues of theology which should serve the Word of God" 
(Introduction, 17). 
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Japanese Protestant theology. We shall learn first what evaluation Kitamori has of 
Calvin's, and more particularly, Barth's theology. Then we investigate what have 
been the causes of the negative appraisal of Kitamori's theology in his own country, 
and how Kitamori responded to them. It is our intention to compare the specific 
features of Kitamori's theology and Barth's theology. 
After having gained a total understanding of Kitamori's theology of the Pain 
of God through the steps described above, we shall assess it against the background of 
Lutheran traditions. 
Finally, we sum up the results of our investigations. On the basis of the 
summary, we shall give our assessment of Kitamori's theology in the context of 
Japanese Protestantism and try to give our reflections on future prospects of his 
theology in that context. 
The pivotal point of this study is the assessment of Kitamori's theology in 
the light of Lutheran traditions. This involves two issues. The first is on what 
doctrinal points we shall assess Kitamori's theology, and the second is what is meant 
by "Lutheran traditions." With regard to the first issue, we shall identify what 
concept Kitamori, in his notion of the Pain of God, has: 1) of God (God the creator, 
Deus absconditus et revelatus, the problem of evil); 2) of man (his status integritatis, 
the nature of sin, his status corruptionis); and 3) of salvation (the meaning of Christ's 
death, the understanding of Law and Gospel, the believer's condition of simul justus a 
peccator, the significance of the Holy Spirit in Christian existence, the nature of the 
eschatological hope). .r 
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As regards the second issue: by "Lutheran traditions" we understand the 
interpretation of the Gospel found in Luther's writings and the Lutheran Confessions, 
the interpretation of the Gospel which has been confirmed and reconfirmed by later 
and contemporary Lutheran theologians. 
A word is to be added in connection with this procedure. When we 
undertake an assessment of Kitamori's theology measured by the yardstick of Lutheran 
traditions, we follow the instruction given concerning the distinction between norma 
nonnans and norma normata. Lutheran traditions are norma nolmata. Norma 
nonnans is "God in Christ" witnessed in Scripture and made alive to us through 
Spiritus Creator. When we shall assess Kitamori's doctrinal position by Lutheran 
traditions, we are going to do this with the conviction that Lutheran doctrinal 
traditions as nonna nonnata stand under the authority of norma nomans. This means 
we assess Kitamori's theology ultimately in the light of norma nonnans. 
Remarks on sources are in order. Concerning the sources in Japanese (both 
primary and secondary), their titles will be translated and given in English, as we have 
already done above. The original titles in Japanese characters are found in the 
Bibliography, where they are given along with the translated English titles. The titles 
of the secondary sources in European languages will be given in their original. 
It is appropriate here to make a brief comment on the theological works of 
Kitamori to which we shall refer from time to time. His opus magnum is Theology of 
the Pain of God (1946), a work great not in terms of its page volume but in its 
significance. Other important works for our study are those preparatory works to the 
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opus magnum, namely, The Lord of the Cross (1940) and Theology and Creeds 
(1943). Though these works are also relatively modest in page volume, they already 
represent Kitamori's thought as a full-fledged theological system." There has been 
no significant development since the completion of the opus magnum.' These works 
thus constitute the main sources for grasping Kitamori's theology. The works of 
importance which were published after opus magnum are Character of the Gospel 
(1948), Theology Today (1950), On God (1953), The Logic of Salvation (1953), An 
Introduction to Theology (1959), and The Theology of Reformation (1960). A special 
mention is to be made of Kitamori's Theological Autobiography in two volumes, 
volume I (1960) and volume II (1968), covering the period from his childhood 
reminiscences to the completion of The Lord of the Cross. These works are based on 
Kitamori's "theological diary-notes" which the author edits with his own retrospective 
comments. These two volumes of his autobiography are the most direct and important 
'These works are modest in page volume: The Lord of the Cross, without 
the appendix of a few related essays, counts 71 pages of a smaller-than-normal 
booksize; Theology and Creeds, without an exegetical appendix (which was also 
included in Theology of the Pain of God), 84 pages; The Pain of God, 259 pages (the 
English version, 183 pages). This external feature would already suggest an aspect of 
the character of Kitamori's theology: it is more of intuitive nature than of an 
objective-theological (wissenschaftlich) nature. His later works mainly consist of 
shorter writings—lecture notes, theological essays, occasional commentaries, and 
reflections on various political, cultural, religious issues—which are combined into 
several volumes. An exception is The Theology of Reformation, which was presented 
in 1960 to Kyoto University as a Ph.D. dissertation. 
'"His subsequent publications [the works after his opus magnum]," writes 
Yoshio Noro, "are the adaptations to the contemporary theological problems of the 
principles which are expressed in it" ("Impassibilitas Dei" [Th.D. dissertation, Union 
Theological Seminary, 1955], 31). 
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sources to learn how Kitamori's inner life and theological thought had developed 
during his formative years. Through these autobiographical works we can learn, 
"from the inside" as it were, the steps of the formation of the theology of the Pain of 
God in its essential core. 
For our further references, the titles of the works above will be abbreviated. 
First, a remark is due with respect to the Theology of the Pain of God. The Japanese 
version we use is the Fifth Revised Edition, 1958, published by Shinkyo Shuppansha, 
Tokyo. The reason for this is that both the English version and the German version 
have been prepared on the basis of this edition. Quotations in this study will be from 
the English version, unless noted otherwise, for the sake of the reader's accessibility 
to the work. Reference in such cases will be abbreviated as Pain. When a quotation 
from the Japanese original is preferred, we shall use another abbreviation, Itami (the 
Japanese term for "pain"), in order to indicate this preference. In these cases, the 
page numbers given refer to the Japanese version. However, in order to make it 
possible to locate the reference in the English version, the corresponding page number 
of the English version will be provided in brackets: Itami, 26 [Pain, 24]. When 
quotations or references are made from the German version, Schmerz shall be used. 
Thus the abbreviations to be used, including the other works, are as follows: 
Theology of the Pain of God Pain 
Kami no Itami no Shingaku Itami 
Theologie des Schmerzes Gottes Schmerz 
The Lord of the Cross Cross 
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Theology and Creeds Creeds 
Character of the Gospel Character 
Theology Today Today 
On God God 
The Logic of Salvation Logic 
An Introduction to Theology Introduction 
The Theology of Reformation Reformation 
Theological Autobiography I Auto I 
Theological Autobiography II Auto II 
In providing quotations from the sources (both primary and secondary) in 
Japanese, I shall translate them into English. However, when more adequate 
translations are available, they will be borrowed from there. Such cases will be noted. 
Translations are made in such a way as to convey the original meaning and intention, 
thus becoming semantic translations. Where it is pertinent to insert original texts to 
provide a better understanding for those who know Japanese, they are given in square 
brackets. If crucial terms in the original language are considered necessary for 
inclusion, they are given, transliterated in square brackets, along with the Japanese 
characters. As to emphasis given in texts, we note the following. Since Kitamori 
'It is often difficult to translate adequately even among cognate languages. 
Japanese is different from English or any other European languages with regard to the 
thinking scheme which determines the sentence construction. When one translates 
from Japanese to English, he has to make explicit what are often implicit in the 
Japanese text. In that case, there emerges considerable room for interpretation. With 
"semantic translation," however, I try to reproduce the original meaning and intention 
as objectively as possible. 
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uses emphasis quite frequently,' it is proper to make it the rule that emphases, in 
quotations, whether from the primary texts or from the secondary, are original and 
made by the authors themselves. When I place emphasis, it will be noted with 
"emphasis added" or a similar phrase. 
Japanese names are written in the Western order, the given name first and the 
surname last, which is a reversal of the original Japanese order. Scriptural quotations 
are made from the New King James Version unless noted otherwise. 
'Once Kitamori wrote that his theology is the "side-dots" (boten, the 
Japanese equivalent of underlining) to the theology of the cross. In fact, his writings, 
especially earlier ones, are filled with side-dots for the purpose of conveying passion 
and shades of meaning. 
CHAPTER 2 
THE PROTESTANT CHURCH IN MODERN JAPAN 
The Meiji Era 
The beginning of Protestant missionary work in Japan was closely related to 
the nineteenth century international situation. The European powers such as Spain, 
Holland, Britain, and France, pursued their own interests in the East; India, South-
East Asian countries and China were under European imperialism. Japan, though 
having enjoyed a Pas Tokugawa' for more than two and a half centuries by total self-
seclusion,' was no longer allowed a comfortable dream of peace. 
It was the American squadron under Commodore Matthew C. Perry, 
'The period was so called because from the beginning of the seventeenth 
century to the middle of.the nineteenth century there was virtually no major war in 
Japan which could have caused serious political destabilization. Under the skillful and 
firm control of the Tokugawa shogunate the country enjoyed "peace." 
'This total seclusion was directly occasioned by the Tokugawa shogunate's 
fear of strong Christian influence, which seemed to have dangerous destabilizing 
effects upon peasantry. Such were experienced in the Shimabara Rebellion, 1638, 
during which 37,000 Christian peasants could withstand the assembled army of the 
shogunate power for three months. Though the government was interested in trade 
with • Spaniards and Portuguese, they preferred the country's security and stability to 
commercial profits. The government then issued a total seclusion act, the so-called 
Sakoku-rei in 1636, according to which henceforth no Japanese was allowed to go 
abroad nor any Japanese abroad was permitted to return to Japan. For more detail 




anchoring off Uraga Bay in Edo (Tokyo) in 1853, that forced Japan "at the gunpoint"' 
to open her ports to foreign vessels. This event also signaled the long-awaited 
beginning of Protestant missionary work in Japan.° Prior to this event, however, 
Japan had already been one of the lands for Protestant missionary interest in the 
nineteenth century, and preparation for the work was underway.' 
The opening of the country was followed by a political revolution, the so-
called Meiji Restoration of 1868, by which the Tokugawa shogunate was abolished by 
the pro-emperor forces, and Emperor Mutsuhito was restored to the throne. This 
period, beginning with his restoration of power and concluding with his death in 1912, 
is called the Meiji Era. 
Suddenly unleashed into a modern world with its overwhelming civilization, 
the nation was at a loss and the traditional value-system, which formed the backbone 
of Japanese life, seemed obsolete and destined to collapse all at once.' Therefore, 
'Hugh Borton, Japan's Modern Century (New York: The Roland Press 
Company, 1955), 29-37; Richard H. Drummond, A History of Christianity in Japan 
(Grand Rapids: Wm. E. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1971), 141-143. 
'Ibid., Drummond, 145. 
"What was then [in the first half of the nineteenth century] known as the 
hermit nation of Japan became the object of 'prayers, contributions and efforts' of a 
growing number of Christians, especially in England and America" (ibid., 139). 
`Since the establishment of the Tokugawa Government in the very beginning 
of the seventeenth century, Confucianism, or specifically the Chu Hsi school, had 
been the strongest force within the Japanese value-system. It maintained the socio-
political order of the country. But in the face of the Western ideas of man and 
society, it suddenly seemed obsolete. "The emperor is man; people is also man. 
There is no difference between the emperor and people. What nonsense it is that man 
made a heaven-and-earth distance between the emperor and people, assigning the right 
only to the former! How unfortunate it must be that one was born in such a rude and 
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"Civilization and Enlightenment"' became the slogan for this new era. The new Meiji 
government desired to modernize its feudal, backward nation through the help of 
Western civilization and technology. Behind this desire, however, there was a fear 
that the nation might become merely another Western colony.' The Meiji government 
was therefore eager to absorb Western culture as much and as quickly as possible in 
order to bring Japan into the realm of advanced nations. Accordingly, the government 
policy began "enriching the nation and strengthening the military."' 
The first decade of the Meiji Era was highly fluid. The oligarchs of the 
Meiji government took drastic measures, introducing heavy industries, conscription 
despicable [ ] nation!" wrote Hiroyuki Kato, a Meiji intellectual (cited in 
Yasushi Kuyama, ed., Modern Japan and Christianity: The Meiji Era, [Tokyo: 
Sobunsha, 1968], 36). 
7 VIJIMilt . How open-minded the Meiji leaders were in the 
beginning toward Western civilization and how universally oriented in their thinking, 
we observe in the Imperial Oath proclaimed in April 1868; it aspires a parliamentary 
polity ("An assembly widely convoked" for "public discussion" of national issues), 
"the welfare of the whole nation," diligence for the building of the nation, emphasis 
on abolition of "absurd usages" and on "justice and righteousness," and that 
"knowledge shall be sought for all over the world." For the English text of this Oath, 
see Borton, 72. 
'According to E. H. Norman, there was at that time no imminent danger for 
Japan to be colonized by European powers, because China at that time largely satisfied 
the colonialistic greed of European powers. Besides, in contrast to China, Japan was 
not a lucrative object as a market for the products of European manufacturing or as a 
supplier of raw materials; in addition, it was hard to conquer by force, here referred 
from Kuyama, Meiji, 25. 
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systems, and a super-modern school system like those of France and America.' 
Protestant Christianity entered Japan in the midst of this turbulent scene. As a result, 
it was bound to play both cultural and political roles, equal to the needs of the time. 
Much of Western civilization came with Protestant Christianity." 
The first converts (mainly from disfavored samurai groups) learned about the 
new faith from American missionaries and later came to accept it.' To them the 
'Those and other modernization measures taken by the Meiji government 
were said to be "almost utopian to Japan at that time," says Masamichi Inoki, one of 
the leading historians of modern Japan (Kuyama, Meiji, 33). 
"Keiu Nakamura (1832-1891) was a representative thinker of the Meiji 
enlightenment. He saw that the reason for the advancedness of the Western nations 
was Christianity, and therefore emphasized that when one absorbed the Western 
civilization he should not forget the spirit of Christianity; see Genshichi Aizawa, 
"Nakamura Keiu and the Reformation," Luther Studies, vol. II, ed. Yoshikazu 
Tokuzen (Tokyo: Seibunsha, 1986), 249. Of Nakamura, another historian, Masaaki 
Koosaka, speaks: "He seems to have received Christianity as a 'Trager' of the 
European culture" (Kuyama, Meiji, 83). We can safely say that many of the first 
Christian converts had more or less the same understanding. 
'2A detailed presentation of the very first period of Protestant missionary 
activity until 1873 is given by G. F. Verbeck (one of the pioneer missionaries and an 
advisor of the Maiji government), "History of Protestant Mission in Japan," reprinted 
in Japan Christian Quarterly 26 (1960): 47-67. Here we only briefly mention the so-
called three Bands as the origins of Japanese Protestantism. These Bands are so 
named according to the places of their origins, Yokohama Band, Kumamoto Band and 
Sapporo Band. S. R. Brown (1810-1880) and J. H. Ballagh, (1832-1920) missionaries 
from the Reformed Church in America, were directly instrumental in the formation of 
Yokohama Band, whose most prominent representative was Masahisa Uemura. 
Kumamoto Band was formed by the inspiration of Captain L. L. Janes (1838-1909), a 
graduate of West Point, who established a Western school in Kumamoto on the 
request of the former feudal lord there; Danjo Ebina (1856-1937) and Hiromichi 
Kozald (1856-1938), were most well-known figures from this Band; Sapporo Band 
came into being under the influence of W. S. Clark (1826-1886), president of the 
Massachusetts Agricultural College, who came to Japan on the request of the Japanese 
government to establish a higher school of agriculture in the northern island of 
Hokkaido; Kanzo Uchimura (1861-1930) and Inazo Nitobe (1862-1933) were the most 
productive Christian leaders from this Band. It should be noted that Sapporo Band 
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Protestant faith was the embodiment of truth and ethics in one, which would meet 
their needs within a new life situation. Fervently patriotic as they were, they thought 
that, with the ideas and values of the faith, they had found a way of life which 
broadened and deepened the meaning of their existence while maintaining their 
patriotic ardor.' Christianity was to them a better, more civilized way of life than 
religion, religion in the sense that it touches deeply contradictory dimensions of human 
existence. 
It is significant to note that the notion of "one" God, who is a loving 
heavenly Father of all human beings and the Lord of all the universe, possessed an 
explosive power; this monotheistic notion alone had exerted a revolutionary effect 
upon their thinking and life. A simple reading of the Bible even within their 
"indigenous" spiritual and cultural background, was powerful enough to cause an inner 
revolution in them." Their budding "theological" conviction in the new faith was 
sturdy and "elementary." At that time, there was an eager and enthusiastic absorption 
and Kumamoto Band came into existence by lay Christians; W. S. Clark and L. L. 
Janes were not missionaries. 
""To many of the first believers, it is more urgent to civilize their nation than 
to love God and believe in Christ, because they thought that without Christianity Japan 
could not be civilized; this is the basic characteristic of the first believers of Meiji" 
(Kuyama, Meiji, 57). 
"To take one example: Jo Niijima (1843-1890), the founder of Doshisa 
University in Kyoto, was one of a few who came across "the name of the Creator of 
heaven and earth" during his Dutch study. Later he was greatly moved in his heart 
when he read the story of the creation of Genesis in the Chinese Bible. Learning 
elsewhere in the Bible that God was the heavenly Father, he felt that "my reverence 
[toward this Creator] was made deeper." Unable to suppress his "burning desire" to 
learn more about the Gospel, he dared to venture a foreign voyage, a gravely illegal 
attempt, to a country where the Gospel is freely propagated," ibid., 81-82. 
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of the Gospel. Yet an awareness of the tension between the new belief and the old 
stratum of their conscience was soon to come. 
An initial enthusiasm about Christianity spread widely among the leading 
intellectuals. One of them even advocated that it be adopted as a state religion with 
the emperor himself proceeding to baptism." In the highly mobile conditions at this 
initial stage, the Christian ideas of God, of man and of society appeared to be 
revolutionary and were instrumental in bringing forth a powerful movement of 
"democratization" of society from below.' 
In the meantime, the oligarchic leaders of the government came to realize, 
through numerous uprisings, that the nation had to be reorganized politically and 
ideologically. For that purpose they saw it necessary to provide the nation with a new 
spiritual backbone. The national reorganization began to take form when Hirobumi 
Ito, later to become the first prime minister, came home from Europe in 1884, where 
he had studied about the parliamentary system and constitutional law. The 
"It was the aforementioned Keiu Nakamura who wrote this in English in the 
disguise of a Westerner. He wrote: "If Your Majesty at least desires to establish 
Christianity in Nip[p]on he should first of all be baptized himself, and become the 
Chief of the Church, and be called the leader of the millions of his people" (quoted in 
Aizawa, 252). It aroused a vehement reaction, and Nakamura later withdrew this 
sentence. 
'There started a movement for democratization in 1874, only several years 
after the Restoration, called the "Liberty and People's Rights Movement." Inspiration 
to this movement may not have been from Christianity directly, and yet the ideas of 
people's rights and equality were imported from Britain and the United States, partly 
also from France (Rousseau's Contrat Social available in translation by 1877!). But it 
was very natural for this democratization movement and Christianity to go together 
from the beginning. The Christians provided this movement with the value foundation 
that "before God all are equal." See further Borton, 93-95; Kuyama, Meiji, 101. 
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government learned, through Ito, the pivotal function of Christianity in the Western 
countries and recognized the significance of religion for the building of the nation. 
The governmental leaders then looked for a candidate for an equivalent function in 
Japan. Traditional religions, Buddhism or Shintoism, were not actual candidates; to 
the leaders they did not seem to possess any capacity for disciplining the people. Nor 
was Christianity a suitable religion as the nation's new spiritual pivot, for with its 
emphasis on individuals' worth and right, and its egalitarian ideas, which were truly 
revolutionary to the people used to living in authoritarian feudalism, Christianity 
seemed more likely to engender centrifugal rather than centripetal effects, quite 
detrimental to their policy of rapid nation building. The new government thought it 
more urgent to strengthen the nation economically and militarily by rallying the 
unquestioning and undemanding populace, even at the cost of their maximal sacrifice. 
In reality, the government eventually fell back on the feudal Confucian ethics, which 
were readily available and most feasible for the national needs. The old feudal society 
was now to be reorganized into a new form with the emperor as the pinnacle and 
pivot of a pyramidal national polity." 
Monumental to this "reactionary" polity by the government was the issuance 
of the Meiji Constitution of 1889 and the Imperial Rescript on Education of 1890. 
The Constitution gave an appearance of modernity and enlightenment because its 
formal framework was a constitutional government. But its substance was kept pre- 
"On Ito's principle for drafting the constitution, see Borton, 138. Further, 
Kuyama, Meiji, 179-180. 
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modern by the measure that the emperor was made the absolute sovereign by the 
Constitution.' The substance of the Constitution was a form of absolutism. Of 
critical importance for our interest is Article XXVIII on religious freedom; religious 
freedom was granted to "Japanese subjects" "within limits not prejudicial to peace and 
order, and not antagonistic to their duty as subjects." Religious freedom was thus 
given, but at the same time its substance was virtually taken back by the crucial clause 
of "within limits. . . ." 
The Imperial Rescript of Education, another monument of the Meiji 
government, remained as the main framework of the nation's education until the end 
of World War II. The Rescript was Confucian in substance, proscribing, for example, 
that "should emergency arise, offer yourselves courageously to the State; and thus 
guard and maintain the prosperity of Our Imperial Throne coeval with heaven and 
earth."' It is easy to discern that what the government intended to do with the 
"[In drafting the constitution] I have paid special attention to the:provision 
that the rights of the emperor were emphasized and the limitations of it were held as 
little as possible," wrote Ito in his "Principle of Draft" [Klan no Taiko, Ast 'Am ]. 
The text in Japanese is as follows: 




Quoted, ibid., Kuyama, Meiji, 180. 
"See Borton, 175-177, under the section "Education to Serve the State." 
According to Kiyoko Takeda, professor at International Christian University in Tokyo, 
the purpose of the educational system of the Meiji government was to mold a national 
character which was useful to the building up of the absolutist state embodied in the 
person of the emperor. The goal of education was therefore not the fundamental 
formation of individual character in the citizen as a human being (Kuyama, Meiji, 
182). 
35 
Constitution and The Rescript was to give the nation an external appearance of 
modernity and enlightenment on the one hand but to fill that modern political 
apparatus with feudal ethical codes based on Confucianism." 
From the above it is possible to observe the government's attitude toward 
Christianity, which had been strictly banned as an evil religion before the 
Restoration.' The government was not openly hostile to it, because Japan could not 
dare to keep the Western religion under ban for fear that she might be considered an 
uncivilized nation. But Christianity was potentially dangerous to governmental policy. 
To meet these two aspects of the situation, the oligarchs legalized the faith but at once 
subordinated it to the national goal. The provisional clause of "within limits. . ." was 
apparently aimed at Christianity. The governmental policy throughout the Meiji Era 
and until the end of World War II dealt cautiously with Christianity. It was not 
outright persecution, as was the case with socialist movements, but was rather a policy 
of domestication with "carrot and stick." 
'Reproducing Ito's principle in drafting the constitution (ibid.), Barton seems 
to be mistaken when he writes that "in Japan neither Confucianism nor Shintoism had 
sufficient power to control the people" (italic is added). We read the text in Kuyama, 
Meiji, 180: r ibefv\-11MIal*Y 3A 9 . . . 514, 4.11::-- 9 I-AE=41ff= 
MA- 9 . iiiiAM11:4IJAPI:-SkZYNAAit, t-agzat-i,-Y-A 
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It is not Confucianism Ito discarded as the leverage of the people's control; discarded 
was Buddhism. In fact Confucianism was to play a crucial role, as we see below. 
21In 1873, the government withdrew the edict against Christianity from the 
public sign-boards throughout the country. The official "reason" given for the 
removal was that the issue of the edict "was already sufficiently imprinted on the 
people's minds." Formally, however, Christianity remained illegal until the 
promulgation of the Constitution. See Verbeck, 65-66. 
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The rigorous measures taken by the government for modernization were all 
motivated by its burning patriotism and national pride. The modernization was urgent 
for obtaining Western acknowledgement of the nation as a full-fledged modern state. 
This urgency had practical aspects. Without Western acknowledgement of Japan as a 
modern state, she could not hope to secure her own tariff-autonomy or to abolish 
humiliating extraterritoriality and various unequal treaties. 
The Meiji Christians did not fall short of these political leaders with respect 
to patriotism and national pride. To many of them it was a matter of course to render 
their utmost to the nation.' In their minds, during these first decades, there were no 
problems between "state and church." These two entities made an unquestioned unity. 
They grasped their life and existence in the light of salvation received by faith, but 
thus to grasp their new life was virtually identical with recognizing their existence in 
service for the nation. 
Whereas national modernization was the unanimous goal for government 
leaders and patriotic Christians, they were deeply at variance with each other with 
regard to the goal and program for carrying it out. The oligarchs primarily aimed at 
modernizing the nation in terms of the consolidation of governmental power, the 
strengthening of national economy and the building up of military force. In order to 
achieve this goal, they opted for the measure of "freezing" again the mentality of the 
2211 am a subject of the true God," wrote Niijima, "and also of Japan, my 
country. To serve the true God and Japan with utmost devotion is my urgent duty" 
(cited in Kuyama, Meiji, 56). A typical expression of this union of faith and 
patriotism can be seen also in Uchimura's epitaph on his tomb: "I for Japan, Japan 
for the World, the World for Christ, and All for God." 
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general populace at the pre-modern feudal stage." The entire mechanism of 
education and influence was mobilized to mold docile "subjects" willing to sacrifice 
themselves for the state. We should say that Japan in this formula was externally 
modern but internally pre-modern. 
Christians thought that the "New Japan" should be built upon the ideals of 
Christianity.' The message of salvation through Christ for every human being did 
not fail to entail a new view of man and his worth. The Gospel was capable of 
renewing man from the inside. They thought that the New Japan should be born from 
below, from the renovation of human beings themselves through new awareness of 
God-given dignity and their calling toward universal ideals and virtue. Naturally, this 
revolution of the view of man had already effected sociological and political 
'The Imperial Rescript on Education was a crystalization of this "freezing" 
measure. Of this, Borton observes: "It was a triumph for Emperor Meiji's Confucian 
teacher, Eifu Motoda, who was convinced that Western ethical teachings were not 
suitable for Japan. . . . In terms of modern methods of propaganda, it was a powerful 
weapon of thought control" (178). Kijoko Takeda also notes that "the type of 
mentality, qualitatively similar to that mentality from feudal times was re-mobilized 
and made the basis for the absolutist nation. . ." (Kuyama, Meiji, 186). 
'One of the representative Christian thinkers was Hiromichi Kozaki. In his A 
New Theory of State and Religion, he criticized Confucianism: "The most 
unacceptable aspect of Confucianism is its artificial imposition upon society of the 
distinctions between noble and common, superior and inferior; it despises the 
commoner as ignorant and crude, and bestows the absolute rights on the noble who 
are as erroneous as the other, assigning the noble alone the obligations of government, 
and of education of the common religion, culture and other things." Confucianism 
had been useful under the feudal system, but it was obsolete now. Presently it was 
"urgent to transform the minds of the people by Christianity" (quoted ibid., 107). On 
this view of Kozaki and some others along this line of thought, see Yoshitaka 
Kumano, A History of Theological Thoughts in Japanese Christianity (Tokyo: 
Shinkyo Shuppansha, 1968), 181-215. 
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ramifications. In fact, social reform movements with political potentialities during the 
initial decades were essentially Christian-inspired.' 
Against this background, confrontation was inevitable between the 
government policy and the hope of the Christian-inspired "idealists." The government 
was therefore apprehensive of the potential dangers of Christian influences. The 
above-cited Article XXVIII of the Meiji Constitution, more than anything else, 
represented this inevitable confrontation. The Christians were rejoicing over the 
promulgation of the Constitution, because the article of religious freedom formally 
legalized the Christian faith for the first time in Japan. But, at the same time, this 
very article put them under the yoke of the inviolable emperor and the state.' The 
lese-majeste incident of Kanzo Uchimura in connection with the issuance of the 
Rescript on Education bore an ominous sign.' The prohibition of religious 
25A close relationship between Christianity and the aforementioned Jiyu-
Mineken movement is referred to in Kumano, 177-78. Many prominent members of 
this movement were devout Christians. See also C. H. Germany, Protestant 
Theologies in Modern Japan (Tokyo: IISR Press, 1965), 14. 
"Mikio Sumiya, former professor in economics at Tokyo University, 
observes that it was from around the time of legalization of religious freedom by the 
Constitution that Christianity began to lose its vigor; one of the reasons for this is said 
to be a strong external pressure caused by conservative reactions of society at large 
(Kuyama, Meiji, 205-206). 
"Fatly in 1891, the Middle High School in Tokyo, where Uchimura was a 
teacher, held a ceremony for the reception of the Rescript. At the ceremony everyone 
was required to bow to the copy of it. On his turn Uchimura, following his 
conscience, declined to comply with the requirement. At this sight the faculty and 
students reacted vehemently against him, accusing him of grave lese majeste. Known 
to the public, this incident occasioned the camps of nationalists to contend that his 
behavior was a sure proof of the incompatibility of Christianity with Japan's national 
polity. For more detail, see: Akio Hashimoto, "'Jesus and Japan' in the Thought of 
Kanzo Uchimura" (S.T.M. thesis, Concordia Seminary, St. Louis, 1983), 40-41. 
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(Christian!) education at all the government-recognized private (mission!) schools 
(1899) was still another example of the government's growing apprehension about 
Christianity.' 
As a result of the progress of national reorganization, Japan became a 
peculiar mixture of pre-modern feudalistic elements forced into a super-modern 
external apparatus. Thus, the first two decades after the opening of the country 
moved in conservative directions. The situation for Christianity changed unfavorably. 
Christianity was after all contrary to the sacrosanct Japanese national polity. This 
emerging antagonism to Christianity was the general sentiment in Japan around the 
turn of the century.' 
As long as Christianity was generally in vogue, there was no need to defend 
it. But, with the counter-swing of the pendulum, Christians now had to defend their 
'According to Kozaki, the decree of the Education Ministry ("There shall be 
no religious rituals or teachings in schools which perform the education of the 
citizen") damaged mission schools to a large extent, see Kuyama, Meiji, 192. 
"The anti-Christian waves spread to the whole nation since the lese -majeste 
incident of Uchimura. Most instrumental for the spread of anti-Christian sentiment 
was Tetsujiro Inoue, philosophy professor at Tokyo Imperial University, who 
published (1891?) a pamphlet against Christianity titled "Collision between Education 
and Religion." He contended that "Christianity was contrary to the concept of 
national polity, that monotheism and undivided loyalty to God were subversive to the 
principles of obedience, loyalty, and nationalism as expounded in the Rescript," 
quoted from Borton, 184. Against this "accusation" of Inoue, Uchimura for one 
argued back that Christians were not particularly behind Buddhists, Confucianists, 
Shintoists or atheists in observing the virtues contained in the Rescript. However, 
Inoue saw aright, at least partially, that there is an undeniable tension between the 
absolutist claim of the national polity and the monotheistic ultiniacy of obedience to 
God. As a matter of fact, it was this tension that came to the surface in the form of 
the question: Emperor or Christ? placed before Christians by the thought control 
police during World War H. 
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faith and legitimize their very existence as Christians in a new Japanese climate. 
Theological reflections began to emerge in a rudimentary form. In view of the 
dominant values, a new integrative approach became necessary to the Gospel. The 
leading Christian thinkers tried to more explicitly formulate a continuity between 
Christianity and Japanese religious-cultural heritage. Ebina affirmed Shinto and 
advocated a Shinto-Christianity;' Uchimura conceived the relationship between Christ 
and Buddha as the relationship between sun and moon;" Uemura had an idea of the 
baptized Bushido as an excellent form of Christianity.' 
It is, however, essential to note that this urge toward integration was not 
conditioned by external forces only; it was rather caused by the internal dynamics of 
the Christians' faith. Sooner or later this urge should emerge. In the depth of their 
minds, the drive behind their theological reflections there was a strong existential 
'There were two Shinto theologians, Norinaga Motoori and Atsutane Hirata, 
who identified in Shinto an unique Japanese element that was absent from 
Confucianism and Buddhism, which were both of "foreign" origin. Hiera is said to 
have also studied part of Christian theology. Ebina maintained that these two Shinto 
theologians were like "the great prophet of Israel to us." "It is more appropriate to 
judge that Christianity perfectly fulfills the Way of Revering God [ aiipo)iff of 
Japan from olden day," argued Ebina, "than to think that Christianity should be 
grafted on it" (quoted in Kumano, 152). 
"In a "poem" written in 1926, Uchimura presents his view of Buddha and 
Christ: "Buddha is the Moon; Christ the Sun. . . . I love the moon and I love the 
night; but as the night is far spent and the day is at hand, I now love the Sun more 
than I love the Moon; and I know that the love of the Moon is included in the love of 
the Sun, and that he who loves the Sun loves the Moon also" (The Complete Works of 
Kanzo Uchimura, vol. 4 [Tokyo: Kobunkwan, 1972], 29-30). 
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drive which sought for the integration of the new faith and the old spiritual soil." 
The Protestant Church from around the turn of the century became more and 
more introverted. To be sure, concerns for external political, social and international 
issues never disappeared from the minds of Christian leaders, but in general the 
circumstantial precariousness of the Church prompted them to defend and consolidate 
the very basis of the Church's existence. They were no longer able to expend half of 
their energy upon external issues. And in addition to this, political and social 
relations of Christians became more and more difficult due to the complexity of the 
modern state and its political and social implications.' In the long run, it was more 
important to work for the laying of solid foundations for Christianity and the Church. 
Examples for this line of thought can be found in Uemura's "Line of the Church"' 
"When the first Christians--such as Ebina, Uchimura, Uemura and Kozaki--
thought of the Christian gospel in terms of continuity with Japanese cultural and 
spiritual heritage (Confucianism, Bushido, Buddhism, or Shintoism), it was a 
genuinely truth-searching desire that motivated their "theological" reflections. This 
continuity consciousness had been latent in their minds. "When discussing evangelism 
in Japan years before, I spoke of the relationship between Christianity and Bushido," 
wrote Uemura. He maintained that Bushido could be preserved and improved best by 
Christianity—"I have been deeply convinced of this ever since," he wrote (Sermons of 
Masahisa Uemura, ed. Tsuneaki Kato [Tokyo: Shinkyo Shuppansha, 1972], 31). 
'An example of this difficulty were the views of war among the church 
leaders, the views which came to surface in connection with the Russo-Japanese War 
of 1904. Uchimura declared publicly against war's justification, while Uemura, Ebina 
and Kozaki defended the war. The division was there not only among the leaders, but 
also among individual pastors and believers. See Kuyama, Meiji, 265-278. 
"The term, "Line of the Church," is Kyokai Rosen in Japanese [ foam 
and it signifies the central emphasis in the formation and building up of the Church as 
the visible body. Uemura's "Line" was founded upon his theological understanding of 
the nature of the Church as the visible body of Christ. "Christ did not preach the 
Way in the world in an abstract manner. Rather contrary, He gathered a group of 
sincere people around Himself, trained and educated them for a special organization, 
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and Uchimura's concentration on "the Bible Study."' 
Once successful in bracing the nation with feudal ethics, the Meiji 
government had only to mobilize the whole national mechanism toward the goal of 
"Enrich Country, Strengthen Military." And once mobilized, the nation should only 
run the course to the end according to its own law. The blind force which swayed the 
nation was a historical burden overwhelming the young Church. Once optimistic, 
Christians came to recognize that cultural and spiritual traditions could not be replaced 
overnight in this historical world. It was then natural for the Church, once it was 
made sober about reality, to look into deeper dimensions of human reality under 
history. 
Toward the end of the Meiji Era, the government could boast of 
considerable achievements even though there were numerous uprisings and political 
tumults. Japan had secured the tariff-autonomy and gotten the extra-territoriality 
this organization into a society confessing His holy name, and let it represent the 
heavenly kingdom in the midst of this evil world" (quoted in Kumanop, 239). 
Uemura was the man who set the foundation of the mainstream Protestant Church in 
Japan. 
"Aizan Yamaji (1864-1917), a prominent Christian historian and journalist of 
Meiji era, sympathetically "complained" when he spoke of Uchimura's withdrawal 
from mundane associations, devoting himself instead to a small group of people, the 
readers of his monthly publication, Bible Study, as the following excerpt testifies: 
"We cannot but judge it as a genius' propensity until he (Mr. Uchimura) will come 
out of his hermitage and throw himself into this mundane world and wage a greater 
war of spirit in this world," (quoted in Kuyama, Meiji, 332). But Uchimura's 
intention with Bible Study was rather a long-range strategy; to build a Christian Japan 
by the rich supply of Biblical truth, and this vision of Uchimura is still alive in the 
Mukyokai circle. 
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treaty abolished (1894)." She had "won" two wars, with China (1895) and Russia 
(1905) respectively. Measures against social and political elements that potentially 
threatened national polity and public security had been effectively taken. The 
educational system had been completed and religious movements were all under 
government control. By this time, the modernization of Japan had been roughly 
achieved, as far as the initial intention of the Meiji government was concerned. 
As a result, while a majority of the populace lived in the pre-modern 
mentality, a minority of intellectuals, who had been recruited from the upper and 
middle classes, were left to themselves with a tormenting contradiction between 
knowing new ideals and not being able to set them into practice. They had already 
been awakened to an independent, modern consciousness of their own autonomy and a 
set of new moral and political ideals. But there was very little or no room any more 
for them to live out their new aspirations and ideals. The minority group to which 
most Christians belonged thus suffered a desolate feeling of rootless isolation in 
Japanese society.' 
The Church, turned in upon its own affairs, as we have seen in the above, 
became a spiritual haven for the rootless modern individual. The fact that the 
Protestant Church in Japan has its sociological basis mainly in the middle class has its 
"For the significance of Japan's victory in the war with China, see ibid. 206-
208. The Chinese hegemony over Korea having been eliminated, Japan came to 
assume that hegemony which eventually led to the annexation of Korea in 1910. 
'On this suffering of minority urban intellectual and "enlightened" 
population, see Kuyama, Meiji, 229-242. 
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historical origin here. An inexorable dualism as it were, resulting from this, was a 
basic feature of the situation toward the end of the Meiji Era. It was a dualism which 
consisted of the tacit acceptance of the reality of the state running its course on a 
"Machiavellian" principle on the one hand, and the search for the meaning of 
existence in the inner, transcendent spheres on the other. 
The nation was now settled; the initial vogue of Christianity was gone. As 
historical forces dictated, the Church became more and more introverted into its own 
"religious" affairs. The meaning of this introversion of the Church at the end of the 
Meiji Era one can discuss and judge as a deterioration." Historically speaking, 
however, this introversion must be considered necessary: Separated from the initial 
"booster," the Church was now placed in the position of following its course in Japan 
on its own terms. The Gospel is the good tidings to human beings in whatever 
existential contradiction and circumstances; as the problems of human existence cannot 
be reduced to "external" solutions merely, the Gospel transcends historical 
particularities. But, at the same time, it includes the external particularities within its 
salvific power. The Gospel therefore requires of the saved to determine the forms of 
witness and love. Salvation and love constitute an inseparable unity. Under historical 
There have been critical voices against this introversion, that the Church 
became more and more out of touch with Japanese society and the general population 
(see Kuyama, Meiji, 248). A present critic of Uemura, the alleged originator of the 
introversion, says that although this Meiji church leader endeavored for the purity of 
the Gospel, his and his followers' effort resulted in the loss of the Gospel's influence 
in history and society; "Was this [effort of theirs for the purity of the Gospel] not a 
spiritualization of the Church into an abstract entity?" says this critic (Mitsuo Hori, 
The Japanese Church and Confession of Faith [Tokyo; Shinkyo Shuppansha, 1970], 
40). 
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limitations, however, it is not an easy task for any Christian thinker to do justice to 
both at one and the same time. In this sense, the initial experience of Japanese 
Protestantism in the Meiji Era reflects the picture of ecclesia militans under the burden 
of history. By the introversion, Japanese Protestantism sought to consolidate the 
Church as Church in Japan upon the "evangelical" understanding of the Gospel." 
Perhaps it was providential that the task of this consolidation of the Church 
fell upon Uemura. In an earlier stage of his career as the Church leader, as early as 
1890, he recognized that the priority of Japanese Protestantism was the establishment 
of a solid evangelical Church on the basis of the "orthodox" (Reformed) understanding 
of the Gospel.' And Uemura was a man who knew the deep tragedy of human 
existence, the tragic dimension under the surface of human life.' Though an able 
'It is generally acknowledged that the Meiji Christians understood 
Christianity mainly in terms of its socio-ethical "benefits." Naturally, it was not due 
to individual awareness of sin that many of the converts came over to Christianity 
from Confucianism. For the evangelical understanding of the Gospel to take place, 
they first had to become aware of themselves standing before a holy God. Of this 
says Sumiya: "They [the Meiji Christians] did not appropriate the Christian faith in 
their own personhood [ Mfitt ]. Generally, they considered it only as a socio-
political resource, as something filling their emotional needs or as a means of ethical 
training," (Kuyama, Meiji, 88). 
410n Uemura's deep affinity with Calvinism, see Kumano, 222-226. On this 
affinity, he says among other things: "We hold high the fact that Calvinism is 
earnestly soteriological. Its theology clearly recognizes sins and it is painfully 
sensitive ( subita ) to sins. Ethical Christianity currently predominant, 
this emphasis of Calvin's theology should be the best remedy for envigorating a 
slacken Church" (ibid., 225). But his Calvinism was mild and not rigoristic. As to 
the first missionaries' efforts to introduce a Calvinistic orthodoxy, see Germany, 3. 
'You know," said Uemura once to his friend, "the Story of Heike Clan or 
the Story of Genji and Heike are certainly heroic stories, but their literary excellence 
lies in the tragedy ( ) under the surface. Tragedy, it is true, is the fact of 
life. Since this world of ours is cursed by human sins, we unconsciously recognize 
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social and political critic, Uemura devoted his energy wholly to the building up of the 
Church. The well-known Christological debates between the "liberal" Ebina and the 
"orthodox" Uemure only strengthened Uemura's awareness of the urgency to 
establish an evangelical Christianity for Japan. For that purpose, he established in 
1904 the first independent seminary in Japan, called Tokyo Shingaku-sha.' 
An event which symbolized the general mood in the minds of the 
intellectuals including the Christians was perhaps the so-called Taigyaku-Jiken, or the 
High Treason Plots, of 1910. It was an incident in which two dozen socialists were 
our sorrows when we read these stories. It is why literature captures us," (quoted in 
Kuyama, Meiji, 109). 
'This Christological controversy between Ebina and Uemura, 1901-1902, the 
first theological debate within Japanese Protestantism, is significant in many ways. It 
indicates the first Church leaders' independence in theological thinking. As for Ebina, 
he was under the influence of "a new theology" (that of the Tuebingen School brought 
into Japan by Allgemeiner Evangelisch-Protestantisher Missionsverein in 1885). But 
the influence was not formative to his theology, giving only a momentum toward a 
development of his own theology. One also observes how their indigenous heritages 
play different roles in their respective theological reflection. One can also trace the 
line of theological controversies in the history of Japanese Protestantism from this 
"proto-typical" controversy. Yet in historical retrospect, it is Uemura's orthodoxy that 
has been far more geschichtsmachitig. However much Uemura's Kyokai Rosen is 
criticized, it has always been within the framework of, and under the presupposition of 
the existence of the "orthodox" Church as the organized body, that theological 
controversies ever since have been carried on in Japan. Also to be noted is that Ebina 
as a thinker tended toward "liberalism" even prior to European influence, due to his 
own mystical inclination and unquestioning affirmation of the "good" in the indigenous 
spiritual heritage. See a concise summary of Ebina's theological position in: 
Germany, 18-27. As to the controversy, see: Yoshiro Ishida, "The Uemura-Ebina 
Controversy of 1901-1902," Japan Christian Quarterly 39 (Spring 1973): 63-69. In 
this article, Ishida sees a dialectical complementarity of Uemura's tradition-bound 
"orthodoxy" and Ebina's experience-based "liberalism" for dynamic appropriation of 
the Gospel for indigenization. 
'This seminary is the direct predecessor of the present Tokyo Union 
Theological Seminary (TUTS). 
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apprehended by the security force for plotting to assassinate the emperor with 
explosives, and half of them were doomed to death in a secret court and executed 
immediately.' With this ruthless measure taken by the authorities, all the socialist 
movements were temporarily brought to an end. Socialist movements at that time 
were to a large extent coterminous with a modernization from below. And many of 
the socialists were in fact Christians or ex-Christians.' The socialist movement was 
a forum, the only hope remaining for the "New Japan." In fact, the severe measure 
of execution was perceived by many as the extinguishing of all prospects for Japan to 
become a new nation worthy to live in. It is deeply symbolic that Uemura dared to 
hold a funeral service for one of the executed dozen under the threatening vigilance of 
police forces.' 
Throughout the Meiji Era, Protestantism had been in close interaction with 
the state. In the beginning phase, it radically challenged old Japanese values and ways 
of living; it seemed to be on the verge of replacing the traditional culture of Japan. 
'This incident was allegedly led by an anarchist, Shusui Kotoku, but it is 
now generally agreed that they were innocent, not actually plotting an assassination 
attempt, even though some of Kotoku's associates intimated such a plot. See 
Drummond, 211-212. 
"Kuyama, Meiji, 249-258. 
"Talcuboku Ishikawa, a contemporary poet, for instance, wrote regarding the 
hopelessness of the situation in his diary on the day of the execution of the convicted: 
"No hope any more for Japan!"[ 13*II3e)c j ] (quoted in Kuyama, Meiji, 336). 
""One of these [executed] was Seinosuke Oishi, who was a Christian and 
whose relatives requested Uemura to conduct a memorial service on his behalf. 
Uemura agreed and assumed full public responsibility in the midst of an atmosphere of 
public shock and antipathy that could well have led to his own assassination," 
(Drummond, 212). 
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But the indigenous cultural heritage proved to be far more tenacious than initially 
thought. Reaction was no less vehement against modern ideas of man and society, a 
large portion of which Protestantism had introduced. As that peculiar form of 
modernization advanced under strong government leadership, traditional values began 
to devour the Christians. The Church became more and more conformed to redressed 
Japanese values. Instead of becoming the leading life-philosophy of the nation, 
Christianity was reduced to a tiny minority religion. This Meiji experience of 
Japanese Protestantism represents a continuing pattern ever since. The basic pattern 
for interaction between Protestantism and the state seems to have been established 
during the Meiji Era in the history of modern Japan. 
The Taisho and Early Showa Era 
By the "victories" of the Sino-Japanese and Russu-Japanese wars, Japan, a 
country insignificant and fearful of Western colonization only a half century ago, 
emerged onto the international scene as one of the world powers and began to compete 
with Western powers for interests in the East-Asian regions. This "phenomenal" 
success of modernization was the result of many factors: the iron-determination of the 
Meiji leaders; the successful cooperation of zaibatsu entrepreneurs with government in 
building up industrial capitalism; servile sacrifices of the docile populace; and 
favorable international circumstances. 
The price of success was very high and this price was to be paid under 
modernization. An early fortune is not always very beneficial to an individual or to a 
nation in the long run. In retrospect, one may discern that this early success was a 
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remote reason for the national catastrophe three decades later, which came to involve 
also all of Japan's neighbor nations. 
For a time, historical possibilities for "healthier" development were open for 
Japan. In fact, speaking purely in pragmatic terms, Japan was brought to a favorable 
economic place by World War I, and her international position was greatly promoted. 
With a nominal participation in the war as a British ally, Japan obtained the former 
German holdings as her share in East Asia. Thanks to the European nations, 
exhausted economically by the war, Japan enjoyed such a growth of economy and 
international trade that in the course of a few years she could enjoy a trade surplus 
and emerge from a heavy burden of debt. Moreover, in this boon, Japan attempted 
more expansion of her interests in China while Britain was heavily occupied with her 
own troubles. 
World War I deeply disturbed the European consciousness of existence. 
With the collapse of the nineteenth century optimism for human history, man learned 
how abysmal human nature was. But this traumatic experience of the Occidentals had 
very little effect in Japan.' Rather, due to economical advantage, even a boom, the 
nation as a whole enjoyed temporal prosperity. 
Once a new framework of national polity proved to function and achieved • 
the initial national objectives to some satisfactory extent, it seemed natural that the 
national psychology became slack in various fields of life. Thus the bulk of the 
'One finds an exception in Uchimura; this war, to him, being waged among 
the "Christian" nations, put a devastating question-mark not only upon the European 
civilization, but also credibility of Christianity itself. See Hashimoto, 47-48. 
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Taisho Era was a relatively calm period, and with respect to government control of 
religion and thought, it became more free. Ideas and thoughts toward democratization 
were resuscitated and came into the open. A hopeful humanism won wide circulation. 
In short, a general liberalism flourished in this era of so-called Taisho Democracy. 
During this period of national pause, the Protestant Church in Japan had 
accommodated itself to the order of the state. The government authorities were no 
longer disturbed by Christianity. The state could now use this religion along with 
Shinto and Buddhism to "educate" and settle the uneasy minds of people. Most of the 
Protestant churches were willing to render service to the state." By and large, the 
state was no longer an acute problem for the church, at least for the time being. The 
Church was now more concerned about modern individual man. After awaking to 
individual self-consciousness in the universe, these modern men struggled with the 
meaning of existence in the seemingly settled nation. 
Under the surface of this slack and even decadent era, one discerns a process 
of disintegration taking place. The Meiji oligarchs, after settling the initial rivalry 
among themselves, provided the nation with a strong government leadership, civilian 
interreligious conference of the three religions [ =O(a ] was held 
in 1912 under the auspices of Home Ministry, to which the representatives of 
Buddhism, Shitoism and Christianity were invited and asked to strengthen and 
discipline the national moral character. Sumiya calls attention to the particular 
significance of this conference for further change of the Church's attitude in the 
direction of cooperation with the state, and observes that with this official 
acknowledgement by the government (by the "carrots") the Church became more and 
more cooperative with the state, even uncritically so (Kuyama, Meiji, 337). Kozaki 
approved this conference; Uemura cautiously admitted its significance for the 
awakening of public consciousness of the needs of religion and for the introduction of 
Christianity among the general public; Uchimura was disapproving. 
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and military. However, the oligarchs gradually disappeared from the scene of history. 
Emerging new leaders, parliamentary (civilian) and military, were of quite different 
stripes in comparison to the Meiji leaders, modern and diverse, due to their 
upbringing and education. The civilian leaders went one way and the military 
followed their own path.' 
Another critical polarization was that of society and its cultural structure. 
There was an urban minority of the "enlightened" and modernized on the one hand, 
and there was the vast majority of those mainly living in rural areas with the feudal 
ideas and values on the other. We have already mentioned this tendency above,' yet 
in this period this polarization was further accelerated into fatal dimensions, the 
consequences of which will be noted shortly. This polarization reflected a peculiar 
side-by-side existence of urban modernism and rural feudalistic ways of thinking, 
internationalism and nationalism, democratic inclination and authoritarianism. The 
unprecedented modernization of Japan left behind this dual structure of Japanese 
society.' 
The problem was that the stratum of intellectuals, to which most of the 
'Yasushi Kuyama, ed., Modern Japan and Christianity: the Taisho-Sahowa 
Era, (Tokyo: Sobunsha, 1972), 2-4. 
"See note 23 above. 
'This dual structure of modern Japan perhaps is to be deemed as the result of 
the modernization policy of the Meiji government; it conceived the policy of an 
agenda that should absorb the external apparatus of the politics, economics, and 
technology from the West, whereas the internal spirit had to be molded by the 
traditional Japanese values. The expression for this is the so-called Japanese Spirit 
and Western Skills [ 
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Christians belonged, and who were supposed to contribute further to the 
modernization of the nation from below,' was so thin and limited in strength that 
they could not make an effective initiative for the political and cultural elevation of the 
general populace. 
This weakness of the progressive forces, including the Christians and the 
Church, was surely explainable in terms of the short historical experience of modern 
values in Japan. In other words, even in the hearts of the modernized people there 
was the same dual structure, modern ideas and inherited values, painfully creaking 
side by side. 
The Taisho Democracy was a seminal phenomenon indeed, but it was a 
feeble one in terms of endurance and impact, for it was limited to the circle of the 
intelligentsia. Industrial capitalism in Japan grew, accompanied by the multiplication 
of social problems in cities. The unstable world economy, with its intermittent 
depressions, duly taxed the nation's economy, which, even under favorable 
circumstances, was precarious and vulnerable to even tiny fluctuations. Natural 
calamities aggravated the situation of the rural areas to tragic dimensions. The 
increase of the population, by this period amounting to sixty million (twice as much 
since the start of the Meiji Era), was of an exploding proportion to a country with 
very limited arable land. 
Emperor Taisho was weak from his birth and incapable of reigning. Crown 
Prince Hirohito took over his father's duties in 1921. Emperor Taisho died in 1925, 
`See supra, 7. 
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and Hirohito ascended to the throne immediately, thus ushering in the Showa Era. 
It was from this beginning of a new era that the country began to make a 
transition toward totalitarian national polity and militarism. The political and social 
situation was already unstable. The two major political parties at that time, Kenseikai 
and Seiyukai, led civilian government alternately. In this rather "calm" and slack 
period their exercise of political powers degenerated into a game of personal prestige 
and gain. Their liaisons with the two major zaibatsu, Mitusi and Mitsubishi, were 
conspicuous and corruption was inevitable. Thus the two pillars of civilian government 
were utterly powerless to curb the rise of militarism. The Great Economic Panic of 
1929 struck the nation severely, and with the subsequent depressions unemployment 
became a critical social problem. The rural farming population suffered most, the 
price of rice and silk, the main sources of its income, plunging sharply.' 
It was under these circumstances that the military took the situation into its 
own hands while increasingly ignoring the civil government. Domestically, some of 
the young officers of the military organized themselves into small groups and staged 
coup d'etats by a series of assassinations of "corrupt" government ministers. On the 
Chinese Continent, military operations and plots were rampant, carried out by the 
order of the generals in charge without sanction from the government. Beginning with 
the Manchurian Incident, Japan escalated military operations on the Continent and 
eventually embarked upon the fatal Sino-Japanese War in 1937. 
Why did the history of Japan develop so tragically? The conditions in urban 
"Kuyama, Taisho-Showa, 176-177. 
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and rural areas alike were on the border of bankruptcy due to international economic 
dismay and to poor government policy. These economical factors surely had 
triggering effects. However, if the nation's problem were purely economic there 
would have been better solutions than militaristic expansionism on the Continent. As 
a matter of fact, it was not the military alone which headed for totalitarianism. The 
broad support of the general populace was a strong factor to the rise of militarism. 
Since the civilian government was inept and the zaibatsu greedily conducted their 
lucrative business at the cost of the majority's well-being, the nation was suffering 
from chronic economic impoverishment and dislocation; hence, the common people 
joined in the young officers' "sincere" denouncements of the corrupt elements in 
government and business, and they were not antagonistic toward the officers when 
they attempted a coup d'etat.' 
What was the ideological link between the military and the non-intellectual, 
unmodernized, rural majority of the population? Due to universal conscription first 
introduced as early as 1879, the soldiers and even the officers among them were 
recruited from farmers' sons. The suffering and misery of rural areas was 
immediately felt by those in the military. Deep indignation and a sense of obligation 
to rectify these unjust conditions crystallized into direct actions against the responsible 
government leaders. 
What factors were involved under the process of Japan's falling into 
totalitarianism? There were surely many. But we regard as basic the measures which 
'Reischauer, 183-188. 
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the Meiji government leaders employed when they attempted the modernization of 
Japan." On the one hand, the leaders "froze" the general populace in the pre-modern 
feudal consciousness by reintroducing traditional Confucian ethics. On the other hand, 
they not only defined the emperor as the absolute ruler but also deified him as the 
object of religious devotion in Japan. This deification of the emperor was designed to 
make Japanese thought similar to that of Christianity in the West. Later, this 
deification of the emperor was underpinned by elevating Shintoism as the inviolable 
state cult. Then, the rigid Confucian codes of "loyalty and piety,"' in which people 
were trained, were fused with the deification of the emperor. "Unanimous Devotion 
to the Emperor,' the national slogan at that time, was the amalgam of these two 
factors. Under uncertain and difficult social conditions, this slogan was a religious 
creed for the people who sought their spiritual pivot.' As the samurais in the feudal 
period found justification for their existence in undivided devotion to their feudal 
57See supra 4. 
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"Of this quasi-religious tendency, Katsuichiro Kamei, one of the most 
prominent literature critics and thinkers, well-versed in Buddhism and Christianity, 
speaks as follows: "Looking back the history from Meiji Era to the present, I cannot 
suppress the impression that Japan has been 'a quasi-religious nation Emisurvaisn. 
having no parallel in the world. The ruling strata admittedly stood behind the 
emperor system, but this alone does not explain the whole. This quasi-religious 
nation, to me, seems to involve a latent danger of self-swelling [ gi EnIN ], of 
which even the Meiji leaders hardly dreamed. Their design was, seen in an authentic 
religious perspective, a formidable attempt to duplicate 'God,' though unknowingly 
made. By this design, they not only imposed [this monster] upon the people, but they 
themselves were under the curse of this grotesque complexity, finding no way to deal 
with this" (Kuyama, Taisho-Showa, 180). 
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lords, so now, in the uncertain modern era, the same longing for an absolute object of 
devotion was created by the two catalysts: the emperor and Confucian ethics. This 
devotion in turn became a blind force which led the nation to totalitarianism and 
catastrophe. 
While the nation became more and more totalitarian in its political outlook, a 
strong communist movement was going on from around the end of the Taisho Era, 
and it particularly captured the attention of young searching intellectuals.°  Prior to 
this emergence of communism, however, social-democratic movements saw their 
opportunities during the time of Taisho Democracy. These movements were 
humanitarian and largely Christian-led.' At the same time, however, more serious 
studies of socialism in terms of Marxism were being conducted among socio-politically 
conscious intellectuals. A communist party was organized in 1922 and infiltrated 
gradually into labor unions and even rural areas. 
As the nationalistic government resumed severe suppressions against all 
"heretical" thoughts and movements toward the end of the 1920s, the communists 
alone remained in open opposition. Their "scientific" theory of history and society 
was deeply convincing, and their messianic heroism, shown under heavy government 
'Osamu Kuno, a student at this time and later a leading leftist intellectual, 
recalls and writes: "To the young and the students, who felt their future threatened by 
economic depressions in the midst of a 'no-way-out' situation of cultural decadence 
and opaque political impoverishment, socialism alone appeared as the ideal to save 
cultural decadence, political impoverishment and economic corrosion. . . . To the 
untainted eyes of the young and the students, socialism almost looked like self-evident 
socio-economic truth" (quoted in Kuyama, Taisho-Shoa, 186). 
"Reichauer, 173-174. See also Burkman, 40-41. 
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persecution, even won a religious halo among the non-participating but sympathizing 
intellectuals.' In fact the communists were the only opposition group throughout the 
fascist government until the end of World War H. 
What were the contributions of Christianity to society during this critical 
period? What were the theological responses to the situation? During this period a 
bifurcation within Christianity became more and more distinct. On the one hand, 
Christianity was more concerned with theological and inner-churchly issues. On the 
other hand, there was a Christian stream which strongly felt the Christians' 
responsibilities to society and nation. The former was represented by the theology and 
career of Tokutaro Takakura (1885-1934), and the latter by the Student Christian 
Movement (SCM). 
We shall view their respective positions briefly in order to know the 
Christian responses during the beginning period of acute national crisis. 
At the height of his theological career, Takakura succeeded Uemura in 1925 
"Kamei, who was one of the students then irresistibly drawn to the 
Communist ideals, describes his inner emotion at that time. As a freshman at Tokyo 
Imperial University, he met a group of young "Leftists"; to him they looked as if 
"young priests of a new God" when they went "into the people," people and workers 
who were now gods. "A [romantic] mood infiltrated among young students," recalls 
Kamei, "yes, that particular mood of overwhelming joy with accompanying arrogance 
and sentimentality peculiar to self-sacrificing believers of a new God" (Kuyama, 
Taisho-Showa, 204-205). We have another witness from one, Yoshio Inoue, who was 
a professor in Tokyo Union Theological Seminary. "From 1927 to 30," recalls Inoue, 
"I was a student attending Kyoto Imperial University. And it was almost a matter of 
course among us students to pay respect to and put trust in the Communist Party 
which was the only organization of resistance, disregarding one's having courage 
himself to join it or not," (The War Responsibility of the Church", Eiichi Amamiya et 
al. eds., The Mission of the Church under the Yoke of Guilt [Tokyo: Shinkyo 
Shuppansha, 1987], 117). 
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as the president of Tokyo Shingaku-sha, the first independent seminary in Japan 
founded by Uemura. Takakura himself was one of the students of Uemura. He 
carried forward what his teacher initiated, namely, the building up of an evangelical 
Christianity solidly founded on the orthodox Protestant (Reformed-Presbyterian) 
doctrine of the Gospel. His opus magnum was "Evangelical Christianity" of 1927.5' 
Takakura was a man who was involved in a continuous struggle with his 
sinful ego throughout his life. His life-long struggle revolved around the tension of 
redemptive grace and renewing grace, justification and sanctification. As a result, he 
penetrated into the core of the Gospel more deeply than his teacher, Uemura. 
Takakura and many of his contemporaries during this period were more concerned 
with elucidating the enigma and plight of individual existence than the immediate 
problems of the nation at large.' For Takakura, an evangelical theology was a 
theology by which his own contradictory existence could be redeemed and carried on. 
What is his basic theological profile? "In the basic theological ideas of 
Takakura we see nothing original. In his concepts of God, Creator, or of the religion 
of conscience and call one sees the influence of Calvin and Kark Ho11,' according 
" ligittlSfiqt . See for the outline of Takakura's theology, Germany, 
87-122. 
'According to Sumiya, the general masses of the Japanese live in the 
collective body, whereas the intellectuals from the years around the Russo-Japanese 
War walked out from that collectivity and tried to grasp their selfhoods as independent 
individuals; but this individualism caused a deep psychological dislocation and desolate 
feeling, and Takakura was a child of that era of existential desolateness (Kuyama, 
Taisho-Showa, 124, see also 122-125). 
"Oshio's view point is thus summarized by Germany, 106. 
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to Tsutomu Oshio, one of Takakura's students who has written a sympathetic but 
sober biography about his teacher.' In turn, C. H. Germany, a presenter of the 
history of Japanese Protestant theology, does not see that there is anything new in 
Takakura's doctrine of atonement," which according to Oshio should be "Takakura's 
most original contribution to the theological world in Japan."' Furthermore, in 
Oshio's estimate, "we probably cannot say that he [Takakura] did more than carry 
Japanese theology a step forward."' On this point Germany sees more: Takakura's 
theology was carrying Japanese theology "commandingly in a new direction," that is, 
in the direction of a theology of a more religious, personal grasp of the Gospel." 
Though not quite original in his understanding of the Gospel, Takakura appropriated it 
more deeply than any of his predecessors. Thus, "with his deeply personal 
explication," Takakura's theology proved, in its own way, to be a creative and 
influential contribution to the formation of Japanese Protestant theology.' 
As Takakura's theology dealt with the vertical dimension of Christian faith, 
the SCM movement could be understood as concerned with its horizontal dimension. 
The SCM was not a social movement sponsored by any of the denominational 




'Quoted in Germany, ibid. 
'Germany, ibid. 
'Quoted in Germany, ibid. 
60 
churches or by a federation of churches. It was a student movement under the 
auspices of the YMCA in Japan. The formal start of this movement was. July 1931, 
and its turbulent dissolution was in the summer of 1932. Prior to the formal 
launching of this movement, there were precedent moves within Japanese 
Protestantism. One of them was the establishment of the "Labor Mission" in 1928 at 
Doshisha University (a Christian institution founded by Jo Niijima and later led by 
Congregational leaders from the Kumamoto Band)" which had been strongly 
conscious of Christian responsibility for society. Another was a concern within the 
YMCA for students, including Christian students, who were strongly drawn to 
Marxism because of its appeal for a classless society and its convincing theory and 
practice. The leaders of YMCA wanted to reorganize its student mission by providing 
a Christian alternative of ideas and program for a just and humane society.' These 
'It deserves to be noted here that this combination of Congregationalism 
(started by the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Mission in 1886), 
Doshisha University and Kumamoto Band, has constituted a section of Japanese 
Protestantism. Ebina was from Kumamoto Band, a Congregational minister and also 
the Chancellor of the university. The historical relationship is that L. L. Janes 
entrusted his convert students to Jo Niijima who was cooperating with the American 
Board when Janes was forced to resign the school at Kumamoto due to his 
"missionary" activities. For more on the contribution made by this "combination," 
see Darley Downs, "The Contribution of Congregationalism to the Church in Japan," 
Japan Christian Quarterly, 25 (Spring 1959): 99-102. 
""Again," admonished a leader of the YMCA in an article written around 
this time, "we [the Church] need openly and frankly to face the question of why the 
church is losing its influence among the students. There are, of course, many students 
in the churches, but even those who do come do not seem to be entirely satisfied that 
they are getting what they need in meeting their life-problem" (Soichi Saito, "The 
Communist Challenge and the Christian Campaign," Japan Christian Quarterly, 6 
[Summer 1931]: 274). Written "on the spot," this article conveys the Communist 
impacts at that time firsthand, see the entire article, 270-276. 
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and the other historical factors provided the start of this movement. 
As to the general theological view of this movement, it is helpful to look at 
the so-called Tozanso General Principles of 1931," which run: 1) God is the 
constantly unfolding life-power; 2) Christianity is God's pulsation in history, begun in 
Jesus and is the movement for the realization of the Kingdom of God; 3) Salvation is 
nothing else than common participation in that movement for the realization of the 
Kingdom of God; 4) Our faith develops in harmony with a growing comprehension of 
scientific truth." Another utterance made by two vocal leaders of the movement, 
Enkichi Kan (Tokyo area) and Shigeru Nakajima (Kansai area), both university 
professors at that time," set the thrust of the Declaration in a sharper focus: 
"Salvation, then simply means participating in the building up of the Kingdom of 
God here on earth";" 
"The religion of Jesus is not merely a religion of individuals' salvation. It is not 
a meditative religion for the perfection of the self. It is a practical, ethical and 
social religion through and through. It is a religion which enables us to live out 
God and to reach to God."" 
These strongly socio-ethically oriented viewpoints betray a telling impact of 
75 vaLiamm . Tozanso is the name of a YMCA site at the foot of Mt. 
Fuji. 
This English translation is quoted from Germany, 56. Elsewhere, he 
compares these four principles with "the dominant idea-foundations of the Social 
Gospel in American Protestantism" (ibid., 64). 
'Of the two, Enkichi Kan has been known as a leading Barthian theologian. 
He was Anglican and a professor at St. Paul University (or Rikkyo Daigaku) of the 
same denomination. 
"Kuyama, Taisho-Showa, 280. 
"Ibid., 273. 
62 
the Social Gospel, adopting the movement's developmental and immanentic ideas of 
the Kingdom's coming into being. 
The SCM was short-lived due to external government pressures, churchly 
criticisms and centrifugal forces within the movement itself. But it is essential to note 
that the movement represented the unquenchable Christian consciousness of and 
readiness for socio-ethical responsibility present in Japanese Protestantism. The 
movement was critical of "churchly Christianity" which seemed to the activists of the 
movement to have lost willingness to serve the world "out there" with socio-ethical 
commitments and to be content with its own salvation. According to the "social" 
Christians, "churchly Christianity" individualized the Christian faith, internalized it, 
and made it subjectivistic, with the result that it was separated from social reality and 
without inner power to reform life.' 
On the other hand, the SCM became heated so quickly and radically in its 
claims that it could hardly be distinguished from a communist movement." The 
main-stream churches could only denounce it. To be sure, this is not to deny that the 
social Christians' criticism of the "churchly" Christians had its validity; yet the 
"churchly" Christians' denouncement of the SCM had its own validity. Indeed, it 
'These are Kan's viewpoints, quoted in ibid., 279. 
""This group [the Japanese Student Christian Movement] is trying," wrote 
Saito, "to follow the line and tactics of the Marxian doctrine, while at the same time 
endeavoring to remain Christian. Such a paradoxical effort to meet the present 
situation deserves every sympathy on the part of those who would understand the 
causes which prompt such an attempt to meet the problem. Time will show whether 
they are right or wrong in their present method. . ." (Saito, 274). 
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needs only to be mentioned in passing that the positive commitments to both 
viewpoints represented legitimate Christian concerns. 
In fact, there were complementary perspectives in both camps; surely no 
Christians would fail to recognize the two dimensions of Christian faith, the religious 
and the ethical; it is much like the two aspects of a curved line with concave and 
convex sides in an inseparable unity. 
On the one hand, Takakura himself was concerned with the social relevance 
of Christian salvation.' In 1928 a council of major denominational churches' 
issued a "Social Creed" which stated the churches' socio-ethical positions and goals, 
and their commitment to bring them into realization as much as their resources 
allowed." On the other hand, from one of the SCM leaders, Gan Sakaldbara, we 
can obtain a strong conviction for the need of the individual's inner salvation, a need 
which cannot be dissolved into the ideals of society, and a sober perception of the 
limitations of social activities. He made it clear that "even if a rationalization 
(liberation) of society should make a remarkable progress, the individual as the carrier 
of irrational inner longing would always seek a religious salvation." "A social 
Germany, 112. 
El*SSTORM 
'Germany places a very reserved evaluation on this statement issued by the 
council, saying: "The extent to which the mind and resources of the churches went 
beyond the formation of this declaration is not noticeable in the records of the time" 
(82-83). But according to another study of this period, conducted by a Doshisha 
University scholar, "the significance of this social creed was not slight; practical 
commitments to various social problems in compliance to this creed were eagerly 
promoted within and without the constituting churches. . ." (Nobuo Kaino, "Political 
Statements of the Kyodan," in: Eiich Amamiya et al., 146). 
64 
Christianity would never forget that in salvation the individual is united with God." 
He further held that social Christianity would say that "the individuality of salvation is 
to prove its living faith in the activity of solidarity."' 
Throughout this period, Protestant Christianity was assigned a twofold task: 
to respond to the fundamental inner sufferings of individuals and to come to terms 
with social needs. Y. Kuyama, a friend of Kitamori, recalls what he, as an elite 
student, experienced during these years. His agony would be representative of what a 
sensitive Christian intellectual and mutatis mutandis, the Church in general, might 
perceive. He wrote: 
When the Sino-Japanese War broke out [in 1937], I was a student at Kyoto 
Imperial University. . . . Students at that time were skeptical about the war. But 
due to severe government repressions they were totally unable to engage 
themselves with social activities and other issues. In fact, we were not sure of 
the availability of help from social activities. . . . We felt we were damned, 
because we did nothing even though we knew there had to be something done to 
breakthrough the contradictions in our class society. . .86 
During the time that this polarization within Protestant Christianity became 
more conspicuous, dialectic theology was introduced into Japan.' This introduction 
of the new theology, particularly that of Karl Barth, was of momentous significance 
for the formation of Japanese Protestant theology. Introduced by Takakura in his 
Evangelical Theology, this theology called forth strong attention and interest among 
"Kuyama, Taisho-Showa, 119. 
"Ibid. 
'According to Isao Kuramatsu, who wrote an article on "The Theology of 
Barth and the Church in Japan" (Gospel and World [May 1956]): Takakura introduced 
Barth "orally" around 1924-25 (see Kuyama, Taisho-Showa, 309). 
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his students and the theological world at large.' Emil Brunner was the first among 
the dialectic theologians to be known, but it was Barth who was to dominate Japanese 
Protestant theology. 
The theology of Takakura itself was not influenced by the theology of Barth, 
but it was, in one view, very much in the same vein, due to the fact that he was under 
the influence of P. T. Forsyth, who is often referred to as "a Barthian before 
Barth."' Already in the early 1930s two later professors of TUTS, Yoshitake 
Kumano and Hidenomu Kuwada, both students of Takakura, produced theological 
works, Outline of Dialectic Theology') and Dialectic Theology,' respectively. The 
translation of the works of the dialectic theologians (mainly those of Brunner and 
Barth) increased year by year.' This strong interest in dialectic theology, 
particularly that of Barth, was not only confined in the circle of Tokyo Shingaku-sha, 
'After mildly criticizing Schleiermacher's theology as an amalgam of the Biblical 
religion and the German culture of his time, Takakura observed that the European 
Protestantism prior to World War I had compromised to the currents of the contemporary 
culture. It is in this context that he mentioned the emergence of "a religious movement" 
by "younger theologians in Germany and Switzerland" which "is trying to enliven 
Christianity as the religion of the Bible"; Takakura includes here the names of K. Barth, 
Fr. Girgensohn (Evangelical Theology, [Tokyo: Nagasaki Shoten, 1930], 260). 
"Kuyarna, Taisho-Showa, 310. 
goOMAMOTRIM , 1932. 
93 4a09*7 , 1933. 
'The translation of the works of dialectical theology counts more than fifteen 
titles in the first part of the 1930s; to mention some, E. Brunner's, The Theology of 
Crisis (original in English), Erlebnis, Erkenntnis und Glaube, Der Mittler, and Barth's 
Credo, Das Won Gottes und Theologie, Recheertigung un Heiligung, Die Note der 
evangelische Kirche. 
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but it was also found among the theological faculty members of Doshisha University, 
known as being predominantly liberal in its theological stance. The translation of 
Barth's Romans was attempted by this group." The beginning impact of Barth's 
theology was thus felt widely within Japanese Protestantism and even outside the 
Christian circle.' 
It has been said that it was the theology of Barth that sustained the Protestant 
Church in Japan during World War II and provided her with strength to recover from 
the ruin of the postwar years." But if this is true, how did Japanese theologians 
understand Barth's theology, given that Barth himself fought politically against the 
Nazis, whereas Japanese "Barthians" rendered no resistance but even made theological 
This attempt was made under the leadership of Keiji Ashida, professor at the 
university, who at the age of sixty-five is said to have turned himself to Barth with 
learned enthusiasm, lecturing over Der Romerbrief in classes always with exclamation 
and enthusiasm. Though terminated halfway by the death of Ashida, the work itself 
indicates how powerful the impressions of Barth's theology were, even to liberal 
theologians at Doshisa (Kuyama, Taisho-Showa, 312-313). It is of interest to mention 
that Chitose Kishi, then a young Lutheran scholar and another young theologian, 
translated an introductory work to Barth's theology, John McConnachie's The 
Barthian Theology and the Man of Today. 
"Kitaro Nishida (1870-1945), a most prominent philosopher of modern Japan, 
captured the issue of the theology of Barth. He advised K. Takizawa, one of his 
followers, to pay attention to Barth, when he was to study philosophy in Germany, 
saying: "There seem to be no particularly interesting philosophers there right now; 
there rather are interesting theologians, Barth in particular" (quoted in Kuyama, 
Taisho-Showa, 314). 
'Yasuo Fufruya, "Succession of the Theology of Barth," in Japanese 
Christianity and Barth, ed. Iwao Morioka (Tokyo: Shinkyo Shuppansha, 1986), 98. 
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compromiser This, however, is not the place to go into this question further. 
Discussion on this question is saved for later. But this much needs to be said: 
Earth's concentration on the Word and rejection of any "point-of-contact" between the 
Gospel and culture was interpreted by Japanese theologians as being in the direction of 
total separation of spiritual from political reality.' 
In view of the responses Japanese Protestantism made to the turbulent social 
situation, one may level criticisms against both camps of Christianity and learn 
important lessons from their experience. In doing so, it is necessary to recognize the 
proper dimensions of the burden of history and to measure these with the actual 
strength of the young Church which was on an uneven footing due to external 
pressures from national conformity and the uncertainty of a short church-historical 
experience. 
Nonetheless, it is the glory of the Church in Japan that however small and 
feeble she may be, it remains her commitment to witness to the complete Gospel of 
Christ in Japan, struggling with the forces of the world however formidable they may 
be. In other words, the Church is not excused from this holy commission even if she 
as the Church in Japan has her own limitations due to ethnological, cultural and 
"Hidenobu Kuwata (see note 92), for instance, wrote a pamphlet in 1942 (An 
Apologetic for Japanese Evangelism, /1E&M#ffNi ) and praised the 
militaristic national polity as "a glorious national polity" (Kakaru Kokiaru Kokutai. . . 
b.4 talk ZVI* ). Inoue criticizes this as a grave compromise, for no 
intellectuals at that time were ignorant of the unacceptability of the China invasion by the 
military government ("Responsibility," Amamiya et al., 117). 
'Germany, 169. See also Hori, 100-101. 
68 
historical factors." The Church is therefore held accountable for her faithfulness in 
witnessing. When she fails to be faithful to her God-given call, she has to confess her 
sins without any excuse for her failures; otherwise it would not be possible for her to 
make a new start as Church. 
We observe in this historical experience a polarization within Christianity, 
the church-centered form and the socio-ethically oriented form of Christianity. There 
is tension between these poles, caused by historical conditions and human limitations. 
We shall point out here with emphasis that this tension has been a perennial one in 
Japanese Protestantism ever since the initial experience of the polarization. 
While the Church struggled for her own identity, Japan was only heading for 
catastrophe. With her own "foolhardy" endeavors on the Chinese Continent, 
especially launching the Sino-Japanese War in 1937, it became practically impossible 
for the nation to stop her catastrophic downfall. Japan, it seems, had to run her 
course to the end, causing immense suffering for herself as well as for her 
neighboring nations. 
In the meantime, surveillance by military government, manifested in the 
thought control of the special police, intensified more and more. Fanatic 
indoctrination concerning the deity of the emperor and cruel coercion of allegiance to 
Shintoism as the expression of loyalty to the emperor and the nation were carried out 
"A distinctive national trait which by itself can be a strong side of the nation, 
may very easily turn out to be a definite weakness to the Church in Japan in terms of 
its critical Auseinandersetzung with the state. This trait can be termed as taisei junno. 
It means both "conformity to the established system" and "conformity to the ruling 
trends." Both aspects are strongly present in Japanese minds even among Christians. 
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all over Japan and other occupied countries.' The military government sought 
frantically to rally all things to the national cause. 
It is important to note, in this connection, that the government enacted the 
Religious Bodies Law, the intention of which was to put all the recognized religious 
bodies under government "protection" and supervision. As a result of this, a united 
Protestant church body, called Nihon Kirisuto Kyodan (Kyodan for short), a 
unification of Protestant denominations (thirty odd major and minor denominational 
churches), was formed under this law in 1940.1' A united Protestant Church, which 
"One of the painful examples of this is to be noted, and it was the experience 
of the Church in Korea. It was not only the military government's thought control 
policy that demanded the Church in Korea to worship at Shinto shrines; the leaders of 
the Church in Japan also demanded that the Church in Korea go to Shinto shrines. In 
1965 under his visit in Korea, Isamu Omura, the Kyodan moderator then, met with 
some of the Korean Church leaders and reconfirmed the Kyodan's wartime 
responsibility, as the leaders determinedly criticized the cooperative and conformist 
attitude of the Kyodan during World War II. Now belated historical studies are being 
done in Japan on the relationship between the two neighboring countries from a 
church historical point of view, see Isao Shoji, "Toward a New Era of Asia," 
Amamiya et al., 229. 
'As soon as this law was passed through the Diet in 1939, all the 
denominational bodies began to prepare themselves to meet governmental 
requirements. But in July 1940, the Education Ministry summoned the denominational 
representatives and notified them that in order to be approved as a religious body by 
the government, a church body was to comprise fifty congregations and five thousand 
members at a minimum. That meant only seven "major" denominations were entitled 
to approval; the rest, more than twenty-five "minor" bodies, were to be denied 
approval. In this situation, the National Christian Council (see note 84) decided to 
form a unified Church body. According to Seigo Yamaya the formation of the unified 
Church was to "assist" minor denominations to survive under governmental control. 
In this sense, the decision made by the NCC was nothing but an emergency measure. 
See Seigo Yamaya, The History of the United Church of Christ in Japan (the Kyodan) 
(Tokyo: Nihon Kirisuto Kyodan Shuppanbu, 1967), 91-93. See also Drummond, 256-
262. In the process of the denominational integration, there was a considerable 
hesitancy on the side of the Reformed-Presbyterian Nihon Kirisuto Kyokai regarding 
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had been desired from the very beginning of the history of Protestantism in Japan, 
materialized, ironically enough, by a wartime ordinance of the government. 
Being thus forced to comply with the government, the Protestant churches in 
Japan in the form of the Kyodan were obligated to play roles in conformity to national 
war-policies. In fact, many forms of active cooperation with the military government 
were planned and executed by the Kyodan.'°' 
With the explosion of two A-bombs over Hiroshima and Nagasaki in the 
summer of 1945, a militaristic and overambitious Japan was definitely terminated. 
Many of "the emperor's subjects" were utterly disillusioned to learn that what they 
believed in and devoted themselves to had been merely a hollow shell. What a 
historical coincidence it is, however, that the termination of modern Japan was sealed 
by the formal unconditional surrender to General MacArthur on board the battleship 
this attempt. The Anglican Nihon Seikokai stayed out of this integration and 
consequently ceased its official existence. 
'°'On the documents of this active cooperation of the Kyodan; see Kaino, 
"Statement," in Amamiya et al., 149-156. A sympathetic appraisal of the Kyodan 
under the war is given by Charles Inglehart in : "The Church and War Time 
Pressures," Japan Christian Quarterly, 18 (Winter 1952): 34-42. Comparing the 
wartime attitudes found in America and Japan respectively, Inglehart wrote of the 
American part: "On the other hand, year by year church-wide pronouncements are 
being toned down. Step by step they recede from former positions. . . to safer and 
saner, more general and less sharply ethical statements of conviction. Fine 
distinctions are drawn, much rationalization of motives and methods is elaborated, but 
when the smoke clears, the churches are found backing the national objectives straight 
down the line" (41). Though not to be used as an excuse by Japanese Protestantism, 
this generalization of the American situation is strikingly similar to the Japanese 
churches as well. Sophisticated theologians were able to elude the traps of "Emperor 
or Christ" placed by the thought-control police, while the less sophisticated pastors of 
the Holiness Groups, unable to escape, were imprisoned and some of them martyred. 
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Missouri in Tokyo Bay, a scene tragically reminiscent of the opening of modern Japan 
about a century before. 
The war, which began in 1930 with the Manchurian Incident, involved the 
sacrifice of tens of millions of lives on the Chinese continent, Korean Peninsula and in 
South-East Asian nations, in addition to several millions of Japanese soldiers and 
civilians. Who was responsible for this meaningless suffering and immense sacrifice? 
What were the reasons for the condemnable and tragic outcome? 
Before going further with this historical sketch, we have to stop here to 
consider the nature of human history as it had been played out in prewar Japan. At 
once it must be stated that no group of Japanese can plead "not guilty" or claim 
freedom from responsibility for the war and all the carnages it involved, based upon 
the excuse that they were themselves deceived and misled by those who were "really" 
responsible. Sins and atrocities committed against tens of millions of humans were 
historical, objective eternally indelible facts, and all the Japanese should bear upon 
themselves that burden of guilt. 
Having clearly recognized this inexorable fact, we need also to consider the 
nature of historical forces. This consideration is necessary to confirm the guiltiness of 
the people who imposed injustice and crimes upon other nations. Otherwise, one 
would dare to exonerate oneself, placing all fault on the blind historical forces. To 
state the point here, the nation lives under historical forces which on rational analysis 
seem to overwhelm human moral and physical capabilities. For this reason, destiny 
could provide the ground for self-absolution from guiltiness. However, even if on the 
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basis of rational analysis one could establish irresistible forces or "fatal" determinants 
in the historical course of events, man is still responsible for his acts. 
In our sketch of the historical development of modern Japan toward the 
catastrophe, we have pointed out that the fascist totalitarianism of the nation was in 
one sense preconditioned by the Meiji oligarchs' reorganization policies: the 
absolutization of the emperor and the re-indoctrination of feudal Confucian social 
views. The national objective, "enriching the nation, strengthening the military," 
contained a latent inner tendency toward unethical pragmatism.' But, in view of 
the Meiji leaders' ideological presuppositions conditioned by their upbringing and 
culture, questions arise: was it possible for the Meiji leaders to opt for different 
policies from those they actually chose? Further, under the intermittent economic 
depressions, with a steadily aggravating population explosion and increasing social and 
economical miseries in urban and rural areas, was it practically feasible for the young 
military officers with their indoctrinated ideology, to think otherwise than they actually 
did? A question of particular significance for us is this: Was it also possible for the 
Church leaders to act defiantly against the military government? In fact, the majority 
of Christians, leaders and laymen alike, naturally wanted themselves to be loyal 
Japanese in national emergency, although they did indeed feel governmental pressure 
in the direction of a fanatic nationalism. These are some sober questions raised from 
"objective" historical observations. One can answer these questions in the negative, 
''Aritomo Yamagata, a general and one of the Meiji oligarachs, "admonished 
the (Japanese) cabinet in the final year of the conflict (of World War I) that 'nations 
make war to extend their interest, not to advance idealistic principles'" (Burkman, 38). 
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saying that in whatever walk of life (military or civilian, Christian or non-Christian), 
citizens in Japan as a whole during the turbulent historical period had no choice but to 
be drawn along by the irresistible force of fate. This deterministic view, not 
unreasonable in itself, can be used as an argument for claiming a verdict of "not 
guilty" by those who tend to exonerate themselves from historical responsibilities. 
But, though fate and guilt are rationally irreconcilable, human beings are still 
responsible for what they actually have done, because ethical responsibility under any 
circumstances is actual and is something which makes man Man. Theologically, we 
are accountable before God; this holds true disregarding the historical circumstance 
under which we live and act. And it is a fact that without recognizing one's own sin, 
there is no possibility for a person to learn from historical experience or to live anew 
as a forgiven and restored human being. The same holds to a greater degree for the 
Church. 
The Post-War Years to the Present 
Japan was now reduced to her physical and spiritual minimum. Japan was 
utterly defeated, and the emperor now declared himself human. This collapse of the 
Japanese myth of "the divine nation" with the emperor as the living god, was a 
complete reversal of the once high national values. Disillusionment and desperation 
could have caused an anarchical situation in the country immediately after World War 
II. As the true features of the warfare beginning from the Manchurian Incident were 
gradually known—government deception in propaganda, military atrocities and 
meaningless sacrifices--popular dismay became deeper and deeper. Sincere 
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intellectuals found their real lives terminated, recognizing their wartime failures 
unredeemable.' 
On this scene of historical crisis, General MacArthur of the United States, as 
Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces, provided the center of gravity for Japan 
politically, socially and spiritually. Though it may sound strange that the military 
general of enemy forces was gradually received in Japan as if he were a savior, it was 
not without reason. In the midst of the total collapse of the authority that the nation 
desperately needed, General MacArthur was capable of commanding authority, thus 
winning deep respect among the general populace. The first occupation measures 
taken by the Allied (substantially American) Forces were those aimed at abolishing the 
old political, economical and social systems. The Imperial Military Forces were 
disbanded; repressive legislations were all nullified; all the political prisoners, in 
particular the Communists, were freed; State-Shintoism was dismantled; all the higher 
officials under the military regime were purged from their government posts; and all 
big zaibatsu were dissolved. 
But the constructive policies were conceived immediately after these 
'From a history of Japanese literature, one reads that a number of novelists and 
poets were compelled to deep self-criticism and nihilism. Yasunari Kawabata, a Nobel 
Prize laureate, wrote after the war: "The war being over and lost, I have nothing now 
but to retreat into the (world of) sorrows of old Yamato," and "as a dead being I have 
no desire from now on to write a line but that transitory beauty of Japan" (quoted in: 
Takeo Okuno, A History of Jae Literature, [Tokyo: Chuo Koron Sha, 1970]), 184. In 
this connection, Okuno says that there were many established writers who kept on writing 
after the war as if there had been no war. And yet a small number of writers were 
deeply conscientious to assume their own responsibilities after the war. "The 
[conscientious] attitude of this minority of writers was deeply touching, disregarding 
whether their wartime thoughts and sayings were 'good or bad,'" observes Okuno. 
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"clearing" measures and they were benevolent in nature and carried out with 
determination. Of the most momentous significance for postwar, and also present 
Japan, was the formulation of the new Constitution. Drafted originally in English by 
the Staff of the Supreme Commander, it was promulgated in November 1946 and went 
into effect on May 3, 1947.104 
In substance, the new Constitution was a reversal of the Meiji Constitution. 
The emperor became the symbol of national unity, "deriving his position from the will 
of the people with whom resides sovereign power (!)."" Political responsibility and 
authority were definitely placed in the people. Fundamental human rights were 
guaranteed by the Constitution "to the people of this and future generations as eternal 
and inviolable rights."' One of the most significant points of the Constitution was 
Article 9 on the renunciation of war, namely that Japan would never maintain any war 
potential in any form. 
Indicating a high mark of pacifist and democratic idealism, the Constitution 
was of revolutionary significance for the formation of postwar Japan. With these 
constitutional measures and other social, economic and educational reform policies, 
which were wisely and efficiently carried out under the authority of the Supreme 
Commander, Japan was changed completely from a fascist country into a pacifist 
nation, from a feudalistic and authoritarian country into a decentralized and democratic 
''On the process of drafting the new Constitution, see: Borton, 409-502. 
"A phrase from Article 1 of the new Constitution. 
phrase from Article 11 of the Constitution. 
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nation. As the nation settled more and more, reactions against this ideal constitution 
were bound to sooner or later occur, but the substance of the new Constitution, once 
introduced and appropriated by the Japanese, would never fade away from the nation's 
political and social consciousness.' 
The reconstruction process was going on steadily, though admittedly the 
political, social and economic situation was precarious and turbulent during the first 
few post-war years. A measure of dissatisfaction with the policies of the Allied 
Forces "came to the surface" now and then. Even rumors of Communist revolution 
were heard. But the firm authority of the Allied Forces and the largely docile, 
cooperative majority of the population held the situation under control. As the 
national recovery proceeded, the day of reassumption by the Japanese of full 
responsibility for the nation approached. 
Furthermore, when the Korean War erupted in June 1950, the once 
collapsed national economy was gaining definite momentum toward recovery. This 
provided extraordinary demands for goods and services needed by the American 
Forces in conflict with the Communist regime of North Korea. Pausing to reflect 
upon the nature of history, one wonders: How "unfair" history's dispensation appears 
to be, that the nation once "victimizing" her neighbor country should recover 
economically by the latter's tragic sacrifice! 
In the meantime, on September 8, 1951, in San Francisco, the peace treaty 
was signed by forty-eight nations and went into effect on April .28, 1952, marking the 
'See Reischauer, 273-275. 
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independence of Japan. In September 1953 Japan was admitted into the United 
Nations. From this point on, the nation again rose to the status of a nation among the 
nations, only this time as a pacifist nation. 
During these postwar years, the Protestant Church, or the Kyodan, suffered 
disorder and material damage. But thanks to the help from oversea partner churches, 
the Church in Japan was able to resume its rebuilding activity and missionary work in 
war-torn Japan.'' In its third General Assembly held in the beginning of July 1946, 
the leaders and laymen issued a declaration, first confessing their sins before God and 
apologizing to their fellow countrymen for their negligence of duties as Christians 
during the war and then stating their determination to carry out the mission of the 
Church for the restoration of the collapsed nation.'' 
The Protestant Church was placed in a favorable position in Japan again. A 
so-called "Christian Boom" came and the churches were visited by many of those who 
were spiritually dislocated. The church-leaders were busily occupied with the 
questions of strategy about how they could meet the needs of those people visiting the 
'On October 23, 1945, a deputation of four men representing the Foreign 
Missions Conference of North America and the National Council of the Churches in 
the U.S.A. arrived, and fellowship meetings were held, under which various aid 
programs were arranged. See Yamaya, 181-82; Drummond, 272. 
""Standing now in the midst of the Capital reduced to ashes," the 
Declaration runs, "we Christians as the believers of the Gospel of peace painfully 
recognize our sins of being unfaithful and negligent toward our mission, and express 
our deepest repentance before God and men." Beginning with these words, the 
Declaration deplores the aggravation of spiritual and material suffering and the wide 
spread of materialistic thought into every stratum of society, and expresses the 
Christians' determination to stand up for the ministry with the Gospel for the 
rebuilding of the nation (Kaino, Statements," Amamiya et al., 151-52). 
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churches. But the question of the church's wartime responsibility, which was bound 
to emerge sooner or later, seems not to have occupied the minds of the Kyodan 
leaders deeply and properly." 
However, the Kyodan, especially its leaders, seems to have jumped on the 
opportunity provided by the "Christian Boom" instead of probing deeply on how 
faithfully the Kyodan had carried out its God-given ministries to the nation during the 
war and reflecting what the war meant to neighboring nations. The leaders may have 
felt that they were victims rather than victimizers. They may have had no spiritual 
resources left over to reflect deeply on these matters and the immediate tasks facing 
them may not have allowed them to examine these issues. Understandable as these 
situations may be, the fact of wartime responsibility remains, and the issue would 
demand, sooner or later, that it be settled theologically and ethically by the Church in 
Japan.' 
"Although the Declaration had been issued, Yamaya admits that the Kyodan 
should have made its rebuilding with a deeper self-examination and a more candid 
repentance. He continues: "True, it [repentance] was done to a certain extent, but to 
our regret it was not sufficient. . . . Certainly, it was important for us to look 
forward, leaving the past behind. But even so, were not we too insensitive to our 
responsibility then? In sum, we were not conscientious enough in our faith, this we 
cannot but confess" (Yamaya, 177). This reflection of Yamaya is significant because 
he wrote this as a senior leader of the Kyodan and as one personally involved in all 
the painful experiences of the Kyodan under the war. We also will see this reflection 
of Yamaya against the background of his overall very sympathetic presentation of the 
Kyodan under the war in the work we refer to presently. 
"Tsutomu Oshio, the biographer of Talcakura, also a senior Kyodan leader, 
pointed out the failure of the Kyodan at the beginning of rebuilding, saying: "We 
might leave the questions open about behaviors of the Kyodan during the war, but at 
least those who were in the positions of responsibility during the wartime should have 
put aside their private considerations, resigned from the leadership, and tried to 
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Partly related to these wartime behaviors of the Kyodan, some held that, to 
make a new start, the Kyodan should be dissolved because of its "irresponsible" 
conduct during the war."' In fact, a dissolution process within the Kyodan took 
place when the Allied Forces replaced the Religious Bodies Law of 1939 with the 
Religious Corporations Ordinance, a process by which some of the major 
denominational churches began to withdraw from the Kyodan."3 
The reason for this dissolution was manifold. One view was that since the 
Kyodan was brought into existence by the Religious Bodies Law of the military 
regime, the basis for the Kyodan's continuance no longer existed. Another view was 
that in the Kyodan--a "disorderly" composite of different denominations—it was 
impossible for any particular denomination to realize its own traditional values. Still 
another factor was the desire in respective denominations for the restoration of 
relations with missionary societies overseas."' For these and other reasons, many of 
the denominations withdrew themselves. By the end of 1947, Reformed, Anglicans, 
establish a new form for the Kyodan. The failure to do so was the gravest and most 
irrecoverable mistake the Kyodan had made then toward the Church of the world and 
the Japanese people" (Yasushi Kuyama, ed., Modern Japan and Christianity: The 
Present [Tokyo: Sobunsha, 19], 34). 
"'According to Ken Ishihara, there were two positions concerning the 
continuation of the Kyodan: the one party held that despite all the deficiencies and 
mistakes, the Kyodan was a fact of the united Church in which participating 
denominations once saw the providence of God; the other party was equally convinced 
that the wartime behaviors of the Church were inexcusable and the Kyodan for that 
reason should be dissolved to make a new start (Essays on Japanese Church History, 




Lutherans, Baptists, the Salvation Army, Holiness Groups, and other small 
denominations had withdrawn. 
In the early phase, the Kyodan had no resources for countering to these 
dissolving forces. But it became clear that a need for the Kyodan's reorganization 
from inside was acute and urgent. Some former denominational groups, though still 
remaining in the Kyodan, felt the same problems as those who had left it. During the 
first decade after the end of the war, three major issues were taken up for 
reorganization and redefinition of the Kyodan as a united Protestant church body. 
They were, the restructuring of the Kyodan (completed in October 1950), the 
formation of its confession of faith (approved in October 1954), and the settlement of 
the so-called Kai-ha problem,"s which was raised by former Reformed and Baptist 
"'The Kai-ho problem was not a surface phenomenon. It has its roots in the 
very nature of the Kyodan's coming into being under the Religious Bodies Law. As 
we saw, the formation of the Kyodan was occasioned by government pressure. It was 
an emergency measure of the nation. It is therefore only in a highly dialectical sense 
that one can hold that the Kyodan was formed by divine providence. The claim 
therefore cannot be made in a facile and direct sense. The Kai-ha problem had an 
inner necessity that surfaced, in the sense that, formed by non-theological motives, the 
Kyodan could not provide any theological ground to those earnestly seeking the way 
to further build-up of the church in Japan. The Kyodan, in substance, had been a 
federation of the different denominational churches. The Reformed Kai-ha claimers 
seem to have been demanding the clarification of this form of federation in the 
Kyodan. But the Kyodan "declared that it is the united Church with the theological 
and organizational integrity" in the fourth General Assembly in 1946 (Yamaya, 232). 
Thus there was a deep gap between the Kyodan leaders and the Kai-ha claimers as to 
understanding of the nature of the Kyodan itself. Earlier, the Japan Evangelical 
Lutheran Church, for instance, insisted on the understanding of the Kyodan as a 
federation and, finding no place in the Kyodan for this understanding, decided to 
withdraw from that body (see Benjamin Paul Huddle, History of the Lutheran Church 
in Japan [New York; the Board of Foreign Missions-the United Lutheran Church in 
America, 1958], 218-221: We shall deal with this Lutheran withdrawal more below). 
The Kai-ha problem was a problem of profoundly difficult nature; it was no less than 
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denominational factions in the Kyodan in the form of claim for formal recognition of 
their semi-independence ("settled" in October 1950). As we shall see later, Kitamori 
actively participated in all three reform-programs and played a very crucial role as the 
secretary of every committee for these efforts. 
The first item for the Kyodan was the restructuring of its organization 
necessitated by the need for democratization. The district system was introduced, as 
was local autonomy. More difficult to solve, however, were the two others. The 
Kai-ha problem, if handled unwisely, could have caused the Kyodan's virtual 
dissolution. The committee dealing with this problem struggled hard to find a solution 
for the contradictory claims between the preservation of the Kyodan's de facto 
integrity on the one hand and the factions semi-independence on the other. Standing 
on the conviction that the Kyodan was providentially formed and should continue to 
work as the united Protestant church in Japan, the committee denied any form of 
denominational independence within the Kyodan, though open fellowship among the 
churches of former denominational affiliation was admitted."' Through this 
"settlement," the Reformed claimers for the Kai-ha constituted their own denomination 
in May 1951. 
a confessional union of highly diverse denominations! In fact, this issue is still on the 
agenda in the Kyodan today, the witness of which is the publication of: Iwao Morioka 
ed., The United Church of Christ in Japan as a United Church--Its Denominational 
Traditions and Particular Nature (Tokyo: Shinkyo Shuppansha, 1989). In this 
pamphlet, the Reformed-Presbyterian, the Methodists and Holiness Groups, 
Congregational and the Baptist traditions are discussed by the authors from respective 
traditions within the Kyodan. 
mIshihara, 285-289. 
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A still more important issue for the Kyodan was the formation of its 
confession; it was thought urgent to unify all the denominational differences within the 
Kyodan. Immediately before the war, the preparatory committee of the proposed 
Kyodan attempted to formulate a confession. But due to the nature of providing such 
a confessional consensus from large denominational diversity, it was naturally not 
possible for it to be formulated under the time restrictions imposed by the Religious 
Bodies Law.''' Nor was it possible for the Kyodan to prepare a confession under the 
postwar turbulances. But its leaders thought that, due to their lack of a confession, 
the Kyodan would face the danger of self-dissolution. As the postwar crisis of the 
Kyodan intensified, it became more and more urgent for the Kyodan to formulate the 
confession upon which the united Protestant church could be re-unified and further 
established. But it was a formidable task. 
As a matter of fact, the desire for a confession to be formulated as soon as 
possible was on the agenda during the Kyodan's third General Assembly held in 1946, 
immediately after the war. A committee was appointed at that time for the task and it 
began to study the possibilities." Although it was reorganized once in the process of 
"During the preparatory process, there were debates about the wording of the 
confession of the proposed united Church body. But since it was not a confession that 
the Education Ministry required but a "Summary of the Teachings," all the dealings 
with the formulation of the confession were suspended due to the wartime emergency, 
while a simple summary was provided to meet the government requirement and 
included in the Kyodan's constitution; see Hori, 103-115. 
'Since the reorganization in 1951, this committee was called as the Special 
Committee for the Formulation of the Confession; the chairman of this committee was 
changed, but Kitamori, the secretary, remained throughout, and he, ex-officio, played 
a crucial role in formulating the final draft of the Confession; we keep this in mind for 
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the Kyodan's restructuring, the committee members remained the same and continued 
the work to the end of the project. 
In October 1954, the text of the Kyodan's confession was finally presented 
to the eighth General Assembly and approved by majority vote."' The Confession 
begins with the words: "We believe and confess. . ." Then belief in the Bible and 
the doctrine of Trinity is confessed. After these ecumenical parts comes the Reformed 
doctrine which confesses: 
God chooses us by His grace, and by faith in Christ alone He forgives our sins 
and justifies us. In this unchangeable grace the Holy Spirit accomplishes His 
work by sanctifying us and causing us to bear fruits of righteousness. 
And for our understanding of the Kyodan and Kitamori's theology it is necessary here 
to get acquainted also with the following paragraph on the Church: 
The Church is the Body of Christ the Lord, and is the congregation of those who 
are called by grace. The church observes public worship, preaches the Gospel 
aright, administers the sacraments of Baptism and the Lord's Supper, and being 
diligent in works of love, waits in hope for the coming again of the Lord. 
In order to accomplish this Confession the committee spent a number of 
assiduous years. What were some of their points of difficulty? One fundamental 
requirement of this Confession is that all the factions within the Kyodan had to be able 
to find room for their denominational backgrounds and emphases, and interpret the 
the later presentation. 
"'The English text of the Confession is found in "Documents of the United 
Church of Christ in Japan," Japan Christian Quarterly 45 (Summer 1979): 172. 
Other official Kyodan documents such as the Constitution, Guidelines for Christian 
Living, the Confession of the Wartime Responsibility are also included in the 
"article." 
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confession according to their denominational convictions. In a sense this confession is 
a formulation of the minimum consensus of "theological views" of the constituting 
denominational factions. The underlying assumption of the entire attempt to formulate 
the confession seems to have been that there existed a common ground of faith in a 
latent form, a ground which could include all the denominations. It seems as if they 
presupposed that there were no genuine theological problems between the Protestant 
denominations, between Lutherans and Reformed, between the Anglicans and the 
Baptists. The task is then to articulate the latent consensus and formulate it in a way 
acceptable to all the constituents. This is not a confession which came into being by 
the urging of an external situation which demanded the defense of evangelical truth 
against other theological or secular ideological attacks. It is a confession to unify the 
factions by formulating the latent theological consensus. The question is whether or 
not this formulation of the Confession could possess a Geschichtsfahigkeit in 
reality. 'm 
As to the content of the Confession, it is clearly ecumenical and evangelical. 
And the emphasis is on the soteriological aspects of the Christian faith. The 
understanding of the Church is, though somewhat simplified, reminiscent of Article 
'This Confession is very much Kitamori's work. He wrote an explanation of 
this Confession to which we shall come back. A question we keep in mind in this 
connection is whether it is possible to settle the problem by simply formulating the 
theological consensus on a "facile" assumption as I suggested here. In retrospect, the 
Confession seems to possess only a limited significance beyond the temporarily 
ameliorating effect on the Kyodan in the danger of dissolution. 
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VII of the Augsburg Confession. We see that the Kyodan defined itself in a church-
centered way with this Confession, true to the Uemura-Takakura tradition. With a 
confession thus formulated and officially approved, the Kyodan was now reorganized 
and expected to work in the world as the bearer of the Gospel of Christ. 
Speaking of the reorganization of the postwar Kyodan, we have to include an 
important item, the establishment of Tokyo Shingaku Daigaku, or Tokyo Union 
Theological Seminary (TUTS), in 1948. The former Nihon Kiristo-kyo Shingaku 
Senmon-gakko, or Japan Christian Theological School (1944) was reorganized and 
recognized by the postwar Education Ministry as a university level institution in 
compliance with the new educational ordinances. Because of its history and location, 
TUTS has been the leading theological seminary in Japan. 
Due to the international situation, particularly the onset of the Cold War, 
Japan publicly began to rearm herself with a "Self-Defense Force" in 1954, based 
upon the government interpretation of the Constitution that, while renouncing war, the 
Constitution does not renounce self-defense. Along with this reformulation of military 
policy, the educational systems and the police force were also recentralized 
simultaneously. Most crucial of all was a strong drive from the ruling conservative 
Liberal Democratic Party to the "reconsiderations" of the Constitution. In 1956 a 
commission was appointed to prepare for a revision of the Constitution. This revisory 
work was conducted on the basis of the theory that the Constitution had been brought 
into existence and imposed upon the nation by the Occupation Forces; it was argued 
that a new constitution should be drafted by the initiative of the Japanese. The focus 
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of the "reconsideration" was, first of all, on Article 9, which declares the nation's 
renunciation of war as a means to solve international conflicts. 
The Kyodan and other Protestant churches issued a strong protest against the 
move to revise the Constitution. In 1962 the Kyodan officially issued a declaration for 
the defense of the Constitution which "was born with the sacrifice of many lives and 
much property and represents 'the universal human principle' of popular sovereignty, 
fundamental human rights and pacifism."' Subsequently, large scale campaigns 
were held by the Kyodan in Tokyo and Osaka for the preservation of the current 
Constitution, and sessions were arranged for the study of the Constitution on the 
grass-roots level among Protestant churches. 
Certainly, this revisionist thrust was only a part of the total political 
tendency which came to surface as the nation gradually gained confidence in its 
national strength. Proposals made by the government for the restoration of National 
Foundation Day and the re-nationalization of the two prominent Shinto shrines, Ise 
and Yasukuni, were examples of this tendency in the early 1960s. The Kyodan 
responded to these issues with strong protest declarations. These responses indicate 
that these "external" political issues could not be disregarded by the Church; rather 
they might have grave consequences politically, socially and religiously, and the 
Church had to make her position clear and act out what was deemed necessary. 
'The text of this declaration see: "The Document. . ." note 117 above), 173-
174. 
inKigen-setsu, ems , which is now called the National Foundation Day 
( 111311E*E1 ). 
87 
Is the Church only to respond passively to dangerous tendencies present in 
society and the nation? Does she have no constructive and preventive role to play? 
Japanese Protestantism, as church body, was generally slow to respond to socio-
political issues. This situation may be attributed to the fact that, as a small minority 
with limited resources in theology, personnel, and other areas, the church body and 
the local congregation had enough to do with the task "proper" to the Church. 
However, there have been active, constructive movements for peace and 
democracy within the Kyodan. A prominent one is the Christian Society for 
Peace,' organized in 1951 as an influential group within the Kyodan. One of its 
leaders, Yoshio Inoue, a former TUTS professor, was a student of Barth and one of 
the translators of Barth's work. Inoue strongly advocated the unity of Christian faith 
and socio-political responsibility. According to Inoue, there were two forces that 
occasioned the formation of this Christian peace movement: "one was the crisis of the 
Korean War, and the other was a consciousness of war responsibility among the 
participants.' It was forces like this group within the Kyodan that stood behind the 
Kyodan's issuance of a protest statement in 1959 against the renewal of the U.S.-Japan 
Security Pact, which was scheduled in 1960 and, in fact, occasioned nation-wide 
'See on this point: Yataka Sishido, "The Peace Movement of Postwar 
Japanese Christians," Japan Christian Quarterly 51 (Fall 1985): 215-224. The name 
of this peace organization in Japanese is 
124An utterance of Inoue at a panel discussion recorded in: "Reassessing the 
Kyodan's 'Confession of Wartime Responsibility,'" Japan Christian Quarterly 45 
(Summer 1979): 156. 
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protest waves against the government.' The Christian Society for Peace indicates 
the fact that there has been steady undercurrents of strong consciousness of socio-
political responsibility in the Kyodan and in Japanese Protestantism at large.' 
This is an appropriate place to include a brief overview of theological 
'Yamaya, 316-317. Yamaya admits that "the Kyodan is responsible toward 
society and nation as the United Church of Protestantism in Japan." Even so, Yamaya 
says, it was rather rare for the Kyodan to address itself to social and national issues. 
But on the occasion of the renewal of this security pact, the Kyodan's Mission 
Department prepared the protest statement together with its theological explanation and 
issued it upon the approval of the Standing Committee. According to this document 
the Church confessing the Lordship of Christ is entrusted the ministry of "the 
Watcher" and "the Salt of the Earth," and therefore cannot remain silent, but should 
clearly state its opposition when the state heads for a military alliance with a specific 
nation and her own rearmament against the pacifist current toward detente. Although 
issued with the approval of the Standing Committee, this statement was severely 
criticized by those who had different views on this issue. They held that a political 
statement issued in the name of the Kyodan deprives the rights of those in the Kyodan 
who have different political convictions. Upon this criticism, the Standing Committee 
apologized for its indiscretion over this delicate political issue. 
'26In 1960, the year of the renewal, an interdenominational movement 
organized against the pact renewal. The Kyodan people made up the core of this 
movement. This movement, called the Christian Protest Group Against the Renewal 
of the Security Pact, issued a declaration, which is of interest for us to know its 
theological viewpoint, so we quote its entirety: "The prophetic idea of eternal peace 
of the world by total disarmament, expressed in the word 'beating swords into 
plowshares,' has become to the human race a most urgent imperative by the coming of 
the ultimate weapons. It therefore is against the spirit of the Peace Constitution of 
Japan and also against the present world-wide currents moving from the peace by 
power to the peace of negotiation, that Japan now is going to renew the Japan-U.S. 
Security Pact and to make it a military alliance. Now is the time that,also in order for 
her to compensate her sins against China and other Asian nations, Japan should 
contribute to the realization of peace, offering herself as a bridge between the East and 
the West. We demand not only to terminate any negotiations for the renewal of the 
Security Pact, which shall ruin such a nobie mission entrusted to Japan, but also to 
abolish the Pact System itself as soon as possible. We declare that we shall make our 
best efforts to the establishment of a God-pleasing international order in which all the 
international conflicts be solved not by the deployment of weapons," (quoted in 
Yamaya, 315-316). 
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background of the development of the Kyodan. First of all, it should be pointed out 
that it was Karl Barth who remained a dominant theological force.' Surely the 
Japanese theological community has been quite attentive to theological currents in 
Europe and America, and influences from these currents are readily noticeable. 
Emil Brunner came to Japan twice, 1949 and 1953, as a "missionary" and 
left certain influences corrective to Barth's "exclusive" line.'" In 1950, John C. 
Bennett of Union Theological Seminary in New York visited Japan, and introduced 
Reinhold Niebuhr while comparing him with Barth. Thus Niebuhr also had his 
influence on the reflection of the Church's socio-ethical relevance.'" Rudolf 
'Yasuo Furuya, "The Influence of Barth on Present-day Theological Thought 
in Japan," Japan Christian Quarterly 30 (Fall 1964): 262-267; Yoshio Noro, "Postwar 
Japanese Theologies: Retrospect and Prospect," Gospel and World 40 (Tokyo: 
September 1985); Toshio Sato, "Forty Postwar Years: A Review of Systematic 
Theology," Bible and Church (Tokyo: February 1987). 
''When Brunner came to Japan the second time, he was to serve as a 
professor of Christian ethics and philosophy at International Christian University in 
Tokyo as well as TUTS. In an interview, Brunner mentioned that there were three 
reasons for his coming to Japan again: Japan's strategic position for Christian 
influence in Asia, an imminent urgency to fill Japan with Christian influences, and the 
need of the Japanese Church to see the way of "interpretation of the Gospel in terms 
of our problems, and of the problems in terms of the Gospel." He thought that, with 
his inclusive theological method, he could help with these challenges "in some small 
way." "I heard the voice of God in this call to come to Japan," see more in detail of 
this interview: "Why I Returned to Japan," Japan Christian Quarterly 20 (Winter 
1954): 14-17. Even with his energetic work in Japan for two full years, observes 
Toshio Sato, "it is not certain how convincing his inclusive method vis-a-vis Karl 
Barth had been to Japanese theologians under the influence of Barth" ("Review," 21). 
'""Dr. Bennett gave us," wrote a Doshisha professor, "a better understanding 
of the social situation and stimulated us, students, ministers and theologians, to 
Christian action. It is not to be forgotten that his personal visit called forth a new zeal 
to face up to the current problems" (Tadakazu Uoki, "Theological Trends in Japan 
Today," Japan Christian Quarterly 18 [Summer 1952]: 212). On a deep significance 
of Bennett's visit, see further Germany, 198-200. 
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Bultmann's theology of demythologization and his existential interpretation of the New 
Testament aroused lasting responses among theologians around the early 1960s.'" 
And Paul Tillich was invited to Japan in 1963 and lectured at various universities on 
his "correlative" theology and was a great influence toward the formation of 
immanentic theology in Japan."' Responding to these and other theological 
impulses, corresponding types of theology have been formed. These theologies should 
be of deep interest and concern for any student of Japanese Protestant theology. 
But in terms of "practical" impacts upon the working churches, they do not 
stand beside the overwhelming influence and impact of Barth. And the translated 
books of Barth's extensive writings seem to be almost co-extensive with the German 
publications, at least as far as his major works are concerned. A solid bulk of the 
Kyodan leaders, who are also pastors of local congregations, are readers of Barth's 
Kirchlice Dogmatik and other writings for their concrete congregational work, whether 
for sermon inspiration or pastoral care.'" 
'"Of a wide impact of Bultmann, see Furuya, Influence, 263-264. 
"According to Noro, Tillich's influence gradually infiltrated the thought-
world of Japan. Noro points out that Tillich's visit in Japan and the turning point of 
Japanese theology from the idea of a transcendental God to the idea of an immanentic 
God fell together, Postwar, 35. 
'2We almost at random can glean the samples of this mode of Barth's 
reception among Japanese theologians and pastors from Morioka, Japanese and Barth 
(see note 94 above). Shin Murakami, a leading Bonhoeffer scholar, confesses: "First 
and foremost, it is Karl Barth [who determined my theological pilgrimage], all his 
writings are an inexhaustible fountain of comfort and inspiration to me as a pastor 
with daily ministry. He, to me, is more my own pastor than a world-renowned great 
theologian" (ibid., 21). "I firmly believe this," also writes Masatoshi Fukuda, a 
former Professor at TUTS and a Kyodan leader, who calls Barth my sensei ("teacher" 
in Japanese, a revered but also affectionate appelative), "that in the midst of this 
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In this connection, we suggest that the cause of the conflicts within the 
Kyodan seem to be traceable back to Barth's own theological position vis-à-vis socio-
political relevance of the Christian faith, and perhaps also to each theologian's 
interpretation of Barth. In this sense, the conflict can be said to be between the two 
"Barthian" camps.' Be this as it may, it is clear that the rediscovery of Barth has 
been a major factor behind the conflict. We will be back to this issue when we deal 
with Kitamori's position in this constellation of theological influences. 
A name which must be mentioned, besides Barth's, in terms of theological 
and practical influence on the Kyodan after the 60s, is that of Dietrich Bonhoeffer. 
First introduced to Japan around 1950, Bonhoeffer's life and thought, as a martyr 
during World War II, captured the attention and interest of Japanese theologians, 
pastors and ordinary Christians.'' His heroic life and sublime mixture of Christian 
idealism and realism won many followers; Gemeinsames Leben was widely read in the 
churches. Bonhoeffer's ideas of the "World Coming of Age" and the "Non-Religious 
Interpretation of Biblical Concepts" were enthusiastically welcomed as hermeneutical 
present time of no directions, no meanings and no strength for life, it is only his 
[Barth's] theology that can point the way of living with true freedom and 
responsibility" (ibid., 47). Although in this booklet there are a few articles which 
warn against the wholesale affirmation of Barth's theology, a majority of the 
contributors entertain the same "devotion" to Barth as Murakami and Fukuda. 
Amamiya et al., 155-157, Yoshio Inoue, an interpreter of Barth, severely 
criticizes the elder Barthians, Kumano and Kuwada, for their religious 
transcendentalism over socio ethical responsibility of the Church. Here is a case in 
point concerning the ever-recurrent conflict within the Kyodan. In other words, it is 
the two Barth interpretations that are in conflict with each other within the Kyodan. 
"Toshio Sato, "Forty Postwar Years," 23. 
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levers for the New Testament message by the rising theologians of the postwar 
decades. In addition to these ideas, his thoughts on the Church's responsibility to this 
world and his own testimony to this responsibility have been deeply influential from 
the middle of the 60s.' Japanese theologians, keenly conscious of the socio- 
political crisis in Japan, drew lessons from his Widerstand and Ergebung and Die 
Nachfolge. 
Now, along the line of socio-political emphasis within the Kyodan, an event 
of momentous significance for the Kyodan's future occurred toward the end of the 
1960s. On Easter morning in 1967, a confessional document was issued in the name 
of the Moderator of the Kyodan, Masahisa Suzuki (1913-1969),' titled "The 
Confession on the Responsibility of the United Church of Christ in Japan during 
World War II."'" 
"Heita Mori, "The Church's Confession of Guilt," Amamiya et al., 165-169. 
'Concerning this distinctive figure of the postwar Kyodan, Otis W. Bell, an 
IBC missionary to Japan from 1950 to 1969, gives a first hand impression. See his 
article: "Concerning The Rev. Mr. Masahisa Suzuki," Japan Christian Quarterly 38 
(Winter 1972): 52-54; further, Robert M. Fukuda, "Masahisa Suzuki: Preacher in the 
Prophetic Tradition," Japan Christian Quarterly 45 (Summer 1979): 163-168; Shin 
Muralcami, "Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Suzuki Masahisa on Death," Japan Christian 
Quarterly 52 (Summer 1986): 174-178. 
137The English text of this Confession is found in: "Document" (see note 119 
above), 176. According to Heita Mori, the date of the announcement of this 
confession was carefully selected, March 26, 1967. On Easter day in 1944, the 
Kyodan, in the name of the torisha--the highest authority of Kyodan at that time—sent 
out an official "pastoral" letter to "All the Christians within the Great East Asia Co-
prosperity Sphere." The letter exemplifies the "sins" of the Kyodan under the war; 
distortion of the Gospel, de facto affirmation of the war's legitimacy and insensitivity 
and inconsiderateness to all the sufferings of peoples in the "Sphere." The 
announcement of the "Confession of Wartime Responsibility" intentionally tried to 
redeem the wrong of the issuance of the letter of 1944 when the "same" date of 
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Although the confession of wartime responsibility, in one view, was long 
overdue (twenty-seven years after the end of the war!), this "prophetic" moderator 
firmly took the lead of issuing it. On the occasion of the twenty-fifth anniversary of 
the Kyodan's formation, sensing the coming of a new phase of building this church 
body for tomorrow, the Kyodan's moderator and its General Assembly felt it 
indispensable to face up to the ambiguity of its origin and its past mistakes during 
World War II, and decided to issue the confession. It states: "At this time we are 
reminded of mistakes committed in the name of the Kyodan during World War II. 
Therefore, we seek the mercy of our Lord and the forgiveness of our fellowmen."' 
After acknowledging the dual aspect of the formation of the Kyodan (the internal 
momentum toward the formation of the united Church and the external government 
coercion thereto), the confession candidly admits: 
"The Church, as 'the light of the world' and 'the salt of the earth' should not 
have aligned itself with militaristic purpose of the government. . . . However, 
we made a statement at home and abroad in the name of the Kyodan that we 
approved of and supported. . . . Now with deep pain in our hearts we confess 
this sin, seeking the forgiveness of our Lord, and from the churches and our 
brothers and sisters of the world, and in particular of Asian countries, and from 
the people of our own country." 
And this confession of wartime responsibility further expresses the Kyodan's "humble 
announcement and the same office (the torisha then, and the moderator now) are 
"matched" to the letter of 1944 (Heita Mori, "Contemporary Significance of the 
Church's Confession of Wartime Responsibility," [Japan] Christian Year Book, 
[Tokyo 1969], 43-49); on this particular point, 45. 
`the confession expresses its historical "context" with the following words: 
"Now, we are faced with the serious task of building the Kyodan. In order to express 
our sense of responsibility which the Kyodan has toward Japan and the world, we 
prayerfully take as our theme 'OUR CHURCH-TOMORROW.'" 
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determination" to correctly "accomplish its mission in Japan and in the world" by 
"God's help and guidance." 
Although the tone of the language used in this confession is restrained and 
conservative, its substance is very clear in declaring the Kyodan's emerging self-
understanding. It unmistakably affirms the Church's inherent responsibility to society 
and nation, not confining itself within its "spiritual" domain. In this sense, it could be 
considered complementary to the Confession of Faith of the Kyodan which was 
"enacted" in its eighth General Assembly.'" In fact, to many of the younger 
theologians, this confession is more than simply a socio-political appendix to the 
Confession of Faith; it is a confessional statement. It is not simply something 
ecclesiologically "desirable" to have, but it has to do with what is essential and 
indispensable for a church to be a church.' The younger theologians argued that 
'In one of his studies, Ishihara speaks of the Confession of Faith of the 
Kyodan. He says that the Confession is the best possible statement of evangelical faith 
relative to the resources time-wise and strength-wise then available to the committee 
members. And yet, Ishihara's modest self-criticism about this Confession was on the 
following point: As the Confession of the Church in the contemporary "heathen" 
environment of Japan, does this sufficiently express our Protestant faith, our position, 
conviction and criticism? "Our Confession of Faith, I wish, should possess criticism 
to the modern age in a way more sincere. In this sense, I wish the Kyodan that it 
produce the second confession complementary this present one," Ken Ishihara, Essays, 
307. The Confession of the Wartime Responsibility may not be exactly the second 
one Ishihara thought of, but his expectation seems to have come true to a certain 
extent. 
'Hon, perhaps in a somewhat one-sided way, represents the vanguard 
position of the Kyodan theologians concerning ecclesiological debates. We can see 
this in his aforementioned work; Church and Confession (see note 39). According to 
him, the Confession of Faith of the Kyodan is "pragmatic in character" (gomokuteki- 
sei, fr Fi OW ) and "theologically insubstantial" (shingakuteki muimi, 
i*VitOrtal* ), 263, but the Confession of the Wartime Responsibility "is concerned 
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the Kyodan could not remain in faith if it should fail to live up to the socio-ethical 
mandates underlying the Confession of Wartime Responsibility. 
Once issued, this Confession of Wartime Responsibility caused a controversy 
over its "fairness" and appropriateness.'" Indignant and critical voices were raised 
against the major points of the confession by the conservative wing within the Kyodan. 
Their criticism was based on the conviction that the Kyodan came into being by God's 
providence in spite of the government order. It should be unnecessary, they thought, 
for the Kyodan to repeat the confession of wartime mistakes, for the Kyodan 
confessed its failure and insufficiency in carrying out its responsibilities during the 
war. By the "re-issuance" of the Confession of Wartime Responsibility, the 
conservative leaders thought the Kyodan would tread on the path of the same 
opportunistic mistake, for this church body would now desire to keep pace with 
fashionable contemporary ideologies and try to align itself with the current domestic 
and international social upheavals.' 
vitally with the faith" (286). To be noted here for a further reference is the context in 
which Hon sharply criticizes Kitamori's theology for his theological formalism. To 
many theologians in the Kyodan, the Confession of the Wartime Responsibility is the 
starting point for the Kyodan's ecclesiological renewal. 
"Seita Mori, "Significance," 47-48. 
'Due to the unexpectedly large repercussions within the Kyodan aroused by 
the Confession of the Wartime Responsibility, the Standing Committee appointed a 
working committee, the so-called "Five-Member Committee," to deal with pro et 
contra on the questions of the Confession's content "constructively and pastorally." 
The Standing Committee set Kitamori as the chairman of the committee. The report 
of this committee, which reveals much of Kitamori's theological thinldng, was trying 
to take the legitimate points of both parties. Oddly enough, however, the committee 
defined the wartime failure of the Kyodan as lying not in the wartime behaviors but in 
the fact that the formation of the Kyodan was made without the unifying confession of 
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In this controversy there were two opposing ecclesiological views; one view 
was that the Church in its proper mission is above socio-political spheres and 
primarily deals with inner spiritual issues of human existence, leaving secular matters 
to reason and good sense; the other view was that the Church by its nature is involved 
in the life of this world, thus contradicting the first view as an illegitimate dualism. 
The issue here concerns ecclesiology, but it ultimately concerns the very understanding 
of the Gospel itself. 
The latent conflict within the Kyodan violently came to the surface when the 
Kyodan's participation in the Expo 70 was legalized by the Kyodan's General 
Assembly in October 1968.'43 The participation in the Expo 70 was supposed to be 
a joint enterprise of the Catholic Church and the Protestant churches, setting up the 
faith; further, as to the Kyodan's wartime behavior, the committee stated that the 
Kyodan performed the intercessory ministry for the state, although deficient in the 
prophetic and kingly ministry; furthermore, regarding the Church's relationship with 
socio-political issues, she should maintain her own transcendence over particular 
historical realities, allowing the believers within the Church multiple ways of dealing 
with concrete socio-political problems. With this mediating report of the committee, 
however, both parties expressed dissatisfaction. In particular the report was severely 
criticized by the supporters of the Confession as attempting to desubstantialize 
) the Confession and to settle the situation politically rather 
than theologically (Mori, ibid.). However, Mori gives credit to the Five-Member 
Committee, that with this report the Kyodan won tranquility for a time. 
"'This Expo participation of Japanese Christendom was first proposed by the 
National Council of Churches (NCC). Responding positively to this proposal, the 
Protestant denominations affiliated to the NCC (the Kyodan is the core), the Catholic 
Church in Japan, evangelical-conservative denominations and other Christian bodies, 
jointly organized a preparatory committee. As to the General Assembly of the 
Kyodan held in October 1968, it seems there were no problems felt then, even by the 
"prophetic" moderator Masahisa Suzuki. This indicates that the participation in the 
Expo as such was not an "absolute evil," but it rather seems to have triggered the 
latent inner tensions of the Kyodan to an explosive level. 
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"Christian Pavilion" at the site of the exhibition for the witness of the Gospel.'" 
The Expo 70, however, had been viewed with suspicious eyes by many socio-ethically 
conscious theologians and laymen. They believed that the Expo 70 served a three-fold 
political and economical purpose; the first purpose was to show off of the nation's 
economic and technological strength which was built upon various forms of 
exploitation of economically weaker nations; the second was to stimulate economic 
demands for big businesses; and third was to divert the attention of the public from 
the up-coming renewal of the US-Japanese Security Treaty." 
The opposition was first formed by seminary students in the Kansai area and 
then joined by those in Tokyo district. It became quite a large force when a group of 
younger pastors and professors from both areas took part in the opposition. Initially, 
rather moderate in claim and demand, the opposition rapidly gained momentum in 
demanding the unconditional cancellation of the Christian Pavilion plan. The Standing 
'"Kitamori was the chairman of the theme committee of the Christian Pavilion. 
The theme for the Pavilion was "Eye and Hands." Kitamori's explanation of this 
theme represents also the view of those who promoted the Pavilion project, and it 
says: "The Expo can be compared to a huge body symbolizing the progress and 
harmony of the human race. We wish that the christian Pavilion be the eye of this 
body. It certainly is a small eye,but it is the eye of discovering the lost humanity, the 
eye of finding the way of harmonious progress, the eye of seeing the true through all 
the disturbances, the eye of believing, hoping and loving. . . . And the eye looking 
for the progress and harmony are to be united with the working hands. The hands are 
those of reconciling, those of praying and those of serving" (quoted in [Japan] 
Christian Yearbook [Tokyo 1969], 63). 
"Tor the view of those in opposition to the Expo participation, see: Akio 
Doi, "Toward an Evaluation of the Problem," [Japan] Christian Yearbook (Tokyo 
1971), 45-49; for the view of the supporters of it, Yoshinobu Kumazawa, "The 
Problem of the Expo Christian Pavilion," ibid., 43-45. Kumazawa gives a detailed 
"chronology" of the development of this traumatic conflict. 
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Executive Committee of the Kyodan took the churchly disturbances aroused by this 
radical opposition seriously, and decided to convene an irregular General Assembly to 
reconsider the issues of Expo 70. But by then the situation exacerbated to an 
unreconcilable stage of confrontation. This made it impossible for the General 
Assembly to deal substantially with the issues.'46  
Part of the reason for the confusion was a traumatic incident which took 
place prior to the extraordinary General Assembly. On September 1, 1969, the first 
discussion was held between the Standing Committee and the anti-Expo forces. What 
was traumatic and tragic was that Kitamori, a member of the Standing Committee and 
the chairman of the Theme Committee for Expo 70,1" was struck twice by a student 
during the session."' The faculty of TUTS, meeting immediately after this incident, 
'46Of this development of the conflict, see: Ian MacLeod, "Wither Kyodan?" 
Japan Christian Quarterly 36 (Summer 1979): 168-174. MacLeod then was an 
executive secretary of the Kyodan's Standing Committee and was an observer ex-
officio at the meetings of the Standing Committee. 
"'See supra note 144. 
'40n one occasion several years later, Kitamori recalls the tragic September 
1st incident and I quote his own words here: "At the September 1st meeting, some 
forty or fifty paper pellets made of hard paper were thrown at me, and my eyeglasses 
were cracked. It was not merely a matter of jeers and shouting; some used rubber 
slingshots to shoot their paper pellets. No one can speak freely under such 
circumstances. Then we were packed into an all-night session of more than twenty 
hours and became thoroughly exhausted; our judgment was dulled. Just as in the 
mass-pressure meetings of campus confrontations, fatigue and anxiety bring one to a 
point of willingness to do anything for relief. The other side produced an already 
prepared document confirming its position and demanded our signature. I, too, gave in 
and signed the document, in a moment of indiscretion, but tore the paper up on the 
spot. It was then that I was struck." (The Task of the Federation of Evangelical 
Churches," Japan Christian Quarterly 45 [Summer 1979]: 151-154). The Spokesman 
of the TUTS Student Struggle Body, i.e., "the other side," as Kitamori puts it, has a 
different "version" of this incident to tell: "Speaking of that incident, it is necessary 
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issued a statement condemning the violence to which Professor Kitamori had been 
exposed and called upon the clergy present to account for their failure to restrain this 
violence. The students and clergy in opposition reacted violently to this statement and 
accused the faculty of distorting the issue itself.'" This incident triggered campus 
turmoil at TUTS. The student body set up a barricade around the seminary building, 
and the faculty refused to negotiate with the student body. The students then began to 
ask critical questions concerning the very foundation of TUTS' theological position, 
which, according to the opposition, was based upon an abstract, individualistic, 
pietistic and pro-establishmentarian theology. In early March of the following year, 
1970, forced by practical necessities and finding no measure to break a half-year 
impasse, the faculty eventually decided to "settle" the matter by calling the riot police 
onto the campus. Three students were arrested. This measure was defended by the 
conservative wing of the Kyodan as inevitable and legitimate, but the faculty was 
severely criticized and even accused of betrayal by the opposition and the moderate 
to be aware of the very urgent situation caused by the de-substantialized General 
Assembly proceedings of the Kyodan. . . the situation in which debates were easily 
overheated emotionally. It was in the midst of this circumstance that one student 
unintentionally struck Professor Kitamori in the cheek when Kitamori was too 
contemptuous toward the students in his dealing with them" (Gospel and World 24 
[Tokyo, May 1971], 38). On this issue, MacLeod writes: "It is the writer's opinion 
that the refusal, or incapacity, of the aforementioned professor [Kitamori] to respond 
at an appropriate level of emotional commitment to the students on the night of 
September 1 helped to inflame them to the point of the rough treatment that they gave 
him, and that the profound alienation between him and them, that resulted from this 
encounter has played a significant part in the escalated estrangement between the 
students and the faculty [of TUTS]. . ." (174, see note 145). 
''See MacLeod, ibid. 
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stratum of the Kyodan clergy.'°  
The work of building the Christian Pavilion was completed simultaneously 
with the time of the calling of the riot police onto TUTS campus, and the Pavilion 
featured the "soft-pedalled" Christian programs as the Expo 70 itself opened. TUTS 
resumed its "normal" operations. But the deep scar made by the vehement 
confrontation was traumatic for the Kyodan and TUTS, leaving theological and 
emotional tension between the leaders of the two bodies. 
The tension within the Kyodan between the "evangelical" wing and the 
socio-political wing was latent during the postwar decades. It became conspicuous 
with the issuance of the Confession of Wartime Responsibility. And it came to a head 
as the controversy erupted over the Kyodan's participation in the Expo 70. However, 
the tragic confrontation was not accidental. The Christian faith itself is of "bi-focal" 
nature. The vertical relation to God is inseparable from the horizontal relation to the 
'"One of the TUTS alumni, Noro, writes: "That group of TUTS students, 
who were influenced by the Movement of all Campus Struggle, put several questions 
to the faculty and demanded the answer to them as they shut themselves up in their 
dormitory. While maldng efforts to persuade the students, the faculty eventually gave 
up the efforts and called in the riot police to settle the problem. That, also to me, was 
a very sorrowful incident. Even now,I cannot believe how my [faculty] seniors and 
friends could take such a measure. Professor Kuwada taught us that. TUTS was a 
church. And yet a church now has settled the conflicts within the Church by the help 
of the state power. Even among non-Christian universities, which have nothing to do 
with religion, I know there were many professors staking their posts in opposition to 
calling the riot police onto their campuses in order to protect their campus autonomy 
[from government infringements]; [we Christians have to know that] their's was not to 
preserve the rule of the Holy Spirit over the Church" ("Postwar," 33-34). See also 
Akio Doi, (note 143), 48-49. A moderate and sympathetic reconciliation attempt 
between the faculty and the students was given by Kuwata, the former President of 
TUTS, "Post the TUTS Problem," [Japan] Christian Yearbook (Tokyo 1971), 49-52. 
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neighbor in love. In fact, neither wing denies these two foci. The question is, then, 
how can the Church live the "bi-focal" Gospel and witness to it faithfully in a given 
historical situation. Surely, the question cannot be answered with a formula; it must 
be sought in a concrete situation in the living encounter with the Gospel. Deeply 
traumatic as it was, the harsh clash between the two wings may have been a necessary 
historical step toward a deeper understanding of the Gospel in Japanese Protestantism. 
During the three postwar decades the Church enjoyed religious freedom. No 
government restrictions were imposed on her. The Church has been offensive, with 
her protests and statements vis-à-vis "reactionary" government policies. Rather, the 
major problem has been within herself: how can the Church come to terms with her 
divinely given mission to preach the Gospel to the world? What does it mean to 
preach the Gospel which has also socio-ethical implications? Both "evangelical" and 
"social" wings fought for a proper definition of the Gospel and the Church in the 
worldly reality of Japan. As the representative church body of Japanese 
Protestantism, the Kyodan is now struggling for that definition, at the cost of her own 
traumatic experience. 
Summary 
Looking back, we now recognize suffering running through the history of 
Protestantism in Japan. Protestant theology took pains to grasp the meaning of the 
Gospel in encounter with modern Japan in its cultural and historical setting. In this 
endeavor, theologians and thinkers in the Church formulated their understandings of 
the Gospel. Due to their cultural, historical and personal limitations, they are often 
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one-sided and partial, either "religiously" one-sided or socio-ethically. A living 
theology is bound, it seems, to be one-sided and partial. Surely, this is the mark of 
theologian viatorum. Because of this partiality and imperfection, the Protestant 
Church and her theologies in Japan had to suffer severe conflicts within itself. 
However, we do not believe the suffering was in vain. Through this suffering for the 
truth of faith, the hope has emerged for a deeper penetration of the living truth of the 
Gospel. It is in this stream of the experience of suffering and hope of Japanese 
Protestantism that the theology of the Pain of God of Kazoh Kitamori was born and of 
which it became a part. 
CHAPTER 3 
KITAMORI'S LIFE, THEOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT AND CAREER 
Formative Years 
Kazoh Kitamori was born in 1915 in Kumamoto, a city on Kyushu, the 
island immediately south of Honshu, which is the main island of Japan. The time was 
that of the Taisho Democracy. The nation was enjoying an economic boom. 
Democratic ideas were openly advocated. A literary movement called Shirakabaha 
promoted an idealistic vision of life. In general, the nation enjoyed a relatively calm 
atmosphere. 
"My family was very pious Jodo-Shinshu Buddhist," writes Kitamori, "and 
when I was six or seven, my grandmother and mother often brought me to the temple 
along with them."' But what he remembers about Buddhism was a "dead" form of 
Buddhism; he found "no agreement between sermons on Buddha's mercy and 
believers' daily lives, no relation between their lives and Buddhist teachings."' As for 
Christian influence, Kitamori says that he had none in his childhood. In fact, it was 
rather usual that, except for major cities on the main island of Honshu, Christian 
`Auto 1, 8. (A bibliographical note: Those of Kitamori's works which are of 
primary significance and therefore quoted frequently are abbreviated like the note 
here. The list of those works is found at the end of the Introduction chapter.) 
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influence on ordinary people was very modest at that time. But, to Kitamori, who 
now sees things in retrospect, this otherwise usual fact should not have been the case 
in Kumamoto, because this city was the birthplace of Kumamoto Band, one of the 
main "fountains" of Japanese Protestantism. The fact that he knew nothing of 
Christianity at all in his childhood is, for him, a sad symptom of distance between 
Christianity and the ordinary people in Japan.' There, on the top of a hill called 
Hanaoka-yama, in 1876, thirty-five students of the Kumamoto Western school, who 
were under the influence of Captain James, declared that they would become 
Christian. In his childhood Kitamori played "nearly every day" around this hill, 
without knowing anything about the hill's historical significance for Japanese 
Christianity. 
The middle school years were not very encouraging for Kitamori; rather, he 
felt his youthful life was stifled by elitism and the school policy of "success-
education." The rank of a school was measured, then as now, by the number of 
students successful in the entrance examinations to prestigious high schools and then to 
universities. The middle school he attended was no exception in this regard. Thanks 
to the elitistic training, Kitamori finished a five-year curriculum within four years, and 
was entitled to proceed to the literature department of the Fifth High School in the 
same city, Kumamoto, in 1932, at the age of sixteen."' 
'Ibid., 7. 
`Ibid., 9. As to the school system of Japan at this time, compulsory education 
was limited to six years at primary school. A middle school ordinarily had a five year 
curriculum. High school continued the middle school education for those who aspired 
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The Manchurian Incident a year before, the assassination of the prime 
minister early in the same year, and harder and harder measures taken against the 
individuals with thoughts and ideologies deviating from national polity caused the 
historical atmosphere in general to become gloomy. However, Kitamori, a freshman 
at high school, could still enjoy his youthful life, only vaguely feeling the imminent 
era of darkness.' But his adolescent joy did not last long; shortly after, writes 
Kitamori, "another problem" confronted him, one concerned with human existence as 
such. He gradually became aware of a fundamental question of human life: is not 
human life and existence only at the mercy of a chain of senseless chances?' We do 
not know what kind of experience directly occasioned this awareness in the mind of 
Kitamori; the sources tell very little about specific details. Kitamori says it was "a 
kind of intuition."' This awareness led him to a feeling of abandonment, that 
"nobody supports and sustains me from behind."' In his groping for any clue to 
certainty of life, he decided to try reading the New Testament. 
He constantly felt the threatening of blind chances that could visit upon him 
to enter a university. High school was at the same time a preparatory school to the 
university education with a three year curriculum. It was more like a German 
Gymnasium organically related to university curriculum. 
'Ibid., 11. 
'Ibid., 12. 
'Here Kitamori uses "chokkan, ES " (ibid.). This term is a translation 
of English "intuition" or German "Anschauung," an immediate insight of a truth. In 




at any time. One day, reading in the New Testament, Kitamori was caught by the 
words of Jesus in the Gethsemane prayer: ". . . nevertheless, not as I will but as You 
will" (Matt. 26:39). In this word Kitamori found the One Being who "possesses the 
will that unceasingly watches and leads my life in the midst of existence [seemingly] 
under chances."' This was the beginning of his "providential faith." An initial 
solution to Kitamori's "existential" problem was thus given: Life is not at the mercy 
of blind chances, but under the will of God.' 
In an essay for Ryunan, the internal periodical of the school, written shortly 
after this discovery of providence, Kitamori expressed his recognition: 
"When we become able to make interchangeable entities '[our] life' and 'the 
manifestation of [the will of] Providence,' then we have learned what religion 
truly is. Religion is that we make ourselves possessed by the Most High. . . 
nevertheless, not as I will but as You will.' Everything is in order with this. . . . 
Only in the peace which one obtains from this [praying word of Jesus] is true 
peace humanly possible; here life is no longer at the mercy of chances."" 
The words of the Lord praying in the garden made so strong and deep an impression 
on the mind of the boy Kitamori that he was immediately convinced of the truth 
expressed by these words as the valid solution of his existential agony. 
Unlike many of his contemporary Japanese (for instance, his later philosophy 
teacher, Hajime Tanabe, who had difficulty in assimilating Christianity into his 
'Ibid., 13. 
'°"Providential faith" is setsuri shinko [ ], which is Kitamori's 
coinage. "If I call this will of God as His 'providence," Kitamori writes, "is it not this 
very providence that should save me [who stands on the edge of a cliff facing down an 
abyss of nihilism]?" (Ibid.) 
"Ibid., 14-15. 
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thought,12), Kitamori knew no obstacle in receiving the "revelation" and committing 
himself to it. It seems he knew no doubt about the notion of God's providence, not to 
mention God's existence! The way for Kitamori to walk from now on was definitely 
given to him by the word: ". . . as Thou wilt." We can characterize this as 
Kitamori's intuitive conviction which can stand as truth prior to any rational support, 
an axiomatic intuition as it were. The truth, for Kitamori, is something to be given to 
a sensitive individual's intuition and obtained intuitively. Further, this intuitive way of 
appropriating Biblical words is one of the typical features of Kitamori's theological 
thinking. 
The "solution" obtained from the prayer words of Christ was, however, only 
a tentative one for Kitamori, bound to become problematic shortly. He took divine 
providence as the will of God, which is "law," calling on him to become conformed to 
the law. He began to make strenuous efforts to remain in this "providential" sphere of 
'During high school years in Tokyo, his native city, Tanabe was under the 
influences of Uchimura, Uemura and Ebina. He said elsewhere that to young students 
at that time Christianity was something "unavoidable"; every thinking student was 
confronted with it in one form or another. Tanabe also received a strong impression 
of Selichi Hatano (1877-1950), one of the most prominent Christian philosophers, who 
lectured on primitive Christianity at his high school. In spite of this strong Christian 
influence, Tanabe was not fully convinced of the truth of Christianity until about four 
decades later. He "had the feeling of having his eyes opened to the truth of the 
Christian Gospel for the first time" when he worked on his "Philosophy of 
Repentance." Yet, Tanabe's Christianity is not "orthodox" (Yasushi Kuyama and 
others, "The Development of Tanabe Hajime's Thought," Japan Christian Quarterly, 
47 [Summer 1981]: 140). It is interesting to observe a contrast between Kitamori and 
Tanabe in their appropriation of Christianity with regard to environment, influences 
and accessibility to Christian thought. 
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God. Initially he did not doubt he could stay in the sphere.' Just as he wrote, the 
making manifest of divine providence in one's own life was to him the essence of 
religion. "Even though God's grace is bestowed upon us," Kitamori contended, "we 
cannot claim that the grace is made manifest in us, unless a joyful life, which must 
emerge from grace be converted to good will manifest [in our moral life]."" We 
observe here a change of Kitamori's themes. Initially he was in a deep existential 
uncertainty and God's gracious providence was a liberating discovery for him. Now 
equating God's providence with divine will, Kitamori here implicitly argues how to 
conform to divine will. His concern here is with the question of how to live up to the 
ethical norm implicit in divine providence. Now the existential question is not with 
the uncertainty caused by the intuitive feeling of blind chance, but with how to 
The young Kitamori here identifies the divine providence with God's will in 
the sense of law. This seems a "diffuse" use of the concept "providence." This 
concept usually denotes "the Fatherly love and care of God, his beneficent providential 
control of all that happens" (Alan Richardson, "Providence," in A Theological Word 
Book of the Bible [New York: McMillan, 1950]), and its connotation is rather 
"evangelical." In fact, Kitamori understood "providence" in this sense when he wrote 
that "here [in the Lord's prayer word at Gethsemane] it is shown that there exists the 
Possessor of a Will behind my life ruled by chances, a Will which unceasingly looks 
after me and guides me," Auto I, 14. His identification of providence and law seems 
to be a "confusion" in the mind of the young Kitamori. Possibly, the reason for this 
is the double meaning of God's will. On the one hand, the will of God is understood 
as being manifest in this "accidental and nihilistic" world as His providence; but, on 
the other hand, God's will is also His will which obliges an individual to become 
conformed to it. What links providence and law is, therefore, the concept of the will 
of God. In fact, however, providence is God's will to sustain the fallen world despite 
man's disobedience to His will as law. Perhaps in this "confusion" we find a 




manifest the divine will in one's own ethical life. In other words, in Kitamori's 
thought, the meaninglessness of life is now overcome by knowing that there is the 
divine Will behind all the happenings. In order then for him to remain in this Will it 
is now necessary to live in conformity with the Will. Here in a rudimentary form, we 
see that an existential problem, an ethical imperative and a religious longing merge 
into a unity in the experience of Kitamori in his early years. 
Kitamori, in retrospect, characterizes this providential faith as a "legalistic" 
Christianity devoid of Christ." He calls this "a religion of immediateness'' or a 
religion based upon "divine love immediate [not mediated by Christ]."" 
Contrary to what he previously wrote, Kitamori, a year later, had to confess: 
"to learn that 'life' is nothing but the denial of providence is a wisdom. This wisdom 
should come before all the other wisdom."' If life is the denial of providence, the 
result is that man only falls back again into that nihilism of chance. And worse than 
the previous nihilism, he now knows he himself is responsible for this falling back. 
In the meantime he was reading voraciously in Pascal, [Raphael] Koeber, 
[Henri F.] Arnie!, [Carl] Hilty" and in much of Kanzo Uchimura." He also mentions 
'Ibid., 17. 
16 MSWV& , ibid. 




the names of Kierkegaard," Dostoiyvsky,' and Karl Barth.' According to 
Kitamori, he was introduced to the emerging dialectic theology through the works of 
Kumano and Kuwada." 
From the fall of 1932 to early 1933, he was "imprisoned under 
disobedience." He was in the darkness of trials. He was brought down to an abyss to 
gaze at his own misery and sinfulness, being constantly threatened by the thought of 
divine judgment. It was the Psalmists in the Old Testament and the great Russian 
novelist, Dostoyevsky, that accompanied him in the struggle for light. They taught 
him not to escape from this terrible lot, but rather to face up to it.24 
In June 1934, Kitamori came across a scholarly work on Luther's Lectures 
on Romans by a "Lutheran" theologian Shigehiko Sato (1887-1935). It was this 
work that definitely freed him from the chains of providential faith and led him into 
the grace of Christ. Immersed in this work, Kitamori recognized his deep sinfulness 






'Luther's Fundamental Ideas as Found in His Lectures on Romans (Tokyo: 
Seibunsha, 1965) on this work and the author, see below, 118-120. 
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sake of his own peace.' 
But, he says, this was not an abrupt change in his faith. He had been on the 
way to that breakthrough.' Prior to "the Luther experience," in the spring of the 
same year he jotted down two notes, suggesting something momentous in his 
theological development: "the abandoned [by God for sin] is now picked up [by Him 
in grace], this is Christianity" and "If Thou did not pick me up, I would not put my 
trust in Thee."' These are confessional words, he says, indicating, "the dawn [in 
me] of a material [content-filled] faith in Christ," as contrary to the previous 
providential faith with no Christ (as its content)? Kitamori says that he was 
unconsciously waiting for this breakthrough, since he had already been aware of the 
261 was then irresolutely wavering between immediate faith [ Mitto f ] 
and faith in Christ. It was this book [of professor Sato], or rather Luther himself in 
this book, that struck me with a definitive blow. The Luther given to me in this book 
was that Luther who confessed his ultimate self-recognition that to seek God for one's 
own sake is not faith but sin. This very point [of Luther's self-recognition] knocked 
me out completely. . . . Hitherto I had never sought and loved God for the sake of 
God; I had thought of God for my own sake. . . . I had now only to submit myself to 
God's judgment." (ibid., 51-52). 
'Ibid., 52. 
'Ibid., 41. 
'Ibid., "Now [in these crucial words for my spiritual pilgrimage] the Savior 
who would pick me up was about to appear on the stage; not the Christ preconceived 
in abstract manner but the living Savior who was now to replace the providential faith 
with faith in Himself. This is the dawn of a qualitative-material faith in Christ 
[ asarypliVatAl)f-filqi ]." With this specific terminology Kitamori means a 
personally experienced and lived faith in Christ. In other words, it was an evangelical 
faith in Christ the Redeemer, as contrary to formal and legalistic faith in providence 
which so far had captured his mind because of its conceptual clarity but seemed to him 
to lack in something "vital." Luther's faith was to Kitamori "strong" because it had a 
"vital" content (ibid., 52-53). 
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futility of providential faith. He needed only a final little "push" to an authentic 
conversion. "Neither Barth nor Kanzo Uchimura had provided me with the definitive 
push."' Luther was the only one who "destroyed my providential faith totally" and 
helped his breakthrough.' Thus obtaining faith in the grace of Christ, Kitamori from 
now on was on the way of winning one theological insight after another. 
In this connection, we note Kitamori's striking "competence" in theology. 
He was yet a high-school student at the age of eighteen in a remote country city; it 
was only two years since his first acquaintance with the Bible. Still, to some extent he 
was versed in the recently introduced dialectic theology through reading of the works 
of K. Barth or introductions to his theology alone. Not even baptized yet, Kitamori 
could regret that the highly sophisticated Swiss theologian or Uchimura had been of no 
help to his struggle for a light in Christian faith! 
It is still more striking to us to learn from his autobiography that under the 
agonizing spiritual crisis and even before deciding to be baptized he was thinking 
critically of the nature of a true theology: 
Those who dare to be ambitious to build a [system of] theology for the sake of 
theology were like those who, though wanting to stand on the side of this world, 
steal the material from the world beyond and try to make shrewd carvings from 
the material, which are worth only contempt. . . . If it is only a scholarship for 
the cake of scholarship, theology is nothing but 'a dead dog' (Hegel). If there is 
ever a true theology at all, it must be born only from a true faith. In order that 
we may be given a true faith, we must die to this world and despise theology 




This looks to be a very "mature" reflection for a high-school student brought up in 
non-Christian religious and cultural environment and at the threshold of his Christian 
faith. One might almost wonder whether or not an autobiographical anachronism is 
the case here." 
Upon his transition from the providential faith to the faith in the grace of 
Christ, Kitamori was baptized on August 19, 1934, at the Lutheran Church in 
Kumamoto. A testimony of Kitamori to a new faith, given immediately after the 
baptism, runs: "Man [becomes] the more miserable, God the holier, Christ the 
nearer."' 
As a young student searching for a firm ground of existence, Kitamori found 
the clue to it in the work of Sato on Luther, began to go to a Lutheran Church in his 
native city of Kumamoto and became a Lutheran. He never forgot his Lutheran roots 
in faith and theology. 
In historical retrospect, it seems to be "providential" that the first Lutheran 
missionaries to Japan began their work on the remote island of Kyushu four decades 
earlier. In fact, before Kitamori's baptism, Kumamoto had been the center of 
"Ibid., 48-49. 
""I cannot recall of whom I had in mind when I wrote this. . . ," says 
Kitamori in his own editorial comment, "these sentences appear like yelling at 'the 
spirit of wickedness in the heavenly places' [Eph. 6:12]. In fact, one cannot deny that 




Lutheran missionary activities. 
This is, therefore, an appropriate place to sketch the beginning history of 
Lutheranism in Japan. The first Lutheran missionaries to Japan were sent by the 
United Synod of the South in the United States. In 1888, the Board of Missions of 
this Lutheran body resolved to establish a mission in Japan.' The first missionaries 
from the synod were J. A. B. Scherer and Rufus B. Peery. They arrived in Tokyo in 
1892. The arrival of the Lutheran mission to Japan was three decades late in 
comparison with the aforementioned missionary organizations. As latecomers, they 
looked for an untouched region perhaps with a bit of pioneer idealism. By way of an 
"accidental" acquaintance with an American teaching English in Saga, a city located 
on the western edge of Kyushu, these first missionaries chose this city as a field for 
their work and the Board in the United States approved it.' On Easter Sunday, April 
'On the history of a Lutheranism in Japan, in addition to B. P. Huddle's 
work: History of the Lutheran Church in Japan (New York: the Board of Foreign 
Missions-the United Lutheran Church in America, 1958), which was mentioned in 
note 116 of Chap. II, see also Takeshi Fukuyama, ed., A History of Japan Evangelical 
Lutheran Church (Tokyo: Ruteru-sha, 1954), Sueaki Utsumi and B. P. Huddle, A 
Brief History of the Japan Lutheran Theological Seminary (Tokyo: Japan Lutheran 
Theological Seminary, 1959), Kurt Walter Biel, "The First Two Decades of Danish 
Lutheranism in Japan" (M. A. diss., Washington University, 1948), and Edward C. 
Eskildsen, Historical Sketch of the Lutheran Church in Japan (Shizuoka, Japan: 
privately printed stencil document, 1972). No recent historical work on Lutheranism 
in Japan is available presently, but it is said that the Historical Department of Japan 
Lutheran Theological Seminary is preparing a new one for the occasion of the first 
centennial of its history in Japan in 1993. 
'Huddle comments on this strategy: "Shortly after Peery arrived in Japan the 
new missionaries undertook to decide on a specific field of work, and looking at it in 
historical perspective, it cannot but be regretted they had moved as they did. Had 
they looked over the whole Empire they could scarcely have found a more difficult 
place in which to begin. . . . Scherer and Peery seemed to have an idea that they 
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2, 1893, the first public Lutheran worship was held in Japan. It is reported that seven 
converts were baptized the first year.' In the course of five years, the converts 
totalled about sixty, and in June 1989 the first Lutheran Church in Japan was 
organized in Saga.' 
The Lutheran missionary work in Japan was later supplemented by the 
missions of the United Danish Evangelical Lutheran Church and the General Council 
of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in North America. In 1910, a cooperating body 
was formed by the three Lutheran missions, called the Joint Conference of Lutheran 
Missions Cooperating in Japan.' 
While the mission of the General Council located its missionary work in 
Tokyo, the main field of the work continued to be in Kyushu. Worthy of mention is 
the name of J. M. T. Winther (1874-1969), a Danish-American missionary of the 
United Danish Evangelical Lutheran Church. He was a life-time missionary in the 
literal sense, arriving in Japan for the first time in 1896 and serving as pastor, 
administrator and teacher until his death in Kobe in 1970 at the age of ninety-six.' 
wanted to undertake work in a place where they would be approaching those reached 




had the privilege personally to hear him lecture over the Old Testament and 
the New, while attending Kobe Lutheran Bible Institute between 1966 and 1967. The 
vigorous sound of the old teacher's voice and his "archaic" Japanese rings in my ears 
even today. He died while he was a professor at Kobe Lutheran Theological 
Seminary, where I am presently a faculty member. Winther dedicated his whole life 
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Upon arrival in Japan, Winther had no contact with the missionaries of the 
United Synod of the South in Kyushu, apparently not yet knowing about the Lutheran 
mission already started there. But he soon came to know the name of Peery. While 
reading The Japan Mail, an English daily printed in Yokohama, a port city near 
Tokyo, he found an article written by the missionary in Saga. Sending a letter to 
Peery, Winther received in reply an invitation to come to Saga to discuss possible 
cooperation. The meeting resulted in the Danish-American missionary soon joining 
the work already started by the United Synod of the South. The joint missionary 
work gradually expanded, and the Winthers moved to another city called Kurume to 
start new work there. During this period several national workers were added." 
The small missionary efforts were beginning to bear fruit. By 1905 there 
were four Lutheran congregations with 114 members in the region. At this time the 
Lutheran church in Kumamoto where Kitamori was baptized was built and started its 
evangelistic work. As the missionary work progressed, the need for a theological 
seminary for the training of national workers became clear. The first missionaries, 
Sherer and Peery, had longed to establish a seminary at the earliest date possible.' 
Eventually, in September 1909, a Lutheran Seminary was established in Kumamoto, at 
to missionary work for Lutheranism in Japan. Mention must also be made of A. J. 
Stirewalt, who, though arriving a decade later than Winther, also had a whole-life 
ministry in Japan, almost parallel with the Danish-American missionary. Stirewalt 
died while he was a professor of the aforementioned seminary. His gentle manner of 




a missionary's residence with four students enrolled. In addition to the expansion of 
activities, the joint Lutheran mission opened a Middle School for boys, Kyusho 
Gakuin, in April 1911, in order to "supply the need for efficient Japanese workers in 
evangelistic work."' Simultaneous with the establishment of Kyushu Gakuin, the 
seminary was reorganized as the Theological Department of Kyushu Gakuin. 
Kumamoto had been the center of Lutheran missionary work for two decades 
with the seminary, Kyushu Gakuin, and a "big" congregation located there. In the 
meantime, the work was expanded outside Kyushu, in Osaka, Kyoto, Nagoya and 
Tokyo. Together with this geographical expansion of evangelistic activities, the vision 
of the Lutheran contribution to theology and evangelism grew. The Kyushu-centered 
strategy was not considered very favorable to the realization of the Lutheran mission 
in Japan. Thinking of the future strategy, the missionaries and national leaders 
considered relocating the seminary to Tokyo. Now, a few of the former students with 
academic aptitude had finished their theological studies in the United States and 
returned home and a few others with higher theological training joined the faculty of 
the seminary. Together with missionary teachers, the national staff persons were 
ready to take on their share of academic responsibilities. After a few years of 
preparations, the Board of Trustees of the Kyushu Gakuin, in the fall of 1924, decided 
that the Theological Department should move to Tokyo. Once the decision was made, 
the work for the relocation of the seminary proceeded quickly. The seminary 
buildings on the new cite in Tokyo were complete in August of the next year, and the 
`Biel, 19. 
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dedication was held on September 10, 1925, now officially known as the Japan 
Lutheran Theological Professional School. 
It is appropriate to insert a note on Shigehiko Sato. His work on Luther, 
which served as a dissertation for his doctoral degree from Kyoto Imperial University, 
was the first academic treatise in Japan specifically on the Christian religion.' It was 
this book that was instrumental to Kitamori's definitive conversion. Sato was first a 
student at the Tokyo Imperial University. Then he transferred to Kyoto Imperial 
University and graduated from there. 
As a Christian, Sato was strongly influenced by Uemura and for a while 
helped in his pastoral and evangelistic work. Confessionally, he was a Reformed.' 
But since his student days, in search for the certainty of salvation, he was strongly 
drawn toward Luther. In the meantime, one of his earlier works, The Young Luther 
(published in 1918), caught the attention of J. M. T. Whither of Kyushu Gakuin. 
'Sato himself spoke of this: "This dissertation of mine was the first one 
purely Christian and purely theological, to which the imperial university granted the 
degree. Therefore I deeply felt I should be responsible [for future Luther scholarship 
in Japan], and my devotion to this study was strengthened still more" (Fundamental 
Ideas, 4). 
Although his primary concern was with Luther and his theology, Sato was 
equally interested in Calvin, retaining his Reformed heritage. From his short essay on 
the plan for his future study included in his opus magnum, we recognize that Sato 
wished to clarify the nature of Protestantism for Christianity in Japan, by seeing 
Luther and Calvin as identical in the understanding of the Gospel: "I hold that 
Melanchton was not the successor of Luther at all; it was Calvin who was the true 
successor. The late Professor Karl Holl . . had more interest in Calvin and held him 
in high esteem. . . . Only those who have studied Luther can clarify why Calvin 
could supplement Luther's theology" (ibid., 385). It was also part of Sato's work that 
he translated a section of Calvin's Institutio as well as his commentaries on Romans, 
Ephesians and Philippians. 
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This Danish-American missionary quickly recognized the potential of the young 
scholar, and invited him to be a special lecturer for the Theological Department in 
Kumamoto." Sato gratefully responded positively to the invitation, and at the same 
time accepted a pastoral call from a Reformed congregation in the same city. Sato 
began to teach at the Theological Department in 1920, while also serving as the pastor 
of the Reformed Church. Sato's initial connection with the Lutheran Church was now 
established. 
Two years later, in 1922, Sato found an opportunity to study in Germany at 
Tuebingen under Otto Scheel and in Berlin under Karl Ho11.' After staying in 
Germany for two years, he returned home in 1924.4 He was then installed as 
professor at the newly reorganized Lutheran Seminary in Tokyo. "It was not too 
much to say," remarks Sueaki Utsumi, a retired Lutheran leader and one of Sato's 
disciples, "that our Church, which had been inclined toward humanism and had 
46Fulcuyama, 190. 
'While teaching at the seminary and serving as a pastor, Sato found it difficult 
to continue his scholarly studies. In the meantime he preferred to study more of 
Luther's theology in Germany. Knowing this wish of Sato, the Lutheran Seminary 
offered to financially support Sato's study in Germany under the condition that Sato 
would also contribute to the seminary with his Luther studies (Sato, 363). 
'Assisted by Karl Heim who visited Japan prior to Sato's departure for 
Germany, Sato first went to Tuebingen to study under Otto Scheel about whose 
achievements on "the young Luther" Sato had already heard in Japan. Under Scheel, 
he studied about the relationship between Luther and German Mysticism. Then 
moving to Berlin, he continued his study on Luther and German Mysticism under Karl 
Holl. He learned Holl's critical methods and his viewpoint of the significance of the 
Reformation. In Berlin he arrived at the idea of taking up Luther's Romans as his 
material for a systematic dissertation on the Reformer's thought. The foundation of 
Sato's dissertation was prepared in its outline during his stay in Germany (ibid., 365-
367). 
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existed in a remote part of Japan, was first awakened to Luther's evangelical faith by 
this man [Sato]."' 
Prior to World War II, the Lutheran presence in Japanese Protestantism was 
not very visible. In general the Lutheran contribution to Japanese Protestantism has 
been modest. The combination of the temporal lag of the arrival of Lutheran missions 
and the "unstrategic" choice of the place for their initial work may partly account for 
this very modest influence.' But it is to be noted that the first missionaries had a 
clear consciousness of the necessity of Lutheran contributions to Japanese 
Protestantism. This can be observed in the document written in connection with the 
formation of an independent Japanese Lutheran Church. It reads as follows: 
We believe that we are commissioned by the Lutheran Church in America to 
establish the Lutheran Church in Japan--not in a spirit of rivalry or sectarianism, 
but because we believe that the Lutheran Church has a mission to fulfill in Japan, 
a contribution to make to the Christianity of Japan; and that it is our God-given 
duty and privilege to make this Lutheran contribution to the Christianizing of this 
nation. We believe then that we are here to plant the Lutheran Church on 
Japanese soil. . . .5' 
Kitamori, perhaps without knowing this desire of the pioneer missionaries, early felt a 
"Utsumi-Huddle, 30. 
""The first forty years [of Protestant mission in Japan (1860-1900?)] which 
our [Lutheran] church had missed was, in a sense, a golden era for evangelism in 
Japan. . .," wrote Fukuyama, "When our [Lutheran] church started its mission work, 
it was an era of reaction [against Christianity] and it was most difficult time for 
evangelism. In addition to this, the evangelistic policy of the first missionaries [of our 
church] resulted in the selection of a field which was most conservative and most 
difficult to evangelize, namely Saga in Kyushu. Since Kyushu was the center of our 
evangelism for a long time, our church was not able to establish the bases for 
evangelism over all of Japan. . . ." (Fukuyama, 3). 
'Here quoted from Biel, 37. 
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calling to this mission of making a Lutheran contribution to Japanese Christianity with 
his own version of Lutheranism. 
We are now back to Kitamori. It is around the time of his baptism that he 
was thinking about his future studies, giving thought to the study of linguistics or 
English-American literature at Tokyo Imperial University. His teacher in English 
managed his classes so competently that Kitamori became fascinated by language 
study, particularly the etymological analysis of vocabulary.' It is of interest to 
mention this because he often used etymology in both scholarly discussion and popular 
exposition of faith, regardless of whether he used Japanese, English, German, Latin or 
Greek. It is his understanding that etymology is a tool by which to grasp profound 
implications often hidden under the surface of the common usage of words.' 
An incident, however, moved Kitamori's toward thinking seriously about 
theology instead of linguistics. One of his friends, brought up in a Christian home of 
""Prof. Kazuo Nakamura [in English] infused into me an immense interest in 
linguistics. . . . [Once made enthusiastic about his classes] I began to imitate even his 
very gestures. . . . Often I felt very much interested in analyzing the English word 
etymologically," tells Kitamori of his enthusiasm about etymology (Auto I, 64-65). 
"In the following we shall meet many cases of Kitamori's etymological 
analysis and his discussion of the analysis. A presupposition underlying his use of 
etymology is his "metaphysical" understanding that words, often composite forms 
(such as prepositional prefix plus a simple form of a verb, e.g., in connection with 
"symbol," sym-ballein, provide clues to the inner dynamics of the human 
understanding of reality. To Kitamori, a change in the usages of a word is not merely 
accidental with the flow of time, but it involves an inner necessity so that if one 
properly analyzes a composite word, he can retrace an inner necessity of reality itself, 
thus enabling one to uncover an important secret hidden under the surface of words. 
See on this feature of Kitamori, for instance, his dealing with "Creed and Symbol" in 
Creeds, 70-71. 
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Anglican faith, came to him one fall evening with a serious spiritual problem. This 
friend confessed that he had no choice but to commit suicide if he could not find the 
answer to the problem. The problem was that this friend sincerely attempted to fulfill 
every "iota of the law" and thus glorify God, but what he actually experienced was a 
total failure in this pursuit. Kitamori helped him greatly by pointing to the wounds of 
Christ, "a little like Statupiz to Luther," as Kitamori says, because he himself had just 
gone through the same spiritual abyss.' 
The Gospel, though proclaimed, is still hidden, thought Kitamori, and even 
many of the believers are suffering under the curse of the law; his lifework must then 
be the study of theology, a study which should serve for the clarification of the Gospel 
as a truly glad tiding.' Though hesitant, initially due to some misgivings on 
theology and the necessary sacrifices, he decided for the study of theology.' 
In April 1935, Kitamori entered the Lutheran Seminary at Tokyo. At the 
very start of his new life, he witnessed two tragic incidents. One was a train accident 
on the way to Tokyo. A little girl, following her mother on a railroad crossing, was 
run over by the very train Kitamori was on and he saw the little victim's mother beat 
the ground in a vehement wail. A bad omen, he thought at first, but this accident 
'Auto I, 67-69. 
'Ibid., 73. 
'Ibid., 75. To Kitamori, it was a sacrifice to give up entering the prestigious 
university "only" to enter an unknown lesser "professional school." Thus, he 
characterizes this decision as a "kind of shukke, ," a Buddhist term for 
entering a monastery or the priesthood. 
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seemed to tell him that his very calling from now on should be to minister, as a man 
of the Gospel, to such people as the mother helplessly wailing in the face of a absurd 
reality, "the people who were at the very bottom of absurdity.' 
The second tragic incident was the premature death of professor Sato at the 
Lutheran Seminary on the very day of Kitamori's registration. Sato died of cancer in 
the prime of his scholarly career. Though he felt deep sorrow at his dreamed-of 
teacher's funeral,' Kitamori learned to stand on his own feet, alone with the Lord 
Christ whom he believed to be his sole Teacher as well as Redeemer. He also learned 
to "relativize" all the human authorities, be it Sato, Uchimura, or Luther. It was this 
experience, assures Kitamori, that saved him from falling victim to a dominant 
"Barthian captivity" of Japanese theology." 
It seems that these sad experiences intensified Kitamori's sense of the tragic 
dimensions of reality and sharpened his "sensitivity to the Gospel,"' an intuitive 
sensitivity that feels the Gospel has to do with "reality at its very bottom."' The 
"Ibid., 79. The expression "the people who are at the very bottom of 
absurdity" is "donzoko no ningen, EA,1-0AM " in Kitamori's own terms. 
Once he decided to study theology, Kitamori was determined to study it 
under Sato, especially about Luther. It was the presence of Sato at the Lutheran 
Seminary in Tokyo that made him decide to apply to this seminary. At Sato's funeral, 
Kitamori thought he might as well give up his studies at the seminary, saying to 
himself, "to stay at the seminary without Prof. Sato anymore is meaningless. . . . I 
can quit the seminary right away" (ibid., 84). 
"Ibid., 86. This expression "Barthian Captivity" is Kitamori's coinage. 
.31n Kitamori's terminology, fukuin e no kankaku, IMI•oallt . 
"In Kitamori's terminology, donzoko no genjitu, EAJVAIX • 
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incidents thus contributed toward ingraining a sorrowful base as the ground-tone in his 
theology of God's pain. 
Development of Theological Thought 
At the seminary, Kitamori was an independently thinking student, and even 
an autodidact in theology. He devoted all the time of his theological pilgrimage to an 
ultimate recognition of the truth of the Gospel.' In his autobiography, though it may 
sound strange, Kitamori does not mention any theological influences he might have 
had from seminary teachers. "Externally, my seminary life was poor and lonely," he 
confesses looking back, "but internally [within myself] it was a life in which I was 
given something definitely essential."' 
What does "externally" mean? He says he had ample time to think by 
himself. When we now compare this silence and his later reference to the professors 
and teachers at Kyto Imperial University, we can infer that the seminary teachers were 
not equal to Kitamori's theological theme and concern. 
What was the teaching staff like at the seminary at that time? E. T. Horn 
was the president lecturing in the Old Testament, C. W. Hepner succeeded Sato in 
church history, and J. K. Linn was responsible for the New Testament and Greek. 
Besides these three American professors, there were two Japanese teachers, Inoko 
"The nature of Musashino [the name of the site of the seminary] which 
surrounds the seminary was the best class-room for me; she fostered me tenderly.. . 
or while viewing Mt. Fuji far away in a small silhouette against the sky colored by 
sunset, I pondered upon the Gospel day and night," wrote Kitamori (ibid., 96-97.). 
'Auto II, 55. 
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Miura who trained the students in practical theology and, the most important of all to 
Kitamori, Noboru Asaji who taught systematic theology (dogmatics, ethics and 
philosophy) and English. According to Kitamori, this professor in systematics, who 
was educated at Philadelphia Lutheran Seminary in the early 1920s, was not fully in 
tune with Kitamori's theological disposition. "This professor disliked Luther and 
preferred Melanchton," he recalls, ". . . and the Melanchton he presented in classes 
was a strange one emphasizing the free will, a troublesome Melanchton to the 
Lutheran Church, and Prof. Asaji's lectures almost seemed to instigate us to keep 
distance from Luther."" Since Kitamori had this impression, it is not difficult to see 
why he went his own way for theological maturation during his seminary years. Not 
very pleased with his teachers of theology, Kitamori trained himself to think 
independently. 
Although the external circumstances were "poor and cold," his inner, 
"spiritual life" was enriched and grew from one insight to another. He spoke of 
"daily progress, monthly leap," as he recalled the pace of his spiritual and theological 
progress during the second year of his training.' In fact, it was during this very 
year of 1936 that the crucial notion of the Pain of God was definitely formulated in 
"Kitamori's utterance in a panel discussion held in the ninetieth anniversary of 
Japan Evangelical Lutheran Church: "The Ninetieth Anniversary of Lutheran Church 
in Japan--Its Heritage of Faith," Ruteru (the JELC organ, November/December 1971). 
'Auto I, 158; "Speaking with a bit of exaggeration, my spiritual life around 
1936 was a continuous eye opening [for theological truth], with a pace of 'daily 
progress, monthly leap' ( Bail* ). I can say that the core which forms me 
now began to be born around this time" (ibid.). 
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his thinking. 
Early in February 1936 he wrote in his diary the following words: 
The Pain of God, all things in this world of ours can be viewed under the single 
viewpoint of the fact of the Pain of God! Irrespective of our knowing it or not, 
we [always] exist under the Pain of God. To me, the meaning of the world is the 
Pain of God. What else does the Bible show us but the Pain of God? Faith and 
the Pain of God, faith is the faith in the Pain of God. What I write about and 
what I speak of are but to point out the Pain of God. . . . Christianity should 
never give its central significance to anything but to the Pain of God. The Pain 
of God must occupy the center of Christianity. Even `faith' is never allowed to 
occupy this place.' 
We clearly observe that the all-embracing dominance of the Pain of God in Kitamori's 
theology had even here gained its clear contours. 
We now review the genesis of the concept of the Pain of God. How was the 
concept born in Kitamori's inner world along the way of his spiritual pilgrimage? His 
own account will shed light on our understanding of it. The concept of the Pain of 
God has as its presupposition Kitamori's most personal experience of his own 
sinfulness. Among other sinful thoughts of his, Kitamori secretly wished, out of 
jealously, the death of his rival student at the seminary,' and this sin in himself 
tormented his conscience. When, to his deep dismay, this wish came true two years 
later when the friend died of a brain infection, he recognized himself as one never-
forgivable; he felt condemned as if falling infinitely deep into the darkness, into non-
existence.' In other words, this experience made him feel he was brought before the 
661bid., 178-179. 
67Kitamori became jealous of this student, "because he was Sato's most loved 
disciple," he says later (ibid., 99). 
'Ibid., 103-104. 
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tribunal of God's inexorable judgment. 
In June 1935, the very word, Kami no Itami, the Pain of God, "visited upon 
him" for the first time.' "God never abandons them — sinners, betrayers and 
detestable ones — not only that, but even lets Himself be slain on the cross for the sake 
of them. 0 what an amazing love, an unfathomable Pain of God! A God never 
abandoning the hopeless, a God who loves those sinners at the cost of His life exactly 
because they are detestable!"" To Kitamori, this notion and the very word of Kami no 
Itami, the Pain of God, came to him "as if it were from heaven."' It, to him, was 
virtually a divine revelation, the revelation of God and His love. "The second visit of 
the word" occurred on him in November of the same' year. Kitamori grasped the 
grace of God as the Pain of God this time more clearly; by what else can it happen 
but by the Pain of God that He holds in His grace the rebellious sinners who stand 
against Him "with spears in their hands," says Kitamori quoting P. T. Forsyth.' 
The Pain of God is a love that loves the unlovable, the detestable, the 
abhorrent, a divine love impossible to human grasp, and for this love to come about, 
therefore, there is a cost of an immeasurable pain on the part of God. The love for 
'In June 1935, His word [Kami no Itami] visited on me [for the first time], 
and it captured me long. For the time, my whole thought kept flowing into this word 
day and night" (ibid., 109). 
"Ibid., 107. 
n"This word [Kami no Itami] came down to me as if from heaven 
[ htzta TAO t)00)1 5 (4: ] and hit the very heart [of what I experienced as the 
Gospel]. No other word than this very word [could be adequate for the Gospel], at 
least then" (ibid., 109). 
"Ibid., 129. 
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the unlovable is impossible without pain on the side of God. This radical contrast 
between man in rebellion against God and God embracing this very man in His 
unfathomable love is the foundation of Kitamori's concept of the Pain of God. 
Kitamori held therefore that if one would truly recognized the Gospel, he must first 
recognize his radical rebellion against God. 
Kitamori wrote down a few notes on the Christmas Day of the same year 
and they indicate this polarity between man's sinfulness and God's inscrutable love in 
Pain: "Christmas is a day of joy for man, but it is a day of pain for God, and only 
those who know this can [truly] celebrate Christmas. Man is the disgrace of God. 
`Never of God, ever of Christ' [Never belonging to God, ever belonging to Christ], 
this is the tiding of Christmas, granting a man like me to celebrate Christmas, and 
allowing those who do not belong to God to celebrate Christmas."' The formula 
"Never of God, ever of Christ" is Kitamori's equivalent to Luther's simul Justus et 
peccator or, as he puts it, "semper peccator, semper justus."74 
While he was making decisive progress in the development of theological 
insights, Kitamori's writing reveals very little reflection on the issues of the time. The 
so-called "2.26" (meaning February 26, 1936) coup attempt by young military officers 




substantial resonance in his theological reflections.' (The steadily threatening 
menace of Nazism, which occasioned the issuance in German of Barmen theologische 
Erkliirung [1934] did not, it seems, catch Kitamori's attention.1 Occasionally he 
touches upon the contemporary situation, but in very general terms, and the 
impressions those occasional references provide are an indication of Kitamori's 
understanding of worldly reality: it was under an irresistible external force, like an 
inexorable destiny. Rather, he seems to have been consumed with the idea of the Pain 
of God more than anything else. To Kitamori, the link between reality and theological 
concern lies deeply in the Gospel, that is, in the Pain of God. He thus concentrated 
on this idea, which to him alone was the solution to the most radical and fundamental 
"The situation around this time described by Utsumi-Huddle was as follows: 
"[In 1930, two prime ministers were assassinated, one after the other, by 
ultranationalists.] Then in 1936, because of the 'February 26 Incident' (an 
unsuccessful military revolt led by army officers), the capital was placed under martial 
law. The Japan withdrew from the League of Nations and established Manchukuo, in 
consequence of which the Japanese and Chinese armies came into open conflict on 
July 7, 1936" (Utsumi-Huddle, 36). 
'Not only to Kitamori but also to many of the contemporary theologians, 
"worldly concern" in the sense of concrete participation in worldly affairs was 
invisible in their theological thinking. One example of this can be seen in a letter 
written by Karl Barth, dated September 15, 1940, to a Japan missionary by the name 
of Egon Hessel. Referring to a request made by a certain Matsutani of the permission 
for translating a selection from his treaties, Barth wrote in this latter: "He [Mr. 
Matsutani] wrote to me asking the permission to translate a selection of my treaties, a 
selection made by him in a highly original way. A strange thing of this selection is 
that no single treaty on political themes which I have written these years is included" 
(quoted in Yoshild Terazono, A Shooting Range of the Theology of Barth [Tokyo: 
Jordan-sha, 1987], 13: Barth's word is my translation from Terazono's Japanese 
translation). However, we are not concerned here with an evaluative judgment of 
Kitamori's theological tendency except descriptively to point out this "a-political" 
feature of it, the feature which has remained one of the consistent features in 
Kitamori's thinking. 
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problems of human reality. This concentration on the most essential may have been 
his so-called "transcendence to the very bottom of reality," a paradoxical expression 
found in his later terminology.' 
In the meantime, Kitamori had an important encounter with Anders Nygren's 
Agape and Eros. He first became acquainted with this classic work on love as a result 
of overhearing two professors talk about the book. "What I have learned from this 
work was. . . how exciting theology can be, and it had a decisive influence upon me," 
he remembers.' As a specific feature of this book, Kitamori points out that it 
operates with "material thinking" in distinction from "formal thinking." "Material 
thinking" in Kitamori's concept, is a thinking in theology guided by the concrete 
contents of the Gospel. In distinction to this, "formal thinking" is thinking that gives 
a primary emphasis on formal concepts such as the word of God, the revelation of 
God, the knowledge of God. These formal concepts must be filled with contents to be 
"This orientation in the "transcendental" sphere in Kitamori's thought can be 
seen in a passage from Logic, 64: "The activity for social renovation by the 'love' of 
God must be based upon the radical [ ] salvation through the 'Pain' of 
God. Social salvation does not know yet the bottomless abyss [ MO= ] of 
man's being. Agonies originating from social irrationalities are something still seeing 
the bottom [ tj ]. The children of this world, however clever in the affairs 
of an age, do not know about the true feature of man, nor about the bottomlessness of 
man's fallen being. . . . The believers, while trying to be relevant in their activity for 
social renovation, must recognize the bottomless abyss which is seen open beyond the 
bottom of relative problems. The believers have to pray an intercessory prayer for the 
guilts of the fallen beings." With this recognition of the bottomless abyss of man's 
being was related man's recognition of the Pain of God, and vice versa. But how the 
relationship between the Pain of God and activity for social renovation has been 
related in Kitamori's theology in concreto remains to be seen in a later chapter. 
'Auto I, 159. 
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concrete and meaningful. In theology, Kitamori holds, "material" (content) must 
precede form (container), although the "formal" cannot be dispensed with to the extent 
that theology is a rational discipline operating with "logos," or concepts with logical 
consistency." By this time, Kitamori was aware of the priority of the "material" 
vaguely, but it was Nygren's book that definitely brought him to this recognition. 
"Nygren introduced me into 'the theology of the love of God' over against 'the 
theology of the Word of God' of Barth." He acknowledges that Nygren rendered a 
very important service to his later theology of the Pain of God.' 
A few months after this initial enthusiasm for Nygren's work, Kitamori came 
to feel that there was something deficient in Nygren's thought. According to an 
analysis made by him in retrospect, Nygren's agape remains "very vague with regard 
to its Christological structure."' When Nygren faced the question of why God loves 
the sinner, this Swedish theologian answered: because it is God's nature to love; 
God's love toward the sinner is spontaneous and without cause. "But," Kitamori 
ponders, "is not the love, with which God loves the sinner, 'the men worthy of 
hatred,' more than a [simple] love which flows naturally from His nature? It certainly 
is the love of God [that loves the sinner], but is that love of God simply God's natural 
love? Is it not the love of God based upon the Pain of God? Is it not so that exactly 






In these penetrating questions about Nygren's position, Kitamori offers a 
crucial distinction with regard to the love of God; God's natural love and His love 
based on His Pain, God's love of a higher order. Something totally new, "super-
natural" love seems to emerge from God's "natural" love, when He loves sinful 
human beings who are worthy of His "hatred" and unworthy of His love. The cross 
of Christ marks a new phase in the development of God's love! But we will leave this 
issue for later discussion, only noting it now as a striking feature of his view of 
development in God's love. 
According to Kitamori, Wilhelm Dilthey said that his whole work is only an 
elaboration of what he thought and planned in the years of his youth. As a student at 
the seminary Kitamori felt a strong affinity with the observation of this German 
philosopher, and later at the peak of his career, he confirmed that this was also his 
own experience.' 
Kitamori first thought of the notion of the Pain of God in the age of his 
youth. One more remark concerning the genesis of the pain of God is necessary here. 
The text of Jeremiah 31:20 has been considered as the Scriptural basis of Kitamori's 
theology. In this verse we read: "Is Ephraim my dear son? Is he a pleasant child? 
For though I spoke against him, I earnestly remember him still. Therefore my heart 
'Ibid., 201. A strong expression of Kitamori is "the men worthy of hatred." 
This expression is "nikumubeki mono ( 4. )" in Kitamori's Japanese. 
'Ibid., 158. 
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yearns ["aches(!)" in an older Japanese translation of the Bible Kitamori used] for 
him; I will surely have mercy on him, says the Lord." But Kitamori's term "the Pain 
of God" was not inspired by this Biblical word originally; rather the concept was his 
own theological idea independent of the Jerimiah verse." His "discovery" of the 
Jeremiah text came about two years after the initial "visit" of the notion of the Pain of 
God."This means that Kitamori's theology of the Pain of God as such does not 
depend on a single Biblical verse. It does not, Kitamori would say, stand or fall with 
an exegetical decision as to whether or not the Hebrew word hamah actually means 
what Kitamori puts into his concept of the Pain of God. 
"Lord, give life to me, thy servant, in order to preach Thy love," prayed 
Kitamori when he was about to graduate from the seminary on March 19, 1938." 
The Sino-Japanese war was, he recalls taking on steadily worse dimensions. "To be 
given life at that time," he says, "was almost a miracle. It was an age of death in the 
literal sense."' But it was not an ordinary wish to live but an evangelistic desire that 
urged him to this prayer, assures Kitamori. 
"Quoting his own diary note from early 1936 that "Amos saw the 
righteousness of God, Hosea the love of God, Isaiah the Holiness of God, and Paul 
saw the Pain of God," Kitamori explains that the name of Jeremiah was then not 
linked with the Pain of God and this shows that he as yet did not know the Jeremiah 
text. "In other words, I used the term 'the Pain of God' as my own term. In other 
words, it is a theological terminus technicus." . . . But I believe I can point out that, 
`the Pain of God' being used then as 'my own' term, it was not a theory but a [real 
expression of my] life" (ibid., 2). 




After graduation from the seminary in March 1938, he immediately 
proceeded to philosophical studies at Kyoto Imperial University, staying there for four 
fruitful years until 1941. In contrast to the seminary milieu which was "poor and cold 
externally," the life at the university in the ancient capital was "a continual satisfaction 
and tension" as well as "challenging."' There was "something intense and 
vehement"?  in the academic milieu of the university. This "something intense and 
vehement" was for Kitamori the philosophy of Kitamori Nishida (1870-1945), founder 
of the so-called Kyoto School of Philosophy. Kitamori began to study the 
philosopher's thought. Reading meticulously in the master's Fundamental Problems of 
Philosophy in two volumes, he was enthralled by the beauty of the logical structure in 
Nishida's thought of "the dialectical Universal" in which the determination of the 
individual by the Universal is simultaneously the determination of the Universal by the 
individual.' This is a philosophical idea with Buddhist as well as Hegelian 
connotation. Kitamori was deeply captivated by the beauty of the structure of the 
thought as such.' This was what he calls the "something intense and vehement" he 
met at the university. 
By the time he entered the university, however, Nishida had already retired 
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who was Kitamori's philosophy professor there. Kitamori says he learned from 
Tanabe what thinking means. The impression on Kitamori's mind of Tanabe's 
stringent thinking was so deep that he could not help but think that the thinkers he had 
known so far were not thinkers in any proper sense. Kitamori recalls that the intensity 
of "thinking" as such, or thinking formally considered, was the first thing Kitamori 
acquired at the university before any "material" learning.' 
In addition, lectures on Kant, the history of philosophy, the introduction to 
comparative religion,"esthetics, ethics, psychology—all were fascinating to Kitamori. 
This academically "intense and vehement" milieu and its influences almost devoured 
all of Kitamori's previous accumulation of theological concepts.' He admits that the 
influence of "Nishida Philosophy" is conspicuous in his programmatic formula: "The 
theological axiom is simultaneously the theological reality, and the theological reality 
is simultaneously the theological axiom."" "But what influenced me," Kitamori 
'Ibid., 62: Looking back, Kitamori comments on the "theological world" in 
Japan in comparison to philosophical thinking at Kyoto and says: "My acquaintance 
with the theological world might be limited, but frankly speaking I had never met in it 
at that time a kind of 'thought' [ ] to which I was being exposed at the 
philosophical department of Kyoto University. I felt hollow a saying like 'Theology is 
a scholarship based on revelation and of the Word of God, and not like philosophy • 
which is a human scholarship'" (ibid.). 
"Shin' ichi Hisamatsu was the professor of this discipline, and Kitamori was 
impressed deeply again by the beauty of a thought presented by this professor on the 
basis of Zen (Rinzai) Buddhism (ibid., 65). We take note of Kitamori's strong 




insists, "was purely formal, being limited to the logical structure [of my thinking]."" 
"As to the material aspect [of my thought]," he says, "the 'much more intense and 
vehement' [the Pain of God] held me so firmly that it protected me from the vehement 
influences of the material side of that philosophy."' We shall come back to this 
issue of whether or not it is possible for the influence of the Kyoto School on him to 
be purely formal, as Kitamori claims. Here it is sufficient to note that the Kyoto 
School had a crucial influence upon Kitamori's theological formulation. 
In this connection we briefly touch upon Kitamori's personal encounter with 
Nishida. This retired philosophy professor, occasionally visiting the campus, looked 
to his admiring eyes like "a walking classic of philosophy."" On one occasion, 
Nishida held a series of lectures on campus on The Problem of Japanese Culture, a 
series extending to several sessions. This series of lectures dealt with the threatening 
prospect of war and was for Kitamori a very special occasion to hear Nishida lecture. 
According to Kitamori, Nishida struggled with a metaphysical elucidation of the 
relationship between the house of the emperor and the Japanese citizenry. Although 
Kitamori was versed in "the system of Nishida Philosophy to some extent," the lecture 
was difficult for him to comprehend. He was, however, left with a clear impression 
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bodily felt this character of Nishida Philosophy," says Kitamori, "a character we can 
describe as carrying a musical rhythm.' 
Later, this lecture of Nishida was printed and Kitamori quotes part of it for 
reflection in historical perspective. Nishida's viewpoint in the lecture was that "the 
house of the emperor is to be thought of as a manifestation of the world of things that 
are mutually 'absolutely contradictory and at the same time identical,' the house as the 
Eternal Now embracing both the past and future, and we are from and to this house 
through and through. This is the idea bringing up and helping all the people.' 
Although we cannot here trace the detail of Nishida's thought, the point is clear that it 
was a philosophical justification of the house of the emperor as the absolute value of 
the Japanese nation in the world. This less-critical justification of the national polity 
of Japan was criticized severely by many thinkers in the postwar years as only 
conforming to the tides of the time. His philosophy was brought into discredit for a 
while after the war.' 
Judging in historical perspective, one feels deeply disturbed that a 
"Ibid. 
'Ibid., 75-76. 
i02"It must be recognized in fair-mindedness that the philosophical thoughts 
connected with the names of Kitaro Nishida and Hajime Tanaba are not of second or 
third class," urges Kitamori, "one should not be obstinate in this. Instead of easily 
putting on these thoughts labels like `idealistic,' bourgeois,' and 'war-cooperative,' 
. . . one should rather examine the proper content of their thoughts. It is necessary to 
recognize the power of these thoughts and to acknowledge its significance [in the 
history of thought]" (Kitamori, "Nishida Philosophy and Tanabe Philosophy--the 
Secret of the Absolute Nothingness" [originally written in 1955], Philosophy and God 
[Tokyo: Nihon-no-Bara sha, 1985], 209). 
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philosophy, struggling sincerely to come to terms with reality, can be easily led to 
supply a de facto rationalization and justification of the existing order which is 
dominating the day. This danger is obviously true of theology as well. It is much to 
our interest that after the war when Nishida's philosophy was discredited, Kitamori 
came to its defense as valid in its philosophical substance. 
Here, however, we are more interested in the question of how Kitamori in 
his autobiography reacts to Nishida's viewpoint in retrospect. He only observes that 
the philosophy of Nishida then faced the "absolute contradiction," and was then trying 
hard to solve it by the philosophical axiom of "identity [of the absolute 
contradiction]."' In this reference, Kitamori raises certain criticisms to Nishida's 
viewpoint indirectly, but avoids getting into the specifics of the problematic elements 
of Nishida's thought in the lecture. Also in this reference Kitamori recalls that critical 
time when the problem imposed upon philosophy by militarism of the time was the 
problem of theology as wel1.104 As we shall see shortly, Kitamori's own theological 
posture, mutatis mutandis, does not seem far from the dangers found in Nishida's 
thought, namely the tendency to a posteriori rationalize and justify the dominating 
order of things. 
We are not here concerned to indict the people who lived in a harsh 
situation; true, anyone who was not actually involved in the situation then may not say 
anything condemnatory without due historical considerations. We are concerned only 
'Auto II, 75. 
'Ibid., 76. 
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with how Kitamori looked at the situation of Japan and the world at that time. Was 
the problematic situation, for Kitamori, after all, something to which the individual is 
only to acquiesce because of its formidability, or something to fight against for a 
better situation however small the improvement may be? What was (and is) his view 
of the problem of the state if it "does wrong?" A clue to the answers to these 
questions may be found in the following note of Kitamori. On the day Nazi Germany 
concluded a non-invasion treaty with the Stalin Soviets, August 24, 1939, Kitamori 
saw his nation like "a reed shaken with the wind" and wrote a memo on this: 
The state itself always belongs to the world rebellious against God's love, the 
broken order of creation, the world of 'destruction and tribulation' and is never 
an object of God's love nor led by the will of God nor under God's blessing. It 
is only by Christians' prayers and their services rendered in faith alone that 
makes the state an object of God's love, makes it led by the will of God and 
under God's blessing. In truth, a state was sustained only by Christians.' 
A detailed exegesis of this note of Kitamori would lead us too far afield, and it is not 
appropriate here. At this point, we will only raise questions and make a few 
reflections. We certainly can subscribe to his description of the state's rebellious 
nature to the will of God. Kitamori recognizes the undeniable darkness of the state. 
It certainly is true that the intercessory prayers of the believers sustain the state 
(although in what sense it concretely does is not clear here). But to us it seems that in 
his view (as far as this passage is concerned) something essential is missing, that is, 
God's positive reign over his creation even if fallen. Kitamori's posture seems to be 
'Ibid., 178, and Kitamori added: "[Written on] the day when the fatherland 
is being shaken like a reed in wind." 
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an a priori resignation toward the problems of this world.'" Is the darkness so 
absolutely dark that in it every cat must be gray? In other words, is there no 
theologically substantial significance of the relative betterment of this fallen reality 
which can claim our serious commitment? Is this, in essence, a quietism with regard 
to the socio-ethical and political reality, or is this so profound a recognition of the 
hopelessness of the fallen reality of humanity that there is little positive meaning in 
any attempt to work for the betterment of the world? We leave this question open for 
our further reflection below. 
During his university years, Kitamori virtually gained the substance of his 
theology. This substance was eventually to crystalize in his The Lord of the Cross 
published in 1940, a year prior to his graduation. The accumulation of theological 
insights, which had been gained by intensive reflections over several years, came to 
fruition by the "formal" help of the philosophy of the Kyoto School. 
We also note as essential the role Earth's theology played in the 
crystallization of Kitamori's theological position. He sharpened the contour of his 
theology in a constant confrontation with the Swiss theologian. As early as the fall 
quarter of his "freshman" year at the university he "poured almost all energy into the 
'In 1963, Kitamori has the following to say in connection with a peace 
movement: "If we only consider a peace movement on [the level of] the roaring sea-
surface [of reality], a prayer alone [for world peace] could be said as abstract. But 
what I am talking about now is the radical 'bottom,' deep down beneath the surface. 
This `bottom' is 'the very bottom' of human reality, a formidable place where mere 
human 'efforts' are totally helpless and where things like human efforts avail little and 
there can be only intercessory prayers" (My Reflections on Life, [Tokyo: Kyobunkan, 
1963], 13). 
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reading of K. Barth's Kicheliche Dogmatik, I. 2."'" This volume of this great 
dogmatic work deals with das Won Gottes and includes the prolegomena on 
dogmatics. In his struggling with this volume, Kitamori found pages 974-976 to 
deviate fundamentally from the Reformation's understanding of the Gospel.'" These 
pages were so crucial to him that he copied them verbatim for intensive study and 
analysis.'" For Kitamori, these pages were to provide the keys to the understanding 
of Barth's theology. An analysis of ICitamori's criticism of Barth's standpoint will be 
made in a later chapter. Here we only indicate Kitamori's understanding of Barth in 
the pages of the latter's dogmatics. Kitamori found in these pages a Barth who 
contended that the Reformers and their Orthodox successors elevated the doctrine of 
reconciliation to articulus stantis et cadentis ecclesiae in an arbitrary act to control the 
Word of God instead of being controlled by it.'1° Further, according to Kitamori, 
Barth considered the word of "Versohnung nur als ein Moment" in the whole line of 
divine history of salvation. Kitamori thus saw in Barth a blatant denial of the main 
article of Reformation."' In one sense, his initial work, The Lord of the Cross, is 
not only a programmatic writing of his theology but also his first public 
'Auto II, 96. 
'"I can say," writes Kitamori, "this discovery [of Barth's deviation from 
Reformation] was made around this time. My criticism of Barth has been carried 





Auseinandersetztung with the theology of Barth."' 
With The Lord of the Cross, written when he was twenty-three years of age, 
Kitamori thought that he had reached the goal of theological pilgrimage. This initial 
book was originally written for the organ of the Japan Evangelical Lutheran Church, 
Ruteru, in the form of ten installment essays from January to December 1938. The 
size of the book is less than a hundred pages; The Lord of the Cross itself about 
seventy. Though it seems improportional to the size, that is, to the extent of the 
coverage of dogmatic loci, Kitamori was fully convinced of its "revolutionary" 
significance to the history of theology. He thought that he had seen something awful 
and crucial and said it in this book.'" Echoing what the prophet Isaiah saw in the 
temple, the awfulness of the holy God (Isaiah 6), Kitamori wrote, "I even fear that 
one who has seen such an awful and crucial thing and said it were to die 
instantly."' Kitamori was also convinced that this work would have a crucial 
significance for the future of the world. 
"What I have now reached, the love based upon the Pain of God, which is 
The theological] axiom at the same time [the theological] reality' is like a seed,'" 
"2Kitamori's criticism against Barth written down in his "theological" diary 
(and presented in his Autobiography) is reproduced verbatim in his first book, see 
Cross, 1-6. 
'Auto II, 206. 
"'Ibid. 
"5 The expression in Japanese is: 01419/.01111011441932MS . On this 
formula we are to go into more detail below, but so much can be said here that the 
Pain of God is the expression of the totality of the Gospel; it is at one time the 
theological axiom, by which one recognizes all the theological truth. At the same time 
143 
said Kitamori, "and in this seed there lies the whole of the tree which shall grow to 
the full in future even if it is not yet actualized. In order for this whole thing to be 
actualized within a soul even of a single individual. . . , it will take more than five 
hundred years. And when this whole thing is actualized, the whole universe will 
reverberate and tremble with exhilaration."" But Kitamori did not reckon with an 
immediate acceptance of his discovery, for "'it is indeed common that a good and 
great thing is initially often considered as insignificant ([Karl] Hilty).'"' 
The idea of the love of God based upon the Pain of God is the objective 
truth which had now been fully recognized by Kitamori. There is no room anymore 
for further material modification of the idea of the Pain of God. The Pain of God is 
"as absolute and eschatological as the order of reconciliation, allowing now no room 
anymore for [conceptual] development."" The love based upon the Pain of God is 
it is the "field" in which all the theological "realities" (creation [the fallen reality 
cursed by sin], redemption and sanctification, Gospel and Law, faith and love, etc.) 
are all dialectically integrated to the totality of the Gospel, the Pain of God. In this 
sense the Pain of God is of both formal and material character. 
'Ibid., 212. 
"Ibid., 207. 
"Ibid., 220. This portion is Kitamori's "editorial" insertion, thus reflecting 
his lasting view on the nature of the Pain of God. When Kitamori says that the 
concept of the Pain of God is absolute and eschatological, it is tantamount to saying 
that this concept is the final concept of the Gospel in history. In fact, he contends 
directly or indirectly that he has unified all the major theological developments into 
the final form in his notion of the Pain of God. It is therefore a theological parallel 
with Hegel's claim in the history of philosophy that all the philosophical currents 
found their final destination in his philosophical system. Perhaps, it can be Kitamori's 
logical claim that the truth of the Pain of God even exceeds the Hegelian claim, 
embracing, as the divine truth, the latter as well. 
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therefore not a relative human theological notion; it is the divine reality itself, and as 
such it exhaustively expresses the divine essence. It is from this soaring idea of the 
Pain of God in Kitamori that we can understand the radical consistency in his 
theological thinking. "The theme is already given, only the variations of the theme 
remain," he wrote."' The variations are to be developed by logical necessity and 
consistency. 
The theme is now definitively given! With this we can safely set the 
terminus ad quem of Kitamori's theological development in its material aspect. Going 
on to live in the historical reality of the human world, he now has in his hand the 
ultimate truth as the key with which he was sure to unlock virtually all the problems 
and realities of human existence. What remains is to deepen the understanding of the 
truth of the Pain of God and to apply it to the realities, thus bringing the salvific truth 
into its historical realization.'" 
"'Ibid. The expressions "theme" and "its variations" seem to be borrowed 
from Karl Barth. Defending the necessity of theological endeavor in the Reformed 
Church, Barth calls attention to Calvin's example. According to Barth, Calvin wrote 
Institutito first, then about practical issues. In this connection, Barth says: "In a 
word, he [Calvin] first had a theme and then developed its variations; first he knew 
what he wanted and then wanted what he knew" (The Word of God and Word of Man, 
trans. Douglas Horton, [New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1957], 224). 
Kitamori was familiar with this work by then. 
'2°Kitamori is convinced of the finality of the Pain of God in the theological 
quest for truth. But he makes room for development in theology. For this, he has 
recourse to the order of reconciliation and sanctification, and locates the finality of the 
Pain of God in the former and the development in the latter. To Kitamori, theology 
from now on is an endeavor to apply the final truth to reality to the effect that the 
Pain of God may be actualized as the power of salvation both existentially and 
ethically. 
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Kitamori's Career as Professor and Church Leader 
Upon graduating from the university in 1941, Kitamori immediately became 
an academic assistant there. Simultaneously, he lectured at Lutheran Seminary in 
Tokyo. The Pacific War broke out on the eighth of December of the same year. This 
caused all the ties between the Japan Evangelical Lutheran Church and the Mission 
Boards in America to be broken. It also affected the Lutheran Seminary; Professors 
Horn and Linn returned home to America immediately after the outbreak of the war. 
The leadership of the seminary fell on the Japanese professors. In September 1943, 
Kitamori became a professor in systematic theology at the seminary. As part of the 
wartime efforts, the government, in April 1943 enacted the Professional Schools Law, 
according to which, along with the Kyodan, the theological seminaries should also 
merge so that the number of the seminaries became minimum. The Lutheran 
Seminary which was located in Tokyo was now to be incorporated into a new Eastern 
Japan Theological Seminary together with Reformed, Methodist, Baptist and other 
denominational seminaries. As the result of this merger, Kitamori became an assistant 
professor of this integrated seminary. 
Due to ill health, Kitamori was not drafted for the battle field. He remained 
as a teacher at the seminary during the war years. His main concern was theology, 
and he continually pursued his reflection on and clarification of the Gospel as the Pain 
of God. 
The fruit of his efforts during these precarious and uncertain years was 
Theology and Creeds, which was published in July 1943, in the midst of the war. In 
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the preface, Kitamori wrote of the content and context of this work in brief sentences: 
Three years ago, in The Lord of the Cross--a note to dogmatics, I have already 
spoken the main theme [of my theology]. The treatises included in this volume 
are variations of the main theme. But, due to an historical event of the formation 
of the United Church of Christ in Japan [Kyodan], these variations now carry 
different resonances which were not heard then.' 
Although this work is not an extensive one either--counting a little over a 
hundred pages--Kitamori enunciated the whole of his theological methodology in it. 
At first sight, Theology and the Creeds seems to present a highly abstruse treatment of 
the necessary development within the Ecumenical Creeds (development from 
Apostolicum through Nicaeno-Constantipolitanum to Athanasianum) on the one hand, 
and these Creeds' inner relationship with the Reformation creeds, particularly with 
Confessio Augustana. The abstruseness is further intensified by the fact that it was - 
carried on in a singular passion for the clarification of the relationship between the 
immanent Trinity and the economic Trinity, and also for the relationship between the 
Trinity and Christology, operating the whole with the highly sophisticated dialectic 
logic of the Kyoto School. In this work Kitamori aims at bringing home the idea that 
the whole history of creedal development, or the understanding of the Gospel, was 
about to reach its final goal in Japan in what he called a Christological Trinity in his 
theology.'n Even in this highly abstruse treatise can one discern the spirit of the 
'Creeds, 3. 
'We shall deal with Kitamori's doctrine of trinity in a later chapter in more 
detail. We want here only to mention Kitamori's strong consciousness of an historical 
raison d'etre of the newly formed Kyodan as the Church of Japan in the universal 
Christianity, and Japan in the world as the nation. "All that can survive through the 
judgment of history," asserted Kitamori, "are only those things that bear the 
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time--a strong nationalism. 
An attentive reading of this work uncovers more of Kitamori's passionate 
commitments to the actual situation of the Church's and his own existence in the war 
regime. A peculiar and impressive synthesis is observable, an abstruse logical 
operation and concrete situational application. While dealing with purely dogmatic 
intricacies, Kitamori drew from them a concrete "evangelical" foundation of Christian 
consolation, endurance and inner victory under the "heavy pressures of reality," as he 
refers cryptogramically to the wartime governmental pressure."' 
In this work we find a viewpoint of momentous significance for his later 
church-political career. Already at that time Kitamori seriously took up the problem 
of the theological foundation of the Kyodan--the problem which was to become one of 
the major problems of the postwar Kyodan. In so doing, he reflected on the content 
of the "Summary of the Teaching" as the basis for a real unification of Protestant 
necessities [of historical mission] upon themselves. Unless [the Kyodan with its 
confession implied in the Summary of the Teaching] bears upon itself this necessity [of 
creedal mission], it would be only futile to cry for Japanese Christianity, Japanese 
Theology, or Japanese Creed. We should not use the name 'Japan' in vain. Once we 
use it, we have to assume responsibility toward it. The way to discharge this 
responsibility is to make her something necessary [in history]. We make her eternal 
in this way" (ibid., 68). 
'"What is the reality [ NA ] in which we are placed today? The reality 
must be taken at its very face value. What is it that makes a reality a reality? Reality 
asserts itself as if there would be nothing besides. Reality presses. The self-assertion 
of reality is its pressure. Reality refuses to be absorbed by whatever else. Reality is 
self-contained and self-served. . . . Reality stands besides faith, but it refuses to be 
absorbed by faith. It rather presses faith" (ibid., 15). We read this paragraph, 
substituting the wartime national polity for "the reality." Truly, "let the reader 
understand!" 
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denominations. Kitamori for one was firmly convinced of the formation of the 
Kyodan as the design of God whose providence is at work in the confusion of 
men.' 
The "Summary of the Teaching," included as Article V of the Kyodan 
Constitution, states, as the main content of the Christian faith, that "the triune God—
the Father, Son and the Holy Spirit--who is revealed by Jesus Christ and witnessed in 
the Holy Scripture, forgives sins, justifies, sanctifies, and bestows eternal life upon 
those who believe, through the redemption of the Son who became incarnate, died and 
rose again for the sins of the world and its salvation."''Kitamori called into question 
the doctrinal validity of this formula's wording, particularly the description of "the 
triune God revealed by the Son." It is right, holds Kitamori, to say that the Son 
reveals the Father. But to say that the Son reveals the triune God, according to him, 
would be not acceptable should one follow the traditional understanding of the Trinity. 
Doctrinally it is "a confusion of men" pure and simple.' And yet, lending his own 
theological insight to the "confused" formula, Kitamori believed he could make 
manifest something revolutionary in church history which lies implicit in this formula! 
Kitamori finds here his idea of Christological Trinity formulated, a synthesis of the 
doctrine of immanent Trinity and economic Trinity through Christ as "the field" in 





Kitamori, is the structure of the Gospel, that is the Pain of God.' 
In other words, formulated by the preparatory committee of the formation of 
the Kyodan, this formula "accidentally" contained Kitamori's new insight into the truth 
of the Gospel. Thus, the Kyodan, together with Kitamori's theology, was now 
assigned a church-historical mission for the universal Body of Christ in the ultimate 
clarification of the truth of the Gospel. And with this thought, Kitamori was now able 
theologically to justify the coming into being of the Kyodan." Thus the Kyodan, a 
new United Protestant Church in Japan born out of the confusion of the world but by 
the providence of God, now became the Sitz im Leben for Kitamori's theology. 
Kitamori dealt with these highly abstruse "theological issues during the time 
in which the Japanese army was forced to steadily retreat and Tokyo and other major 
cities were under heavy air-raids. It is astounding to observe that Kitamori was 
'Ibid., 44-45. 
'Under the headline "The Theological Significance and Task of the Kyodan's 
Constitution" in Creeds, Kitamori advocated a positive acceptance of the Kyodan, 
giving a theological significance to its coming into being. In spite of all the 
governmental pressure for its formation, Kitamori contended, the Kyodan should have 
its place in "the history of the Gospel" [ ]. In other words, in reliance on 
God providence which is at work in human confusion, the Kyodan, with its 
specifically being Japanese, could carry an historical mission for the new actualization 
of the Gospel in history. "When we stand on this awareness [of the Kyodan's 
historical mission], the Kyodan is never a burden imposed upon us by force, but 
becomes an organ serving the Gospel in a most significant way" (ibid., 36). And, by 
the help of "confused" formula of the "Summary of Teaching," Kitamori could supply 
a theological justification and positive significance, even with an eloquence, to the 
Kyodan formed under the pressure of the wartime government. The critical point is 
then whether or not things, seen in this way, can be justified at will, losing any thrust 
for critical confrontation and self-analysis. Is not this procedure similar to Nishida's 
"a posteriori" justification of the existing order of the nation by the help of 
philosophy? 
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sovereign and even heroic in his theological writing in the midst of the war. The 
situation brought by the war was severe both spiritually and materially, and even 
university students were drafted into war service. There were naturally a huge 
number of casualties. Kitamori was not exempted from experiencing the pain of war 
casualties within the circle of his close friends. In his sovereign manner, however, we 
notice that he was struggling hard to strengthen faith in the invincible and all-
conquering Gospel of the Pain of God, but we, on the other hand, speculate about 
who would have been the readers of this work at that time and how much they 
understood Kitamori's intention. 
A good measure of nationalism can also be traced behind Kitamori's wartime 
endeavor in theology.' More circumspect than Kuwada ' and Oshio," 
Kitamori avoided all concrete references in his writings so that he did not need to face 
any military censorship then, nor churchly criticism later. 
This work, composed in war time, reveals much of Kitamori's theological 
thinking. Further, including the exegetical studies on Jer. 31:20 and Is. 63:15, which 
were the Scriptural "foundation" of The Theology of the Pain of God--his opus 
'See note 128 above. 
"°See note 95 in Chap. 2. In the same place, though criticizing Kuwata for 
what he wrote uncritically of the national polity then, Inoue praises Kuwata for 
Kuwata's sincere endeavor to face the problems of the time and to come to terms with 
them. 
'Germany, 168: "[In an article entitled `Torinashi' (Intercession)] he [Oshio] 
seems to tread on very dangerous ground as a Christian scholar when he intimates that 
John 10:34 might serve as a rationale for the divinity of the Emperor." Oshio is said 
to have corrected this mistake recalling that intimation (ibid.). 
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magnum to come out later--this work is also future-oriented. This is a preparatory 
work for the opus magnum, which had been in preparation during the war. But it is 
also the statement of his ecclesiological commitment to the Kyodan. 
Further, it gives us a singular witness to Kitamori's theological posture of 
consistency and transcendence. Indeed, his theological writings immediately before, 
during, and right after the war, all indicate little interruption in the enfolding of his 
theological theme, showing an undisturbed, monolithic passion and tone. This feature 
can be seen in The Character of the Gospel, his second publication after the war, in 
which one reads the essays written before the war and treatises immediately after, 
without noticing any difference in tone and content. Since he was so deeply immersed 
in his theological struggle with the abysmal depth of human reality, Kitamori 
paradoxically was able to relativize the history of human suffering on the surface. 
In this posture of his theology, Kitamori is true to his own concept of the 
Gospel, that the truth of the Gospel is the absolute truth, and that, once discovered, 
there would be no development or modification of the idea of the Gospel as the Pain 
of God. To Kitamori, theology, as an occupation with the Gospel, is not affected 
substantially by the temporal situation for the human situation, and is not different 
from one situation to another; it remains constant in its substance. 
The Theology of the Pain of God was ready for publication in 1946, a year 
after the end of the war; the kairos of the work had come. Once published, this book 
found immediate popular response. Kitamori himself saw that the term "the Theology 
of Pain" was now in wide circulation. Writing, one year later, in the preface of the 
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second printing of this book, he confesses that to him this vogue of his theology was 
totally unexpected, and he was deeply surprised at this.'" The virgin work, The 
Lord of the Cross, was not widely understood;'" but this work, which was a further 
elaboration of the former one, was in vogue! How popular the theology of the Pain of 
God had become! 
Here, however, a closer look at this popularity is due in order to glimpse 
and anticipate a bit of the destiny of this theology in post-war Japanese Protestantism. 
Yoshio Noro, a former student of Kitamori, recalls that this book captured the 
attention of Christians, especially those of the younger generation, with the sweeping 
effect of "a prairie fire",' they were thirsty and devoid of spiritual values after the 
war, longing for something to saturate their hearts, and they found in Kitamori's book 
that for which they searched. But on the other hand, many theologians, especially in 
the circle of TUTS, did not approve "the idea" of "an aching God"; they were critical 
and even cynical toward it. According to K. Ogawa, already at the publication of 
Kitamori's opus magnum, "the orthodox theologians viewed it with suspicious eyes 
and they criticized; 'that is not a theology but an essay."' Thus, at the very 
beginning Kitamori's theology experienced a mixed reaction, and the assessment of his 
' 32Pain, 9. 
mAuto II, 167, 171-172. 
"Yoshio Noro, God and Hope (Tokyo: Nihon Kirisutokyodan Shppankyoku, 
1980), 454. 
Ogawa, "Formation of the Japanese Type of Indigenous Theology—On 
`The Theology of Pain of God,'" Gospel and World, 38 (Tokyo: March 1983), n. 
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theology has ever been controversial in Japan, even after its gradual international 
recognition from the early 1960s to the present. 
In addition to securing his theological position in Japanese Protestantism, 
Kitamori simultaneously took a definitive standpoint for his "denominational" 
affiliation. In November 1947 Japan Evangelical Lutheran Church (JELC) officially 
announced its withdrawal from the Kyodan as a resolution of the Extraordinary 
General Assembly held in Kumamoto.'" The crucial questions raised by the 
Lutheran leaders then were the following. Was it possible for JELC to preserve the 
Lutheran faith within the current organizational form of the Kyodan? If not, was there 
any possibility in the Kyodan leadership for providing a structural frame in which 
JELC was able to develop herself as a semi-independent Lutheran Church?'" 
These questions were natural for the Lutheran leaders for two reasons. 
First, it was confessional consciousness. The Lutheran Church by this time became 
strongly conscious of its confessional heritage.' While in the process of the 
'A detailed record of JELC's participation in and withdrawal from the 
Kyodan is found in: "Japan Evangelical Lutheran Church in its Process of 
Participation and Withdrawal from the United Church of Christ in Japan [the 
Kyodan]," ed. the Archive Room of Japan Lutheran Seminary (the exact date of 
editing is not known, but according to the bibliography given at the end of this 
document, it was edited after 1971, probably around 1972). 
'"Ibid., 18. 
'Historically it took time for the Lutheran Church to be conscious of its 
confessional heritage. Early on, many of the first workers were "adopted" ones; the 
first Japanese pastor, Ryohei Yamanouchi, was from the Reformed; he was actually 
the brother-in-law of Masahisa Uemura. It was also natural that most of the earlier 
Japanese teachers at the seminary were also from other denominations (Noboru Asaji, 
for instance, was from an Alliance church). Lutheran consciousness was gradually 
awakened around 1925 when the "adopted" workers became aged and the new "born- 
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formation of the Kyodan immediately before the war, it was the JELC leaders who 
insisted on denominational autonomy within the Kyodan until the very last phase of 
the process. In the process, they strongly advocated the idea of the Kyodan as a 
federation of denominational churches as "blocks" within the Kyodan.'" Initially 
accepted, the block system was soon abolished as the war efforts were intensified.' 
It was this idea of federation the JELC leaders took up again at the table of negotiation 
with the Kyodan officials. Second, JELC as one of the minor forces in the united 
church body, was also fearful of being totally absorbed into the denominational 
"syncretism."' 
In the course of the negotiations, held early in December 1946 between the 
Kyodan officials and JELC leaders, it became clear to the Lutheran leaders that, the 
Kyodan officials denying the idea of a federation, the answers to these Lutheran 
as-Lutheran" teachers began to take teaching responsibilities. 
'"Process of Participation and Withdrawal, 10. 
'Ibid., 11; the abolishment of the block system within the Kyodan was 
unanimously voted for in the first General Assembly of the Kyodan held in November 
1942, "no opposing views presented and all calling for an immediate abolishment." 
The editor comments on this unanimous decision: "[Even within our Lutheran church] 
there was no opposition or discussion on the abolishment of the block system, 
although it was we Lutherans that had previously insisted on the block system." It is 
of interest to note that Kitamori, a few days later, gave to Lutheran pastors a lecture 
on "A Theological Consideration on the Abolishment of the Block System" (ibid.). 
141/b• la 18. Against this fear of being absorbed into "syncretism," Kitamori 
expressed his view that "even if the Lutheran church is a minority, there will be no 
fear of it if we Lutherans have a clear awareness of [the evangelical] truth. The 
Kyodan in fact pays respect to Lutheranism now" (ibid. 17). 
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questions would lie in the negative."' Upon this conclusion JELC decided to 
withdraw and to reorganize an independent evangelical Lutheran church."' 
This formal decision of JELC did not affect Kitamori's further career as a 
theologian within the Kyodan. In the above, we already touched upon his theological 
justification of the formation of the Kyodan as the result of God's providence amid the 
human confusion. Remaining in the Kyodan, Kitamori was consistent with his 
theological conviction. Though it is not necessary to go into more detail of JELC's 
withdrawal from the Kyodan, it greatly interests us to go through a document 
submitted by Kitamori in May 1947 to the Preparatory Committee of JELC's 
Reorganization. The title of the document is "Proposals to the Standing Board 
Committee and to the Committee for the [Lutheran] Seminary Reestablishment."' 
This document reveals his understanding of Lutheranism, the mission of the Lutheran 
Church in Japan, his position within the Kyodan, his "holy" ambition to Lutheranize 
this Protestant ecumenical church body. We will dwell on this document at some 
length. 
"There are two crucial issues for a true reconstruction and development of 
the Lutheran Church in Japan," Kitamori pointed out, "the one is its self-fortification 
and self-integration, and the other its self-giving and self-opening." JELC, in this 
"'Ibid., 16. 
"'The text of the Withdrawal Declaration is found in: ibid., 10-21. The text in 
English in: Huddle, Lutheran Church, 220-221. 
"'I obtained from the Archive Room of Japan Lutheran Seminary a copy of 
Kitamori's handwritten manuscript of "The Proposals. . ." Following references are 
made from this document. 
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critical time, will follow the path of the truth, only when she is willing to do justice to 
these two issues; otherwise, suggests Kitamori, it would be impossible for her to hope 
for a future for true Lutheranism in Japan. Kitamori, for one, emphasizes the latter 
factor; self-giving and self-openness. The truth of the Gospel itself dictates this latter 
standpoint. The Lutheran understanding of the Gospel, according to him, is the 
Gospel which embraces the unembraceable, and which is also "the origin of all the 
evangelicalism." The Lutheran understanding of the Gospel, therefore, must prevail 
in the Kyodan, a unified church body of Japanese Protestantism. The formation of the 
Kyodan, in this sense, was not merely a result of ignorant and erroneous confusion, 
but also an opening for a way to the church unity which Confessio Augustana VII 
deeply longs for, that is, an ecumenical concordance on the basis of the doctrine of the 
Gospel. JELC, as the Lutheran Church in Japan, would fall into "contradictio in 
adjecto" if she shuts herself up against the "unembraceable" and seeks her own 
existence for her own sake. Further, Kitamori insists, the consentire doctrina 
evangelii of Confession Augustana VII is not to be understood in an abstract manner. 
It must be materialized in a concrete visible church body, which in the present Japan 
is the Kyodan. 
The JECL leaders were naturally eager to get Kitamori to go along with 
them in their withdrawal from the Kyodan, but the young theologian with a highly 
independent theological judgment followed his own convictions, even if he had to go 
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against an oriental code of "filial piety."' Private emotion should not have any say 
in matters concerning theological truth. Kitamori had to pursue the fulfillment of the 
ecumenical mandate of the Lutheran Church as he understood it expressed in the 
Confessio Augustana. Self-consciously, he argues that the decision of a theologian's 
"come and go" must be made theologically, and if made non-theologically, it would 
only ruin the integrity and credibility of a theologian. It is therefore impossible for 
him to move from the ecumenical stance in the Kyodan to a denominational position 
of the Lutheran Church without sacrificing his theological integrity. As long as the 
Kyodan was open to his Lutheran theology he was theologically obliged to remain in 
Kitamori would suggest the two conditions in which he could return to the 
"denominational" Lutheran Church without ruining his theological integrity. The one 
was that the Kyodan should cease to be an ecumenical Protestant Church in Japan, and 
the other was that the Kyodan no longer would accept his theology."' 
Embracing what he calls "Ecumenical Lutheranism," Kitamori wanted to be 
a Lutheran in the Kyodan, making his professorship a Trojan horse to Lutheranize 
Japanese Protestantism. Once the withdrawal of JELC became a fact, Kitamori had no 
choice but "jumped off from the [JELC] train," and became part and parcel a Kyodan 
""Pastor [Denki] Honda [one of the Lutheran leaders] tried day and night to 
persuade me to come home [to JELC]. . . I wanted him to understand my decision.. . 
. I did him oya-fuko [ sw.* [disobedience to a parent. . .]. I regard myself 




What were the conditions in the Kyodan under which Kitamori was favored 
to become one of the most influential theologians for the postwar Kyodan? Kitamori 
candidly admits that he would never have occupied the professorship at TUTS if it 
were not for the support of the prewar JELC.R9 Fortunately for him, he was from 
the Lutheran Church, one of the minor denominations; if he were from, say, the 
[Reformed] Church of Christ in Japan (one of the major denominations), or the 
Congregationalists, or the Methodists or the other "major" ones, none of these rivaling 
denominations would have approved him for long. In fact, it was those "major" 
denominations mentioned above, the Congregationalists, the Methodists and the other, 
that supported Kitamori as a counter-measure to that powerful [Reformed] Church of 
Christ in Japan.' Kitamori thus secured his place on the power balance of 
denominational "rivalry" within the Kyodan. 
The position assigned to Kitamori at TUTS, the central theological institution 
of the Kyodan, was highly satisfactory to him. The document previously mentioned 
"Process, 17. A comment of Kitamori in Ruteru made on this issue after the 
Kyodan troubles in the early 1970s draws our attention, because Kitamori's viewpoint 
is somewhat different three decades later. He now understands that it would be 
desirable for the Lutheranism in Japan to have an "Ecumenical Lutheranism" and a 
"Specific Lutheranism." It is necessary to share the Lutheran mission in Japan by 
Kitamori's Ecumenical Lutheranism and JELC's Specific [Confessional] Lutheranism 
(bungyo-ron, , in Kitamori's term). Both of them are now desirable 
and necessary. Without Specific Lutheranism, the Lutheranism in Japan may 
evaporate, holds Kitamori! 
i'Kitamori, "Proposals." 
'Yasushi Kuyama, Modern Japan and Christianity: The Present (Tokyo: 
Sobunsha, 19??), 42-43. 
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gives a good testimony to how deeply he appreciated his current position theologically; 
The Seminary of the Kyodan unequivocally has declared its ecumenical position 
on theology. It also has assigned to me the lectures over the prolegomena of 
dogmatics, which, as well known, is by far the most crucial discipline of 
theology. . . . The Kyodan gave me "a blank check" concerning this crucial 
discipline. I gave a clear expression of my Lutheran position; the Kyodan, fully 
admitting this, trusted its ecumenical theology to me. . . .'" 
In the midst of the Barthian dominance at TUTS, Kitamori understood that he now 
occupied the key position for the formation of the Kyodan theology. 
Once set on this career, Kitamori was able to establish church-political 
credentials by his own theological conviction, practical wisdom and persuasive 
eloquence. During the chaotic years of reorganization, the Kyodan had to face 
difficult tasks of mediating differences of denominational factions, including those 
"non-theological" all too human factors. Kitamori managed to lead complicated 
negotiations with his clear logic and oratorical as well as political skills. He thus soon 
became the "spokesman" of the Kyodan.'" 
In the preceding chapter, we have already touched upon how crucial a role 
Kitamori had played in the efforts of settling the vital problems of the postwar 
Kyodan; the restructuring of the organization, the Kai-ha controversy and the 
formulation of the Kyodan's Confession of Faith. Committees were organized to 
settle these problems. Due to a seniority principle and also perhaps to considerations 
of denominational power balance, Kitamori did not lead any of these committees as 
'51Kitamori, "Proposals." 
1320gawa, "Indigenous Theology," 72. 
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the chairman, remaining the second man throughout as the "secretary." However, it 
is not difficult to discern that in the capacity of secretary Kitamori was the man who 
substantially provided the committee's solution proposals with theological 
substantiations and directions. 
One therefore could not regard it as a usurpation on the part of Kitamori 
when he would claim, as he occasionally intimates, that settling the problems and 
setting the Kyodan on the road again was mainly was his work. It was Kitamori who 
led difficult negotiations with the Kai-ha claimers and provided the formula of the 
solutions to the problem; it was also he who wrote a commentary of the Kyodan's 
Confession of Faith, the commentary which remains the only one of its kind.' 
In his own person, Kitamori was functioning as a mediator among the 
mutually opposing parties within the Kyodan for two decades or so. He was in good 
cooperative relationships to the senior leaders of the Kyodan (those from before the 
war), thus winning their trust. Actively joining the young generation of theologians, 
he pursued solutions of theological and practical problems. In fact, these activities of 
Kitamori were quite true to the inclusive line of his theology of the Pain of God. 
Certainly, the settlement of the problems of the Kyodan wrought by the 
efforts of Kitamori was not the final one, as the later experiences of the Kyodan 
painfully demonstrate. In fact, there was a shadowy side in the efforts of Kitamori. 
Tsutomu Oshio once commented on Kitamori's postwar work in the Kyodan, a 
"Kitamori, The &planation of the Kyodan's Confession of Faith, (Tokyo: Nihon 
Kirisuto Kyodan Shuppanbu, 1955). 
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comment which interests us much here.' Oshio was a moderate personality with 
whom Kitamori himself felt a deep theological sympathy. According to him, 
Kitamori's theology proved to be a convenient means for those in power in the 
Kyodan from the war years and who wanted to preserve the church body in the status 
quo. Unfortunately, the more theological justification of the Kyodan's status quo 
appeared plausible and logically undefeatable, the more fiercely the opponents (the 
Kai-ha claimers) reacted against that justification, and they themselves eventually 
decided to withdraw from the Kyodan and formed their own denomination. Oshio 
regretted this tragic incident, saying that "they [the opponents] were people more 
trustworthy with regard to faith." 
This senior Kyodan leader acknowledged that for the first postwar decade 
the foundation of the Kyodan had been provided by Kitamori." To him, however, 
Kitamori's theology also ran the risk of self-deteriorating into the Kyodan's puppet 
theology. Oshio blames those in power for their "irresponsible exploitation" of 
Kitamori's theology, but he also found Kitamori himself responsible for this. So 
much was Oshio's comment. 
Certainly, Kitamori, an attentive observer of the nature of human beings, 
was never unaware of the "non-theological" motives of those conservative leaders. 
But his theology did not exclude those unembraceable elements; to Kitamori, God 
works in the midst of human confusion. Just on this point, however, one notices the 
"Kuyama, Present, 34-36. 
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strong side and the less fortunate side of Kitamori's theology. His intuition of the 
deep depravity of this world made visible a proportionally profound implication of the 
Gospel, that the Gospel is absolute in the sense of all-embracing. This understanding 
of the Gospel provided a sober perspective of reality. But, on the other hand, his 
theology tends to grind out the sharp edges of criticism raised by the awareness of the 
holiness of the divine commandment against all human complacency. A theology on 
the way or theologia viatorum, is bound to be limited, finding it difficult to steer 
between the scylla of idealistic enthusiasm and the charybdis of facile sanction of the 
status quo. Kitamori's theology seems a case in point. 
"For the Kyodan," Kitamori judges in retrospect, "1950 was the most 
critical year." It was in the Sixth General Assembly of the Kyodan held in the year 
that the Kai-ha problem was "settled." "At that time we got over that [Kai-ha 
problem], and there have been no serious problems in the Kyodan since then," 
observes Kitamori.'' In fact, about two decades from that time, he was able to 
perform his mission unhindered. His ministry ranged wide. He taught at different 
seminaries and visited several universities in the capital and elsewhere as a lecturer. 
As a prolific author he wrote theological articles extensively as well as essays on 
humanistic themes to Christian publications and secular media alike. Often he 
engaged himself in broadcasting lectures. In addition to all these activities, he sat on 
various theological and administrative committees of the Kyodan. In the spring of 
1953, he gave lectures on Christianity to the present emperor Akihito, then crown 
'Ibid., 33.' 
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prince. He is one of a few theologians who took pains to communicate the Christian 
truth to a broader public beyond the hedge of the Christian community in Japan. 
Before we go to the next section a short note is to be included as to 
Kitamori's relationship with his senior colleagues, Yoshitaka Kumano and Hidenobu 
Kuwada, at TUTS. Kitamori's activities are a sharp contrast to theirs. Both were 
strongly influenced by the theology of Karl Barth. While their concerns were more 
strongly oriented to the deepening of theology proper for the Church's ministry, 
Kitamori rather sought the "applicability" of the Gospel, the Pain of God, to the 
problem-filled reality of this world. Due to deep differences between Kumano and 
Kuwada on the one hand and Kitamori on the other in regard to theological 
conviction, orientation and methodology, it was virtually impossible for each to take 
up the other's theological viewpoints for critical public examination.' It was 
perhaps practically necessary for both sides, being in the same boat, not to criticize 
each other openly. However, it was not possible to totally hide the tension; the one 
criticizes the other by ignoring him or by indirect complaint.' In a sense, it should 
'"To the lecture by Kitamori entitled "the Spirituality of the Japanese," a 
questioner made a comment: "The Kyodan is a typical case of the Japanese 
`embracing-all-ness' [mugen-hoyo-sei, *ARM% ] and 'living-together- 
unorganized-ness' [zakkyo-sei, Mt ]. We can see this, for instance, [the 
Kyodan's] in Basic Theories of Mission, in which everything [seemingly pertinent to 
the theme] is included anyway. And as a typical case of no communication [for the 
overcoming of zakkyo-sei], we can point out no communication between Kitamori 
Theology and Kumano Theology" (The Kyodan's Faith and Order Commission, ed, 
Indigenization of the Gospel, [Tokyo: Nihon Kirisutokyodan Shuppanbu, 1962], 65). 
"As for Kumano vis-à-vis Kitamori, there is complete silence except for one 
case (as far as I know), in which Kumano briefly criticizes Kitamori's concept of 
Trinity: "There are theologians who contend: 'Although it is true that the Father, the 
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be understood as quite human, but at the same time quite tragic for the Kyodan. In 
fact, it indeed means a theological relativism that two types of theology have been 
poured from the podium at the same seminary without interaction between them. This 
in fact indicates that the Kyodan was as yet not a united Church theologically. In 
addition to this, one may wonder how students at the seminary who were to carry the 
Kyodan in the future won their theological identity. 
Now one can safely say that Kitamori's career as a professor at TUTS and 
an influential church-man of the Kyodan was uninterrupted throughout the two postwar 
decades. During this period, Kitamori was indeed one of the most influential pillars 
of the Kyodan. 
Kitamori's Career in Decline 
Kitamori's influence, as well as the "credibility" of his theology, however, 
declined abruptly as a result of his way of dealing with the upheavals in the Kyodan in 
the late 60s and the early 70s in the regard to the Confession of Wartime 
Responsibility, the problem of the Kyodan's Expo participation and the campus 
Son and the Holy Spirit is the One Godhead, the notion of Trinity should be corrected 
right away which has no "gap" or no "mediation" in it. The unity of the Godhead 
must be a unity mediated by contradiction' (for instance 'the Theology of the Pain of 
God'). This is an erroneous standpoint, for it mistakenly puts the Trinity and the 
being of the historical world on the same level, thus making light of the Lordship of 
God who is truly the Creator" (Yoshitaka Kumano, Faith, Church and Doctrine 
[Tokyo: Zenkoku Rengo Choro-Kai, 1982], 18). Kuwada has virtually nothing to say 
about Kitamori's theology. On the other hand, Kitamori intimates the inadequateness 
of a highly scholarly theology such as Kumano's for the communication of the Gospel 
to a broader public. Perhaps the following quotation may be directed also to his 
opponents in silence at TUTS: "Just as we do not recognize as men of literature those 
who only translate and introduce foreign theologies" (Introduction, 149). 
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turmoil at TUTS. We have seen the course of these events in the preceding chapter. 
In this section we investigate the theological background of the decline of Kitamori's 
influence. Our investigation will be an assessment of Kitamori's career as a church 
leader. Of course, the leading idea of his commitment to the Kyodan infiltrates his 
ecclesiology. So we will touch upon it when necessary. But the main concern here is 
to see why Kitamori's influence declined so abruptly. Admittedly, it is still too early 
to give a full historical account. But it is necessary for us to dare to give an account, 
though a preliminary one, to discover Kitamori's theological contribution. In so 
doing, we go only as far as evidence will allow. 
Our focus is on the three events which took place around the late 60s and 
the early 70s: the issuance of the Confession of Wartime Responsibility, the Kyodan's 
participation in the Expo 70, and the TUTS turmoil. First of all, we recognize that 
Kitamori was consistent with his theological conviction and principle in dealing with 
all the problems involved. 
As for the Confession of Wartime Responsibility, those who felt an inner 
urge to issue the confession were deeply troubled over the fact that the Kyodan as yet 
had not sincerely repented of what it had done during the war. To them, the Kyodan 
had fallen into grave sins by cowardly cooperating with the military regime, in 
justifying the war, collecting money for war planes, glorifying the emperor and the 
nation, abandoning some of the Kyodan pastors to martyrdom, and so on. They felt 
that there was no excuse for the Kyodan's "crimes"; without repenting squarely over 
the past sins, there was no true forgiveness and therefore no true future for the 
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Kyodan as the Church of Christ.'" 
But Kitamori saw this issue differently.' This we touched upon in the 
preceding chapter. Here we recapture the main points. First, the Kyodan's main 
failure was that it had not thought a confession of faith was necessary and had 
provided 
none. Second, though certainly insufficient in her prophetic ministry and erroneous in 
her works during the war, she was still faithful in her priestly ministry—in her 
intercessory prayers for the state--and in faithfully preaching the Gospel during the 
war. Third, the Kyodan remained the Church despite all the erroneous deeds because 
of her preaching of the Gospel, the true sign of the Church. Fourth, compared with 
the negligence on the Kyodan's confession of faith, these shortcomings in her works 
' Ken'ichi Kida, a professor at one of Christian universities in Tokyo, spoke 
of his grandfather who was "abandoned" by the Kyodan: "My grandfather was a 
minister of the Nazarene Church. When he was seventy years old he was arrested by 
the military police and forced to make a choice between Christ as divine and the 
emperor. He was in prison for six months . . . . I heard that the wartime Kyodan had 
taken away the ministerial credentials of persons like my grandfather. Unless the 
Kyodan had repented of such criminal acts and made the Confession of Wartime 
Responsibility, I do not believe that I could dedicate myself fully to the Kyodan" 
(quoted from: "Reassessing," Japan Christian Quarterly 45 [Summer 1979]: 158 [see 
note 125 of Chap. 2 above]). In a personal card responding to my letter in which I 
wished God's blessing to the inauguration of his moderatorship of the Kyodan in 
1987, Rev. Norimichi Tsuji, whose father was a minister of the Holiness Church in 
Japan, suffered martyrdom during the war and was abandoned by the Kyodan 
officials, wrote to me something as follows: "I feel something moving deep inside me 
by the fact that I, the son of a pastor abandoned by the Kyodan, am now entrusted the 
office of Moderator of the Kyodan." 
1' For the following view of Kitamori, see Heita Mori, "Contemporary 
Significance," [Japan] Christian Year Book (Tokyo: 1969), 48 (cf. note 137 of Chap. 
2 above). 
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did not negate the Church's esse. A confession of faith deals with the Gospel upon 
which alone the Church of Christ stands."' 
These viewpoints of Kitamori were clearly formulated in a document which 
was prepared by the so-called Five-Member Committee which was appointed by the 
Board of the Kyodan to settle the disturbances within this church body. As the 
chairman of this committee, Kitamori naturally reflected his inclusive mediating 
viewpoints in the solution-document. But Kitamori's view of the Kyodan's main 
problem--failing to provide a confession of faith in the process of the formation of the 
prewar Kyodan--was rejected by the adherents of the Confession of Wartime 
Responsibility as distorting the real issue of wartime responsibility. His contention 
that the Kyodan essentially remained the Church preaching the Gospel even under the 
pressures of wartime government was labeled an abstract theory. All of Kitamori's 
viewpoints mentioned above were severely criticized by his opponents as only 
diverting the very thrusts of the Confession of Wartime Responsibility.' To the 
opponents, the settlement proposal of inclusive and mediating concepts was a typical 
''We also pay attention to the following saying of Kitamori: "[Although it is 
said that there was not much attention paid to Barmen Declaration,] the situation in 
Japan for Japanese theologians was different from the situation in Germany for the 
German and Swiss theologians. In Japan the concern of the theologians was that the 
logos [Gospel] be declared faithfully. The leading theologians in Japan during this 
[war] period felt 
. . . that what they [the German and Swiss theologians] were saying was not 
necessarily essential to the declaration of the Gospel within the Japanese situation" 
(quoted in Germany, 172). However, we doubt if Kitamori here represents the view 
of "the leading theologians" at that time, because Kuwada for one tried to come terms 
with the actual Japanese situation at that time theologically, see note 129. 
"'Assessment," 159-60. 
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recurrence of the same "Kitamorian" church-political maneuver by which Kitamori 
again would try to preserve the unity of the Kyodan for unity's own sake, while not 
allowing the Kyodan people to confront the serious issues that concerned its 
ecclesiastical to be or not to be.'' 
True, it is one of the crucial problems inherent to Kitamori's inclusive 
theology that there often seems to be little room for serious confrontation between 
"rights and wrongs." One is therefore often compelled to question if it is possible by 
the theology of Kitamori to provide a real renovation of the Church urged by the 
Holiness of God. But Kitamori's way of seeing the issues is understandable from his 
own premises. To him, the nota ecclesiae is the Gospel, the Gospel as the message of 
salvation given to unlovable sinners through the death of Christ, the supreme 
expression of God's love as His Pain. The Kyodan's wartime insufficiency in 
prophetic witness did not nullify its esse as the Church of Christ, because the Kyodan 
preserved the preaching of the Gospel, which alone and exclusively constitutes the 
Church and which is more real and powerful than any human frailties. The Gospel 
can heal the Kyodan's wounds of sins. 
The problem with this position of Kitamori is, once again, the danger of 
escaping from the painful confrontation with the past and also from confessing sins not 
only before God but also before man in clear and unequivocal terms. Kitamori was 
not ignorant of all this. He admitted, in the settlement proposal, the human frailties 
''Heita Mori, 48. 
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and the need for serious repentance.' The question is, however, whether the actual 
effect of his theology as a whole was to let the people escape from acknowledgment of 
their past sins however excusable the situation in human terms. 
Be this as it may, for Kitamori it is the Gospel through and through that 
must reign in the question of the esse of the Church. The Kyodan's problem, for him, 
was her failure to take a confession of faith seriously at the time of the formation of 
the Kyodan.' Thanks to Kitamori's theological contribution the Confession of Faith 
was given to the Kyodan." The importance of taking the Confession seriously holds 
true also today. For the Kyodan can stand only on the Confession of Faith. 
Here we recognize that the understanding of the Gospel and the 
understanding of the esse of the Church are inseparably linked. What is the Gospel? 
In fact, the opponents' criticisms raised against Kitamori ultimately are concerned with 
his understanding of the Gospel. For Kitamori, the Gospel is given an objective 
"ICazoh Kitamori, "A Progress of the Kyodan during the Past Twenty-Five 
Years," Christianity of Japan (Tokyo: Sobunsha, 1966), 265. "[Due to this 
suspension of the task of formulating a Kyodan's Confession of Faith] the Kyodan had 
to suffer from this [negligence] for fifteen years since its establishment," holds 
Kitamori here. "Of course, we are to be sympathetic with those leaders during the 
war, the leaders who were responsible for the establishment process, but it is still 
necessary to point out their negligence. The first generation men came to impose this 
vital issue on the second generation men." However, Denki Honda (see note 144 
above), a Lutheran delegate in the establishment process of the Kyodan, said the 
following in 1940: From the beginning I thought that the attempt to unify the 
churches involved something insurmountable. It is truly formidable to form, out of 
more than twenty different church bodies, one Church with one organization and one 
creed" (quoted in: Process of Participation and Withdrawal, 10). 
l'Kazoh Kitamori, "The Twenty-Five Years of the Kyodan," Christianity of 
Japan, (Tokyo: Sobunska, 1966), 299. 
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magnitude, eternally unchangeable truth, the love based upon the Pain of God. It has 
all the powerful potential to sustain the full range of fallen reality. The question is not 
one of hearing here and now the Word of God anew; it is rather one of application of 
the Gospel already discovered. The Gospel as the Pain of God is unchangeable; it 
cannot change. 
Different from this objective view of the Gospel, his critics held that the 
Gospel involves the believers' subjective living; to believe in the Gospel and to act 
according to it are inseparable. To them, therefore, Kitamori's viewpoint that the 
Church can preach the Gospel while falling into "errors" in her works--as was the 
case with the Kyodan during the wartime--is unacceptable. They hold that when the 
works of the Church are wrong, her faith is also wrong.' 
In this connection, it is striking to learn that a fundamental ecclesiological 
difference between Kitamori and Masahisa Suzuki, the issuer of the Confession of 
1967, was there already in one of the early postwar-decade publications whose title is 
The Church--the Task to Its Formation, 1948.' Suzuki was three years older than 
Kitamori, that is, of the same generation. Suzuki, although he had Methodist 
background, had been a student of Barth most of his life. Because of its 
"Hidetoshi Watanabe, a theologian of the younger generation within the 
Kyodan and a radical critic of Kitamori's theology, maintains that "in reality there is 
no faith that does not express itself in acts. Therefore, it is quite natural, when 
speaking of faith, to ask also about works. Faith separated from works is merely 
assent to a creed. But our point is that the Confession of Faith is essentially a matter 
of how one lives," quoted from: "Assessment," 160. 
"Masatoshi Fukuda and Kazu Yamamoto, eds., The Church--The Task of Its 
Formation (Tokyo: Shinkyo Shuppansha, 1948). 
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ecclesiological significance for both Kyodan leaders we dwell on their contributions to 
the book at some length. 
To this volume, Kitamori contributed "Luther's View on the Church,"" 
whereas Suzuki provided "Protestant Denominations in the Modern Era."' In a 
sovereign manner, Kitamori advanced his conviction in The Lord of the Cross that the 
Lutheran understanding of the Gospel is the very origin of evangelicalism; it must 
prevail in Protestantism as the axiomatic "place" in which every other Protestant 
denomination finds its place. Like the sun which lets red look red, Lutheranism is the 
Protestant axiom which lets the Reformed be the Reformed, the Anglican the 
Anglican, the Methodist the Methodist and so on."' The definition of the Protestant 
Church, or the Church simply, is clear to Kitamori. He refers to Luther's notion of 
the Church and characterizes it as follows: the Church is conceived in an organic 
relation to the Gospel through and through; the Reformer's ecclesiology is fully 
liberated from "sectarianism;" Luther emphasizes "the invisibility and visibility of the 
Church."' Conceiving Luther's idea of the Church this way, Kitamori stated that 
the Gospel alone constitutes, and determines the nature of, an ecumenical Church in a 
visible manner in Japan. According to him, this ecumenical feature of the Kyodan in 
Japan is a church-historical unicum, bearing a vital implication for the universal 
"ICitamori's contribution, ibid., 139-172. 




Church of Christ, namely the realization of the one Church in the world on the basis 
of the Gospel--the Pain of God.' Kitamori thus had ready in his hand the blue-print 
of the Church to be made visible in Japan. 
In contrast to Kitamori's sovereign manner in advancing his position, Suzuki 
was deeply reserved in his claim of objective validity of his observation of 
denominational history. Suzuki held to the effect that every historical event, including 
the denominational development in the Christian Church, took place as the result of 
interactions between various persons; but those persons were unique and particular 
each in his own way. To Suzuki, an individual, who happens to look at an historical 
event from the present, cannot comprehend it exhaustively. An individual is limited in 
his recognition of the thoughts of the others. "A crab digs a hole like his own 
carapace," Suzuki quotes a folk saying to make his point.'" 
According to Suzuki, denominations are necessary consequences of the 
Reformation faith; he holds that the Reformation is a re-establishment of the 
'3" [We shall continue to fight a `liebender Kampf to win the Roman Catholic 
Church to the Gospel.] Because it is a 'loving struggle,' our way [for overcoming 
sectarianism in the Church] will take on a feature of 'the way of pain' (via dolorosa). 
However, first of all, this way must be practiced for the unification of denominations 
within Protestantism. Despite Luther's anti-sectarianism, the history of Protestantism 
throughout four centuries has been a history of [the Church's] splitting into 
denominations. . . . Even if we admit that the denominational split has involved its 
inner necessity, we must overcome it to achieve an integration and unification. The 
way to this goal cannot be but the way of pain which is a 'loving struggle'" (ibid. 
160-161, and see also ibid., 166). According to Kitamori, in the very search of the 
way by which the Kyodan is to be formed into a united catholic Church, there lies a 




pre-Constantinian appropriation of faith through the individual's existential encounter 
with the Gospel.'" On this understanding, Suzuki summarized the history of modern 
denominationalism as the process in which the personal appropriation of faith was 
again brought into effect, or the nominal and customary faith was made the real, 
personal faith again. Thus Suzuki acknowledged denominationalism as a corrective 
element in the history of the Church, as an antidote to cool objectivism and 
intellectualism in church and theology.' 
This viewpoint of Suzuki represents quite a different theological profile from 
that of Kitamori, both in methodology and outlook. Perhaps the most striking feature, 
compared to Kitamori's position, is Suzuki's recognition of man's relativity and 
limitedness in respect to his understanding of the Word of God and God Himself. At 
the end of his essay, Suzuki quoted from A. C. McGiffert's Christianity as History 
and Faith. Although the American author resignedly gives up any hope of postulating 
something common and universal to different "Christian" denominations, Suzuki 
himself turned to the Apostolic Council in Jerusalem (Acts 15), and rather took the 
message from there, while paraphrasing: "There occurred a great dissension and 
debate. They came together to discuss it. All the assembly came to silence after they 
finished speaking. James then gave a reply. The words of the prophets agreed with 




congregation in Jerusalem obeyed the prophetic word. Then Suzuki continues to say: 
The Lord alone, in His Word, is the free Lord of the Church. The Church and 
the believer on this earth remain in the tensions of relativity even in their most 
profound understandings of the Word. And the Bible as the Word of God, while 
remaining ever as the free lord in the midst of the dialectical tensions, gives us 
new understandings from time to time.'" 
Suzuki's understanding of the Church is typical of the Reformed, ecclesia verbo divine 
semper reformanda. The Church in time and space is and remains relative, always 
needing to be open to the Word of God in Scripture in order to be formed ever anew 
by it. Neither Church nor any theology can make claim to the "habitual" possession 
of the eternal, absolute truth of the Gospel while on earth. The living Lord alone is 
the truth, and this Lord is a free Lord who never allows himself to be grasped 
exhaustively by the sinful and finite mortals. There is, however, little need to mention 
that the whole of Suzuki's theology is supported by the deep recognition of the 
sovereignty of divine grace and mercy given to frail and sinful man. If we then 
follow the implications of Suzuki's view to its logical conclusion, we arrive at a sharp 
contrast to Kitamori's theology.'" 
Kitamori and Suzuki, the two contemporary Kyodan leaders, thus advanced 
'"Ibid. 
"In addition to this theological difference between Kitamori and Suzuki, there 
was also a marked contrast between the two Kyodan leaders as to their church-political 
approaches immediately after the war. Whereas Kitamori was respectfully cooperating 
with the senior Kyodan leaders from the wartime for the reorganization of the Kyodan 
(see Kuyama, Present, 43), Suzuki was one of the young pastors who demanded, in 
1946, an election of new representatives of the General Assembly of the Kyodan to 
form a new leadership. Suzuki and others demanded this in order to prevent the old 
leaders from getting their own revised proposals of the Kyodan's constitution and rules 
sanctioned by the old representatives (Yamaya, 192). 
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their theological views in the postwar joint publication in search of the way for the 
formation of the Kyodan. It was Kitamori who played a decisive role in the years 
immediately after the war, when many unsettled problems threatened a dissolution of 
the Kyodan itself. His inclusive, mediating theology seems to befit the needs of the 
time. But when the need and wish to radically renovate the Kyodan in theology and 
ethics began to be felt keenly from 1950s on, Kitamori's theology appeared to be too 
static and too schemmatic; it no longer seemed to be able to contain the new wine of 
the theological and socio-ethical consciousness of the rising generations. Suzuki's 
prophetic vision for the future Kyodan symbolically replaced Kitamori's realism and 
conservatism. For those who supported the Kyodan's renovation, it is the moderator 
Suzuki who, though long overdue, initiated the real history of the Kyodan as the 
Church of Christ.' 
The intensity of criticism against Kitamori's theology and his position in 
church-political issues was heightened still more in connection with the Kyodan's 
participation in the Expo 70 in Osaka and the campus tragedy at TUTS. His theology 
was accused of being pro-estabilishmentarian and reactionary; his critics said that 
Kitamori had no desire but to preserve the Kyodan for the Kyodan's sake; it is 
I8°"The importance of the confession [of Wartime Responsibility in the name 
of Moderator Suzuki] is found in its timing," says Yoshio Inoue, "which, I believe, 
marked the real beginning of Japan's postwar church history. Without examining 
what was solely lacking in the church during the war, its postwar era could not begin, 
nor could future be projected. The confusion in the [Kyodan] church today is a 
natural result of a kind of retribution for having failed to conduct this essential 
soul-searching much earlier. And this is a problem that cannot be solved by political 
maneuvering. In other words, we must look again at what it means to be the church" 
(quoted from: "Assessment," 162, emphasis is added). 
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contrary to the nature of the Church, they claimed, for she exists in the world for 
others. 
Yet, in dealing with these issues, Kitamori was consistent with his 
theological premises. In his view, the constitution of the Church cannot be made 
conditional on the quality of its socio-ethical practices. The Gospel of the Pain of God 
is the very gospel exactly because it embraces even the Church's socio-ethical 
insufficiency and frailty. For this reason, Kitamori never gave in even an inch with 
regard to his ecclesiology; his ecclesiology and his concept of the Gospel made an 
inseparable organic whole. In fact, Kitamori gave an impression of separating the 
Gospel totally from the Church's socio-ethical existence. Certainly, on the level of 
individual ethics, Kitamori emphasized the quality of the believers' love as the 
necessary fruit of the Gospel. But when it came to the discussion of the Church's 
socio-ethical behavior, Kitamori seems to have advanced a view nullifying any 
socio-ethical claim placed on the Church by faith itself. Kitamori therefore asserted 
that the Kyodan might. be mistaken in her "work" but she remained the Church 
because she preserved and believed the Gospel during the war. The opponents then 
ask: what kind of a Gospel is the Gospel Kitamori advances which could stand side by 
side with "open misdeeds" contrary to the ethical implications of the message of 
salvation given in Christ?' 
"Kitamori holds that the Church is constituted by the Gospel. Who can deny 
this statement? The question then becomes more specific: what kind of Gospel, or 
what kind of understanding of the Gospel is it? The Kyodan's understanding of the 
Gospel during the war is found in its Summary of the Teaching (p. 39), which is 
clearly soteriological, expressing the main content of the Protestant understanding of 
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For further investigation, we raise two questions. First, why did Kitamori 
actively and willingly cooperate with the political and business establishments in the 
Expo as the Chairman of the Theme Committee? Second, why could he as a senior 
member, or an actual leader, of the TUTS faculty approve the measure to call in the 
metropolitan riot police onto the campus? Now, in retrospect, the Expo participation 
and the calling in of "riot police" are generally considered as questionable and 
condemnable steps for the Kyodan to take. To be sure, an ingredient of the tragedy 
may have been a power struggle going on in the Kyodan. But from a theological 
point of view, Kitamori had to take the stand that he did, if he would remain 
consistent with his theological conviction. 
In fact, in Kitamori's contribution to the joint publication mentioned above 
(three decades earlier!), we believe we have a documentary clue to the answers to 
these questions. In dealing with Luther's view on the relationship of Church and state 
the Gospel. Kitamori believed to have found in it a profound implication, and 
"spelled it out." The problem is, this Summary of the Teaching included "the Rules of 
the Believers' Life" the first one of which urged the believers, as the faithful subjects 
to the emperor of "eternal lineage," to assist the prosperity of the emperor's house and 
to make utmost efforts to manifest "the quintessence of the national polity of Japan." 
This regimentation led the Kyodan to a tragic compromise with the state during the 
war; "The Kyodan degraded itself to be [voluntary] spokesman of the military regime; 
. . . . The Kyodan leaders and believers alike officially visited Shinto.shrines for 
worship(!); the Rescript of War Declaration was read in the Church before worship 
service and holy communion. . . . (Hori, Confession, 111). What is, then, the Gospel 
which could stand side by side with this compromise? An essential issue is, as we see 
it, the problem of the Law. What seems to us crucial to the problem of Kitamori is 
the lack of the Law's function for the Gospel. The Gospel without the Law's 
unceasing claim in men's life would cease to be the Gospel as the living message of 
salvation. 
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(he does this with reference to Karl Ho11's work'), Kitamori advances the view that 
"for the ultimate goal of man's service to the Gospel, the Church and the State should 
cooperate with each other; they should not be antagonistic to each other in vain."'' 
Drawing a parallel line between the situation of Luther's Germany then and the 
present one in Japan, Kitamori viewed the state more positively than his opponents. 
As for Expo 70, for Kitamori, it was an outstanding opportunity to present the Gospel 
in cooperation with the establishment. Kitamori was not unaware of the problems his 
opponents pointed out as inherent in such an enterprise. But, "in spite of" the shadow 
side of this festival, held Kitamori, the Christians can at least "show" something of the 
Gospel to tens of millions of visitors, and by participating in it make them aware of 
the problematic elements of modern technological civilization. Kitamori consistently 
argues that Christians cannot render their service to society in an ethically pure room 
and form, but the service is only possible with the often painful but inevitable "in spite 
of" and "putting up with" imperfection and shortcomings inherent in the world in this 
aeon. 
It needs to be mentioned that Kitamori made it clear that in the 
understanding of the Gospel there should never be dissensions in the Church, but 
concerning the approach to socio-ethical matters—the Expo 70 is one of such matters-- 
''Kitamori uses for his contribution two of Karl Ho11's treatises in his Gesamelte 
Aufsaitze I: "Der Neubau der Sittlichkeit" and "Was verstand Luther unter Religion." 
'Fukuda and Yamamoto, Church, 154. 
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multiple possibilities must be allowed.' 
The issue of calling the riot police onto the TUTS campus was a catastrophe 
both for TUTS and the Kyodan, and yet even that tragic measure was no less 
consistent, it seems, with Kitamori's view. In the absence of direct documentary 
evidence, we again resort to the contribution he made to the joint ecclesiological 
publication. Given Kitamori's consistent theological viewpoint, this document serves 
to make intelligible what he advanced on this particular occasion. 
To him, the protesting students and the theologians sympathizing with them 
denied the Gospel formulated and given in the Confession of Faith of the Kyodan. By 
the same token, they departed from the Gospel. Falling into "another Gospel" and 
resorting to violence only to destroy the order of the seminary and the Church, they 
ceased to be the members of the Body of Christ unless they would repent of their 
errors in their grasp of the Gospel and in the consequent violence. Since repentance 
was virtually impossible, they were now little more than boryokusha [die 
Gewalttlitigen] committing bogyaku [die Ausbeutung].`as The Kingdom of God must 
be protected from the doers of violence to the power of the state to which God 
provides the peace necessary for the Church to grow. Thus seen, Kitamori's "come 
and go" as a theologian is consistent also in this issue. 
In all these critical events, Kitamori has been consistent with his theological 
'"Kazoh Kitamori, "The Task of the Federation of Evangelical Churches," Japan 
Christian Quarterly 45 (Summer 1979): 151-154. 
'These are the words of Karl Holl, which Kitamori uses translating thus in his 
contribution to: Fukuda and Yamamoto, Church. 
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premises. And yet, due to his very consistency, Kitamori failed to advance the unity 
of the Kyodan. To the contrary, he became the target of vehement criticism. The 
same theological position experiences the opposite reactions when situations alternate. 
History goes, and things change. 
With these catastrophic incidents, the leadership of the Kyodan went into the 
hands of those who followed Suzuki's line. Hideo Old, a former TUTS president, has 
his own view of the issues which interest us here. Old himself was not an 
Expo-supporter but antagonistic to the Suzuki followers due to their criticism of 
TUTS. In an interview held a decade after the TUTS tragedy, he said that "the 
anti-Expo group and its sympathizers now occupy leadership positions in the Kyodan 
and the NCC. . . . It took them ten years to gain control of the Kyodan, but the 
important point is that they used physical force and coup d'etat methods to do so."'" 
Our concern here is not with the objective validity of this saying. We only want to 
draw out two things: the one is how acrimonious the feeling of a TUTS faculty 
(perhaps also the majority of the faculty) remained toward the Kyodan leaders even a 
decade later, as revealed by Old's tone; and the other is that Kitamori was no longer 
in the leadership position in the Kyodan either theologically or church-politically. 
According to Isao Kuramatsu, these new leaders of the Kyodan "have driven the 
professor [Kitamori] away from the position of being the Kyodan's theological 
'Hideo Old, "Reflection on the Kyodan Problem" (an interview article), Japan 
Christian Quarterly 45 (Summer 1979): 169. 
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pillar."' 
The schism between the Kyodan leadership and the TUTS faculty is not the 
only one. There is another "schism" among the churches within the Kyodan. Those 
who adhere to the more distinct "Suzuki Line," and those who bitterly oppose that 
line. In between, there is a moderate, mediating group, represented, for instance, by 
the "Ministers' Forum.' It is ironic and tragic that Kitamori is now among the 
rivaling factions, no longer a mediator as he had been during the two postwar 
decades. 
The Kyodan is in chaos. One would wonder where her center of gravity is, 
if there is any at all. In 1976, the so-called Federation of Evangelical Churches' 
was formed within the Kyodan "to make manifest the binding force of the Confession 
"Isao Kuramatsu, "An Attempt to Understand the Theology of Kitamori," 
Journal of Theology 45 (Dedicated to Kitamori as Festschrift on Kitamori's retirement] 
(Tokyo: TUTS, 1983), 12. 
'See note 190 below. 
"Fukuinshugi Kyokai Rengo, 14-rareitAitti . According to Rinzo 
Washiyama, a leader of this group, the "Federation" was formed by the merger of the 
former Evangelical Ministers' Emergency Alliance in Kansai area (with Osaka-Kobe 
as its center) and the Kyodan Normalization Alliance in Kanto area (with Tokyo as its 
center), both of which emerged as counter-organizations to the faction following the 
line of the Confession of Wartime Responsibility and the Expo opponents. The 
merger occurred when it became clear that "the main stream of the Kyodan politics 
lined itself up with the views of the Problem-Raiser [ IBMEM.4 ]. This 
"Federation" intends "to form one true Church" "by recovering the Gospel through 
the establishment of sermon and sacraments." This organization held its own 
ministerial examination and ordinational approval in 1979, see Rinzo Washiyama, 
"Nihon Kirisuto Kyodan Fukuin-shugi Kyokai Rengo," Arimichi Ebizawa, ed. Lexicon 
of History of Christianity in Japan [Tokyo: Kyobunkan, 1987). By administering its 
own ministerial examination and ordinational approval, this organization within the 
Kyodan seems to recognize itself as the legitimate continuation of the Kyodan within 
the Kyodan. 
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of Faith [of the Kyodan] and its character as our basic standard."' Kitamori is the 
leading theologian of this group. Was this, we wonder, not the last thing Kitamori 
would imagine for himself--to form an organization which de facto nullifies the unity 
of the Kyodan? 
If we should assume that also in this issue Kitamori is consistent with his 
understanding of the Church, then a possible justification of this federation on the part 
of Kitamori may run as follows: since the Kyodan under the current leadership has de 
facto relativized the Confession of Faith and thus virtually nullified it, those churches 
which follow the current leadership are no longer the Church. The true Kyodan must 
be found in those churches which hold firmly to the Confession of the Faith. "Those 
others," wrote Kitamori in the ecclesiological publication, "who do not amend their 
doctrinal errors [concerning the truth of the Gospel], in spite of utmost efforts on our 
190Kitamori, "Federation of Evangelical Churches," 154. There is a mixed 
reaction to this "Federation" in the Kyodan. Yo Shikama, a member of "Ministers' 
Forum [ MU;-- ]" which was formed for the rebuilding of the Kyodan, says of 
the "Evangelical Federation": "It has been the Kyodan's urgent task as a living body 
of Christ the Lord to form an evangelical Church while settling the external and 
internal problems assigned to the Kyodan. In the light of this task, we understand the 
intention of the 'Federation' to a certain extent. But its approach to the task seemed 
to us somewhat too narrow. [As an alternative to this] a study group has been formed 
by the ministers who had the same desire for the Kyodan, not as a church-political 
move but as a theological movement hoping to harvest fruits through our study. This 
group is the 'Ministers' Forum'" [Yo Shilcama, ed., The Kyodan as a United Church 
[Tokyo: Shinkyo Shuppansha, 19891, 3). A severe criticism of the "Federation" made 
by in Yoshikiyo Ito, a Kyodan minister, in his short essay on the Kyodan's problem: 
"One should be careful not falling into provocation of 'Evangelical Federation.' What 
is 'Evangelicalism'9 What is conspicuous in this group is only political will to 
gain power within the Kyodan, and we do not call theology those theological theories 
attached to their [preconceived] views" (Iwao Morioka, ed., Christianity in Japan - Its 
Present and Future [Tokyo: Shinkyo Shuppansha, 1985], 87). 
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side, are no longer the Church."' How plausible this word of Kitamori three 
decades ago sounds even today! 
Now we recall what he once wrote, that only when the Kyodan would not 
accept his theology, then he could move from the ecumenical standpoint to the 
denominational standpoint without sacrificing his theological integrity.'' Is the 
Kyodan with the current leadership the one which "would not accept" his theology? It 
is definitely so. But the crucial question is now: who are the Kyodan? The Suzuki 
disciples and their supporters who are now in the leadership position of the Kyodan, 
or the people within the Kyodan who, as Kitamori himself, hold firmly or supposedly 
hold firmly, to the Confession of Faith? These queitions are impossible for an 
outsider to answer. But a crucial question is: how does the repeated claim of 
Kitamori's theology to embrace the unembraceable apply to this situation? 
"The difference of views among the Kyodan people on the participation in 
the Expo in Osaka more than a decade ago," holds Akio Dohi, a Doshisha professor, 
"gradually turned out to be a loss of common ground and became [a breeding pool ofJ 
lasting friction of human relationships."' There are no agreements, laments this 
professor further, on such issues as evangelism, confession of faith (!), the relationship 
between Church and State, or any other Kyodan issue which came to the surface in 
connection with the problem of the Expo participation. He complains that TUTS, 
"Fulcuda and Yamamoto, Church, 159-160. 
'See 42-43, above. 
"Akio Dohi, "Departure for Renovation and Unity," Iwao Morioka, Present and 
Future, 94. 
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despite its privileged status as the seminary run by the Kyodan itself, does not 
participate in the common work for the solutions of the Kyodan's problems. "The 
present situation of the Kyodan," describes this professor, "is deeply chaotic and its 
future infinitely opaque."' 
"Wither Kyodan?"'" A Kyodan missionary put this question in the vortex 
of the Expo and TUTS conflicts. That was relevant then and is still more relevant 
today. Apparently it is not easy to answer this question. Yet it is necessary for us to 
form an idea of the direction the "wither" if we want to assess Kitamori's contribution 
in the Kyodan and Japanese Protestantism at all. We are aware that this is a risky 
attempt on our part, because the Kyodan situation is still chaotic, which makes it 
formidable to predict any direction whatsoever with any degree of historical validity. 
True, events in the solid historical past can only occasionally be revived into a new 
meaning and perspective, it is even more difficult when issues are of such recent 
origin. But we will rely on the reasonable validity of our historical experience that a 
historically conditioned thought, once it has seen its day, will only rarely be restored 
to its pristine vigor. And this we assume against Kitamori's own prediction of the 
future of his theology. 
The Kyodan's ideal has been to form an ecumenical Protestant church in 
Japan. This ideal was also a burning theological ambition of Kitamori throughout his 
career. His theology of the Pain of God should have been the formative principle of 
'Ibid., 94-95. 
'See note 146 in Chap. 2. 
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the Kyodan as the "unity of contradictions." The Kyodan's official English name is the 
United Church of Christ in Japan. But, in fact, there are many writings in which we 
read that the Kyodan is still on the way to becoming a united Church, that is, it is 
now a "uniting church."' Now, Kitamori would also agree with this way of 
viewing the Kyodan's unity, but the main thrust of his view on this matter is still that 
the Kyodan is already a united church by virtue of the Confession of Faith of 1954. 
The recent publication by the leaders and pastors of the mediating group' indicate 
the fact that they have been studying their respective denominational backgrounds and 
re-examining how they can come to terms with the current chaotic situation and form 
a new theological and ecclesiological basis for the Kyodan and for her continued 
existence. In other words, the Kyodan is in reality not yet united, but, given the goal 
of unity in advance, is now struggling to reach that goal. This would say that new 
efforts of the denominational synthesis, which were supposed to have been settled 
decades ago, are now being taken up all over again. 
A crucial question is now whether the Kyodan in the near future can emerge 
as a united Protestant church without falling back to one of the already existing 
'"Yo Shikama, explaining the meaning of the title of the volume produced by 
"Ministers' Forum," incidentally speaks of the Kyodan's current unitedness: "We 
chose as the title of this volume 'The Kyodan as a United Church.' Yet what we mean 
by that title is not that the Kyodan is already a united Church. Needless to say, we 
wanted only to express that the Kyodan is on the way to its formation, not as a 
`United Church' but as a 'Uniting Church,' (Shikama, United Church, 4, [the two 
terms in the single quotation marks are put in English by Shikama]). Kitamori's name 
is mentioned besides three others in Shikama's acknowledgment as one of the advisers 
who "have played a leading role" for the "Ministers' Forum." 
'See note 188 above. 
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denominations. In other words, is it possible to have a united Protestant church 
without a certain ruling confessional orientation which after all determines the outcome 
of the proposed united church? We must consider two elementary issues before we 
can give an answer. First, are there real theological conflicts among the Protestant 
confessions? The answer to this question is apparently in the affirmative, as numerous 
ongoing confessional dialogues demonstrate. Second, can one begin to form a church 
confessionally from scratch? Given historical reality, the answer is evidently in the 
negative. If we now put these answers together, we should almost conclude that there 
could be no such a thing as a really united ecumenical Protestant church in which all 
the Protestant denominations are integrated in terms of doctrinal tradition and ethos. 
In fact, Kitamori wanted a Lutheran Kyodan; his opponents now seem to want a 
Reformed-Barthian Kyodan in opposition to Kitamori. Still others may want a 
Congregational Kyodan. 
The Kyodan as a united ecumenical Protestant church is perhaps an 
eschatological vision, and to realize it here on earth may be a priori denied. Actual 
prospects of the future of Kyodan seem as follows. If the late moderator Suzuki's 
"prophetic line" should determine the course of the future formation of the Kyodan, 
those following Kitamori's "evangelical line" would be compelled to form a new 
Church, and vice versa. Or, if this does not happen, the Kyodan can probably remain 
in a perpetual tension between the denominational differences within it. Or, as we 
suggested in the above, the Kyodan may become a united church but with a distinctive 
confessional orientation, probably a Reformed Kyodan or less probably a Lutheran 
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Kyodan. With a feeling of tension one watches the direction that the Kyodan will 
develop as a united church in Japan. 
Now that Kitamori's influence is in the Kyodan past, we are left with the 
following questions. What does the outcome of the postwar history of the Kyodan 
imply to Kitamori's theology? Has Kitamori's vision of a united Protestant church as 
the "unity of contradictions" on the basis of the Lutheran axiom collapsed after all? It 
is still too early to give a definitive answer to these questions. But in view of the 
actual development of conflicts in the Kyodan, it seems at least probable that 
Kitamori's goal of a visible "unity of contradictions" as an ecclesiological formula is a 
theoretical postulate which did not actualize. Contradictions seem to be 
contradictions, after all. Perhaps the recent history of the Kyodan witnesses to the 
"bankruptcy of his theology,"' as far as his ecclesiology is concerned. In other 
words, nothing can embrace in itself all the contradictory things in this actual reality. 
As limited beings, humans often live under the alternative of "either-or" at a given 
historical time. Even the "both-and," as we see in Kitamori's inclusive theology, in 
reality falls back to the "either-or." Although here we do not have a definitive 
assessment of Kitamori's contribution to the Kyodan, our impression is that Kitamori's 
theology had its appointed time and mission in its Sitz im Leben, in the history of the 
Kyodan. The theology of the Pain of God is not an eternal theology, as Kitamori had 
been convinced. It is, after all, a theologia viatorum. As such we shall see the whole 
of his theological contribution to Japanese Protestantism. 
'Hod., Confession, 289. 
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Summary 
Kitamori grew up in a deeply uncertain and tragic period of the nation's 
history. His formative years were not conducive to a happy idea of existence. In 
encountering the Bible, Shigehiko Sato and, through him, Luther and others, he 
gradually appropriated the Gospel as God's forgiving grace and was baptized in a 
Lutheran church. He was then led step by step to the vision of the Pain of God as the 
truth of the Gospel, a Triune God suffering Pain for the love of sinners. He grasped 
the Gospel as the Absolute grace of God--that no sinner, however detestable and 
unworthy of God's love, can fall outside this love based upon God's pain. The love 
of God in His Pain is all-embracing. In the critical confrontation with the theology of 
Karl Barth and under the influence of the philosophy of the Kyoto School, he 
developed his evangelical intuition of the Pain of God into a theological system, the 
theology of the Pain of God. He published his main work, The Theology of the Pain 
of God, soon after World War II, which was an unexpected success. Remaining in 
the Kyodan after the Lutheran withdrawal, Kitamori worked as an "ecumenical 
Lutheran" for two decades for the Kyodan's ecclesiological consolidation and the 
Lutheranization of its theology. Thus the Kyodan has become his life-work. But as 
the "Barthian" understanding of the Gospel with the "activistic" emphasis gradually 
won the field in the Kyodan, Kitamori's theology turned out to be deeply incompatible 
with this new theological trend. After the tragic incidents around 1970, he no longer 
could stay in a leading position in the Kyodan, either theologically or 
church-politically. Though presently working for the Kyodan through an evangelical 
189 
faction of churches, Kitamori's influence seems to be largely terminated. His work 
now seems to have entered into the field of history. 
We now try to locate Kitamori in the history of Japanese Protestantism. 
Kitamori belongs to the "Line of the church." In this sense he followed the 
Uemura-Takakura line. His theological outlook with the emphasis on the individual's 
personal salvation witnesses to this. The link between Uemura-Takakura and Kitamori 
is their common understanding of the tragic dimension of man's existence. Kitamori 
thus pursued what Uemura initiated, "an solid evangelical church on the orthodox 
doctrine of the Gospel." Kitamori "only" replaced Uemura's Reformed orientation 
with his own "Lutheran" perspective. As we shall see below, this link indicates the 
character of Kitamori's Lutheranism: a synthesis of Lutheran and Reformed tradition 
on the basis of Lutheranism. We have seen that there are two streams with regard to 
the understanding of Christianity and the nature of the church; the "evangelical" one 
and the "social" one.'" These two understandings have constituted a perennial 
tension in the history of Japanese Protestantism. Kitamori had to suffer in this 
tension. He tried, with his theology, to do justice to both the "evangelical" focus and 
the "social" one. But this "both-and" in Kitamori's aspiration did not work out in 
'This polarization within Japanese Protestantism is not primarily caused by 
denominational differences, say, between Lutheranism and the Reformed tradition. As 
we have seen, there was a polarization before Kitamori's 'Lutheranism' came on the 
scene. However, present concerns for socio-ethical issues have been strongly 
motivated by the theology of Barth, perhaps a "political" Barth. Kitamori then allied 
himself with the evangelical wing of the Reformed and other traditions in Japanese 
Protestantism. This may have an influence on Kitamori's understanding of 
Lutheranism. We take up Kitamori's relationship with the Reformed tradition when 
we assess his theology. 
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reality. His emphasis is definitely "evangelical," which is after all "relative" to the 
"social" focus. This relativity, against Kitamori's claim to the absoluteness of his 
theology, eventually constituted the acrimonious antagonism between his camp and the 
opponents. So far his efforts to Lutheranize the Kyodan have failed to show their 
fruit. An ecumenical Protestant church on the basis of the Lutheran understanding of 
the Gospel has been Kitamori's holy ambition. Nor did this ambition come true. 
Kitamori's theology lacks, it seems, the realization of its holy ambition in the history 
of Japanese Protestantism. 
Before we finish this summary, we include a few of Kitamori's personal 
traits. He has been personally active in concrete congregational work; until very 
recently he was a pastor at one of the Kyodan congregations in Tokyo, which he 
himself founded in 1950. He is said to be a dedicated pastor, winning devout 
congregational support. Although Kitamori has been rather a loner in the theological 
community of Japanese Protestantism, a few of his former students at TUTS have 
taken up his theological insights for further development. A well-known one is 
Kosuke Koyama (the author of Waterbuffalo Theology), formerly a missionary sent by 
the Kyodan to Thailand and, at the time of this writing, a professor at Union 
Theological Seminary in New York.' As a very personal trait, we also mention 
Kitamori was," says Koyama, "my revered teacher at Tokyo Union 
Theological Seminary. . . . Dr. Kitamori shared [the truth of 'communion in pain'] 
with us in his lucid exposition of the pain of God," Waterbuffalo Theology (New 
York: Orbis Books, 1974), 116. Another former student to be mentioned is Hiroshi 
Obayashi, who has written Agape and History (Washington, D.C.: University Press of 
America, 1981) and is presently serving as a faculty member of Rutgers University in 
New Jersey. Both of these "disciples" have developed their teacher's idea of the pain 
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that he has remained a bachelor, not as a sign of ascetism, but willing to sacrifice 
marital joy and familial happiness as a witness to God in Pain. 
With the historical survey finished, we go on to analyze Kitamori's theology 
itself. 
... 
of God with critical modifications, Koyama "relativizing" the absolute claim by 
Kitamori of the concept of the pain of God as an indigenous hermeneutic concept, and 
Obayashi substituting the concept of "evil and suffering" for "pain." Later we shall 
come back to their viewpoints in our evaluation of Kitamori's theology. 
CHAPTER 4 
AN ANALYSIS OF THE THEOLOGY OF PAIN OF GOD (1) 
Preliminary Observations 
The Pain of God as Primary Experience 
"Each religious individual," wrote Friedrich Schleiermacher in his Reden, 
"is totality complete in himself, and to understand this totality you should strive to 
search out the primary revelation which constituted the ground of it."' This 
conviction is true also of Kitamori. "Oh, the unintelligible love of God, the 
unfathomable Pain of God!" exclaimed Kitamori when he experienced God's love in 
the depth of his soul; God [in Jesus] allows Himself to be slain for those sinners, the 
rebellious and the detestable."' It is a vivid vision in which Kitamori saw God 
Himself in Pain and suffering Pain for the sake of defiant sinners. For Kitamori, this 
vision is an unshakable inner experience.' Although in later theological elaboration 
'Friedrich Schleiermacher, Ober die Religion: Reden an die Gebildeten unter 
ihren Vertichten, ed. Rudolf Otto, 6th ed., (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 
1967), 181. 
'Auto I, 107. [A bibliographical note: Those of Kitamori's works which are 
of primary significance and therefore quoted frequently are abbreviated like the note 
here. The list of those works is found at the end of Introduction, Chapter 1]. 
'Ibid., 136. Regarding this immediate inner experience, Kitamori also writes: 
"As long as Christianity is looked upon as an historical and cultural entity, it cannot 
be fully grasped. Only when I encounter the Gospel as a personal fact overwhelming 
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Kitamori deals with this experience in more abstract terminology (which tends to 
deprive it of its vividness), the idea of the Pain of God in its most concrete sense 
never loses its power for Kitamori; it continues--not merely as a figurative expression 
of the inexpressible, but as a literal term describing the God sensed in his inner vision; 
a God aching for the sake of sinful humanity.' Thus the Pain of God becomes 
Kitamori's primary vision of God. 
Included in the background of Kitamori's visionary experience are two 
important contributing factors in juxtaposition: his experience of the abysmal depth of 
human sinfulness, and a vivid mental image of the crucified Christ, a suffering God 
par excellence. "Our sins (even when we are in faith) kill God Himself," cries 
Kitamori; "you believers, it is you who are the criminals killing Christ!" Sinful 
humanity is detestable, a "stinking, putrid heap of trash!" Man is "a disgrace to 
God." Nevertheless, Jesus "the very Son of God!" still would have us as His, visiting 
detestable sinners--as if He could not help but search for us. "This is totally 
unintelligible to man!" exclaims Kitamori. For him, the word love is too 
conventional to accurately describe this "amazing" love. No word but Pain is capable 
of expressing this extraordinary love. This love of God is the Pain of God, and in 
this love, love and Pain are inseparable; in God's love, love and Pain are one. 
'Speaking of God's Pain vis-a-vis humanity's pain, Kitamori has the following 
to say: "We see here [in man's pain] the image of the reality which is taking place in 
the grace of God. 'God is aching!' [1410ak-clom 3 ] Jesus Christ is the Persona of 
the Pain of God." (Itami, 258 [Pain, 167]). 
'Auto I, 139. 
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"Christ, who is God Himself," says Kitamori, "is willing to bear the sins of those 
trying to kill him, as if the sins were his own, and died the death of the convicted."' 
To Kitamori, his vision of an "aching" God is a vision of overwhelming 
impact, beyond human comprehension. "God his even died!" he proclaims. "Be 
appalled, 0 heavens; at this, be shocked. . ."' This horrid fact of God in Pain and 
death is, however, not simply a demonstration of God's immeasurable love—it is much 
more. The vision of the Pain of God has revealed to Kitamori something 
extraordinary regarding God's otherwise impenetrable essence: "The cross of Christ, 
is a tragedy of God before it is a tragedy of man. Before man suffered pain, God 
suffered Pain."' 
One might think that God's suffering (if God is capable of suffering at all)9 
should be contingent upon the reality of human sins; being moved in love and 
compassion by the sight of human miseries. However, Kitamori sees that the Pain of 
God is a divine reality within God Himself, a reality inseparable from human sin but 
independent from human suffering. The Pain of God is seen not as a secondary, but 
as a primary reality. It seems that in Kitamori's thought, Pain is not a contingent 
reality, but a necessity within God. Obviously, this idea produces a whole series of 
logical obstacles which would lead to profound speculation (a problem to be dealt with 
'Ibid., 92. 
'Pain, 44. 
8Auto I, 127. 
9This possibility will be discussed in Chapter 6 in conjunction with Luther's 
idea of the suffering of God. 
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when we later discuss Kitamori's assertion of the eternal nature of God's Pain). 
God in Pain is Kitamori's vision of God Himself, of His innermost essence. 
As His innermost essence, this Pain cannot be contingent upon anything or anyone--
not even upon human sins or human misery. Our point here is to recognize 
Kitamori's notion of the Pain of God as not only God's reaction to human sins, but 
also as an inherent characteristic of God Himself. In a sense, this position explains 
why Kitamori states he is not primarily concerned with human suffering (however 
appalling and meaningless it might be) but with the Pain of God.'° Although this is a 
difficult concept to understand, it is Kitamori's unique concept of making the Pain of 
God independent of human suffering, that has made this particular concept such a 
powerful, flexible and even "almighty" vehicle for Kitamori's subsequent theological 
exploration, as we shall see later. 
Let us now look a little more closely at Kitamori's experience of the Pain of 
God. "The real feature of the cross of the Lord," says Kitamori, "is the Pain of 
God."" This vision of God in Pain is deeply related to Kitamori's own experience of 
salvation. Kitamori obtained absolute assurance of the forgiveness of sins when he, in 
an "audition," heard the crucified Christ, God in deep misery on the cross saying, 
'°"First, the primary theme of this book is to behold ["adore," fip<- ] the 
Pain of God, since the theology of the Pain of God is literally concerned with his 
pain. Our human pain should only be considered as service to God's pain. . ." 
(Pain, 233). 
"Itami, 68 (Pain, 50). The original term in the text is translated "the real 
feature" [ . "Das wahre Wesen" in Schmerz, 47. 
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"My son, I am the Christ. I died for you. I became as you see me now, only for 
you. . . . My son, you are now released from God's judgment. I am the Christ." 
Believing in Christ, through the vision of the Crucified, Kitamori intuitively learned to 
know the Pain of God ens realissima. Kitamori assures: "As for me, I really feel the 
Pain of God in my soul, just as I feel the air on my skin." Everything else can be 
doubted, but not the Pain of God, since experiencing the Pain of God has the power to 
overcome all other doubt. "To use an expression in my theological diary written 
later, 'the world is more under the Pain of God than under the firmament,'" recalls 
Kitamori while reflecting on his experience of God's pain. "The Pain of God has a 
reality more certain than the reality of the firmament.' 
The vision of the Pain of God is a mystical Urerlebnis for Kitamori. This 
experience of God in Pain is charged with a burning energy, consuming his whole 
being;" it is an experience of divine "pathos," as Kitamori would say. As with any 
primary religious experience, Kitamori's vision of the Pain of God cannot be 
successfully reduced to or ordered into a system of thought, or into a system of 
"logos," since in God, pain is love, and love is pain, and the Pain of God as the 
' 2Auto I, 89. 
"Ibid., 136. 
'Ibid., 136-137, cf. ibid., 178. 
"One of Kitamori's friends, Kazuo Muto, confesses in the introduction to 
Kitamori's Logic that he was overwhelmed by Kitamori's strong conviction of the 
truth of the Pain of God. "I was really overwhelmed by finding in him [Kitamori] a 
man who is driven by the truth he discovered and who is ecstatically absorbed in it 
[ +M.:VA-NZ 1)1,;:rfPNZA ]. Perhaps in this, we find one of the reasons 
why the author [Kitamori] has been a loner." (224). 
197 
divine pathos is a totality that cannot be analyzed. 
In any analysis of Kitamori, it is essential that this feature of the Pain of God 
be kept in mind. It is the reality of this pathos in Kitamori's inner world that 
passionately drives him in his attempt to communicate the Pain of God to others 
through logic and reasoning. It is therefore not logic that upholds Kitamori's 
theological idea of pathos, but the reverse. It is the pathos that animates the logic 
within his structures. The true fountainhead of Kitamori's theological thinking is his 
personal vision and experience of the Pain of God.' 
Pathos and Logos in Kitamori's Thought: 
Experience to Structure 
There were many influences which were instrumental in Kitamori's primary 
vision. The external historical environment provided a general framework for his 
developing perception of reality, his personal world view. The Bible itself was a 
continuous source of influence. Uchimura, Uemura and other Christian figures in 
Japan, as well as a number of prominent thinkers from the west, also helped him 
along the way toward his experience of the Gospel. Most instrumental was the person 
of Shigehiko Sato, and through him, Luther. However, Kitamori's personal encounter 
'6A passage from Schleiermacher's Reden will mutatis mutandis aptly describe 
the kind of vision Kitamori has experienced: "Die erste bestimmte religiOse Ansicht, 
die in sein Gemflt mit einer solchen Kraft eindringt, daft durch einen einzigen Reiz 
sein Organ ffirs Universum zum Leben gebracht und von nun an auf immer in 
Tatigkeit gesetzt wird, bestimmt freilich seine Religion; sie ist und bleibt seine 
Fundamentale-Anschauung, in Beziehung auf welche er apes ansehen wird, und es ist 
im voraus bestimmt, in welcher Gestalt ihm jedes Element der Religion, so bald er es 
wahrnimmt, erscheinen mufl" (179, emphasis mine). 
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with the Gospel and the culminating vision of the Gospel as the Pain of God can be 
claimed as solely his own. 
The concepts Kitamori gleaned from this collection of infuential "external" 
personalities were rational, communicable ideas, but for Kitamori the result was an 
unutterable, amorphous and irrational vision of experience. Kitamori's experience 
borders on mysticism: "I know all things, but I do not know the one thing--the Pain 
of God. Oh, so calm a vision!"17 Kitamori's vision can be characterized as his 
initiation to an irrational, indescribable experience of the Supernatural. 
But as long as this vision is an experience of the Gospel (and the Gospel 
must be proclaimed to others) it cannot remain in a theological fog; an amorphism in 
the domain of the irrational and the inexpressible. Kitamori is left with the task of 
taking a vague primary experience and translating it; reducing it to a rational structure 
capable of communication. It naturally follows that in attempting a process of 
"reduction," tension is bound to occur between the inexpressible vehemence of the 
primary experience and any rational structure that follows. 
Kitamori himself has reflected on the relationship between the "passionate" 
primary experience and the need for a rationalization of it. Even though seemingly 
lucid, Kitamori's elaboration of this relationship betrays an intrinsic tension. On the 
one hand, Kitamori maintains "there is logic in the Gospel,"" that is, that the Gospel 
has its own rational structure, allowing the theologian to elucidate the Gospel by 
"Auto I, 180. 
'Character, 236. 
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logical inference and deduction.' In his view, "our salvation [the Gospel] is a 
`pathetic' event which involves us totally" and "the fire of its pathetic character should 
utterly consume the framework of the logos."' 
But at the same time, Kitamori holds that the logic of the Gospel is "the way 
in which a thing makes itself manifest; speaking figuratively, logic is like ruts left 
behind after a vehicle has passed through." If a reality which is called "the Gospel" 
has had an effective touch upon a soul, Kitamori continues, it necessarily leaves its 
ruts on the soul, and the ruts left behind are "the logic of the Gospel."' Thus, 
Kitamori maintains that his primary experience has its own logical structure which 
allows him to present his experience of the Gospel to others in a rational form. But, 
in saying this, he again makes a reservation. The "pathos" refuses to be put into a 
'For us to be subdued by the irresistible problem [in our reality] is our 
collapse. The solution to this problem is our salvation. The Giver of the solution is 
the Savior. . . . Our concern is then to ask what kind of a savior our Savior is. In 
other words, what kind of structure the salvation has. On this point we are urged to 
search out the logic of the salvation." 
[ filfogig ] (Logic, 14). 
"Ibid., 20. 
'Character, 236. "Logic is not an abstraction of things," says Kitamori, "but 
it is the way through which things make themselves manifest [to our consciousness]" 
(ibid.). Kitamori seems to take over this "metaphysical" viewpoint from Kitaro 
Nishida. In an essay entitled "Understanding of Logic and Understanding of 
Mathematic Logic," Nishida writes: "All the understanding through logic is the inner 
development of something Universal [God]. I regard this [logic] as a kind of creative 
activity. 'Something Universal' here is not an abstract universalia but an inner 
creative Power." (Kitaro Nishida, Classic Works of Japan - Kitaro Nishida, ed. 
Shunpel Ueyama [Tokyo: Chuo Koron Sha, 1970], 252). 
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logical order, or to use Kitamori's original language, "logicalized."" He even gives 
assurance that if one "succeeded" in the "logicalization" of the pathos, it would mean 
that the pathos had been distorted into what it is not.' 
We take note of Kitamori's admission that the competence of theology does 
not match the unfathomable depth and vehemence of the reality of the Gospel.' How 
then does it become possible to put the primary experience of the Gospel into 
communicable terms? According to Kitamori, the necessary link between "pathos" 
and "logos" is provided by "pathos" (the Pain of God) itself. "Pathos" is the event of 
salvation. Salvation must be communicated to those needing to receive salvation, and 
communication becomes possible only by the mediation of the "logos." "Pathos" is 
"chaotic flame" which must be brought into the sphere of the "cosmos," braced by the 
framework of the "logos." "But," Kitamori writes, "the logos is destined to be burned 
up by the fire of the pathos." Thus Kitamori is trying to argue both for and against 
the "logicalizaton" of "pathos." His point is clear--the Gospel of the Pain of God 
constantly breaks the framework of man's rational comprehension.' 
In Kitamori's thought, what makes this "rationalization" of "pathos" possible 
is to be found in the "pathos" itself, which (being salvation for man's reality) also 
"saves" the inadequacy of the human attempt to make the "pathos" comprehensible 
nLogic, 20. The original Japanese terms for "logicalization" and "logicalize" 




and communicable. Kitamori's elucidation of the relationship between "pathos" and 
"logos" gives the impression (especially in the original Japanese) of a logical 
symmetry. Images and logic are skillfully interwoven, and one is tempted to question 
whether his logical operation in this task de facto argues against the very point he is 
trying so passionately to make. Our question here is whether Kitamori has succeeded 
in balancing his "pathos" and "logos" without losing the "pathos," that is, the Gospel. 
Adept and resourceful though he is at interweaving concrete images and abstract 
concepts into an impressive discourse, Kitamori's theologizing, by the same token, 
comes dangerously close to unbalanced rationalization at the expense of the "pathos"--
even at the expense of his original vision of the Pain of God.' 
Kitamori's primary vision is, in its initial stage, still quite amorphous, and 
there are several possible types of theology into which it could develop. Since the 
development into a system depends on several factors, including the cultural and 
historical, it is helpful for us to form two hypothetical questions before we go on to 
examine them with the available evidence. First, how does his own individuality 
come into play in the process of development? Seeing that Kitamori is a highly 
independent thinker, this aspect of his personality is surely essential for understanding 
him. Second, in whose thoughts does Kitamori find a conceptual affinity with his 
own? Here we are thinking of a metaphysical scheme. Third, against whom does he 
launch his polemics while giving his own theology its shape? This is quite essential, 
'Kazuo Mutoh writes in the introduction to Logic: "The author [Kitamori] is 
successful, perhaps too successful, in his `logicalization of pathos' [to the point] that 
one may be afraid whether there is a danger here." (Ibid., 226). 
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and we shall take up this issue in due course. At this point, we shall consider the first 
two items. Specifically, we are thinking of Kitamori's passion for synthesizing 
"pathos" and "logos" and his other personal traits, and of the metaphysical scheme of 
the philosophy of the Kyoto School. 
Kitamori reveals his distinctive personality traits in his writings. On the one 
hand, he is a man of refined sensitivity. He "feels" the nature of a thing rather than 
trying to recognize it analytically:" his emotional perceptivity is intense. The 
frequent use of exclamation marks in his writing gives witness to the fact that he is 
deeply moved by things overlooked by others.' In addition to this comes his 
inclination to describe things in superlatives. Kitamori is a man of pathos himself. 
His longing for beauty can hardly escape attention; in his appreciation of nature and of 
the practical way of life and existence, one observes a sort of aestheticism.' But on 
""The Japanese are weak in conceptual and formal thinking, but they are 
strong in intuitive and material [content-oriented] thinking," says Kitamori (speaking 
of himself), "and this is certainly a weak side of the Japanese, but in it a strong side is 
included. It is an advantage for us to grasp the Gospel. For Hebraism is also an 
intuitive and material thinking." (The Contemporary and the Pain of God [Tokyo: 
Kobundo Shobo, 1970], 187). 
22Knowing of Schelling's idea of Natur in Gott and of "an agonizing God," 
Kitamori feels "a violent breath of the truth [ Afloat 12,1,gpx ]" (Itami, 29 
[Pain, 26: the English translation here, "within a hairbreadth to truth," does not 
convey Kitamori's passion]). This is a typical example of Kitamori's way of putting 
things, which reflects his passionate perception, cf. Character, 193-194. 
'In a section of his magnum opus where he speaks of the Wissenschaftlichkeit 
of his theology, Kitamori includes his apology of the "crudeness" of the language used 
for the discourse in the Pain of God (Pain, 30-31). "Crudeness" in Japanese is "yabo" 
[ vfg which is the opposite of "iki" [ ], a refined aesthetic way of 
life and attitude. Perhaps having 1 Corinthians 1:25 in mind, he says that "yabo-ness" 
in his theology is far superior to all human refinements. This apology, however, 
eloquently reveals his concern for "iki-ness." 
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the other hand, in his unquenchable drive for logical clarity in matters he would like 
us to grasp, we see Kitamori's inveterate drive for understanding the rationality of 
things.' It seems to be his a priori conviction that things in reality must have a 
rational structure. This idealistic inclination is undeniable in Kitamori the thinker,' 
and Kitamori's theology distinctively bears the marks of both of these personal traits. 
As to his "adoption" of the philosophy of the Kyoto School, we have a few 
things of vital importance to say. First, the philosophies of Nishida and Tanabe 
provide Kitamori's theology with a basic conceptual framework and structure, making 
it virtually impossible to interpret Kitamori without having these philosophies in mind. 
Kitamori's terminology and his pattern of the operation of concepts can be understood 
only in the light of the philosophy of the Kyoto School.' 
In the preceding discussion, we have placed the word adoption in quotation 
marks. But Kitamori's adoption of the philosophy of the Kyoto School for his 
theology is not an accidental or unbiased decision, but one based upon necessity. This 
necessity seems to lie in the basic cultural traits common to both the philosophy of the 
3'nFor a long time I have been tormented by a problem concerning the 
relationship between the Word of the Cross and the Holy Spirit," says Kitamori in an 
essay (Character, 234). His problem is which one, the Word of the Cross or the 
Holy Spirit, is the theological axiom. We have here an example of Kitamori's passion 
for logical clarity; he had been tormented for many years! 
'In his literary masterpiece, Kitamori speaks of the Pain of God which 
transcends worldly reality. It is an Idea in a Platonic sense. In this sense, he says, 
"we must be Platonists." (Itami, 155 [Pain, 102]). Kitamori is also a Hegelian. See 
Pain, 27. 
"In this study we have no separate section for this philosophy, but I shall 
provide necessary notes on this philosophical school whenever necessary to better 
understand Kitamori. 
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Kyoto School and the theology of Kitamori. Though both are strongly influenced by 
western thought, their products are distinctively Japanese as we will see below. It is 
possible for us to think of the affmity between Kitamori and the Kyoto School in the 
following way: Kitamori's vision is an original, religious experience, not a secondary 
elaboration based upon borrowed thoughts. By "original" we mean that Kitamori has 
experienced the Gospel through his distinctively Japanese sensitivity and spirituality, 
and his native cultural and spiritual complex permeates his personal interaction with 
the Gospel message. In other words, Kitamori's primary vision is strongly colored by 
a Japanese spirituality; a spirituality nurtured by traditional elements of Shinto, 
Buddhism and Confucianism. In Kitamori's theology, original also means native. As 
for the philosophy of the Kyoto School, it is a system built upon Japanese sentiment 
and metaphysical orientation; in grasping reality it tends to be holistic, intuitive, 
harmony-seeking and all-embracing. According to one critic, the philosophy of the 
Kyoto School can be understood as a refined form of ordinary Japanese thinking 
patterns." Our observation is as follows: Kitamori is an original and independent 
thinker firmly rooted in a Japanese spirituality; this means that he stands on common 
ground with Nishida and Tanabe in religious and metaphysical orientation. In view of 
"Mineo Hashimoto, "The Principle Supporting the Japanese Metaphysics," 
Japanese Philosophy, eds. Mitsuru Yoshida and Keiji Ikumatsu (Tokyo: Iwanami 
Shoten, 1972), 85-87. According to Hashimoto, the highest principle of Japanese 
metaphysics as a whole is "the contradictory identity of the One and the many." 
Shuzo Kuki, whose lecture on modern western philosophy Kitamori heard at Kyoto 
University, has a similar viewpoint when he says: "God is the One who is in sorrow 
with men and rejoices with them; God is the One who dwells in men; man is at once 
God [ Aranwchsz ]" quoted in ibid., 87). 
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this, one can understand why Nishida's philosophy has deeply influenced Kitamori's 
theology. 
Kitamori's theological writings bear the mark of strong conviction, 
sometimes overwhelming the reader to the point of uneasiness." It is a witness to the 
fact that the impact of the Gospel has reached the bottom of Kitamori's heart, since it 
has directly affected his highly Japanese sensitivity. An actualization of the Gospel 
took place in Kitamori through the meditation of his native culture, but it is not 
difficult to see the possible danger of "distorting" the Gospel through an unhealthy 
occupation with one specific aspect of it. We recognize a perennial dilemma here: If 
one tries to "make" the Gospel actual, the resulting theology should be as close as 
possible to the "target culture;" but if the theology takes on too powerful a cultural 
coloring, it runs the risk of distorting the Gospel. This ambivalence is inescapable in 
any attempt to communicate theology for a specific language and culture. 
Any primary experience of the Gospel undergoes the process of development 
into a theology as a "testimony" to it. In this process, various metaphysical "tools" 
come into play. It is immaterial whether the "tool" is used consciously or 
unconsciously. It is not necessary to remark here that the metaphysical tool employed 
does not remain purely formal but determines the character of the theology it serves to 
shape. The crucial question is this: Is the "tool" subordinated to the Gospel and open 
to modification by the Gospel, or does the tool dictate the Gospel and cast the content 
of the Gospel into its own metaphysical mold? 
'See note 15 above. 
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An important issue here is that Holy Scripture, to which a theologian 
constantly refers in his work, is inexhaustible in theological richness and infinite in its 
perspectives, and therefore refuses to be reduced into a neatly organized set of 
categories, but constantly "disturbs" a theologian's system. This fact indicates that a 
theology can remain vital only as long as it remains a finger pointing to that which is 
infinitely greater than itself. 
Kitamori himself is clearly aware of this issue,' but in theological 
endeavor, as in any human effort, to know is one thing, to follow the knowledge in 
practice is quite another. In the following, we shall pay particular attention to how 
Kitamori has managed to resist the danger of metaphysical overhand in his interpreting 
the Gospel. 
Overview of the Concept of the Pain of God 
The impact of the vision of the Pain of God has urged Kitamori to proclaim 
what he experienced. With his conviction that "there is a logic [logical structure] in 
the Gospel," Kitamori developed his theology of the Pain of God. His aesthetic urge 
for clarity and symmetry in thought is part of his passion in "doing theology." In the 
following, we review the appearances of the concept of the Pain of God in Kitamori's 
writings. We shall then observe the distinctive features of the concept of the Pain of 
'In his graduation thesis, Kitamori writes that "a theology, if it wants to be a 
true theology, is always theologica viatorum" ("The Recognition of God in Christ." 
[Japan Lutheran Theological Seminary, 1937], 295-296). In this connection, he also 
touches on the very term "the Pain of God" and writes as follows: "This term should 
never be identified with the `Sache' itself; our term witnessing to God has no 
permanence and security." (Ibid.). 
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God. 
As is often the case with influential thinkers, Kitamori found in the concept 
of "the Pain of God" a powerful, versatile handle with which to grasp a whole range 
of reality (theological, philosophical and otherwise). The Pain of God is his 
methodological axiom and his most comprehensive term for describing the reality of 
God. To Kitamori, this term alone is capable of conveying his view of God. While 
he was still a student at the Lutheran Seminary in Tokyo, Kitamori wrote that "we 
must make the truth of 'the Pain of God' the very foundation of every truth in the 
Gospel."' 
"What is revealed in the Son," explains Kitamori, "is not merely the wrath 
of God nor merely the love of God, but love truly conquering wrath, that is, the Pain 
of God."' As long as we are sinners, we are only the object of God's wrath; but 
God loved (and still loves) the object of His wrath, and this love which has conquered 
wrath, is the Pain of God.' "The love of God which loves the object of the wrath of 
God," Kitamori further explains, "is the Pain of God."" This love became a 
historical reality when Christ died on the cross, bearing the wrath of God on behalf of 
'Auto I, 183. One finds a similar pattern of thought in Nishida; his 
philosophical (and religious!) Urerlebnis is what he calls "pure experience," an 
intuitive knowledge of the ultimate in reality: "It has been my wish for many years 
that one day I would try to explain all things in the light of 'pure experience' as the 





sinners. In other words, the Pain of God is the love made manifest in the 
Crucified.' 
Describing the Pain of God in this way, Kitamori never tires of emphasizing 
the full reality of the wrath of God. It is this wrath in God that causes the pain in 
God. Here we are warned not to misunderstand the Pain of God. According to 
Kitamori, it would be a theological mistake if one would say (in a prayer for instance) 
that we cause the pain in the heart of God by sinning. Pain is not God's reaction to 
human sins, it is wrath that is aroused in God by sins committed by man.' The 
reality of the wrath of God is irreducible and is the very presupposition of the Pain of 
God. The Pain of God is the love of God bearing the wrath of God. Because of this 
bearing, the love of God toward sinners became a reality. "The true feature of the 
Cross of Christ," expounds Kitamori, "is the Pain in love."' Thus, the Pain of God 
is "the forgiveness of sins." It is "the grace of God."" In short, it is nothing but 
the Gospel of the Cross. As Kitamori emphasizes repeatedly, it is the victorious 
character of love of God which makes His love "irresistible" to a sinner.' Man 
°Pain, 90; Character, 258; Auto I, 81, 137. 
'Pain, 115. "If what one sees in the crucified God were 'sympathy or 
goodwill,' Christianity would be a lie pure and simple. If it were so, Nietzsche had 
seen the truth. . . . There one sees the Pain of God ['a love which loves the 
detestable' (Auto I, 195)]" (Auto II, 80-82). 
'Character, 258. 
"Pain, 40, 103. 
"Ibid., 103. 
'Auto II, 85; cf. ibid., 90. 
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cannot fall out of this love in the Pain of God, and this means, from the sinner's 
viewpoint, the absolute certainty of salvation. 
Expounding on the meaning of the Pain of God, Kitamori follows traditional 
dogmatic categories of creation, reconciliation and sanctification. When Kitamori says 
that the Pain of God is the forgiveness of sins, he means that the Pain of God belongs 
to "the order of reconciliation." As the basis of reconciliation, the Pain of God is also 
the basis of a new life, and has two aspects: first, it sustains the believers in this 
world of sin and pain; secondly, it effects sanctification in the believer's life.' 
Therefore, emphasis is also placed on the order of sanctification. 
It is true that God in pain embraces man, man with all his sinful reality, a 
being who is absolutely "unembraceable." But the Pain of God cannot remain without 
effecting sanctification in both the sinner's life and the larger reality around him. In 
Kitamori's understanding, God's "embracing of the unembraceable" is made on the 
basis of God's Pain, His real suffering. Thus it cannot be a gratuitous indulgence to a 
sinner, but a costly grace, a forgiveness based upon God's own self-sacrifice. "We 
see," writes Kitamori, "that the love of God which embraces the sinner has the 
character of pain, and this shows that it is the love which never allows any laissez-
faire with the sinner's reality but moves man to fight against the reality, conquer and 
change it [into a new reality]."' In Kitamori's thought, the love of God in Pain is 
""Whereas the Pain of God embraces the sinner just as he is, the Holy Spirit 
as the love based upon the Pain of God is the love which actually removes the sinner's 
sin" (Logic, 60). 
"Auto II, 50. 
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absolutely embracing; no sinners (no matter how sinful they may be) are left out. The 
Pain of God is a constant challenge to overcome sins. The Pain of God is the basis 
and energizing power for a new life and a new reality. 
In spite of the sanctifying power of the Pain of God, in which Christians 
now are living, we still remain semper peccator. As long as we remain so, the wrath 
of God continues as a constant reality, because, according to Kitamori, our sins 
invariably evoke the wrath of God; an undeniable relentless reality.' It is therefore 
necessary for God to be continually in Pain, bearing His own wrath upon Himself. 
Because of His love for us, God remains in His Pain in order that we may not be 
destroyed by his wrath." In this sense, the Pain of God is a soteriological concept. 
It summarizes man's salvation. 
Though the Pain of God is a strongly soteriological concept, soteriology in 
the narrow sense is not Kitamori's primary theological concern. Kitamori rather 
admonishes Christians to remember that our primary concern should be the Pain of 
God rather than our human pains. If our concern was primarily for our own pain and 
suffering, we would remain in our sins. Our rebellion against God, holds Kitamori, 
matters more than our own misery, since the former has to do with God, while the 
""What we call the 'Pain of God' is not simply the response of his heart to 
our sins. It is the wrath of God, and not his pain, which responds to sin. . . . God is 
angry at our sins, never hurt. God suffers pain only when he tries to love us, the 
objects of his wrath." (Pain, 115). 
"'What actually smites us and destroys us is the wrath of God. But the 'Pain 
of God' results from the love of the One who intercepts and blocks his wrath toward 
us, the One who himself is smitten by his wrath. Because God's pain has intercepted 
his wrath, those within his Pain are protected" (ibid., 123). 
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latter only concerns our own life.' In other words, we should be more concerned 
with our sin and with the Pain of God (which is caused by our sins) rather than with 
our pain. 
We cannot deny the deep concern for human suffering felt by Kitamori (and 
who as a theologian would deny the problem of suffering and pain in life?). 
Nevertheless, it is conspicuous that in Kitamori's theology of the Pain of God, God 
Himself in Pain is the primary concern. "The primary theme of this book is to behold 
the Pain of God, since the theology of the Pain of God is literally concerned with His 
pain."' Writing the preface to the third edition of his magnum opus in this way, 
Kitamori makes the main intention of this theology very clear; obviously he is aware 
that the "practical" applicability of this work may threaten to overshadow the writing's 
main issue. "Human pains are not my main [theological] theme," writes an 
unambiguous Kitamori.' 
The author declares: "Theology is ultimately concerned with the view of 
God Ikami-kan]." A theology which fails to make a decisive contribution to the 
concept of God has no right to speak in theology. According to Kitamori, "kami-kan 
is: how one grasps and adores the form of God.' He holds that various kami-kan 
"Auto /, 119. 
'Pain, 11. 
'Kitamori, Literature and God, (Tokyo: Nihon no Bara-sha, 1983), 233. 
'Pain, 46. "The view of God" is our translation of[ ], a term 
more akin to the German Gottesanschauung. 
Sugata, [ ] in the original Japanese. 
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have appeared in the Creeds of the Church throughout the centuries. In his view, as 
far as kami-kan is concerned, the Ecumenical Creeds ("produced by the Greek and 
Roman churches") provided the definite view of God.' In this regard, the 
Reformation contributed very little to the view of God, and subsequently, even the 
Reformation's decisive contribution to the doctrine of faith [soteriology] was adversely 
affected.' 
In this regard, Kitamori acknowledges Karl Barth's "contribution;" believing 
that Barth restored the right perspective for understanding the Gospel, namely, his 
concentration on the doctrine of God. In his graduation thesis, Kitamori writes, "The 
theology of Karl Barth is a theology pointing to God; there has never been a theology 
so faithful in pointing to God as that of Barth."" Kitamori then approvingly quotes 
from Barth's Das Won Gottes and Theologie: "The Bible has only one theological 
'Ibid., 46. 
Creeds, 7-10. According to Kitamori, the main issue of Reformation 
theology was how to come to terms with the sola in sola fide, and the et in fides et 
opera. In his view, sola fide is the "field" in which fides et opera find themselves; 
this should reflect the Trinitarian structure where solus Christus is the field in which 
Pater, Filius et Spiritus Sanctus find themselves. 
Concerning this argument Kitamori has the following to say: "The structure 
of the [Reformation] soteriology is the Trinitarian structure [of the Ecumenical 
Creeds]. But were the Reformers aware of this issue? If they had been, 
Melanchthon, for instance [in his Loci], would not have put aside the Trinitarian 
dogma as an item of frigida disputatio. Nor would Luther have passed it by as 
something not subject to controversy. . . . If they had applied the Trinitarian dogma 
to their soteriology, their struggle would have won a greater victory—a victory of the 
Gospel without the tragedy of schism from the Roman Church." (Ibid., 9-10.). An 
analysis of Kitamori's viewpoint here will be made later in this study. 
"Recognition, 25 (see note 35 above). 
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interest and that is. . . interest in God himself."' "Barth alone sees God; all the 
other theologians did not see God," judges Kitamori." Here he fully agrees with 
Barth on this necessity of theological concentration on God, believing the Swiss 
theologian has opened the way for a right understanding of the Gospel through this 
particular emphasis, since only where "God is [properly] seen is it possible to 
understand the Gospel aright; one cannot expect a precise understanding of the Gospel 
where God Himself is not seen.' But for Kitamori, Barth's emphatic and exclusive 
concern with God is only the starting point for a deeper penetration into the truth of 
the Gospel. Kitamori feels it is necessary to either go further than the solution posited 
in Barth's Vorfrage, and to set-up a prolegomena more "radical" than that of Barth.' 
We shall deal with the question of relationship between Kitamori and Barth on the 
issue of theological prolegomena in a later discussion.' Here, we briefly touch upon 
some of the more pertinent points affecting our present analysis. 
For Kitamori, Barth's Deus dixit is still formal in nature, void of the 
essential content of the Gospel; this formal Deus dixit cannot be a prolegomena for a 
'Karl Barth, The Word of God and the Word of Man, tr. Douglas Horton 
(New York: Harper & Row, 1957), 75. 
Auto II, 69. 
'Ibid., 69-70. 
'bid., 70. 
'See Chapter 6 below. 
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proper evangelical theology.' It must be filled with the essential content, holds 
Kitamori, and that is Deus in dolore. In this way, Kitamori means that he has gone a 
step further than Barth, claiming to have laid the real foundation of an evangelical 
theology." In his view, the Gospel (the Pain of God) must be the prolegomena, the 
methodology, for dogmatics as well." In other words, the Pain of God must hold the 
sole sway in theology, both as its content and as its method.' 
For Kitamori, the concentration on God means the concentration on God in 
Pain. With. Barth, concentration on God is not limited to the redemptive sphere in the 
narrow sense, as is the case with Kitamori. Redemption is understood as one factor in 
the order of operatio ad extra besides creation and sanctification. With this broader 
perspective, Barth's theological intention seems easier to understand, while grasping 
Kitamori's theological viewpoint is more difficult because of the intrinsically negative 
nature of his central concept: The Pain of God. 
'"According to Barth, 'Gott redet, dall er redet.' But we shall say, 'Gott 
redet, daft er liebt.'" (Recognitio, 271). 
("What we have to do is not to build up materiale Frage [the content of 
theology] on the ground Barth has opened by his Vorfrage, but we do have to build up 
a further Vorfrage than what Barth has accomplished by his own Vorfrage." (Auto I, 
213-214.) 
'"Criticizing Barth, I was trying to carry through 'faith alone' and 'the Cross 
alone' as the sole methodology of theology," says Kitamori, recalling his earlier 
confrontation with Barth. 
The place of the Pain of God in Kitamori's theology is comparable to the 
place of justification in Luther's theology, when the Reformer says: "Articulus 
justifications est magister et princeps, dominus, rector et iudex super omnia genera 
doctrinarum, qui conservat et gubernat omnem doctrinam ecclesiasticam et erigit 
conscientiam nostram coram Deo." (WA, 39 I, 205, 1-9). 
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Kitamori explains and defines this concept at various places in his writings. 
At one point, Kitamori says that "the Pain of God is the definition of the essence of 
the Absolute." In another context, "The Pain of God is His essence."' Kitamori 
claims, "the truth of the Pain of God is the head and king of all divine truths, and 
demands all our concern as its witness,"' and, "the Pain of God is all [all-inclusive] 
and eternal."' All of these quotes are of crucial importance in interpreting 
Kitamori's theology, and require careful analysis. We recognize that for Kitamori, the 
Pain of God is the essence of God. To know His pain or see Him in Pain is to see 
God in His innermost essence!' 
In view of this "definition" of the essence of God, we immediately feel 
compelled to ask: Can the concept of "pain" be used as the description of God's 
innermost essence? Pain, in the sense of suffering, is a negative concept and remains 
so, regardless of modification. Of course, what Kitamori means by "pain" is not pain 
pure and simple; but a form of love which is inseparably united with experiencing 
pain. However, when Kitamori emphasizes pain so strongly as the essence of God, 
we must suppose that he has something specific to advance with regard to his view of 
"Kitamori, The God of Double Negation (Tokyo: Nihon no Bara-sha, 1981), 
149. "The Pain of God as the Pain of God," also says Kitamori, "is the truth of the 
transcendental Being [ mylmt ]" (Auto II, 136). 
Character, 51. 
Pain, 123. 
'To the Jews, to see the face of God meant instant death. How can he who 
saw the Pain of God live any further! Is it really allowed to the mortal to touch upon 
the Pain of God? If it had not been allowed, he who saw it would not have lived any 
longer!" (Auto I, 200). 
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God; it is therefore necessary for us to pay attention to what he intends to convey by 
this particular emphasis on the Pain of God. Another question also arises when 
Kitamori holds that it is our sins which evoke God's wrath and then cause the Pain of 
God. Does this not mean that the Pain of God is something contingent, for our sins 
are contingent. How can the Pain of God, which is contingent, be the essence of 
God? 
Again, these are very important questions, questions which we shall deal 
with shortly. First, it is necessary to preface these concerns with a few preliminary 
remarks. Kitamori's fervent devotion to (or even adoration of) God in Pain strongly 
supports the view that for Kitamori, the Pain of God is an absolute value, not a 
secondary condition with God; not alienum to God but His proprium. We see in 
Kitamori's statements an attempt to make the Pain of God absolute and eternal (an 
"absolutization" and "eternalization," if one so will). 
This concept of Pain as absolute, eternal and essential to God is bound to 
have far-reaching consequences for one's view of God, ontology, anthropology, 
soteriology, ethics, and so on. If the Pain of God, as Kitamori believes, is a tension-
filled coexistence of God's love and His wrath; and if God's wrath is something, in 
principle, negative in God Himself (as Kitamori also seems to suggest); and if we dare 
to reasonably consider the logical consequences of these statements, what would our 
conclusion be? Our conclusion: for Kitamori, humanity is, for some reason, 
preconditioned to sin against God (therefore arousing His wrath), in order to "help" 
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God to become a more true God in His Pain (Pain as a divine love of a higher 
order)." This reasoning seems to be leading Kitamori's thought ad absurdum. But 
each hypothetical step we follow is not completely without supporting evidence, and 
therefore, our conclusion cannot be completely dismissed as unwarranted. 
This hard idea of Kitamori may have its origin in the hidden side of the 
Godhead, which has found expression in his theology. If this is true, Kitamori may 
be treading on the shaky ground of human speculation; a risky undertaking, since it is 
impossible to penetrate the mystery of God and without incurring serious consequences 
to our interpretation of God and the reality around us.' 
But, as we remember, his primary vision of God in Pain was quite concrete 
and "tangible" in nature. Kitamori considered it to be a positive value in itself, an 
absolute value. In comparison with God in Pain, even the most painful human misery 
'Later we will analyze issues surrounding this crucial theme. Until then, we 
posit this problem pointedly. 
"Kitamori is a strongly Christocentric theologian; he finds his theological 
"axiom" in 1 Corinthians 2:2: "For I decided to know nothing among you except 
Jesus Christ, and him crucified." (NRSV) Even so, he profoundly speculates upon 
the trinitarian mystery contained in "him crucified." 
This feature of Kitamori is in significant contrast to Luther, whose thinking 
was exclusively based upon the incarnate Son. While Luther's Christocentrism 
warned against any speculation of the divine majesty, Kitamori goes in the opposite 
direction. From this difference we learn that Christocentrism as such is no sign that a 
theologian is opposed to speculation. We quote a short passage from Luther: "Dis 
[the traditional appropriation of the three Persons to opera ad extra; the Father to 
creation, the Son to redemption, and the Holy Spirit to sanctification] sind die 
unterscheid der personen uns im Euangelio geben. Darliber mag welter denken, wer 
da wil, wird aber keine mehr, die gewis sein mochte, finden. Danimb sollen wir 
einfeltiglich dabey bleiben und uns daran bemigen lassen, bis wir dorthin komen, da 
wirs nicht mehr Wren oder gleuben, sondern klerlich sehen und erkennen werden." 
(WA, 50, 275, 27-31). 
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should lose all color and fade away." This strongly suggests that Kitamori's vivid 
intuition urged a theological analysis of the Pain of God. We can suggest that the 
attributes of God, anthropology and ontology themselves are preliminarily deduced by 
Kitamori, while the Pain of God retains absolute theological primacy. At one point, 
Kitamori says that we should seek the wrath of God in order that we experience our 
own pain, and give witness to the Pain of God.' This thought implies that in 
Kitamori's theology, the Pain of God is believed to be a value in and of itself, even 
the absolute value. 
So far, we have not taken up the concept of "pain" itself. The meaning of 
the term "pain" as emotional and mental misery and sorrow can be considered as self-
evident, but in order to clearly understand Kitamori's thought, we need to reflect 
briefly on the phenomenon called pain and see how Kitamori personally understands 
the term, particularly when it is applied to God. 
The primary meaning of "pain" is "a localized physical suffering associated 
with bodily disorder," as well as "a basic bodily sensation induced by noxious 
stimulus."" Without a physical body, the sensation of pain in this primary sense is . 
impossible; pain thus presupposes a physical organism possessing a nervous system. 
As with any concrete term, "pain" has also been used in a more abstract sense. Pain 
""Listen! Jesus is about to be buried. God's only Son, God Himself in the 
person of His Son, is about to be buried! We to whom this fact has been revealed 
forget everything else. We can no longer be interested in anything else. God is in 
pain! Before this fact all other actuality looses (sic) significance." (Pain, 101). 
"Ibid., 64. 
'Webster's 1Vinth Collegiate Dictionary (1988), s. v. pain. 
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is thus used to describe mental agony or spiritual anguish (because of man's 
psychosomatic nature, it is possible for physical disorders to originate in the mind; 
agony, anguish, dismay and other types of pain may be used in a literary sense). In 
this regard, the term "pain" is also appropriate in expressing "actual mental distress or 
suffering." 
What does "pain" mean when it is applied to God? God is an incorporeal 
Being, and therefore He does not experience pain as a bodily sensation. In other 
words, "God in Pain," as in all positive statements of God, is analogical language. 
Obviously Kitamori understands this: "We cannot know directly what the pain of God 
is," he says, because "man is essentially different- from God."' How then can we 
actually know if God is in Pain? Through our own pain, Kitamori answers, which 
symbolizes God's Pain. Analogia is called for here; Kitamori specifically uses the 
term analogia doloris to describe this way of knowing God in Pain.' 
According to Kitamori, the term "pain" should serve as a theological 
terminus technicus describing "the character of God's love." Formally speaking, 
the character of God's love is the "mediated love of God."' Pain is also defined as 
"Ibid. 
'Pain, 60. 
'Ibid., 56. We will come back to this theme when we deal with Kitamori's 
theological methodology in Chapter 5. 
'Introduction, 46. 
'Ibid., 44. The phrase "the mediated love of God" is given by Kitamori in 
English. 
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"the love of God which embraces the extra (sinful men) within the intra (God's 
love)."" In addition, Kitamori gives a more abstract definition when he writes: "the 
term 'pain' is a qualitative expression of negative mediation."' Kitamori even denies 
that "the pain of God exists in God as substance;" "the pain of God is not a 'concept 
of substance'--it is a 'concept of relation,' a character of 'God's love."' 
We should reflect for a moment on the meaning of pain in this rather 
abstract sense. It first appears as if Kitamori has taken back what he has been saying 
until now concerning the Pain of God. In his "sober" reflection on the term, Kitamori 
thus gives his solution to the semantic problem pertaining to "pain" (although we do 
not find any detailed description of the problem in his writings). 
And yet, making "pain" a technical term does not in any way nullify the 
immediacy and concreteness of his inner perception of the Pain of God. In connection 
with Kitamori's exposition of "the immanence and transcendence of the Pain of God" 
in his magnum opus, he refers to Matthew 26:12, exclaiming: "Listen! . . . God's 
only Son; God himself in the person of his Son; is about to be buried! . . . God is in 
pain [literally, God is aching]! " In another context, Kitamori confesses his bliss in 
language tinged deeply with mysticism: "When I am dissolved in [literally, 'melted 
with'] the Pain of God and become one with Him in pain, it is pure joy, and there can 
"Ibid., 81. 
"Kitamori, Negation, 149. 
'Pain, 16. 
'Ibid., 101; cf, note 73 above. 
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be no greater happiness for me.' 
The Pain of God is more than a theological cipher; more than a Hegelian 
Vorstellune it is something "substantial" in his theology! In fact, it is this 
immediacy and concreteness of the Pain of God that gives the very force to Kitamori's 
theology. Even though Kitamori now presents the term "the Pain of God" as a 
theological terminus technicus, the Pain of God remains in Kitamori's thought in its 
literal sense. It is a vision of God who is "really" in Pain; a vision of the crucial 
reality beyond and prior to any analytical reflection on its nature. Perhaps, even in a 
corporeal sense! Jesus suffered pain as a man! Thus, even a concept like "suffering" 
would be too abstract and too weak to describe the reality of the God in Pain 
experienced in Kitamori's vision." From our perspective, therefore, the concept of 
85Pain, 72. 
"Ibid., 28. 
'Perhaps, on this point, Kitamori is most akin to Uemura, who reflected 
deeply on the immediate and concrete image of God in pain. In his magnum opus, 
Kitamori quotes Uemura twice. One of these quotations is quite relevant in this 
context. To properly appreciate Kitamori's affinity with Uemura, it is helpful to 
reproduce the quotation in a "literal" translation. "God opened the way of sins' 
forgiveness for man" wrote Uemura, "tasting unspeakable suffering and pain, going 
through an aching [heart-aching] process, and offering His own body as a sacrifice." 
(quoted in Itami, 21-22). It is this tangible image in Uemura's thought of "God in 
suffering" that Kitamori primarily thinks of when he speaks of the Pain of God. 
"Christianity is," wrote Uemura elsewhere, "a faith which recognizes the heart of God 
in the Cross of Jesus; the Cross means God's suffering and pain." (Sermons of 
Masahisa Uemura, ed. Tsuneaki Kato [Tokyo: Shinkyo Suppansha, 1972], 297). 
It is, however, possible that in Uemura's thoughts on divine suffering 
obtained inspiration from Horace Bushnell, A. M. Fairbairn and other English 
theologians of suffering (see J. K. Mozley, The Passibility of God, [Cambridge: 
Cambridge Univ. Press, 1926], 138-65), for Uemura had been reading these 
theologians (see Sermon, 211, 261). 
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"pain" is irreplaceable in Kitamori's theology; for him it is sine qua non. God is 
"really" in Pain, as Kitamori's mystical exclamation clearly indicates. 
Basic Characteristics of the Concept 
of the Pain of God 
Now we shall make the following observations concerning distinctive traits 
of Kitamori's concept of the Pain of God and their implications.' We learned that 
there were two main issues involved in the Pain of God: soteriological concern and 
theological concern. When we look more closely at these two points, it is apparent 
that in Kitamori's thought the Pain of God is the sum of both the doctrine of God and 
the doctrine of salvation; soteriology is theology and vice versa. More precisely, the 
doctrine of God has absorbed the doctrine of salvation, becoming soteriology as well. 
We shall now focus on the reason for this merger. 
"Theology is the science of [God's] grace."" Kitamori says it is "a precise 
understanding of the Gospel."' In other words, "we must fathom 'the heart of the 
'In this part of the present section, we shall give an orientation of Kitamori's 
theological landscape. Cursory discussions here on these themes will be dealt in 
extenso in following sections. Since the arguments below are somewhat complicated, 
it is felt that an overview would be helpful to show respective issues in their total 
context, although this may involve the risk of repetition. 
"Itami, 134. The original Japanese [ EN10-7tz ] has not been 
translated in Pain, 89. 
'Pain, 20. When we place God's giving up of the Son in the present tense, 
we indicate that this divine sacrifice is an eternal act on the part of God which is 
manifested on the Golgotha ephapax in history. Ontologically, the sacrifice is an 
eternal act of God; phenomenologically, it is an ephapax event in history. We may 
even dare say that in Kitamori, there is death in God Himself eternally; the death of 
Christ is the paradigm of this element of death in God Himself. We shall analyze this 
issue shortly. 
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Gospel' by knowing the will of God minutely (Colossians 1:9 ["For this reason, since 
the day we heard it, we have not ceased praying for you and asking that you may be 
filled with the knowledge of God's will in all spiritual wisdom and understanding. . 
.9) and by searching the depth of God (1 Corinthians 2:10 r these things God has 
revealed to us through the Spirit; for the Spirit searches everything, even the depths of 
God.9)."" In these quotations, we see a constellation of two concerns: first, an 
interest in the view of God ("by knowing. . . and by searching. . .") and second, an 
interest in soteriology ("grace" and "the Gospel"). These two groupings indicate our 
observation above that soteriology is theo-logy and vice versa. We hear from 
Kitamori that this is the essential thing in theology: to know and search for God and 
the Gospel. "It has been our sincere desire," he concludes in his most representative 
work, "to see deeply into the heart of God. . . ."" In other words, to gain insight 
into God in Pain is also to know the Gospel, and this means that God Himself is the 
Gospel. To "see and know" is thus the constitutive factor for the theology of the Pain 
of God." To make a point here, we could twist the Melanchthonian dictum a bit and 
state: Hoc est beneficia Dei in Christo cognoscere, cognoscere Eum in dolore. 
Here it may be helpful to note Kitamori's "intellectualization" of faith: 
"Although this world is filled with the grace of God, this grace does not become 





clear and sure comprehension, [does] the grace [of God] become real grace, and it is 
the Holy Spirit who makes grace clear and sure for us."" An intellectualization of 
faith or the Gospel, as exhibited here and elsewhere, seems a logical consequence of 
Kitamori's concept of God as reviewed above. By "intellectualism," we mean an 
attitude of faith which seeks to penetrate a deeper meaning of the Biblical texts beyond 
their immediate clarity. In other words, it is a theological attitude which seeks ratio 
veritatis behind the external words of the Biblical texts. "I am filled with thankfulness 
because it has been allowed to me to enter the depth of God's heart?" This saying 
of Kitamori is a case in point when we speak of his theological intellectualism. 
Kitamori's theology can well be characterized as that of fides quaerens intellectum." 
What then does this merging of soteriology into theo-logy indicate in 
Kitamori's theology? When Luther speaks of favor Dei, he speaks of God turning 
Himself toward us with His favor; a movement primarily from God to us. When 
Kitamori speaks of the Pain of God, or God in Pain, the direction is mainly from us to 
"Auto II, 209. "To believe in Christ means to have a truthfulness 
[ AA, pi st is ]," says Kitamori referring to the Greek word, "and this means one 
assumes his responsibility toward the grace of Christ, a responsibility which does not 
permit the believer to be ignorant of the grace but rather drives him to know more of 
it. . . . This is the connection between faith and knowledge. We should therefore say 
that a faith which does not reach to knowledge is no faith. The Anselmian 'Credo ut 
intellegam' should be understood to this depth." (Theology in Dialogue, [Tokyo: 
Kyobunkan, 1961], 176; italics mine). 
"Pain, 19-20; cf. ibid., 145. 
"It is not widely known that Kitamori is deeply inspired by the Archbishop of 
Canterbury. Anselm's ontological argument is used by Kitamori in the necessity of 
the historical Jesus as the constitution of the concept of the Pain of God (ibid., 34). 
See further, Introduction, 131-34, Character, 11-13, and note 93 above. 
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God. Certainly, for Kitamori, this direction of movement from us to God is initiated 
by God's self-revelation in the crucified Son. But, as we shall see shortly, God has 
been in Pain prior to the revelation of the Son in history. This means that the Pain of 
God is in principle the terminus ad quem to which man lifts himself.' We saw that, 
to Kitamori, the Pain of God is the essence of God, something within the Godhead 
Itself. God in Pain, we may say, is an object of man's contemplation and theoria. 
The idea of God eternally in Pain also indicates Kitamori's distinctive view 
of the mode of God's presence in the world. What is missing in Kitamori's thinldng 
is the belief that God actively intervenes, or is "aggressively offensive" in history. In 
other words, we do not find in Kitamori an awareness of God in His creatio continua; 
his concept of God's presence in the world is static in nature (and this, apart from the 
manifestation of God's wrath!). He uses terms like "the Gospel of the love of God 
[the pain of God] covers the world,"" "the grace of God fills this world," "the 
Pain of God embraces the world,"`" and the like. Certainly Kitamori states that God 
is immanent in the world, but it is an immanence in His "defensive" and passive 
solidarity with the suffering reality of man; God in Pain inviting man to find the 
"Speaking of the "epistemology" of salvation, that "salvation effects not only 
salvation but also lets the believer recognize salvation," Kitamori has the following to 
say: "Now here at the end we have to consider [not salvation but] the Savior Himself. 
As a matter of fact, to recognize [ sa.,-4 ] the Savior [God in Pain] is the 
ultimate duty [ Rikovs ] of the believer. How can it be possible for me to be 
ignorant of the Being who saved me!" (Logic, 54). 
"Itami, 213 (Pain, 140). 
'Auto II, 209. 
mAuto I, 136. 
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meaning of his suffering in the Pain of God. Transcending the immanent suffering 
reality of man while at the same time covering and embracing it, the Pain of God is 
triumphant over the world and gives man the triumph over his existence in the world. 
The truth about God (that is, the truth of God in Pain) is an already "established" 
reality, which is therefore possible to be "searched, seen and known" by those who 
have an intuitive sensitivity to the Pain of God. We are therefore left with the strong 
impression that Kitamori's God is passive and "defensive." 
Further, we mention the possible danger in Kitamori's concept of the Pain of 
God: the narrowing of the perspectives of theo-logy and soteriology. Kitamori has 
incorporated soteriology into theo-logy, emphasizing the knowledge of God in Pain. 
When the concept of God is identified with the doctrine of man's redemption, the 
doctrine of God is in danger of being absorbed into the sphere of redemption. The 
sphere of the creation which is to be redeemed easily disappears. But the God of the 
Bible is not only the Redeemer; He is also the Creator of man. He is Creator before 
He is the Redeemer. God is the One who gives each individual his life and existence 
in the world. In Kitamori's theology, God as Redeemer occupies the pivotal place, 
throwing a shadow upon the other reality of God (this can be seen in his Christology 
as well). Conversely, his soteriology also becomes meager since it is absorbed into 
the Pain of God, reflecting a pessimism about the world. This particular issue will be 
addressed in more detail in later pages; the above should be of sufficient notice. 
Lastly, we speak of the predominant emphasis of love in the theological 
system of Kitamori. Love in this context understood as an inner fellowship between 
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personal beings, transcending the eternal, material existence. Kitamori's passion for 
"the precise understanding of the Gospel (the Pain of God)," is closely related to his 
love for God. Only when one possesses the exact knowledge of the Pain of God [or 
God in Pain] is one brought to a proper response to God's love in Pain. Thus, for 
Kitamori, the knowledge of God and the love of God is intimately linked. The 
background of this concept of relationship (as we anticipate the following discussions) 
is found in Kitamori's concern with our love for God.' His theology can therefore 
be seen as a theology of love in the following ways: first, God's love in His Pain 
flows to man, and second, man's love in pain flows to God in Pain; both directions 
are qualified by pain. 
God in Pain 
Cur Deus in Dolore? 
If Anse1m of Canterbury raised the question "Cur Deus homo?" on the basis 
of faith in the mystery of the incarnation, Kitamori might well raise the question "Cur 
Deus in dolore?" on the basis of his mystical vision of God in Pain in the person of 
Christ on Golgotha. We shall now take a closer look at the ontological structure of 
the Pain of God. 
We should note that Kitamori never forgets to stress that the Pain of God 
""For these twenty years," wrote Kitamori in 1953, "I have been tormented 
by the question of the relationship between the love of God [for us] and our love for 
God. . . . In this book I give a satisfactory answer to this question. I hope it is now 
clear that in order to witness to God's love [in His Pain] we are challenged to love 
God through our own existence." (God, 5). 
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does not correspond to the pains of sinful humanity. The pains of man are the result 
of God's wrath; His reaction to man's sin. Prior to the healing of man's suffering, 
there must be forgiveness, the forgiveness that is unavailable until the wrath of God is 
conquered by the Pain of God.'' Thus, the Pain of God is primarily an "inner-
divine" issue. 
Kitamori distinguishes between two aspects in answering the question of why 
God suffers Pain within Himself. Kitamori's starting point for reflecting on "Cur 
Deus in dolore?" is concrete human experience as an analogy to God's own 
experience. First, God is in Pain because He "loves the unlovable;" second, because 
He gives up His beloved Son as a sacrifice of love for the unlovable.' 
He illustrates both from the Old Testament "witnesses," Hosea and 
Abraham. In an essay entitled Christmas According to Hosea, Kitamori gives the 
following exposition in support of the first aspect of his explanation:1" the prophet 
Hosea was commanded by the Lord to take himself "a wife of harlotry and children of 
harlotry." (Hosea 1:2). For Hosea, this divine commandment was a task of 
unbearable misery and, at the same time, one of glory, says Kitamori. With this 
assignment, the prophet is called to give witness to God's own "hatred" for the Israel 
found in harlotry, and to His unquenchable love for the chosen people (despite their 
""To turn from man's suffering to God's suffering means, in other words, 
that we turn our heart from our 'suffering' to the problem of our sins. For the 
suffering of God takes place, first and foremost, to forgive our sins." (Character, 
41). 
''Pain, 90. 
"Kitamori, On Love and Hatred, (Tokyo: Kyobunkan, 1960), 98-111. 
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betrayal of the love He has shown in the past). Hosea's unforgiving indignation over 
Gomer's continuous harlotry and the Lord's consuming wrath against Israel coincide 
"as if they were [two sides of] one sheet of paper." Reading words such as "I will . 
. . slay her," (2:3) and "I would kill her children," (9:16), Kitamori describes the 
whole story as "almost like a scene of a love scandal."' "The days of punishment 
[over Israel] have come," (9:6). In this Kitamori sees an unmistakable expression of 
divine rejection and punishment. But God shows that He is "God, and not man," 
(11:9), for ."I will heal their backsliding; I will love them freely, for My anger has 
turned away from them." (14:4). In this love, comments Kitamori, God "infinitely 
transcends Hosea and shows His heart to him." Through this love of God, Hosea also 
learns to receive his adulterous wife. In Kitamori's exposition, God's love for the 
unlovable is witnessed through the experience of the prophet. 
Here we see a familiar psychology of the human relationship of love. It is 
no doubt "suffering" when a husband continues to love his wife, even after her 
betrayal of his love through adultery. Kitamori uses the Japanese term miren for this 
ambivalent, indecisive psychology between hatred and love.' In this psychology, 
we see a form of intensified love for the person once so dearly loved. Although 
Kitamori judges miren by itself as "an ugliness" because of its "self-seeking motive," 
he finds an analogy between God's seeking love for straying man and this human, all 
105“ I r *VA “ 106). 
'[ *I* ]. This discussion is based on a short essay entitled "Miren and 
the Cross." in An Introduction to the Bible, (Tokyo: Kawade Shobo, 1954), 155-62. 
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too human miren.' Imitating Pascal's "Rien n'est si semblable a la charitate que la 
cupiditate, et rien n), est si contraire," Kitamori writes: "Nothing is so contrary to 
God's love than self-seeking love; and nothing is so similar to God's love than self-
seeking love."'' Amor est souffrir! For Kitamori, this also holds true for God's 
love in Pain. 
Kitamori's second witness is Abraham during the offering of his son.' He 
agrees that Abraham is certainly "the father of faith," but this expression does not 
fully recognize the significance of what Abraham has done; for Abraham is "the father 
of service to God" as well, giving a paramount witness to God's Pain as he allowed 
Isaac to die as a sacrifice.' Who could plumb the depth of Abraham's heart in this 
sacrifice? The eyes of anyone watching Abraham on Mount Moriah, writes Kitamori, 
would be frozen by this appalling scene!"' It was, holds Kitamori, Soren 
Kierkegaard who perceived the true dimension of this shocking, even lurid scene, 
when the Danish thinker wrote: "From that day Abraham became an old man."' 
But to Kitamori, the significance of Abraham's action on Mount Moriah "has not been 
'Ibid., 158-159. 





fully recognized," and Kierkegaard is no exception in this regard.' 
What then is the real issue in Abraham's sacrifice of his beloved son? It 
was nothing else than his service, in pain, to God. Abraham with ineffable pain in his 
heart served the God who "caused his own Son to die, the God in Pain, the Father of 
our Lord Jesus Christ.""° This "experience of God," the experience of suffering 
pain when God caused His beloved Son to die, is not far from human experience 
(especially under the particular wartime situation in which Kitamori wrote his magnum 
opus). "In this world," wrote Kitamori, "the strongest expression of human pain is 
found when parents send a beloved son into suffering and death."' This was not an 
abstract statement, but a real experience for many parents in Japan; to send their sons 
into the battlefield for the sake of the nation was virtually identical to sending them 
into suffering and death. Analogous to this, God also truly suffers when He sends His 
beloved Son into death, in order to save sinners." 
Kitamori's primary vision of God in Pain was a product of contemplating the 
concrete historical suffering of Christ. He is convinced, as was Uemura before him, 
that the Cross of the Lord Jesus is the manifestation of the heart of God. This heart 
"3lbid. 
"Ibid., 52. 
usltami, 64, (Pain, 47). 
"Spealdng of what constitutes divine agape, Kitamori contends that eros must 
be "the structural moment" of agape. Agape as a sacrificial love constitutes itself first 
on the basis of eros, which is bound to the "unabandonable." The analogy of human 
parental love for a child has an essential position in Kitamori's interpretation of divine 
agape found in God's abandoning of His Son, Literature and God [Tokyo: Nihon-no-
Barasha, 1983], 201-202). 
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of God cannot be described by the simple term "love," but only by "Pain." And yet, 
this Pain in God is not a historical and temporal phenomenon. Behind the historical 
event of the Cross, there is the eternal Pain of God. "The Pain of God," explains 
Kitamori, "is the infinitely deep background of the historical Jesus."' Kitamori's 
interpretation of Abraham's sacrifice (before the historical sacrifice of Jesus) as a 
witness to the pain of God par excellence also indicates the presupposition of the 
eternalness of the Pain of God." 
A crucial question arises here: how can the Pain of God be an eternal 
reality? Kitamori even says that "Pain is the definition of the transcendent Being."' 
Ordinarily, we understand God's work in temporal sequence, and Scripture speaks in 
that mode. God created heaven and earth; "And it was indeed very good!" (Genesis 
1:31). This is, as it were, God's joyful exclamation when He completed His work of 
creation. After the fall of man his redemptive act follows this work of creation. If 
one, perhaps in a "simplistic" way, confines one's thinking to the temporal, one would 
have immense difficulty grasping the idea that God's Pain is eternal. Certainly, St. 
Paul, for instance, speaks of supra-temporal events ordained by God for man's 
salvation (1 Corinthians 2:7-10; Ephesians 3:9-12; Colossians 1:26). These and other 
"'Pain, 35. 
'This viewpoint is supported by Kitamori's own refutation of Ignatius' [of 
Antiochia] tou pathous tou theou mou, saying that the apostolic father spoke "only of 
the sufferings of Jesus on earth. . ." (Pain, 115, emphasis mine). In other words, 
Kitamori presupposes the eternalness of the Pain of God when he comments on 
Ignatius' view in this way. 
"Negation, 149. 
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passages in Scripture would suggest the inevitability of a way of thinking which refers 
to an extraordinary dimension of God's reality. The question would then be: how, to 
what extent, and with reference to what, a relativization of the "ordinary category of 
thinking" is required and legitimate. This question suggests the problem of "time and 
eternity." We cannot deal with this problem here at any great length; but later we 
will include aspects relevant to the discussion at hand for a deeper understanding of 
Kitamori's theology (when we deal with the question of the eternalness of the Pain of 
God).'" 
The Wrath of God 
When God wants to "love those sinners who cannot and should not be 
loved," and when He even "causes His beloved Son to die" for their sake, God suffers 
aj. 121 n In Kitamori's view, "God as such" [that is, God without Christ] cannot love 
sinners. Before He can love them, God must be reconciled to Himself. Why is this 
so? There exists, Kitamori answers, an absolute conflict between the God who desires 
to love sinners and the God who must annihilate those who have denied His love, 
"killing" Him. The loving God now bears upon Himself the wrath of God which 
the Biblical concept of time and eternity, see Regin Prenter, Skabelse og 
GenWaning, (Copenhagen: G. E. C. Gads Forlag, 1955), 245-50. Prenter sees God's 
faithfulness in eternity which makes man's time filled with blessing and meaning: 
"Evigheden betegner for israeliten ikke, som graekeren, den over al timelighed haeved 
eller bag al timelighed hvilende, abstrakte tidsloshed, men tvaert imod selve det faste i 
al timelighed" (248). Prenter sees this holds true also of the New testament concept 
of the relationship between time and eternity. See further Erich Frank, Philosophical 
Understanding, 64-66. 
L'Itatni, 136 (Pain, 90). 
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should have stricken sinners. This is the Pain of God. God suffers Pain for His love 
toward sinners, and this because of His own wrath.' But after this explanation, we 
are left wondering: what then is the wrath of God in Kitamori's thought? 
"For the wrath of God," writes St. Paul, "is revealed from heaven against all 
ungodliness and unrighteousness of those who by their wickedness suppress the truth." 
(Romans 1:18). The wrath of God is an undeniable reality in Biblical faith, a reality 
in which all men are placed. It is one of the basic features of Luther's theology that 
the law of God reveals death, sin and the devil "praesertim intensive vel in 
conscientia," all the threatening forces which are ultimately the revelation of the wrath 
of God.' In Luther's thought, in addition to the ethical aspect of the concept of 
God's wrath, there is also included a transcendental dimension of God's reality toward 
man, particularly in connection with his idea of Deus absconditus.'' It is also a 
well-known trait of the Reformer's thought that the wrath of God is opus alienum in 
contrast to the love of God, His opus proprium. There is no doubt that God's opus 
alienum is considered subordinate to His opus proprium, the former serving the 
9t is important to note that God does not suffer for the love toward sinner 
directly; love and suffering are not directly linked; divine suffering is related primarily 
to divine wrath. We can say, therefore, that for Kitamori, God suffers Pain for the 
love of sinful humanity only indirectly. God's suffering is primarily "for His own 
sake," because He wants to love us despite His own wrath. 
'WA, 40, I, 481, 1-2. 
'Of this dimension of the hidden God, says Werner Elert: "This God, who 
holds us responsible for demands we cannot fulfill, who asks us questions we cannot 
answer, who created for us that which is good and, in spite of this, leaves us no 
choice but to do that which is evil--this is the hidden God." (The Structure of 
Lutheranism. tr. Walter A. Hansen [St. Louis: Concordia Publ. House, 1962], 22). 
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realization of the latter. 
Kitamori's concept of the wrath of God occupies an essential place in his 
theology; it is "an absolutely stubborn, absolutely nonnegotiable reality."' In his 
view, this absolute character of the wrath of God therefore refuses to be absorbed into 
the love of God; if God's wrath were assimilated, there would emerge what he calls 
"the monism of love," an idea of divine love that would not know of the Cross of 
Christ.' This would, then, totally miss the central message of the Bible--the Pain of 
God, and make superfluous the Cross of Christ, which Kitamori calls the very 
revelation of "the innermost heart of God."1zf No, the love of God is not a love 
pure and simple, but a love which involves friction, contradiction and suffering.'" 
For Kitamori, divine wrath ever remains "an absolutely stubborn, absolutely 
nonnegotiable reality," as long as man is sinful. It is not propitiated once for all on 
Golgotha. It is, we must add, not even propitiable!'" 
Genuinely consistent with his basic conceptual scheme of theology, Kitamori 
expounds upon the emergence of the wrath of God in light of the preceding concept of 
125" #65116v)itibtizabltel.WCI6,6 " Manzi, 21 [Pain 21]. 
"Kitamori thinks primarily of the Ritschlian understanding of divine love. 
"The monism of love" in Kitamori's terminology is " 20—Tc.1411 " 
(Introduction, 46-47. See also Character, 23-24. 
'ltami, 221 (Pain, 145). 
'Character, 23-24. 
'If, in Kitamori's thought, the propitiation had been actually carried out as 
the ephapax of Hebrew 9:12 ([Christ] entered once for all into the Holy Place, . . . 
with his own blood, thus obtaining eternal redemption"), the Pain of God could not be 
eternal, a statement contrary to Kitamori's view. 
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God's love: 
When the love of God is betrayed by man, it turns into the wrath of God. 
The wrath of God is the same as saying: Divine love betrayed. The love of God 
becomes the wrath of God [when betrayed] because it is true love. True love 
once betrayed turns into wrath. If a love does not become wrath, even when 
betrayed, it is no true love at all. That God is God is shown by His wrath. A 
God without wrath is no God at all.' 
Here we see that the wrath of God is a reaction on the side of God which 
has its origin in the love of God. This idea of divine wrath as a "reactionary" form of 
love has as its conceptual background Kitamori's notion of God, that is, God is 
exclusively love; all the other attributes of God are only different aspects of God as 
love, including His holiness. If ordinary human love is believed to be analogous with 
divine love, interpreting God's wrath as a reaction to the betrayal of love in a personal 
relationship is readily understandable; love, when intense, is highly charged with 
spiritual and personal energy, which, when betrayed, naturally results in a destructive 
reaction against love's object. For Kitamori, the intensity of the love of God 
surpasses human comprehension; the wrath of God (His love betrayed) therefore also 
surpasses human comprehension. 
To understand this concept of divine wrath, we need to pay particular 
attention to Kitamori's category of love and the significance he gives to it. Divine 
wrath is a reaction to man's sin. In Kitamori's thought, sin is conceived as man's 
betrayal of divine love, and the reaction of God to sin is vehement. To describe this, 
'Logic, 130. "Sin is the betrayal of love. . . . Sinners who betray this love 
should never be loved. Sin therefore presupposes intense love. When intense love is 
betrayed, anger becomes intense." (Pain, 91). 
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Kitamori borrows P. T Forsyth's expression: "Sin is the death of God. Die sin must 
or God."'" The Scottish theologian speaks of a death struggle between divine 
holiness and sin. Forsyth is concerned here with God's vindication of His holiness 
which is absolutely incompatible with the dominion of Satan.'" This concerns an 
absolute either/or situation. Kitamori now understands Forsyth's idea as a death 
struggle between God and sinners. "Sinners are the death of God." Kitamori would 
read, "Die must the sinners or God." Wrath is thus God's absolute negation of 
sinners. 
Kitamori reads Forsyth "differently" from what the latter intended, since the 
Japanese theologian replaces Forsyth's idea of "divine holiness" with his own idea of 
"divine love."'" As Forsyth could not give up the claim of God's holiness, so 
Kitamori cannot admit that God's love (a love betrayed) can tolerate the sinner's 
"The Justification of God. (London; Duckworth & Co., 1916), 151. 
`Character, 43; Itami, 181 (Pain omits three sentences at the end of the 
paragraph, which includes the quotation from Forsyth. Schmerz translates the 
sentences omitted in Pain: "Gott allein erleidet wahrhaftigen Schmerz, weil er 
eigentlich &Ude nicht vergeben darf. [The quotation from Forsyth comes here.] 
Und doch hat dieser Gott die Sande vergeben!" [118]). On this point, Forsyth has 
the following to say: "The more love there is in a holy God, the more wrath. Sin, in 
the sinner He loves, against the law of His own nature, which He loves better still, 
could not leave Him either indifferent, or merely pitiful. For Love would then desert 
its own holiness. A being holy, God's concern with sin is more than pity, more than 
pain. It is holiness in earnest reaction." (Samuel J. Mikolaski, ed. The Creative 
Theology of P. T. Forsyth: Selections from his Works. [Grand Rapids: Wm. B. 
Eerdmans, 1969], 132-133). 
'"See the quotation in note 132 above. 
238 
existence. The sinner must die, or God ceases to be God.' 4 God's wrath, divine 
love betrayed, is thus an absolutely nonnegotiable reality to the person who betrays 
God's love. 
Despite this absolute divine negation, God still wants to love the sinner. 
There emerges then a severe conflict between the God who must destroy sinners, and 
the God who earnestly seeks them. In fact, Kitamori's idea of the struggle within God 
closely resembles Forsyth's concept of the relationship between God's holiness and 
His love. When Kitamori speaks of God bearing upon Himself His own wrath,' it 
sounds similar to Forsyth's phrase ". . . also there [on the Cross] bearing Himself the 
Judgment of His own holiness."' A major difference between these two 
theologians is the direction of the divine reaction. Whereas Forsyth sees the reaction 
of divine holiness directed against sin, Kitamori believes the wrath of God is directed 
against sinners; and thus, the wrath of God against the sinner is a destructive, 
annihilating reality. Because of sin (man's betrayal of God's love), "the world is laid 
'It was sin," writes Forsyth (in contrast to Kitamori's interpretations of 
Forsyth), "that had to be judged, more even than the sinner, in a world of salvation; 
and God made Christ sin in this sense, that God as it were took Him in the place of 
sin, rather than of the sinner, and judged the sin upon Him; and in putting Him there 
He really put Himself there in our place (Christ being what he was); so that the divine 
judgment of sin was real and effectual." (Ibid., 142). We see that Forsyth makes a 
clear distinction in his argument between sin and the sinner. 
135Spealdng of the poena-aspect of redemption, Kitamori says: "The Christ 
who bears the punishment is the Christ who bears the wrath of God. And Christ was 
the very God who loved the sinner. Accordingly, the Christ crucified is the figure of 
God's love bearing God's wrath upon itself. The fact that one bears one's own wrath 
upon one's own love is pain. But is there more vehement Pain than this kind of 
Pain?" (Character, 21). 
`Forsyth, Justification, 151. 
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down under the wrath of God."'" 
God's love of "the first order" (to anticipate what follows) is now betrayed 
and has become wrath; but God does not cease to love sinners. Here we see in 
Kitamori's idea divine love split into two opposing realities within God.' This love 
of God which still loves the sinner is now called the love of "the second order." But 
the integrity of the divine love of the first order must retain its own proprium, 
otherwise God would cease to be God [Forsythianfl.'" God therefore takes upon 
Himself His own wrath, so that He may be able to love sinners. 
The love which sinners now receive from God is, therefore, not a love 
coming to them "im-mediately" (that is, without mediation). God's love for the sinner 
is invariably a divine love which is already gone through and mediated by the Pain of 
God. It is an already "processed" love as it were. Moreover, God's Pain is conditio 
sine qua non for God's love towards us. Thus, the Pain of God is not synonymous 
with God's eternally unchangeable love (in Kitamori's view, the love of God is not an 
'Logic, 33. 
138"`Sin is the death of God. Sin must die or God.' This is the wrath of God. 
But God in Christ is the God who loves the children of wrath. What kind of love is 
this? Here God is split in Himself. Real sin is that which splits God into two." 
(Character, 44). 
'"The grace of God is [first and foremost] forgiveness of sins; forgiveness of 
sins means that the love of God conquers the wrath of God. But [it is vital to note 
that] sins [actually] forgiven are at the same time something which shall not be 
forgiven. This means that one should not regard the wrath of God as dissolved into 
nothing [even when sins are forgiven]. When God forgives sins, the wrath of God is 
not dissolved into nothing but it continues to be borne by God Himself. The love of 
God bears upon itself the wrath of God in forgiveness of sins" (Character, 57). 
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eternally unchangeable identity; it is "changeable" and has movement)." The Pain 
of God is a term that genuinely describes God's suffering within Himself. 
For a better understanding of this we turn to a "longhand" term for the Pain 
of God, namely, "the love based upon the Pain of God."' In this phrase, primary 
stress as well as logical primacy is on "Pain of God" rather than "love." The Pain of 
God is not the pain based on God's love. If this were the case, there would ultimately 
be no pain within God for the love of sinners (God already loves the sinner before His 
Pain!); Pain would then only be an expression of His love and sympathy. On the 
contrary, according to Kitamori, God must suffer a fierce conflict within Himself, 
because He wants to love sinners whom He must also destroy. Whenever He loves 
sinners, He therefore suffers this Pain prior to loving them. The Pain of God is thus 
primarily God's problem in His love for sinners. 
In comparison with other theologians who have developed theologies of 
suffering,' a distinctive departure in Kitamori's system is that the suffering of God 
'"We shall see this later in this section. 
"The original term of "the love based upon the Pain [of God]" is 
" iloolaigzaw-50-t,h . " Pain translates this as "love rooted in God's pain." 
The original image of the term is that of a house standing on a foundation. Kitamori 
may hold that God's Pain supports His love. Schmerz: "Die im Schmerz begrundete 
Liebe Gottes." Despite some incongruity between Pain and my translation, I prefer in 
this study "the love based upon the Pain of God." However, when I quote from Pain, 
I do this without change. 
'Including the theme of God's suffering are the following: J. K. Mozley, 
The Impassibility of God, (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1926); Jurgen 
Moltmann, Der gekreuzigte Gott, (Munich: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1972); Jung Young 
Lee, God Suffers for Us, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974); Geddas Macgregor, 
He Who Let Us Be, (New York: Seabury Press, 1975); Warren McWilliams, The 
Passion of God, (Macon, GA: Mercer Univ. Press, 1985); Paul S. Fiddes, The 
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is an inner-divine suffering. In other words, while most other theologians concerned 
with a theology of suffering emphasize divine suffering for us, Kitamori concentrates 
primarily upon the Pain of God as suffering within God Himself, suffering because of 
His own conflict; "only" secondarily does God suffer for sinners. To put it bluntly, 
the sinner is for a time a spectator of the drama of the Pain of God. Kitamori 
therefore constantly emphasizes that believers should concern themselves primarily, 
exclusively, with the Pain of God. The theology of the Pain of God is a theology of 
the Pain of God. The wrath of God is absolutely constitutive for this particular 
theological system.'43  We can therefore maintain that in the mind of Kitamori, the 
wrath of God is proprium in the Pain of God. 
One may better understand Kitamori's use of the phrase "divine wrath" by 
analyzings of the traditional idea of God's wrath and love. Figuratively speaking, the 
Creative Suffering of God, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988). 
'43Moltmann and Lee, among others, speak of the wrath of God, but their 
conceptualization of divine wrath is somewhat vague, something other than the usual 
understanding of the idea of wrath. Moltmann writes: "Als verletze Liebe ist Zorn 
Gores nicht zuerst ein Zufiigen, sondern ein gottliches Erleiden von Ubel." (261, 
underline mine). Can wrath which is not primarily Zufligen be described as wrath? 
Lee, who has many thoughts similar to Kitamori, is also not clear regarding the 
concept of divine wrath when he says, for instance: "The wrath of God is. . . to be 
understood as an act of the inner struggle between transcendence [the eternal will to 
assert His own glory and power] and immanence [the compassionate heart to renounce 
and sacrifice Himself] of God when He is fully involved in the existential 
estrangement of the world. It is the symbol of the struggling love to accept that which 
also is rejected by Him." (14-15). Lee's thought scheme is quite similar to 
Kitamori's, but still, the concept of wrath is not as specific. 
The ambiguity concerning the idea of divine wrath as found in Moltmann 
and Lee indicates that theologies of the suffering of God built upon the love of God 
have difficulty in the coming to terms with the wrath of God, a transcendental aspect 
into which humanity cannot fully penetrate. 
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traditional idea of God can be described as an ellipse with two foci: holiness and 
love, while for Kitamori, God is described as a circle with a single focus. When 
Luther in his Small Catechism explains the Commandments individually with the 
introduction: "We should fear and love God. . .," he also presupposes the elliptical 
model. Holiness marks divine otherness, which is not absorbed into His relationship 
of love towards us. In contrast to this, we can characterize Kitamori's formal scheme 
in this regard as "loveism," in the sense that love is the sole category of theology.'" 
This interpretation by Kitamori of the wrath of God on the basis of his 
"loveism" has both strong and weak aspects. On the one hand, it has a definite 
advantage in making the reality of God's wrath intelligible. If God loves us so deeply 
and intensively, then our rejection of His love cannot leave Him indifferent to us. 
The Old Testament idea of a jealous God is a case in point. On the other hand, when 
Kitamori reduces the holiness of God to love, he runs the risk of losing the dimension 
of God's "numinous" transcendence over man. In other words, the wrath of God has 
also dimensions which defy our rational comprehension; it sets the borderline of our 
understanding of the mystery of God and the world under His inscrutable 
providence.' This means, in practice, that when one does not take this divine 
'"We could have used the term "the monism of love," but this term has been 
used by Kitamori already, as we saw above. In need of a handy term to describe his 
use of "love" as the sole classification in his theology, we have coined this term. 
"One of the themes of the Book of Job is the recognition of the ultimate 
transcendence of God's way of dealing with us. In his studies in "Gottesrede" in the 
Book of Job, Jurgen van Oorschot makes the following observation: "Sowohl die 
Tendenz weisheitlicher Theologie im nachexilischen Judentum, die undialektisch das 
Weltgeschehen and Gotteswillen gleichzusetzen begann, als auch der Protest dagegen, 
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transcendence, he is forced to explain what is unexplainable, and this with the risk of 
straining the reality we experience and the reality of God as witnessed in 
Scripture."' We are under the wrath of God, and there is no question about it. But 
this statement, if understood in the same way as it is by Kitamori, does not explain the 
whole problem of tragedies, miseries and absurdities of human reality. 
We are told that God's love betrayed by sinners causes Pain. The love 
which still loves sinners causes Pain as it has to bear the wrath of God upon itself. 
Why is God in Pain? It is because God loves sinners who are unlovable and 
"unembraceable" by their own right. God's love has this character of Pain, or 
tragedy. When Kitamori reflects on this tragedy of God, however, he finds "an 
infinitely deep background." What is this background? 
The Pain of God as the Essence of God 
The Pain of God in Kitamori's thought is an inner-divine conflict caused by 
human betrayal of God's love. God suffers Pain within Himself because of the love 
der sich auf eigene Eifahrungen bereft und diese zum Mafistab der Bewertung des 
Handelns Gottes in Schifpfiing und Geschichte macht, ilberschreitet anmofiend die 
Grenze menschlichen MOglichkeiten." (Gott als Grenze, [Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 
1987], 199-200). 
"Just as Job's friends were forced with their "rationalistic" view of lex 
talionis to convince Job that he was guilty for what he was receiving, so Kitamori's 
contention of human suffering purely as the wrath of God is compelled to assert the 
seriousness for the betrayal of divine love. The wrath of God is most difficult concept 
for the Japanese to "digest." But Kitamori's contention involves the same danger as 
Job's friends in this regard. When man rationalizes the wrath of God, it results 
(mutatis mutandis) in "entweder gegen seine /Leidenden] Gewifiheit an eine eigene 
Schuld glauben zu mussen oder sich in den Handen eines das Recht verachtenden 
Tyrannen zu wissen." (Ibid., 206). 
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he has for sinners. But this does not exhaust Kitamori's ideas concerning the Pain of 
God. In fact, he often alludes to a more profound background of a metaphysical 
nature of the reality of the Pain of God. This is concerned with the essence of God, 
and its reflection in the world.'" We are thinking of a contradiction in God Himself 
or in His love." We consider here the eternalness and essentiality of the Pain of 
God, Pain as an intrinsic issue in God. 
What is the essence of God? Kitamori says that God's essence is "His inner 
world."'" Concretely, what is in "His inner world" is His essence, and that is "the 
Pain of God as seen by Jeremiah and the love shown in the Cross as seen by 
Paul."' His inner world is "His heart," which is the Pain of God."' The Pain of 
'"When God's essence is Pain, then the world is also ultimately in pain. This 
is a simple metaphysical equation. In fact, while still a student at Kyoto University, 
Kitamori wrote the following striking note: "The deepest feature of reality is the 
`identity of absolute contradictions,' [the axiomatic formula of Nishida Philosophy].. . 
Why is it so? Because, I believe, the very love of God for the world is the 'identity 
of absolute contradictions.' The reality of this world is the imago [ 1 ] of this 
God." (Auto II, 171). Whether this view will logically lead to the conclusion that the 
suffering in this world has its origin in God remains to be seen in the below. 
''Explaining Hegel's Phanomenologie des Geistes, Hans Kimg characterizes 
the Great Idealist's concept of God: "Die Gottheit umfafit alles, ohne dafi die 
Differenz sibergangen wird. Ganz im Gegenteil: die Diferenz wird schon in Gott 
selbst gesehen. Das Leben Gottes besteht geradezu im Kampf mit dem Gegensatz: 
eine auseinandersetzung Gottes mit sich selbst, in deren Lauf es zur welt aus Gott and 
zur Versohnung der Welt in Gott kommt." (Existiert Gott? [Munich: Deutscher 
Taschenbuch Verlag, 1981], 177). See also Paul Tillich's exposition of Hegel on this 
point: A History of Christian Thought, (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1963), 
429. 
'Itami, 59 (Pain, 45). 
1 Pain, 46. 
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God is the essence of God. It is the holy of holies in God, which no mortal could 
dare to see and live. "Awe is fitting here to us!"'" 
"God is love," (1 John 4:8). This is the cardinal conviction of the Christian 
faith about God. And yet, when one tries to give a closer definition of this love, then 
differences will emerge. Kitamori's definition of God's love as the love based upon 
the Pain of God may be a distinctive one; for him, God's love is not a simple, 
"happy" identity but a composite nature of love and pain. Kitamori's originality can 
be seen in his "exegesis" of John 3:16. "For God so loved the world that He gave 
His only begotten Son. . . ." The text seems to speak of the very depth and intensity 
of God's love for the world. In other words, this passage emphasizes the degree of 
intensity of God's qualitatively unchangeable love (off - (haw). Kitamori interprets 
differently: "But this 'so' in the verse is not the 'so' of merely accidental but of an 
essential force; that God gives 'His only begotten Son' does not speak of the degree of 
His love to the world but of the necessary condition for that love's constitution."'” 
That is, "God's love would not have become love to the world without His giving up 
of the Son."' In Kitamori's view, the love of God is not a static identity from 
eternity to eternity; the "primordial love" of God's or the "love of creation's has 
59 (Pain, 45). 
'Auto I, 211. 
'Pain, 119. 
'Logic, 45. The original term is " fgt.* 
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turned into the wrath of God. A new love should emerge if the human race is to 
remain the object of God's love. This love of a new order can only be constituted by 
the Cross of Christ, that is, the Pain of God.'' 
For Kitamori, the eternal essence of God is love, but in the sense of the love 
based upon the Pain of God (in short, the Pain of God). In view of his exegesis of 
John 3:16 above, we quickly notice a difficulty in grasping Kitamori's thought if we 
take the Cross of the Lord as a mere historical event. If this were the case, there 
would be no love for the world prior to the Cross in 30 AD; nor could it be said that 
Pain is God's eternal essence. Apparently, Kitamori's statement alludes to more than 
a historical event. Although he often speaks of necessary historicity of the Cross 
(indeed a very important concept for him), Kitamori also speaks of the Cross of the 
Son as in an eternal order. Also on this point, Kitamori agrees with Forsyth, who 
wrote: "The cross was a reflection (or say rather the historic pole) of an act within 
the Godhead itself."' Kitamori also agrees with Forsyth's view that "His sacrifice 
began before He came into the world, and His [sic] cross was that of a lamb slain 
before the world's foundation [Revelation 13:8]."`" The Pain of God is from 
'In addition to John 3:16, Kitamori has warned of the insufficiency of the 
"ordinary" exegesis of &n in Romans 5:8; if &n is taken as a pleonastic participle, 
holds Kitamori, the meaning of the verse only indicates an illustration of the depth of 
divine love, whereas if taken as a causative participle, then the meaning of the verse 
becomes: God showed His own love toward us because Christ died for us. . . . 
Kitamori interprets the &n in the causative sense in the light of the Pain of God (Auto 
II, 22). 




"before the world's foundation," and Kitamori strengthens his view by noting 
"according to Luther, 'Seen from the eyes of God, the Gospel is proclaimed before 
the foundation of the world.'"'' Also referring to Theodosius Harnack's Luther 
studies, Kitamori finds that Luther should contend that "the presupposition for the 
[divine] counsel of redemption is 'eine absolute, innergottlich begrundete 
Notwendigkeit der Dahingabe des Sohnes.'"" Here Kitamori sees the eternity of the 
''Kitamori's quotation is an indirect one via Theodosius Harnack's Luthers 
Theologie II (Munich: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1927). (The first volume was published 
two decades earlier. Here we use the two volumes of the Luther studies published by 
the same publisher in the same year.) The quotation is from one of Luther's sermons 
of 1537, and the Reformer's own words are as follows: "Do erfarnn wir, wie unil 
Gott gnedig ist, Gnad und grad gibt, Daft ist nun daft gewifi Zeichen, daft uns 
versichert, daft uns Gott gnedig sey umb deft Liben Sonft willen, der uns deli vatteril 
hercz eroffliet, Daft Evanglium von yhmm gehort, Gepredigt worden vor 
Gotteftangesicht, Ee der welt grundt gelegt wardt. Aber d alleft were unit nicht 
nuczlich geweften, Das Christus von Ewigkeit vor Gott am Crewcz ist gehangen, wenn 
man unf3 dce3 nicht heft eroffnt durchs won und durch eM Eusserlich Zeichen." (WA, 
45, 414, 39415, 6; emphasis mine.) We are especially interested in the words 
underlined; what does Luther mean by this? An eternal cross? The tense is present 
indicative, so we cannot interpret this as hypothetical. Luther says this (even though 
there is the possibility of a scribal insertion). If taken in a literal sense, it would be a 
kind of speculation which Luther elsewhere determinedly warns against ("Non debes 
ascendere ad deum, sed incipe ibi, ubi [Christus] incepit: in utero matris, factus 
home et factus,' et prohibe sensum speculationes." [WA, 40 I, 76, 9-10]). We leave 
this question open here. 
'Pain, 45. The German quotation is from Harnack's Luther II, 242. 
Kitamori's interpretation of Luther is heavily influenced by Harnack. Gerhard Rost, 
in his article on Luther's concept of the wrath of God, comes into Harnack's 
interpretation of Luther's view of the relationship between divine wrath and love. Rost 
criticizes Harnack's creation of a deep gap between divine wrath and divine love, 
asserting "ihren kontradiktorischer Gegensatz" and relativized both to each other in the 
higher concept of divine righteousness, thus moving into speculation. Rost, then, 
makes the following observation: "Diese beiden Versuche einer Relativierung der 
Gegensatze haben eins gemeinsam: Sie stellen beide eine an der geschichtlichen 
Offernbarung Gottes anknapfende metaphysiche Spekultaion dar, durch die das Wesen 
Gottes begreiflich gemacht werden soil. Tatstichlich will Harnack ausdnicklich Luther 
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Gospel, which is the same as the Pain of God. "And eternity involves necessity," 
concludes Kitamori.'' 
The Pain of God is the eternal essence of God. What does this mean? We 
are in the heart of Kitamori's theology, his doctrine of God. Our purpose here is to 
grasp Kitamori's meaning of God's eternal "aching" as precisely as possible. 
Although Kitamori does not mention it explicitly, there is a logical crux in 
his assertion of the eternalness and essentiality of God's Pain. On the one hand, in 
order to assert the eternalness of the Pain of God, it must be a supralapsarian reality. 
And if the Pain of God is supralapsarian, then the proprium of the human fall and sin 
is lost. A further question is why should God suffer even "prior" to His creation of 
man? If, on the other hand, Kitamori would maintain the proprium of man's sin (as 
he earnestly does) it means that the Pain of God is infralapsarian. Then, how can the 
Pain of God be eternal and essential to God, the Pain of God being contingent upon 
the human fall? Certainly, we do not insinuate that we have a more rational solution 
to the problem which Kitamori faces here. Rather, there cannot be any rational 
gegen einen `theologischen Empirismus' flir die `theologische Metaphysik' in Anspruch 
nehmen, die bestrebt 1st, sick durch die auJ3eren Tatsachen des Hells die 'in ihnen 
offenbarten ewigen Heilsgedanken Gottes and den inneren Kausalnexus erschliefien zu 
lassen, in welchem sie mit gattlichen Notwendigkeit zueinander zu stehen.' Ohne 
Zweifel, werden hier Gedanken in Luther hineingetragen, die diesem selbst vollig 
fremd sind. Seine Theologie ist ja in jedem Augenblick Offernbaningstheologie." 
("Der Zorn Gottes in Luthers Theologie," Lutherischer Rundblick, vol. 9 [1961, 2-
32], 3-4). See for the polemic background of Harnack's Luther studies and its overall 
evaluation Gerhard 0. Forde's The Law-Gospel Debate. (Minneapolis: Augsburg 
Publ. House, 1969), 81-95. 
'Pain, 46. 
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solution. Our question here is only this: whether it is possible in our theology to 
postulate pain or suffering as eternal and essential to God, without falling into the pit 
of rationalizing evil. In raising this question, we admit our own assumption that in 
addition to the rational unsolvability of the question concerning evil, suffering 
(whether it be God's or man's) is in itself intrinsically evil, something which must be 
eventually overcome. 
We now examine Kitamori's supra- and infralapsarian ideas of the Pain of 
God more closely. First, his supralapsarian concept. Our methodological question 
here: is the creation of man based also upon the Pain of God? In other words, was 
the Pain of God "before" creation?" What would Kitamori answer to this question? 
We read: 
God created man as a free personal being [free to respond to God's love] 
and, [considering this] we cannot but say that the creation involved a risk from 
the beginning. If we go a step further, we have to say that the creation of man 
was not merely an act of simple and immediate "love of God". . . but it already 
bore a character of "the Pain of God." The Pain of God is to say: the love of 
God embracing the negative being, amd this is the proper content of salvation. 
The fact of the creation thus already bore the character of pain [on the part of 
God].'" 
Kitamori speaks clearly--the creation of man bore the character of the Pain 
of God. 
'With this "before" we show the time-category limitations of human thinking. 
If time is also created along with man and the world (see Frank, 62-64), we cannot 
transcend this category, although we are aware of the limitation. But our purpose 
here is to see more closely whether or not the Pain of God is essential to God and 
reality. This "before" is an ontological concept. 
'Logic, 29-30. 
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Further, Kitamori advances his understanding of Christ in creation, quoting 
Colossians 1:16 in connection with his quotation above. Paul writes, "For by Him all 
things were created," and Kitamori reads in this statement that "for that reason 
[namely, the creation bore the character of the Pain of God] the Bible speaks of Christ 
not only in redemption but also in creation.' Christ is "the Person of Pain" within 
the Godhead.'' That Christ is also involved in creation means that Pain was already 
there from eternity. Putting this idea into personal terms, "my very being [called into 
existence] is by the Pain of God."167 
It is also highly significant in this connection to note that Kitamori's 
understanding of the structure of the Gospel corresponds to the eternal Trinitarian 
structure of the Godhead. According to Kitamori, the classical formulation of the 
Trinity is that of immanent Trinity. Since the doctrine of immanent Trinity, he holds, 
"only saw God the Father as the Father of generatio of the Son" and not as "the 
Father causing the Son to die," it has missed "the crucial point," namely, the Pain of 
God.'' The Trinitarian dogma has often been considered, Kitamori thinks, as the 
source of "frigid and alien disputations apart from Christ," because the doctrine is 
30. 
'Character, 28. 
167Logic, 47. Cf. Luther's explanation of the first article of the Creed in the 
Small Catechism: " . . and all this purely out of fatherly, divine goodness and 
mercy, without any merit or worthiness in me." 
"'tang, 63 (Pain, 47). 
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separated from the love of God in Christ, the Pain of God.' Kitamori, however, 
maintains that the Trinitarian dogma is the truth guaranteeing that "the Cross of Christ 
is God's self-split and sorrow in pain [viz. the Pain of God]."'" This mens that the 
dogma of the Trinity should not be conceived apart from "the existence of 
sinners."' 
The doctrine of the Trinity, for Kitamori, should be primarily "economic," 
that is, soteriological.'n Against this background, Kitamori relates each Person in 
the Trinity to three aspects of "the existence of the sinners." The first of the relations 
of God to man is that of the Father in His immediate love. But this love of the Father 
is able to be negated by man, and as far as it is liable to man's negation, God the 
Father's relation to man leaves "a crucial problem unsolved."'" The first relation 
thus necessitates the second, the relation of the Son which is "to overcome the 
negation" that the first relation has found in man." "At this point here," writes 
Kitamori, "the love of God conquers the negation [of man] and becomes the love 








finding oneself in God]."' With the relation of the Son, man cannot fall outside of 
God's love in the Son, the Pain of God. With this love within the second relation, 
God wins the victory over man's disobedience. "Here the negative is turned into the 
affirmative, the extra into the intra.' This victory of God over the sinner, in 
Kitamori's view, is the relation of the Holy Spirit. 
Here we have a triad movement from creation to redemption and finally to 
sanctification, and this triad corresponds to that of wrath, pain and love. The doctrine 
of the Trinity is thus put into a soteriological scheme. By equating the structure of the 
Trinity with the structure of the Pain of God, Kitamori in this way also indicates that 
the Pain of God, as an essential mode of the Divine Being, is a supralapsarian reality. 
We continue by dealing with the infralapsarian view of God's Pain in Kitamori's 
thought. 
In a small book entitled On God (1953), Kitamori gives an exposition of 
God's attributes under the following headings: existence, omnipotence, omniscience, 
ubiquity, faithfulness, Trinity and holiness-righteousness. This booklet contains a 
characteristic viewpoint of Kitamori's approach to the attributes of God, the centrality 
of God's love. Following the Johannine definition of God as "love" (1 John 4:16), 
Kitamori says that even when he speaks of God's omnipotence, omniscience and 
omnipresence, he does so in terms of divine love. "God's love," writes Kitamori, "is 
not one truth of God among the other truths of him; evidently, it occupies the place to 
'Ibid., 83. 
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integrate all the other truths of God."' Earlier, we mentioned that Kitamori's 
theology is a theology of love. Here in his book we see a characteristic concentration 
on love. 
Dealing with God's omnipotence, Kitamori takes up God's creation of nature 
and man, asserting that one sees in non-human creatures the omnipotence of God 
which fully prevails in the form of natural law." But this understanding of 
omnipotence captures only "the fragment and torso of this truth." To grasp "the 
complete form" of the truth of Divine omnipotence, it is necessary to see it "in the 
light of the truth of Christ,"' that is, in the light of negative mediation.'° What 
does this mean? 
God created man as a free personal being, who can freely choose either to 
respond to Divine love or reject it. The nature of the relationship God desires with 
man is not that of "iron chains of coercion," but that of "a thin thread of love" which 
can be broken at any time man wills."' From this, Kitamori deduces "the very fact 




'Theology of Dialogue. (Tokyo: Kyobunkan, 1961), 184. The original 
Japanese term is " tjurfitik 9 X 1.sili ." 
Inbid., 35. 
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a limit on His own omnipotence.' But "man cut the thin thread of love" and thus 
"the image of `God's omnipotence' is destroyed" by "the negative force of human 
sin.' "The `power' of God," says Kitamori, "thus had to suffer this damage 
because He risks His `love.'" The initial omnipotence of God is thus invalidated 
by human sin. 
But how can the omnipotence of God be removed from this "damage?" 
"Only the Cross of Jesus Christ [we read: the Pain of God] is the guarantee of the 
omnipotence of God," holds Kitamori.' Why? It is because Jesus Christ, the 
persona of Pain, "is the Subject of Love which, in spite of sin, still embraces man, 
fallen from the love of God into the intro [God's love], the love which no one can 
resist any longer.' The initial divine love, now mediated by the Pain of God 
(which naturally includes the negative mediation of man's sin), emerges as the 
absolutely victorious omnipotence of God. This omnipotence can no longer be 
'bid., 36. MacGregor, basing his view on "God is love," presents a similar 
view of the limitation placed on God by the creation of man: "To say that the biblical 
God is love is to say that his creation is an act, not of self-expansion but of self-
limitation. For the biblical God, being ontologically perfect himself as well as 
sovereign over and independent of his creatures, could have nowhere to go by way of 
expansion. He could have no ambitions to fulfill or goals to attain or projects to 
promote either for his aggrandizement or for his betterment. The only way he could 
go in his creative act would be a way of self-limitation, self-emptying, self-abnegation. 






negated. God's omnipotence, in Kitamori's thought, thus becomes the absolute 
omnipotence by the mediation of human sin. 
In a similar manner, Kitamori expounds God's omniscience and His 
omnipresence, namely in terms of God's love as developing from the positive through 
the negative to the final victory. Explaining this theme, he uses Matthew 10:30. That 
the very hairs of your head are numbered "most impressively" conveys the meaning of 
God's omniscience vis-a-vis man.' It is the full knowledge of us, which is virtually 
identical with love. Divine omniscience was, however, limited by human sin. For 
instance, Kitamori interprets the "repentance of the Lord" found in Genesis 6:6 when 
he says: "The concept of omniscience had to suffer a total collapse in the face of the 
situation described in this verse."'" This limitation was placed upon God by human 
sin! A significant point here is that Kitamori advances expressis verbis the possibility 
of the limitation of God's knowledge. Kitamori now holds that human wickedness 
created a novel situation in which God came to have an "outside" to God's 
"omniscience." In order, then, to maintain evil as true evil, he concludes: "Evil is a 
derailment from the will of God; it is the darkness which [even] the knowledge of God 
cannot penetrate."' The recovery of God's "omniscience" (now qualified as the 
omniscience of love) is again achieved by Jesus Christ because "He alone is the 





the knowledge.' Thus God's omniscience is reestablished as true omniscience 
through the mediation of Jesus Christ. 
We include here a few items of importance in Kitamori's idea of the 
omnipresence of God. While interpreting this idea he introduces two concepts; 
substance (jittai) and relation (kankei).' In fact, he presupposed these two concepts 
when he dealt with omnipotence and omniscience. In his view, the omnipresence of 
God does not mean the omnipresence of God as substance. If this were true, he 
asserts, we would have difficulty making a proper distinction between the Christian 
idea of divine omnipresence and pantheism.'' "The omnipresence of God signifies 
the mode of God's being as a personal Being in His relation of love to man," says 
Kitamori. "What Psalm 139 [7-10] would say is that God supports us, protects us and 
guides us everywhere in His love."' Kitamori interprets the verse "For in Him we 
live and move and have our being'" (Acts 17:28) as meaning: "In God who is love 
we live, etc."' "The God who embraces the world and us in His love," states 
Kitamori, "is the God who is present everywhere; this is God's omnipresence in the 
Biblical sense.i'9S  Kitamori sees God's omnipresence of love violated when man 
'Ibid. 
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denied His love but recovered by Jesus Christ, in whom the extra has been embraced 
within the intra; in Christ God's love is present in all places.' 
So far Kitamori's exposition of divine omnipresence has been made within 
the category of love. Now we ask what does Kitamori intend to advance by replacing 
the "substantial" omnipresence of God with a "relational" ("in love") omnipresence? 
This distinction between "substantial" and "relational" may be original for Kitamori's 
theology. By the term "substantial," Kitamori seems to mean an equivalent to 
"physical," which his criticism of pantheism indicates. Of course, no theology would 
posit God's "substantial" or physical existence univocally; it would be a contradiction 
in terms, the term "physical" being limited within the frame of time and space by 
defmition. But it is still a fundamental part of the Christian faith, we believe, to assert 
that God is also present and active in the world "physically" or "substantially." This 
'In this regard we can characterize Kitamori's interpretation of divine "omni-
attributes" as the "spiritualization of God." The relationship between God and man is 
"immediate" to use Kitamori's own term, that is "without external means." But if 
creation involves God speaking to us through physical objects and reality, as the 
incarnation of Christ affirms, then Kitamori's conception of God in Kitamori's 
"loveism" would curtail the most basic datum of the Christian faith. A consequence 
of this is that Christian existence in this physical world would necessarily be severed 
from its Biblical faith in God who "totally" rules the world. 
Concerning this point Kitamori's phrase "God's Turn to Make an 
Appearance on the Stage," and his so-called " M.6 gm/ " is suggestive; what 
Kitamori means by this phrase is that God should not yet show up on stage when it is 
not His turn to make an appearance. "In our drama of life there are some acts in 
which we can somehow solve ourproblems by our own resources [in such sections of 
the drama, God needs not show up Himself]. . . . But here [1 Corinthians 1:8, 9] 
Paul speaks of God's turn on stage." (Short Meditations on Biblical Verses, [Tokyo: 
Chikuma Shobo, 1964], 42-43). Is not this limitation of God's reality in this world 
the criticism which Dietrich Bonhoeffer announced with his non-religious 
interpretation of Christianity? 
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can be most clearly seen in the faith of God's creatio continua. For us, Kitamori 
tends to reduce the reality of God to love in which God's reality is confined within the 
framework of a direct, inner relationship between God and man; in other words, 
God's relationship with us is within an "immediate" relationship of love between God 
and man. In this concept, the physical world in which we live is on the edge of 
disappearance. 
We have examined Kitamori's "infralapsarian" view of the Pain of God on 
the basis of his exposition of God's attributes. We attended to his concept of dialectic 
movements within God vis-a-vis man's sin. We also observed that the divine 
attributes are reduced to love, a love on the verge of becoming an almost too human 
love. 
How can we now reconcile this "infralapsarian" view of the Pain of God 
with the supralapsarian view? Is not Kitamori aware of this logical difficulty? Does 
Kitamori believe this is not a problem at all, since he thinks in the logic of dialectic? 
How do these two views constitute a unity in Kitamori's thought? To the best of our 
knowledge, Kitamori does not explicitly take up this problem. Although we must rely 
on less direct evidence, we shall attempt to grasp the unity of these two aspects of 
Kitamori's Pain of God in our attempt to better understand his theological system. 
Our first step in reconstructing Kitamori's view here is to observe that the 
infralapsarian limitation of the divine "omni-attributes" is completely overcome by 
God in the person of the Son. The Son is, as the negation of negation, the absolute 
mode of God's being. Divine love, in this mode of being, embraces the extra into its 
259 
intra. The mode of God's being as the Son is seen as a victorious one. 
But is this divine conquest over negation through the embracing of the Son 
temporal or contingent? No, Kitamori would answer that it is essential and eternal. 
His concept of the essence of the Son as the mediation between the human negation 
and the divine negation of the negation is eternal and necessary,' of both and 
accordingly, the divine conquest over the negation is also eternal. How can we then 
understand Kitamori's assertion in relation to the authenticity of human sin as a 
responsible act, an act that incurs guilt upon the sinner, if (after all) the Pain of God is 
supralapsarian? 
Perhaps we must understand Kitamori's concept of God as having a dialectic 
structure. On the one hand, there is the first mode of God's being, which is capable 
of being "limited" by a negating force. In Kitamori's thought, this first mode of the 
divine being, "the wrath of God," does not cease to exist nor does it become 
aufgehoben, but remains as a presupposition for the emergence of the authentic Pain 
of God. Also, man's sin becomes authentic sin in the sphere of this first mode. 
But there is also for Kitamori a second mode of God's being, in which this 
antagonism between God in the first mode of being and man as sinner is overcome. 
This second mode of God's being, God in the person of the Son, is also eternal and 
necessary in nature, Christ being the eternal essence of God. In view of the existence 
"9-While attempting to protect sin's "authenticity" and at the same time to 
maintain the eternal victory of divine love, Kitamori says: "As Ephesians 3:1ff 
shows, the Christ who came to the world to save the sin of Adam is in reality the 
eternal essence of God, the eternal essence which embraces the sin of Adam" 
(Dialogue, 184; emphasis mine). 
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of both of these two modes of God's being, we are brought to the conclusion that 
there is a dialectical movement within God, the second mode bearing upon itself the 
first mode, that is, the Pain of God. When Kitamori says: "God exists in pain; 
speaking more exactly, God is aching,' he seems to indicate such a movement. 
We see here two modes of God's being, but to Kitamori, these two 
constitute one reality, while containing at the same time two opposing elements. The 
"infralapsarian" Pain of God has been preceded by the supralapsarian Pain of God. In 
Kitamori's own words: "Essentially [or ontologically], the reality of salvation ['the 
Pain of God'] precedes the presupposition of salvation [the wrath of God], though 
phenomenologically the latter precedes the former.."'" The Pain of God in 
Kitamori's thought is thus simultaneously supralapsarian and infralapsarian, while 
ontologically it is supralapsarian but phenomenologically infralapsarian." 
By introducing this subtle dialectic of, let us say, "essence and 
phenomenon," Kitamori seems to believe that he has done justice to both aspects of 
God's being in relation to humanity: the Pain of God is at one and the same time 
'Me Contemporary Man and Christianity, (Tokyo: Kobundo, 1959), 63. 
'God, 22, 30. 
'Here it seems that Kitamori is confused in taking the orders of ontic and 
noetic categories for that of essential and phenomenological categories. It seems 
apparent that ontically wrath precedes salvation, whereas noetically, salvation is prior 
to the recognition of reality under wrath. However, it is still possible to understand 
that Kitamori as the idealist believes that knowing constitutes being as well. 
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eternal and historical.' 
A serious danger inherent in the eternalization and "essentialization" of the 
Pain of God is the rationalization of evil. Kitamori with his infralapsarian version of 
the Pain of God has tried to protect the authenticity of man's sin and the justice of 
divine wrath, but does he actually succeed in this attempt? Or does he after all fall 
into a theodicy, making evil, suffering and pain something inherent to reality and also 
indispensable for a higher value? 
The Ontology of Love 
In our attempt to understand Kitamori's idea of the Pain of God, we initially 
raised the question, "Cur Deus in dolore?" We now append in aeternum, since the 
eternalness of the Pain of God is Kitamori's ultimate motif behind his idea of the Pain 
of God. Now our question is this: what is Kitamori's metaphysical presupposition to 
'As far as we can grasp Kitamori's thought as presented above, there are 
similar traits very much in common with prominent thinkers within process philosophy 
(Alfred N. Whitehead and Charles Hartshorne). According to Fiddes, process 
thinkers have proposed "a diapoler God." God on the one pole is transcendent and on 
the other pole is deeply involved. To process thinkers, God in transcendence is 
impassible, while Kitamori's supralapsarian Pain means that God in His transcendence 
is in Pain. 
However, despite this difference (a difference of no consequence since 
Kitamori "essentializes" the Pain of God, making Pain no more a pain in the true 
sense) there is a strong similarity to the thought schemes. Fiddes' following 
reproduction of the process thinkers' thought sounds quite "Kitamorian;" "God [who 
is 'deeply involved in the world]. . . suffers in his contingent nature. . . . In his 
worldly aspect. . . . God is influenced and created by the world; he is caused by the 
world in a supreme manner, and as the archetypal sufferer he grows and develops in 
response to the world as we do." (124; see note above). For process theology see 
John B. Cobb, Jr. and David Ray Griffin, Process Theology, (Philadelphia: 
Westminster Press, 1976). 
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the eternalization of the Pain of God? This question is acute because the Pain of God 
as the eternal essence of God involves theological and practical problems. 
Kitamori's theological Ansatz is highly concrete and quite near the ordinary 
human experience of love. Why does he then develop this concept of the Pain of God 
with a sophisticated dialectic? Thinking of this, we are naturally led to his 
concentration on love. In fact, Kitamori's understanding of love seems to provide a 
clue to the understanding of his motif regarding the eternalization of the Pain of God. 
What is contained in Kitamori's idea of love? In other words, what is the ontological 
structure of love in his thought? In view of his thesis that God's relationship with 
man is based solely upon love, we understand love as the ultimate reality in 
Kitamori's thought. The question of the ontological structure of love is then not 
confined to a partial aspect of reality; the structure of love is the ontological structure 
of reality itself. 
We also ask: what is the relationship between the ontological structure and 
the dialectic movement within the Godhead? In dealing with Kitamori's exposition of 
the divine attributes above, we came across his notion of the process of the 
"absolutization" of God's omnipotence, omniscience and omnipresence. This notion 
of process suggests itself as the background for Kitamori's motif behind his integration 
of love, movement and absoluteness. We shall now examine this problem complex. 
There is an organic relationship between the notion of divine passibilitas and 
that of divine love. Most theologies of divine suffering are based on the conviction 
that "God is love." In this sense, Kitamori's theology also moves in a similar orbit. 
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When an idea of the eternalization of God's suffering is advanced, there are two 
factors involved; one is the belief in the presence of the eternal in the temporal, the 
other is the structure of love itself. The former is a logical requirement for those 
whose metaphysical presupposition is idealism (Platonic or otherwise); historical 
phenomena being the reflections of the ideas in the eternal order.' Idealistic 
thinking becomes problematic in theology when it attenuates historical reality. We 
saw that Kitamori's theology is not free of this problem. Here, however, we will 
primarily analyze Kitamori's understanding of the nature of love. 
"God is love' necessarily entails the fact that God creates the world," says 
Kitamori, "because Love necessarily sets up Its object which receives Love."' In 
his way of thinking, the Subject of love [God] which does not set up its object is a 
contradiction; it is not love.' For Kitamori, the creation of the world is creatlo ex 
amore, as it were. In comparison, the traditional doctrine of creatio ex nihilo has a 
'See note 147 above. 
'God, 31. 
"An Introduction to the Bible (Tokyo: Kawade-Shobe, 1954), 46. In view of 
Kitamori's strong emphasis on the correlation between God and man, one would ask 
whether Kitamori has any idea of the aseitas of God. Is God eternally together with 
man? On this point, Nishida's idea of God is suggestive. Admittedly, we cannot go 
into detail concerning Nishida's thought on this theme; however, we note one 
interesting position of this prominent Japanese philosopher: God is the Absolute; the 
Absolute transcends all relations; but the Absolute that merely transcends is "nothing;" 
"The God who does not create the world is nothing." Thus God does and does not 
transcend the world. This Nishida terms the Absolute Nothingness, which is Nishida's 
definition of God in philosophical terms. Being the Absolute Nothingness, God is 
omnipotent and omnipresent. "Therefore I say that because the people is, so is 
Buddha, and because Buddha is, so is the people; because the Creator is, so is 
creature and because there is creature, so is God." (Complete Works of Kitaro 
Nishida, 11 [Tokyo: Iwanaami Shoten, 1949], 397-398). 
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wider conceptual range, extending from the personal to the impersonal, from the 
spiritual to the non-spiritual, from the visible to the invisible, and so on. However, 
there can be no contradiction between creatio ex amore and creatio ex nihilo. 
Designating Kitamori's view as creatio ex amore, we again take note of Kitamori's 
emphasis on love within his theological system. 
From his distinct view of God's creation, we also learn of his understanding 
of divine love. "In the creation of man. . . there is already a reflection of the Pain of 
God." We have touched upon this viewpoint in the above.' According to 
Kitamori, man is brought into being by God's "natural" love, but also by His Pain. 
What does this mean? The Pain of God is "God's tragic love."' We now realize 
that Kitamori's position implies that divine love is intrinsically tragic in nature; God's 
love per se is a tragedy, filled with suffering. Humanity, by its sin and rebellion 
against God, hurts the loving heart of God. Man used his God-given freedom, not to 
love Him but to damage the glory of God. Why is this disaster brought upon God? It 
is because God wants a created being who freely and spontaneously loves Him. If it 
were not for God's creation of the world, says Kitamori, "there would be no being at 
all who loves God, an ineffable loneliness [for God]." Therefore, "abhorring this 
loneliness, God decided to enter into the fellowship of love with man, which was a 




risk." For God, however, this risk produced a tragedy due to man's betrayal of the 
divine love offered.' 
If the divine love out of which man was created bears the character of 
"pain," then it is logical to conclude that love intrinsically involves pain, suffering and 
sorrow. They are constitutive to a reality called love; or rather, suffering is another 
side of love. Observing the two shades of meaning "ache" and "long for" in hamah 
(the key Hebrew term to his theology), Kitamori suggests that this linguistic 
phenomenon reflects something essential to love. "It is appropriate to maintain," he 
says, "that pain and love are complementary to each other."' This overlapping of 
"pain" and "love" can also be observed in other languages, including Japanese. In 
Japanese, the ideograph [Chinese character] closest to the meaning of the English 
word "love" is R . This written symbol can be either read love (ai) or sorrow[ful] 
(kanashi). Reflecting on this particular linguistic feature, Kitamori suggests that 
"there is something in the structure of man's spirit which testifies that when loving, 
one [inevitably] suffers; love always carries sorrow along; I feel it is a universal law 
[of reality]."' 
In the mind of Kitamori, love and man's existence are inseparable. Truly, it 




'Ibid., 211. The original Japanese term for "the structure of man's spirit" is it MINN • " 
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is a fact of life that humanity suffers because of love. There are many factors which 
cause the one offering love to suffer—sacrifice, loss, betrayal, sympathy, human 
limitations, and so on. Whatever the cause, love worthy of its name is willing, even 
glad, to suffer for the benefit of its object. In this fallen world it is inevitable for 
individuals to suffer if they love other human beings. From this universal experience 
it is quite natural that some languages and cultures reflect this empirical connection 
between love and suffering." Language is the reflection of man's experience. 
There is, therefore, no reason to object to this observation pertaining to the 
coincidence of love and suffering in actual life. But it becomes theologically debatable 
when one draws the conclusion that love is ontologically one with suffering.212 
Theologically, we shall assert, love in se is an unalloyed bliss, which can gladly 
sacrifice itself when it encounters obstacles.' In that case, sacrifice is no longer 
simply suffering but a supreme expression of love; there is no inner conflict in the 
subject at the moment of self-sacrifice. As a matter of fact, love can often express 
itself in suffering, but this does not mean that it must suffer. It is also an ordinary 
human experience (one need not always be profound in recognizing the truth) that love 
'According to linguistic information Carl Michalson (obtained from E. A. 
Nida) the language of the Miskito Indians of Nicaragua contains a word for "love" 
that literally means "pain in the heart" (Contribution, 172). Kitamori has also learned 
from a Taiwanese theologian that the native language of Taiwan includes a word 
meaning both "pain" and "love" (Literature, 213). 
'On this point, Lee makes a clear distinction between love and suffering: 
"However, we must make clear that the very nature of Agape is not suffering but is 
only capable of suffering." (19). 
"See the unmistakable link between love and the fullness of joy in John 15:9- 
11! 
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among people can be realized where no "explicit" sacrifice or suffering is required. 
From Kitamori's standpoint, however, love is intrinsically one with 
suffering. Here we observe the conceptual core of Kitamori's idea of the Pain of 
God. When Kitamori says that God's creation of man already involved Pain, he is 
advancing the view that God suffered by the very fact that He created humanity. 
Behind this, we must presume, there lies a set of metaphysical and theological 
presuppositions. Since Kitamori does not state these in an explicit manner, we shall 
endeavor to spell out these presuppositions ourselves, reconstructing the theologian's 
idea behind this identification of love and pain. We are aware of the risk of 
misinterpretation involved here. Nevertheless, we hope that the result of this 
clarification will help us to grasp the overall structure of Kitamori's theological stance, 
thereby confirming our reconstruction as valid. 
God has opted for "a risky love" instead of "a solicitude without risk" as we 
have already seen. Yet the expression "a risky love," when applied to God, seems to 
lose its force as an "objective" description of the issue and turns out to be a 
"rhetorical" statement. This hardly needs any elaboration. Kitamori's explicit 
contention that creation bears the mark of God's Pain suffices here to make it plain. 
In his thought, the "risk" had been taken by God in eternity, and it had also been 
already "taken care of" by God in eternity. A typical statement of Kitamori shows 
this: "The death of the Son is the primary word of the Gospel."' 
214p_ am 47. It is not clear what Kitamori has in mind here as to the immanent 
relationship between the Father and the Son. When Kitamori says that the death of 
the Son is the primary word in the Gospel, does he mean that this primacy of death is 
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In other words, there was a divine history prior to the beginning of the 
world, a supratemporal history which consists of the eternal divine decision of, and 
preparation for, the creation of man and the world. What movement and preparation 
then had been going on in God in eternity? We could say that it is God's overcoming 
of His own negation of creature (though still only potential). In Kitamori's conception 
this divine self-overcoming seems to involve two issues: first, the overcoming of His 
negation of the human creature,' and second, His becoming true, absolute God." 
On the basis of some documentary clues we pursue the metaphysical 
assumptions for these two issues. First, why is it necessary for God to overcome His 
own negation of the human creature before His act of creation? Created as a finite 
being, man is by definition bound to be imperfect vis-a-vis the perfect God. 
Metaphysically speaking, man's imperfection means that man inevitably deviates from 
God's will. For if man's will is totally conformed to God's, Kitamori holds that man 
only soteriological and not for God Himself? However, taking into consideration the 
argument in the succeeding pages, we clearly recognize that he does not give a 
positive theological significance to generatio (as well as processio of the Spirit). By 
this reversal of the significance of generatio and morn of the Son, Kitamori makes the 
immanent Father-Son relationship a tragedy of pain. 
'As the basis of this concern in the theology of Kitamori we mention his 
quotation from Dante's Divine Comedy in Pain (119), where Kitamori particularly 
borrows the expression "the primordial love of God," which can be equated with 
Luther's phrase the "naked God" (Character, 164). Here Kitamori thinks of God as 
mysterium tremendum. This side of God is to be overcome within God Himself. In 
addition to this, there is Kitamori's clear approval of Schelling's "Natur in Gott" and 
other ideas (Pain, 25-26). 
'See note 148 above. 
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would become like God; man would cease to be man.2" Also Kitamori's contention 
that man is created as a free subject of love is an important factor in this connection. 
The fact that man is free vis-a-vis God is tantamount to being rebellious against Him. 
In other words, the freedom given to the human creature can only be actualized by his 
rebellion against God. For man to be man means "in practice" to be against God. 
Speaking pointedly, when God decided to create human beings, He decided to create 
His antagonists. Creation therefore must be preceded by God's overcoming the 
antagonism of His own creation. 
Second, concerning God's becoming a true, absolute God. In Kitamori's 
theological framework God is not simply ipsum esse. The fact that God is love, 
Kitamori would hold, itself excludes this notion of the solitude of God. God is never 
without His relation to man.218 In this sense He is relative to a being other than 
Himself. In fact, without this relativity of God there would be no possibility of any 
217In order to understand Kitamori's stance that man as a created being de facto 
is rebellious, we need to carefully read the following passage: "God who is the 
Infinite and Absolute has the freedom which does not include the possibility of turning 
to evil. But the freedom of man as a finite being includes the possibility of evil. If it 
were not for this possibility, man would cease to be finite and [would] become equal 
to the Infinite. For, in such a case, what man wills becomes completely conformed to 
the will of God. That there is a possibility in man for evil is what makes man man. 
But this possibility is not the actuality of evil." (Logic, 29). 
Does Kitamori really think that this human possibility is actualized in good? 
If such is the case, when man's will totally conforms to God's will, does man become 
God Himself? We doubt it. In his thought, man is a dialectic being also in this 
regard: semper Justus et semper peccator. This semper peccator is so to speak a 
metaphysical definition of man, rather than theological, due to the difference of mode 
in being between God and man. 
218 tioa 31-32. See also note 204 above. 
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fellowship of love with man. Yet, as we have just seen, this relativity necessarily 
entails the radical, ontological antagonism between God and man. A paradox! And, 
according to Kitamori, this antagonism (as man's negation of God) is a very sign of 
relegating God to relativity.' Although Kitamori sometimes holds that human sin 
degraded God to a relativity, we should rather contend, following his reasoning 
consistently, that it is God who has relativized Himself by His very creation of man. 
And as far as this divine self-relativization is concerned, we regard it as conformed to 
the Biblical revelation, especially actualized by the incarnation of the Son. It is of 
course to be noted that this divine self-relativization does not fully absorb God's 
absoluteness. God retains his absoluteness is intact even when He relativized Himself 
"partially," as it were. The only question, then, is whether God's self-relativization 
vis-à-vis man a priori involves divine-human antagonism, as we believe Kitamori 
would hold for he believes that God had to overcome this relativity vis-à-vis man and 
win His absoluteness over man. This divine winning of the true absoluteness over 
relativity is an eternal divine process. In other words, this is a process of God 
becoming a true, absolute God.' 
Putting these two issues of Kitamori's thought together, we can say that God 
has overcome His own negation of man's negation of Him. By this overcoming God 
can establish the basis for an "authentic" relationship of love with man; humanity has 
freedom to rebel against God; it is not bound to love God by necessity. When man 
'Character, 258. 
"See above on Kitamori's explication of God's "omni-attributes." 
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loves Him whom he meets as the God in Pain, he loves Him freely, although he still 
rebels against God. Kitamori's formula "Never of God, ever of Christ" expresses this 
paradoxical situation. Man's love for God has thus a dual aspect: love in rebellion, 
and this necessarily so because of the nature of love and of the metaphysical 
antagonism between God and man. In this overcoming, God Himself becomes a true 
God. 
We now review our argument above. A reconciliation of the divine-human 
antagonism, necessitated by the nature of love, must have been established within God 
before creation. This involves "pre-creational" Pain of God. On this basis man's 
authentic freedom in love vis-a-vis God is secured and at the same time redeemed. 
Creation, made possible on the basis of God's Pain, awaits the historical actualization. 
We now examine the Pain of God specifically as a reality within the divine 
Trinity. The doctrine of the Trinity is the heart of the Christian faith; from Kitamori's 
perspective, the divine Trinity is the structure of the Pain of God. Relating the Pain 
of God to the Trinity, Kitamori clearly expresses the Pain of God as God's eternal 
essence. 
Kitamori strongly underlines the importance of Trinitarian dogma, because in 
this he sees the suffering of Christ on Golgotha as nothing else than God's own 
suffering in eternity.' We have already seen the reason for God's eternal suffering; 
what we want to examine here is Kitamori's concept of that eternal overcoming within 
the Godhead--the overcoming of the contradiction which emerged when God decided 
'Character, 80. 
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to create His Gegeniiber.=  It is necessary to understand his Trinitarian concept to 
see why Kitamori passionately defends the central position of the Pain of God in 
theology and Christian experience. 
Before we discuss the Trinitarian movement within the Godhead, we insert a 
reminder about Kitamori's idea of God, which is necessary to understanding the nature 
of this movement. Kitamori's image of God is not a vision of a transcendent God far 
above. As in the case of God in the Old Testament, God is a passionate, loving 
Being. When Kitamori reads "God is love," it is always in the sense of a God filled 
with pathos. For him, the character of love, or the trait which makes love authentic, 
is that of a "flowing unhindered to its object with a passionate longing."' It is not 
distilled water, pure but tasteless. Divine love is filled with emotional and spiritual 
energy. In this sense, the love defined by Kitamori can be said to be akin to eros in 
its intensity. When this notion of love is applied to God, it gains a "demonic" 
connotation and represents the numinous aspect of God. This intense, jealous and 
"erotic" love is said to be God's "nature." We should attend to this theological 
position of God's "nature." "Nature" here is a crucial category for Kitamori; he 
makes the distinction between nature and essence when he speaks of the eternal 
attributes of the Godhead. When Kitamori uses the term "nature" he means something 
immediately given and not "processed yet by negation," whereas the term "essense" 
This German term is appropriate because of its double meaning of "face-to-
faceness" and of contradictory position. In our interpretation, Kitamori conceives of 
the divine-human relationship in these two contradictory aspects as a unity. 
n3Itami, 164 (Pain, 122). 
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connotes something which is both the cause and the result of the continuous 
overcoming of nature. Essence in this sense is a dynamic concept. An important 
point in the thought of Kitamori is that nature is never abolished by essence. We can 
say that essence is the dialectical process which continuously fulfills itself by the help 
of nature as the negative mediation into a higher reality. 
Now we take up the Trinitarian movement. The love of God in the first 
order (the wrath of God in our present reality!) is something "natural" within the 
Godhead. It is a sheer, intense love with which God created man and the world.' 
Is this love in the proprium of the Father? The answer is both yes and no. On this 
point Kitamori is ambiguous, depending on the context from within which he 
speaks.' Here he would say "Yes." This "natural" love is in the order of the 
Father, the Creator. However, this love is a "simple" love, which is bound to react 
vehemently in wrath to man's negation. Deus simplex in amor simplex will sooner or 
'The character of this love of the first order is to love the loveable, that is 
"erotic" love. Of this Kitamori writes: "Both Christ and man were originally objects 
of God's love of the first order, but now only Christ is its object. Man has now fallen 
away from this kind of God's love, and has become unworthy of it because of 
rebellion and sin" (Pain, 118). 
'To grasp this we might propose the term "di-unitarian" for Kitamori's . 
concept of the identity of oneness and two-ness between the Father and the Son, vide 
"fuistu-funi" ( ), another technical term from Nishida's philosophy. 
When Kitamori speaks of the Pain of God in a trinitarian way, then the Father is the 
God of wrath (see for instance: "the Father who ordered the death of the sinner. . ." 
[Creeds, 23]), but when he speaks in the "di-unitarian" way, the Father is the subject 
of Pain, perhaps more than the Son. See Kitamori's explanation of Abraham as the 
witness to the Pain of God par excellence (Pain, 50ff). As far as can be seen there is 
no proper place for the Holy Spirit in Kitamori's theology of the Pain of God. It 
could very well operate within this di-unitarian scheme of thinking. We shall see 
more of this later. 
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later result in the destruction of the creature; it cannot endure for long in the face of 
negation. For "nature is powerless [in the face of its negations]," says Kitamori 
quoting from Hegel. It is "like something healthy [but] unvaccinated which, once 
infected, is utterly powerless."' 
At the beginning of time, human rebellion is yet potentiality and not 
actuality. Yet, in the order of eternity, the wrath of God against man's fall is already 
an actual wrath. The primordial love of God is negated by human sin already in 
eternity. Man's betrayal of God's love must be redeemed by God Himself for actual 
creation to ever take place.' In this sense, the Gnostic dictum esse est salvari 
would apply to Kitamori's thought here. In order to overcome this reaction of wrath 
in God which emerges by the mediation of human sin, God the Son takes the wrath 
upon Himself, thus protecting the human creature from God's destructive reaction.' 
The Pain of God is love which is triumphant over God's negation of man and man's 
negation of God. Thus in Kitamori's thought, the Pain of God in the Person of the 
Son is the negation of two negations. It is, on the one hand, the negation of divine 
'Negation, 148. 
'When speaking within categories of time concerning the thought of God's 
"actual" creation, we take for granted that Kitamori also thinks in similar paths, but 
we are not sure that this is clearly the case with Kitamori, particularly in view of his 
strong emphasis on the correlation between God's love and its necessity to set up its 
object. In Kitamori's thought there is no concept of trinitarian fellowship among the 
Persons in perfect love, the fullness of God's aseitas. Rather, God cannot be an sich; 
He needs fair sich so as to become an and flir sich. Thus, if Kitamori sees, as Nishida 
did, a kind of co-eternalness between God and man, the Pain of God is the essential 
nature of God and man's essential condition of existence. 
"See Kitamori's parable of thunder (Pain, 126-127). 
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negation of sinners. Now it is not necessary for God to destroy man in order to 
preserve His deity because God himself has taken His own wrath upon Himself. On 
the other hand, it is the negation of man's negation of God, the absolute affirmation 
[salvation] of the sinner. For Kitamori, God's absoluteness would not be established 
if God destroyed those who negate Him.' If He destroyed the sinner, He would 
then only stand on the same relative level with His negators. By destruction, God 
relativizes Himself and is defeated by His negators. But now, by taking up His own 
negation upon Himself, God truly becomes an absolute God.' No one can negate 
Him anymore, because He has negated all the negators in eternity, in His eternal Pain. 
This eternal drama within the Godhead can be seen in the historical Cross of 
Christ. Kitamori believes that the historical Cross is a reflection of the eternal Cross 
within the Godhead. Put in another figure, the historical Cross is the window through 
which the eternal scene of the Pain of God is seen. Or, one sees the essence of God 
backward from the historical manifestation to the eternal inner sphere of the Godhead. 
God the Father abandoned God the Son unto death in order that human beings might 
be brought into existence. This abandonment by the Father of the Son unto death in 
'God, 44-45. 
"We need to include here a brief comment on Kitamori's concept 
"absoluteness." "Absoluteness" in Japanese is fejt [zettai] which, in an 
etymological analysis, means "to cease to stand over against." According to this 
concept of absoluteness, it cannot have any confrontation with a relative being (man) 
without ceasing to be absolute. In theology this means in theology that God cannot 
stand over against man in the ultimate sense; by definition, God must embrace his 
antagonist. God ultimately cannot destroy His Gegen!Ther, by embracing the negation 
in Himself, God establishes His absoluteness. 
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eternity is the meaning of Kitamori's statement that the Pain of God is God's eternal 
essence. (Here we notice that the Father is also the Subject of the Pain, the Bearer of 
His wrath.) The Gospel is thus also from eternity, as Kitamori quotes from Luther. 
In this sense, Kitamori is akin to Barth when the latter says that reconciliation 
precedes creation.." We then understand that when Kitamori says that "the Gospel 
is the tragedy of God," it is not an accidental, casual remark. It hits the main chord 
of Kitamori's theology. Love is suffering; for the sake of love, even God has to go 
through tragedy, since love has no other ontological possibility either for God or for 
man. Love's very ontology dictates, as it were, the divine-human tragedy. 
This Pain of God remains as long as man remains a free subject of love. 
Man's freedom never ceases to exist as long as the fellowship of love (based on man's 
free will) between God and man endures. According to Kitamori's definition of God, 
the fellowship of love must endure because "God is love" is only possible in relation 
to man. Christ, God the Son, remains crucified from eternity to eternity, and God the 
Father is in Pain from eternity to eternity. This view of reality (or ontology in 
general) we characterize as "Pantragismus," as it corresponds to Hegel's 
philosophy.' 
We can understand this divine tragedy, or the Pain of God, as something in 
the relationship between God the Father and God the Son. In this sense, the 
'Kitamori's relation to Karl Barth will be dealt with in the next chapter. 
'Hajime Nakano. Hegel: Reason and Reality. (Tokyo: Chuo-Koron-sha, 
1968), 49. 
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Trinitarian framework is constitutive. But in addition to this Trinitarian aspect of the 
divine tragedy, there is also a unitary aspect of God's overcoming His wrath. Both 
the Father and the Son are suffering in this movement. The Father and the Son are 
not divided; God the Father and God the Son in unitas bear the wrath of God in 
common Pain. God thus becomes a true, absolute God in His continually overcoming 
the negative moment (of His wrath) within Himself in the Pain of the Father and the 
Son. 
We observe in this theology the eternal movement between the Father and 
the Son; a divine tragedy which is preeminently witnessed in Abraham's service of 
sacrificing his son Isaac. To describe this relationship between the Father and the 
Son, Kitamori often uses the term of "non-one-nor-two," meaning that the Father and 
the Son are two distinctive Persons but one "substance." Duo personae, una 
substantia. It is truly "Trinitarian" as far as the Father and the Son are concerned.' 
In view of this fact, we are very interested in understanding how Kitamori 
conceives of the Holy Spirit. Two things seem to stand out in his concept of the Holy 
Spirit. The first prominent characteristic concerns the very reserved place expositions 
on the Holy Spirit occupy. The term "Holy Spirit" occurs less than ten times in 
Kitamori's magnum opus. We are left with the impression that Kitamori deals with 
the Holy Spirit as "non ut illud dicerewr, sed ne taceretur." However, this is to be 
expected in the works of Kitamori since God the Holy Spirit has no place in the 
"event" of the Pain of God itself. The second prominence involves the observation 
'Cf. note 225 above. 
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that when God the Spirit is mentioned it is in connection with the dialectic of love 
within God. 
To complete this section we now look at Kitamori's idea of the Trinity as 
divine love of three orders. Again we use the "long-hand" term of the Pain of God, 
namely "the love based upon the Pain of God." According to Kitamori, this "long-
hand" formula serves in explicating the meaning of the Trinity. In his work The Lord 
of The Cross, Kitamori "appropriates" the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit 
respectively as "God," "Pain" and "love," the three components of his long-hand 
formula of the Pain of God. The sequence of the three components of this formula in 
the original Japanese follow the ordinary sequence of naming the Trinity (namely, the 
Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit) and thus serves to illustrate the Trinitarian 
structure of the Pain of God, or in the "long-hand" formula, the love based upon the 
Pain of God. But when we translate the formula into English, the word order is 
turned around as we see from the translation above, that is "love," "Pain" and "God." 
To understand Kitamori's exposition, we need to read the "long-hand" formula 
"backwards" as it were; the love (3. Holy Spirit) based upon the Pain (2. the Son) of 
God (1. the Father).' The movement follows the creedal order of the Trinity. In 
his view, the immediate love of the Father, as we saw above, is the love that became 
His wrath in this fallen reality. This wrath is borne by the Son as the Pain of the 
Father and the Son. But the inner-divine movement is not complete in this stage of 
the Pain of God. Dealing with an ethic on the basis of the Pain of God, Kitamori says 
'Cross, 21. 
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that "the true feature of the Pain of God consists in the fact that it immediately 
develops into the love based upon the Pain of God."' Kitamori illustrates this 
development of love in an ingenious way when he gives an exegesis of Ephesians 
5:25-33. In his view, the phrase "Christ. . . gave himself for her [His church]," 
points to the same divine act as described in Acts 20:28, "the Church of God which 
He purchased with His own blood," namely love on the level of the Pain of God. 
However, Kitamori holds that Ephesians 28-29, in which Paul speaks of the analogy 
of marital love and Christ's love for the Church, shows the love of this last order, 
love which is no longer a painful love as witnessed by Hosea, but an immediate love 
which is so intense as to be called an eros-like love.' The initial, intense love of 
God is now recovered through the mediation of the Pain of God. The divine love thus 
attained is "the absolute affirmation which is the [divine] negation of the [human] 
negation [of the initial love of God]."' This is the victorious love of God against 
which human rebellion is no longer possible, since it embraces men who have fallen 
out of the love of God in the first order. 
Kitamori identifies this victorious love of God as "the resurrection of Christ, 
the Holy Spirit which is the Spirit of Christ and the sanctification which is the work of 
the Holy Spirit.' He emphasizes that in the Gospel this victorious love occupies 
'Rand, 141, (Pain, 93). 
142 (ibid., 94). 
'Ibid., 240, (ibid., 156). 
Cross, 36. 
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"the ultimate place."' "Without the resurrection of Christ everything is in vain," he 
says, "without the works of the Holy Spirit nothing becomes intelligible, and nothing 
reaches without the sanctification God's love does not reach its goal."' Thus 
Kitamori views the Holy Spirit as the victorious power of love. The Spirit is power, 
and this power finally realizes the goal of God's love, that is, man's sanctification, 
which (in Kitamori's thought) is the actualization of man's willing and spontaneous 
love to God and to fellow human beings. We observe that he repeatedly underlines 
the triumphant aspect of the love based upon the Pain of God, and the Holy Spirit as 
the agent of this triumph of God's love. Viewed thus, the Holy Spirit is the final 
level of the dialectic movement of love within the Godhead. However, is this 
triumphant love in the Holy Spirit the final sublimation of the previous stages of 
divine love? Again the answer is both yes and no. Kitamori would say that as the 
love based upon the Pain of God, the love in the Holy Spirit has already gone through 
the levels of God's wrath and Pain. But, on the other hand, as the love based upon 
the Pain of God, it still remains fragmentary. In it, the love of the first order (the 
Wrath of God) and that of the second order (the Pain of God) remain intact with their 
respective propria." For as long as man remains semper Justus, semper peccator 
'Pain, 123. 
29t is the basic pattern of Kitamori's argument on the movement of love 
within the Godhead that he allows the love of God to develop from the wrath through 
the Pain and finally to the victorious love in which the Pain is overcome. But since 
the victorious love in the Holy Spirit, exposed to man's negation, is not yet fully 
"victorious" and therefore is broken and fragmentary, Kitamori brings the victorious 
love back to the Pain of God again. [Is the victory of love in the Holy Spirit, which 
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before God, the wrath of God over man never ceases to be an actual reality. The 
triumph of divine love in the Holy Spirit is only a fragmentary fulfillment which is 
always broken.' (In view of Kitamori's concept of eternal Pain, one doubts 
whether there is an ultimate triumph of love.) Thus, both the first order and the 
ultimate order of love are sustained by the Pain of God. Consequently, the Pain of 
God also occupies the pivotal place in the development of love within God. In all this 
we remember that within this theological scheme, the development of divine love is 
not a temporal event but an eternal event within the Godhead. In addition to this, we 
also note that just as the divine Persons are "three in one" and exist "side by side," so 
"all the levels of divine love are in one" and retain their respective propria side by 
side. It is because of this coexistence of mutually contradictory levels of divine love 
that God is eternally in Pain. 
Summary 
In this chapter, we have seen that God in Pain is Kitamori's primary 
experience. It is a vision of God's pathos, and as such, it cannot be reduced to logos. 
But when it is developed into a theology, it calls for profound speculation. Though 
related to man in sin, God in Pain is not a contingent state of God. For Kitamori, it 
can be negated by man, truly victorious? Is it not a contradiction in terms on the part 
of Kitamori?] Thus, he characterizes this triumphant love in the order of the Holy 
Spirit as also having Pain within itself; the verse "the Spirit Himself makes 
intercession for us with groaning which cannot be uttered," (Romans 8:26) holds 
Kitamori, should indicate the Pain of the Holy Spirit (Logic, 60). 
242Pain, 123. 
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is ens redissima. It is eternal and essential to God. As God's eternal essence, the 
Pain of God requires an infinitely profound background. When the wrath of God is a 
constituent factor of God's suffering Pain, and when the wrath of God is contingent 
upon human sin, then it becomes necessary for Kitamori to introduce the two orders 
for the emergence of the Pain of God. Supra- and infralapsarian emergencies of the 
Pain of God are conceived. Kitamori, as he emphasizes the eternalness of Pain, 
regards the supralapsarian idea of the Pain of God as ultimate. The Pain of God is 
thus an eternal event. Why is God eternally in Pain? Kitamori answers: because He 
is love. Love cannot be without Its object, and God cannot therefore but create man. 
Love, however, can be authentic only in freedom. Freedom "factually" means man's 
rebellion. This incompatibility between love and freedom in the divine-human 
relationship is due to the metaphysical difference between God and man. If man 
spontaneously loves as God wills, man becomes God himself. Man's love for God 
must involve a negative element, sin. Sin is then de facto what makes man man. In 
eternity, the "potential" rebellion of man evokes the wrath of God, and God, who 
wants to create man as the object of His love, had to take this wrath upon Himself. 
God's own bearing of His own wrath upon Himself is an eternal inner-Trinitarian 
movement of Pain. In this Trinitarian movement, love "logically" develops into 
victorious love in the Holy Spirit. But wrath, pain and love (all of which are different 
modes of divine love) remain the constituent factors of God's love called the Pain of 
God. Thus, in Kitamori's theology, the dogma of the Trinity occupies the central 
place. This dogma provides dramatis personae for the Pain of God. Man's being is 
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eternally redeemed by the Pain of God. Even saved by the Pain of God, man remains 
a sinner, thus continually causing God to bear His wrath against the sinner upon 
Himself. God is eternally in Pain because He loves man, who is "metaphysically" 
antagonistic toward God. Love suffers intrinsically. God is Love, so He is eternally 
in Pain. 
What we find above includes our own interpretation of Kitamori. Upon our 
interpretation, we are now ready to draw some consequences. First, in Kitamori's 
thought, there should be no end of the Pain of God, no eschatological end of Pain. If 
this were not so, the Pain of God could not be eternal or essential to God. 
Accordingly, there would also be no end to human suffering. Second, if Pain is 
essential and eternal to God, it should be an intrinsically positive value.' Third, 
perhaps the Pain of God would even be the absolute value which should transcend all 
human suffering so that concern for solving the problem of suffering would ultimately 
be irrelevant. 
Do we carry Kitamori's concept of the Pain of God ad absurdum? We pick 
up this question in the next chapter. 
'We argue for this viewpoint by Kitamori's own argument. He writes in 
connection with his refutation of the eternal dualism of good and evil: "If we admit 
that [the consequence of] good and evil is the principle of dualism, we have to also 
admit that evil as well as good should exist as something essential. And can this 
`something which exists essentially' be designated as evil? . . . If evil exists from 
eternity to eternity together with good, shall we not say that evil is also ultimately 
something good?" (Contemporary Man and Christianity, 22-23). 
CHAPTER 5 
ANALYSIS OF THE THEOLOGY OF THE PAIN OF GOD (2) 
Man in the Pain of God 
The Nature and the Reality of Sin: Anthropology 
One could ask why the world as a whole exists and why I myself exist in it. 
In fact, it is a wonder that I together with the world exist at all. "Creation is a 
miracle, the idea of which human reason alone cannot grasp."' Kitamori finds the 
reason for this miracle in the Biblical "definition" of God as love. As love, God 
cannot but have those who receive His love, otherwise He would not be love.' His 
love is the fundamental motive for the creation of heaven and earth, and of man. 
With this Scriptural message of creation by divine love, says Kitamori, the world and 
man are saved from contingency and meaninglessness.' 
What then is the meaning of man's existence in Kitamori's view? "The 
meaning of man's existence is to receive God's love with clear knowledge of it and to 
'E. Frank, 61. 
2Kitamori, The Contemporary and the Pain of God (Tokyo: Kobundo Shobo, 





thank God for it."' In fact, man alone is capable of responding to the love of a 
personal God with his own personality. In this, Kitamori holds, we find the meaning 
of "imago Dei" (Gen. 1:26-27). In other words, the imago Dei consists in man's 
being "a personal subject of love."' Thus in understanding man's creation and 
defining him, Kitamori emphasizes the relationship of love between God and marl. 
To recognize Kitamori's position in contrast, it is helpful to take Luther's 
explanation of the first article of the creed in the Small Catechism, where God's 
creation is understood as motivated by "God's benevolence and mercy" and mediated 
through "physical" gifts ("body and soul, eyes and ears, etc."). There would be, of 
course, no objection from Luther against the statement that God created the world and 
man out of love. But in Luther's view, the creation of man is out of the benevolence 
and mercy of the sovereign God and is "dinglich" oriented; the relationship between 
God and man is mediated by "external things." In comparison with this view, 
Kitamori's view of the divine-human relationship as reflected in his concept of 
creation is in the category of personalism, that is, of a direct personal "Ich and Du" 
relationship. 
Here we see love as the basic category of Kitamori's theological thought. 
Thus, when he thinks of man's fall, it is the falling from God's love, or from the 
'Kitamori, An Introduction to the Bible (Tokyo: Kawade Shobo, 1954), 47. 
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sphere of God's love, to use Kitamori's own space-figure.6 Sin is "not a physical or 
sociological concept," says Kitamori, "but a personal concept through and through." 
"This personal relationship is love itself."' "Sin constitutes itself as sin when man 
betrays this love." True, in defining sin as the betrayal of love, Kitamori is 
consistent with his concept of love as the ultimate reality. God Himself is love, and 
sin against Him is nothing but the betrayal of the Love. 
In Kitamori's thought, this is the basic form of sin. With this understanding 
of sin's nature, Kitamori then speaks of the propagation of original sin through sexual 
love. Again, sin is man's falling from the true love of God and once the fall occurs it 
°Logic, 25. The original phrases are 401UP t7OfgAt and 
Iii10 0)Yi•ic giS ." Kitamori uses this term in analogy with the English 
term "fall." We note, however, that this "definition" in terms of a space category is 
very essential to Kitamori. Phrases like "to embrace the extra into the intra" 
"to enter into the fact of salvation" [ ft&o*voititz At, ], 
"the proper field of salvation" [ ft&off1419)ffid ], "Christ as the God who comes 
out from God to save those who fall outside of God's love," etc. abound in Kitamori's 
writing. This would be an important theme of a separate study. Here we only attend 
to the implications of this predominance of a space category in Kitamori's thought 
scheme, namely, its ahistorical character. A similar indication can be found in his 
frequent use of the phrase "logical structure" (of salvation, for instance). An 
analyzable structure presupposes its unchangeable existence. Space and time are the 
basic categories of our thinking, and on which category one places emphasis is 
determined by one's own metaphysical presupposition. 
[A bibliographical note: Those of Kitamori's works which are of primary 
significance and therefore quoted frequently are abbreviated like the note here. The 
list of those works is found at the end of the Introduction.] 
'Ibid., 27. 
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necessarily entails "the perversion of love."' Referring to Gen. 3:7 ("Then the eyes 
of both of them were opened, and they knew that they were naked; they sewed fig 
leaves together and made themselves coverings"), Kitamori finds a symbolic 
manifestation of sin's consequence. "It is made plain," maintains Kitamori, "that the 
sexual love of man is [a form of] love which came into existence out of man's betrayal 
of and his falling from the true love [of God]."" Kitamori thus affirms Augustine's 
idea of original sin when the former says that "the idea, since Augustine, of the 
hereditary transmission of sin through sexual acts is still valid." Kitamori, however, 
qualifies this "biological" view of original sin with his idea of love and writes: "We 
must conceive of this [propagation of original sin through sexual acts] as [a matter 
deeply related to] personal relationship or the essence of love."" What he maintains 
is that since humanity's sexual love is invariably a love perverted,' the result of 
such love, the conception and birth of human beings, involves the inheritance of the 
perverted love.' Kitamori conceives of the entirety of sin and sin's consequences 
'Ibid., 30; "the perversion of love" is " tfl " in the original 
language. "We cannot love our neighbor for his sake. We love him for our own 
sake. This is what the Bible calls sin. Sin is the deception of love [ foam ]," 
says Kitamori (Martin Luther [Tokyo: Kobundo, 1951], 26). See further 
Contemporary and Pain, 31-33. "The essence of sin," says Kitamori, "the impurity of 
love ['that man cannot love God and his neighbor as sincerely as he loves himself; the 
reason of this impurity is his self-love'], (Dialogue, 151). 
'Logic, 30. 
"Ibid., 31. 
1211 EVANH-Z " (ibid., 36). 
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solely as phenomena within the category of love. The perversion of love, according 
to Kitamori, is the root problem of man's existence. 
Again, it is useful to grasp Kitamori's concept of the nature of sin by 
comparing it with Confessio Augustana's definition found in. the statement of Article 
"sine metu, sine fiducia erga deum et cum concupiscentia." Here the nature of sin 
is more specific, its emphasis going in the direction of man's hybris. Certainly, hybris 
is one of the most blatant forms of man's betrayal of God's love. Thus, there is no 
contradiction between Kitamori's view of the nature of sin and the Confession's. But 
the difference we observe in the way Kitamori and the Confession conceive of sin's 
nature reflects their respective views of salvation. 
Let us now take a brief look at the problem of sin and evil. It has remained 
a mystery in the history of Christian thought why man, the crown of God's good 
creation, is so thoroughly sinful and so helplessly inclined to evil. The inability to 
reconcile God's absolute goodness and sovereignty with the actuality of evil has been a 
theological crux. If one maintains on the one hand that there is no other principle but 
God Himself in this universe, one would logically ascribe the origin of evil to God 
and lose the authenticity of sin's ultimate seriousness. If, on the other hand, one 
proposes another principle beside God, then one would "rescue" God from 
responsibility for evil but fail to maintain faith in an all-sovereign God. The 
existence of evil becomes most troublesome in view of man's radical sinfulness. 
However, the problem of evil is not a reality solely confined within man's inner 
sphere. At the same time it transcends man's subjective reality. We should even say 
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that man is partly a victim of this reality of evil; certainly we say this without 
excusing man from his own responsibility for his being and his acts. 
In his essay entitled "Man and Christianity," Kitamori deals with the 
problem of evil.' He holds that there are three possible ways to approach the 
problem of evil, mentioning first a monistic approach and a dualistic approach. As for 
the monistic approach, Kitamori gives Plotinus and Leibniz as examples, the former a 
representative of the idea of evil as privatio boni and the latter a proponent of the 
concept of evil as a complementary reality for the enhancement of good. Neither of 
these explanations, sees Kitamori, is acceptable for those who suffer evil. They are 
abstract and avail little in the face of evil. As for the dualistic approach, Kitamori 
explains that the parallelism of good and evil from eternity is bound to nullify the 
serious force of evil, meaning that something which exists eternally by definition must 
be good." With the understanding that neither of the two approaches does justice to 
the reality of evil, Kitamori dismisses them both as inadequate. 
Now, on to the third approach as presented by Kitamori. "The real strength 
of an idea," maintains Kitamori, "can be measured by the tenability of its solution to 
the problem of evil."' "No idea is first class unless it is able to solve the problem of 
"Contemporary and Pain, 20-31. 
"Discussing the problems in the dualism of good and evil, Kitamori says: 
"To admit the dualism of good and evil is to admit that both good and evil exists 
essentially [ ** ]. But can a thing that essentially exist be said to be evil? 
Is not evil evil because it should not exist essentially? . . . If evil should exist 
eternally together with good, does not evil also become good?" (Ibid.) 
22. 
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evil.' What is the solution of the problem of evil given by Christianity, or rather 
Kitamori's own solution? We are told by him that Christianity overcomes "the 
abstractness of dualism" by its doctrine that "man was not evil originally [ ]. 
By this doctrine, Christianity understands the reality of evil as contradiction, because 
evil is something which must not exist originally and yet exist in reality. But as to the 
solution of the monistic approach, Kitamori argues that through the fall from God's 
love, "man became . . . evil" and that since man became evil, evil became a[n 
objective] reality. Kitamori's argument here sounds like a simplistic statement; it is 
not a substantial reflection on the problem of evil. Be this as it may, we are, 
however, more interested in these arguments, because here Kitamori maintains that the 
origin of evil is man's voluntary fall from God's love, a reduction of the origin of evil 
to the inner sphere of man. 
Now we take a closer look at how in Kitamori's view evil became a reality 
in this world. Kitamori formulates the process as follows: 
Man as a created being had merely possibilities to become good and evil, and as 
such he was as yet neither good nor evil in actuality. When man actually uses 
his freedom to choose good, then he actually becomes good, and when he 
chooses things against God's will then he actually becomes evil. "The fall" 
means that man actually used his freedom to choose evil. This deed [of the fall] 
is an actuality, behind which there was nothing to necessitate the fall. If there 
were any, man would not be a free being . . . . The fall of man means therefore 
that it was completely accidental. And yet this accident came to signify 





Here it is possible to observe two things. First, in addition to his reduction of evil to 
a reality within man, Kitamori locates the origin of evil solely in the freedom of man. 
Second, in so doing, Kitamori maintains that man actually became an evil being, using 
his freedom to choose evil. Here he seems to distinguish between act and being and 
to hold that act determines being. In other words, man's own act toward evil has 
fundamentally and essentially determined his being. The view of Kitamori will be 
better grasped by comparing it with the statement in the Book of Concord that man's 
nature as the creation of God is not capable of being corrupted to the point where it 
ceases to be man. That is, the nature of man as created by God, in its core, remains 
constant irrespective of man's act.a Kitamori seems to assert that man's own act of 
rebellion has determined the nature of man to be evil. Perhaps we should not press 
these viewpoints of Kitamori too hard because he says elsewhere that the doctrine of 
original sin is unintelligible.' Yet, we attend to his view that this accidental choice, 
by man's own will, towards evil resulted in constituting his fundamental and essential 
nature as evil. In other words, it was solely of man's own making that he is what he 
actually is. 
This particular anthropological viewpoint is of crucial significance because 
'Formula Concordae, Sol. Decl. 1:33; after speaking of an "empirical" 
difficulty in making the distinction between man's nature created by God and his 
actual state brought out by sin, the article firmly states: "Discrimen igitur retinendum 
est inter naturam nostram, qualis a Deo creata est hodieque conservatur, in qua 
peccatum originis habitat et inter ipsum peccatum originis, .quod in natura habitat." 
'The doctrine of original sin is unintelligible, but without this unintelligible 
doctrine, our existence would become more unintelligible" (Dialogue, 178). 
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on the basis of this viewpoint Kitamori's concept of the divine-human relationship is 
built, namely a relationship solely on the basis of love and betrayal of love. As we 
have already seen, the reality of the wrath of God is described only as the reaction of 
divine love against man's betrayal of this love. 
The radical corruption of man's nature is the consequence of his free choice 
of evil. With this view Kitamori emphasizes man's responsibility for what he actually 
is. Certainly, man cannot rightly excuse himself from the responsibility for what he is 
and what he does by taking refuge in any "predetermined" conditions of his existence, 
conditions over which he never had any control. "Mea culpa, mea culpa, mea 
maxima culpa!" is a cry from the believer's existence. However, by itself, man's 
subjective denial of God does not adequately dismiss the mysterious reality of evil and 
sin. It is a clear Biblical witness that there exits a transpersonal and trans-human 
reality of evil. The accounts of Gen. 3:1-19 and of Jesus' temptation in Matt. 4:1-11 
provide the clearest Biblical paradigms. The origin of satanic reality is not confined 
exclusively to the inner sphere of man, but it is an "objective" reality, independent of 
man.' On this point Kitamori is virtually silent. Although he occasionally refers to 
'Goethe, observing a fundamental contradiction in reality which he names the 
"Demonical," finds "the most fearful manifestation of the Demonical" in men like 
Napoleon and Cagliostro, and writes in his Truth and Poetry: "All the moral powers 
combined are of no avail against them; in vain does the more enlightened portion of 
mankind attempt to draw suspicion upon them as deceived if not deceivers--the masses 
are still drawn on by them. Seldom if ever do the great men of an age find their 
equals among their contemporaries and they are overcome by nothing but the universe 
itself; and it is from the observation of this fact that the strange but striking proverb 
must have risen: Nemo contra Deum nisi Deus ipse" (here quoted in E. Frank, 145-
146). True, the proverb is daring as well as dangerous because it ultimately leads to 
the conclusion that the Demonical has its origin in God. But this recognition of a 
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Gen. 3, he does not delve into the details of the text. Nor does he find any 
significance in the agent of Jesus' temptation in the desert, reducing the issues of 
temptation to the psychological struggles within His inner consciousness.' 
The crucial point in Kitamori's view here is that all the satanic realities 
surrounding human existence are totally absorbed into man's betrayal of divine love. 
This view constitutes the foundation of what we present as Kitamori's thought of 
man's existence under the caption of "Man in the Pain of God." This means for 
example that there is no cosmic struggle between God and Satan. There are virtually 
no transhuman evil forces in his thought. The consequence of this view is 
immediately apparent. Speaking pointedly, man as such has become evil itself; he is 
"diabolized." If man is thus "diabolized," its consequence must naturally dictate a 
denigration of man. Man possesses no value at all, being totally unworthy of divine 
love. He is not only of no value to God but also detestable "minus value" to Him.' 
trans-human dimension of the abysmal reality of evil is important. 
'Logic, 149-151. Explaining the first item of the temptation, the problem of 
the bread, Kitamori for instance writes: "Berdyayev speaks of a truth when he says 
that 'the concern for one's own bread' is a material issue, but it becomes a spiritual 
issue when it is translated into 'the bread of the others.' That the liberation of the 
oppressed is an expression of love for one's neighbor must be truth. But what is more 
tragic than the discrepancy between intention and effect if the oppressed become 
`happy pigs' once they are liberated? Jesus refused this kind of a materialistic and 
economic savior [concept]. How painful [ gatx ] it must have been for Jesus 
(a merciful One) to restrain His true emotion [ n-4* ] and to refuse this 
[materialistic concept of savior]" (ibid.). 
24" Ill.{Nia • gfilift ," (Introduction to Bible, 62). "God the Father abandoned 
His beloved Son for the salvation of man. That is, He abandoned the most beloved 
Object, the fountainhead of His happiness. And this sacrifice was made for a being of 
no value, and even minus value. . ." (ibid., 61-62). 
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It then becomes difficult for us to grasp why "God so loved the world that He gave 
His only begotten Son," the world so "diabolized." What will be the consequence of 
this view in Kitamori's thought with regard to God's relationship to man? 
Man's Reality under the Wrath of God 
"The world lies under the wrath of God," writes Kitamori, "and any eyes 
capable of penetrating to the very bottom of the world see the world lying under the 
wrath of God."' What is the reality of man under the wrath of God? Kitamori 
quotes from Ezek. 5:13: "Thus shall My anger be spent, and I will cause my fury to 
rest upon them and I will be avenged; and they shall know that I, the Lord, have 
spoken it in My zeal, when I have spent My fury upon them." Based upon this verse, 
Kitamori comments that the wrath of God is most clearly manifested when sinners are 
totally annihilated. With one more quotation, from Gen. 6:13 and 17, he writes: 
"God will utterly destroy those men who are sucking the juice of carnal pleasure, just 
as a man in a summer evening slaps mosquitos sucking the blood delightedly from the 
skin."' Truly, he says, the wrath of God is "an authentic destructive force which 
does not cease until it destroys its objects utterly."' 
Kitamori's language, to us, seems extraordinarily fierce, even horrifying, 
bordering on the verge of sadistic irrationality. He describes the wrath of God as the 





here as speaking in a rational language, or does he speak a language of a mystic 
experience of God which is often almost irrational in expression. Or does he paint the 
wrath of God with the darkest black transitoriness so as to provide the most effective 
background for the Gospel of the Pain of God? Perhaps both elements may be 
included. But one thing which is important for us to note is Kitamori's well-nigh 
"animosity" toward human beings. One may wonder if Kitamori is so perfectly in 
tune with God in His wrath that he can, standing with God, bitterly denounce sinful 
humanity by depicting the wrath of God on His behalf. In order to recognize this 
feature of Kitamori's thought, we recall that Luther makes the distinction between 
God's love as His proprium and His wrath as His alienum, subordinating the latter to 
the former. On this point, Kitamori criticizes Luther for not taking his experience of 
the wrath of God fully into his theological system.' To Kitamori, God's wrath is not 
merely alienum but rather proprium in the sense that it refuses to be subordinated to 
anything. 
What is the reality of man under the wrath of God in specific terms? Why 
does the world of humanity endure if, as Kitamori describes, the wrath of God is so 
fierce and formidable a reality? "It is not necessarily so," he says, "that the wrath of 
God only manifests itself as a sweeping destruction of the world."' Before the 
""Luther's experience of the wrath of God was fearful enough to 'turn his 
bones into ashes.' Moreover, the experience of his judgment under the wrath of God 
became the starting point for his inner development. It is most regrettable that this 
fundamental experience of his could not have been utilized fully in his central thought, 
`the hidden God'" (Pain, 108). 
Logic, 33. 
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destruction, the world "is abandoned" by God." The world of man is abandoned by 
God in His wrath into transitoriness and contingency; cut from the very origin of 
meaning, man is only drifting around in total meaninglessness.' First, Kitamori 
finds the concrete manifestations of the divine abandonment in the curses imposed 
upon man and woman, which are described in Gen. 3:17-19 and 3:16 respectively. 
Man is placed under the sufferings of labor, and woman the pain of conception. In 
Kitamori's interpretation, these features are the "routinization of the wrath of God"' 
in man's daily life; man's life under labor and his family life which is based upon 
marriage is permeated by the wrath of God. The fundamental aspects of human life 
are thus under the wrath of God, and this means that "human life is, in the final 
analysis, deprived of [God's] blessing.' Elaborating on this point, Kitamori holds: 
"Biblically speaking, labor itself is by no means filled with blessing.n3' He is 
therefore critical of the Puritan identification of labor as God's Beruf, because to him 
the Weberian identification overlooks the problem inherent in human labor.' 
More than in man's labor, Kitamori sees divine wrath glaringly manifest in 
"Ibid. 
"Ibid. 
32st 41110g OD EMIL 
"Ibid. 
'Ibid. 
," ibid., 34). 
""We cannot concur with Max Weber's idea of `Berufsarbeit' without further 
ado. The problem of labor is here skipped over in a rough manner. This standpoint 
is only available for those who have enough 'guts' to take labor as God's blessed 
calling. It is the standpoint only for the spiritually privileged few" (ibid.). 
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woman's conception. To grasp this we here need to touch upon the role Kitamori 
assigns to human sexuality. Strikingly, in his view, "sexual love is a love fallen from 
true love [God's love]," a perverted love as we saw above.' Now, more radically, 
Kitamori intimates his view that sexual love has been the cause of the original fall. 
We make this inference from the following sayings of Kitamori. The fall, according 
to him, is human betrayal of and falling from the true love of God. Kitamori seems 
to speculate why this fall took place. Sexual love between man and woman rivaled 
God's love, and overwhelmed them to betray of God's love." Sexual love, in his 
view, is a characteristic manifestation of human self-seeking nature ("Selbstsuchr). In 
sexual love, human beings reveal their real nature of defiance of God. Kitamori then 
argues that "undoubtedly, sexual love--a form of love perverted and corrupted--must 
have had something to do with the fall."' 
We observe here that for Kitamori human sexuality and marriage are not the 
'Cf. note 12 above. 
"Quoting 1 Cor. 7:33-34, Kitamori argues that "marital love divides one's 
mind between his love to spouse and his love to God. Here the self-seeking and 
exclusive character of sexual love (which is the necessary component of marriage) 
becomes manifest. Sexual love as the desire for an exclusive possession refuses to 
surrender its spouse to God" (Logic, 49). In this connection he gives Kierkegaard's 
"abandonment" of his fiancee as an example of this contradiction between sexual love 
and love for God. 
""Since the Fall is the falling-apart from God's love--the true love—, undoubt-
edly sexual love--a form of love perverted and corrupted—must have had something to 
do with the Fall [ IVAN LT Ott*L h iP0),I.b*-C1134 I, T II911E1 ]" 
(ibid., 35). See further ibid., 48. 
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blessings of God's original creation." Rather, they both belong to status 
corruptionis. From this concept, Kitamori connects the fundamental contradiction in 
human existence ("the perversion of love") with the mode by which every individual 
comes into existence (that is, through sexual love). In other words, for Kitamori 
sexual love is the bearer of original sin. That an individual is born as the result of 
sexual love reveals the very "ugliness" [ falS ] of man.' In support of this 
concept, Kitamori quotes from Ps. 51:5: "Behold, I was brought forth in iniquity, 
and in sin my mother conceived me."°' Man is, we are told, a being who only emits 
a rotten odor! Man is a disgrace to God!' Kitamori further intensifies the ugliness 
of man that results from his sexual origin: "By love perverted and corrupted ['the 
sensual desire of a female spider that consumes the male' (Dostoyevsky)], humanity 
""Because of the desire [in sexual love] for exclusive possession [of its 
object], marriage contradicts the love of God . . . . Marriage, however, becomes a 
blessing and a holy order when it is brought into the Pain of God. But we should 
never forget that this can only be said in the salvific love of the crucified Christ, never 
in the field of love in the order of creation" (ibid., 49). To see Kitamori's point here, 
we need to recall the distinction between nature and perverted nature. Kitamori holds 
that marriage as such is a form of perverted love which must be embraced and 
redeemed. In Kitamori's thought this redemption of marriage is the change of its 
nature, and not the restoration of its original nature. To some extent, this can be seen 
as parallel to his view of man as such (cf. note 20 above). 
'This term is most characteristic when Kitamori describes the fallen man; he 
uses this term often (Logic, 25, 26, 36, 46; Introduction to Bible, 56, 58, 152). It 
connotes a strong abhorrence with an aesthetic overtone. The most pregnant 
expression for man's status under the wrath of God is man's existence under 
"contingency, nonsense and ugliness [ Arnit ft:FAL gigg ]" (Logic, 46). 
41Logic, 31; Introduction to Bible, 29. 
cAuto I, 107; " ,M4t40t1 4%.3tA,..4%/az 
(Ibid.). 
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gives birth to 'a brood of vipers' (Matt. 3:7)."' "The brood of vipers is worthy of 
even our own wrath," he continues, "and if so, how can they possibly flee from the 
wrath of God?"" God's wrath becomes manifest in the suffering of humanity into 
which man by "the sensual desire [like that] of a female spider" gives birth to "a 
brood of vipers."' 
"Down-trodden by miseries, still driven to rebellion [against God]—this is the 
reality of the life of the sinner," wrote Kitamori when he was still a seminarian.* 
This picture of man's reality has remained throughout Kitamori's life. Abandoned by 
God—the Fountainhead of meaning, humanity ultimately does not find anything but 
misery, absurdity and meaninglessness in its world. 
Dealing with man's historical reality, Kitamori bases his interpretation on his 
concept of the freedom of man. We recall a similar approach Kitamori used in his 
exposition of man's original fall from God's love. Kitamori is also here consistent 
with his fundamental notion of man as a free being. Man repeatedly uses his freedom 
to choose evil. "History," writes Kitamori, "is formed solely by the decisions of free 
man."" Freedom, to Kitamori, must ontologically include the possibility to choose 
'Ibid., 139. 
"Logic, 36. 
*Auto I, 120. 
'Character, 231. 
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outside," explains Kitamori using his etymology of "Ex-istenz," and he is thus "driven 
to rebellion."' To the "existing" man (though he is "free" in theory), the reality turns 
out to be contingent, absurd and the worst possible, a diametrical reversal of what 
man longs for. Here is paradox in Kitamori's thought. Freedom is a destinity of 
man's contradictory reality. The well-known existential dictum, "condemned to 
freedom," might serve to illustrate Kitamori's paradox. Like the tragic ontology of 
love, freedom is also destiny that equates to an entological condemnation of man. We 
again call Kitamori's fundamental idea as an ontological tragicalism. "Freedom, 
contingency, absurdity, evil and misery, these are the fundamental characteristics of 
history," observes Kitamori." As long as history maintains its own proprium [and on 
Kitamori's anthropological premises it must], "there is no room for God in man's 
historical reality."" Historical reality denies God totally; it is apart from God, 
"atheistic" through and through. "God" in this context means a God who is supposed 
"Ibid. 
'Ibid. 
'Ibid. It is necessary here to ask what Kitamori means by "no room for God 
in man's historical reality EVAMAttA---4-6 ''F 9 , 41 i0A9*6itUtoil ]." 
It is true that we cannot discern the meaning of history; history more often than not 
stages events which drive men to total nihilism, although it sometimes can present an 
optimistic "illusion" (the nineteenth century!). Our question to Kitamori here is what 
is meant when he says this as a Christian theologian. Does he speak for atheistic 
existentialists? If he does, it seems sure that he agrees with them in this way of 
viewing historical reality. If he speaks of this on behalf of himself, it means that 
Kitamori does not adequately consider the total lordship of God in actual history. 
Either way, it seems to me, Kitamori does not acknowledge the positive rule of God 
in history. Certainly, this critique is based upon faith in God, so it is not based on 
objective observation. What I am concerned with is how we theologically conceive of 
God's active governance in history. If God's lordship does not extend to the realm of 
history, the Gospel becomes an issue of a purely inner sphere. 
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"atheistic" through and through. "God" in this context means a God who is supposed 
to save man in man's struggle for meaning and life. Fallen "outside" of God's love, 
man is without God and without hope. There remain then two contradictory realities: 
God who cannot bear man's history and man's history which cannot bear God." In 
Kitamori's thought, this is the absolute contradiction! 
Man and his world as such are thus abandoned by God. This connotes two 
things: negatively, God's non-intervention in man's own doomed struggle and, 
"positively," His carrying out His judgement over man. Kitamori is never tempted by 
the optimism to which some hopeful omens on "the surface of the sea" occassionally 
encourage man. He will rather continue to gaze at the very abyss of man's reality. 
We can further observe Kitamori's view of human reality in his discussion of the 
specific mission of the Christian peace movement in Japan. Kitamori was critical 
God's active governance in history. If God's lordship does not extend to the realm of 
history, the Gospel becomes an issue of a purely inner sphere. 
"Ibid., 231-32. On this point, see: Helmut Thielicke, "The Godless World 
and the Worldless God," Church, Word and Spirit, eds. J. Bradley and R. Muller 
[Festschrift to G. W. Bromiley] (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1987), 291-298: 
Thielicke, here being critical of his own Lutheran tradition concerning the doctrine of 
the two kingdoms for its liability to be abused, still maintains that God rules the world 
in His right and left hands; speaking of incompatibility of the Sermon on the Mount 
with the worldly reality (the Godless world), Theilicke warns against a 
misunderstanding here: "if the structure of the world seems to make the radical 
demands of the Sermon on the Mount unfulfillable, then we must not conclude that 
this means that the world is related in a radical contradiction. . . . [God works 
through the orders of this world.] For this reason, the orders have always been 
understood as measure of providential care and love" (295). In view of the doctrine 
of the two kingdoms (a theological scheme which in the Lutheran perspective aptly 
renders justice to the relationship between God's lordship of the world and the fallen 
reality of man), Kitamori's absolute separation of God and the world looks as if it is 
an abstract construction. 
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toward the movement, saying that in joining "secular" peace movements it does not 
contribute anything specific from its own "religious" resources." In this context, he 
urges the Christian activists to a sober, "religious" recognition of man's reality. He 
calls this reality "the bottom." "This bottom is, as the extreme bottom of man's 
reality, a formidable and tragic field over which man's so-called movement is utterly 
powerless to exercise any influence."' Why is it so formidable? Because God 
abandons man to that condition. "The bottom," warns Kitamori, "is a field in which 
no means--including man's movements--avail except our intercessory prayers to the 
merciful Lord."' Man and his world lie under the wrath of God. 
The Reality of Salvation in the Pain of God 
Kitamori presents a hard picture of man's reality under the wrath of God. 
Man's reality has no meaning, no assurance of existence; it is only misery and 
absurdity. Nihilism is the word for man's reality under the wrath of God. However, 
in Kitamori's thought, this reality at the same time has a totally different aspect. He 
also intuitively perceives that it lies under the Pain of God. "Our world and all things 
in it," says Kitamori, "can only be seen under the single reality of the Pain of 
God."' Whether we know it or not, he says, we exist only under the Pain of God. 
"Kitamori, My Reflections on Life (Tokyo, Kyobunkan, 1963), 9-11. 
'Ibid., 13. 
"Ibid. 
'Auto /, 178. 
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For Kitamori, the meaning of the world is [found only] in the Pain of God." For 
God's love is possible only on the basis of the Pain of God; our joy, victory and hope 
are all possible only on the basis of the Pain of God.' 
We were told that for Kitamori the world lay under the awful curse of God. 
Now we hear that man's world is under the Pain of God. In Kitamori's thought, are 
these two contradictory realities at one and the same time describing how God deals 
with man's world? Is he following the Lutheran concept of the duality of God's 
relationship to the world, the dialectic of divine wrath and love? One should answer 
yes to these questions, at least as far as its conceptual scheme is concerned. The 
wrath of God noetically precedes the Pain of God. Also for Kitamori, wrath drives 
man to desperation. In this desperation one experiences pains, and through pains one 
comes to see God in His Pain. Now it is necessary for us to look more closely at 
Kitamori's view of the relationship between God's wrath and His Pain and its 
conceptual presupposition. 
In Kitamori's concept, the reality of man is a composite of two antithetical 
facts. We see this in his view of man's existence. Man is "a double being" 
[ :=.131 ]. On the one hand, Kitamori says, man is brought forth into existence 
"by God's love and blessing."' For Kitamori, "the cruciality of this postulate is 
almost immeasurable." Without this man can hardly continue to live, for the world 
"Ibid. 
'Ibid., 180. 
Logic, 31; here Kitamori quotes from Ps. 139:13 and 119:13. 
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would become sheer nonsense and he would only know his own ugliness.' On the 
other hand, says he, "an individual is brought forth into being by the very fact of 
man's fallen condition."' What Kitamori is saying is that the existence of man is a 
result of the sheer sin of man, namely sexual love which is nothing but the cardinal 
manifestation of sin, die Selbstsucht. This means that an individual owes his existence 
to two parallel causes. "In man light and darkness entangle themselves with each 
other."' What does Kitamori want to advance here in particular? At this juncture 
we need to pay attention to a subtle but crucial point in his view. It is a form of 
dualism that Kitamori finds in the origin of the individual. Man comes into being as 
the result of a contingent and even cursed human relationship but also by the blessing 
of God. Does this dualism not involve an illegitimate mixture of the domains of 
discourse? On the one hand, without the divine revelation of salvation there is no 
recognition that man is created by God. But on the other hand, with revelation one 
cannot theologically say that man's coming into being has a double origin. In faith, 
one believes that man is brought into being solely and ultimately by God's will despite 
the empirical fact that human contingency and sin are involved in it. It is therefore 
either/or in the understanding of man's origin. This dualism in the thought of 
Kitamori, however, entails some serious consequences for the understanding of man 




thought a strong tendency to "diabolize" man. We find the reason here in this 
dualism. Man's coming into existence, understood as the result of human sin (evil 
itself), is ontologically antagonistic to God, totally separated from God; but on the 
other hand, as the result of God's love, God wants to redeem him in His Pain. Man 
is thus in himself an absolute contradiction.' Consequently, God can only relate to 
man as his Redeemer. The concept of God the Creator as the basic relationship 
between God and man in His created world has substantially disappeared from 
Kitamori's thought. 
It therefore seems natural for Kitamori to reverse the ontological sequence of 
creation and redemption, namely redemption first and creation second. In other 
words, he conceives of the reality of creation as meaningful only in light of 
redemption. Without redemption creation is only a curse because of man's sin. 
Therefore, creation in its actuality is, to his "penetrating" eyes, nothing but "ugliness, 
absurdity, meaninglessness."' The most crucial point here is that redemption does 
not redeem the fallen creation; it constitutes the meaning of creation.' In other 
'The viewpoint here that man is a being in contradiction stands in parallel 
with the contradiction between God and man's historical reality which we saw in the 
above. This is logically consistent on the part of Kitamori. Our concern here is 
whether this dualism is an adequate description of reality in the light of the Bible or is 
rather an abstract construction which is required by the scheme of his thought. 
`See note 40 above. 
'In addition to "narrowing" the range of God's active presence in man's 
reality (the narrowing which we have touched upon in the above and will discuss more 
in the below), this way of seeing the relation between creation and redemption has an 
apparent logical difficulty. If man's existence is contingent, meaningless and ugly, 
how can one know about all this nonsense? Does this not presuppose a reality with 
signs opposite to these negative signs? Yes, it must, otherwise it would be impossible 
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words, redemption itself becomes the meaning of creation rather than the restoration 
of the blessing and meaning inherent in creation, and this with a theological 
consequence that man's sin and God's Pain become constitutive to the ultimate reality. 
We here discern how a basic conceptual scheme can dictate the whole 
interpretation of the Gospel. To Kitamori, the order of redemption is primary and 
constitutive to the order of creation. Thus, the order of creation by itself is reduced to 
a total nothingness. To set this concept of Kitamori in relief, it is helpful to have an 
alternative scheme in view. It is a scheme which simply follows the order of the 
Apostolic Creed; creation first, and then redemption. On this order one can construct 
various theological systems.' The main point in this scheme is, however, that the 
order of redemption is the confirmation of the original will of God in creation; it is 
the recapitulation of creation. Although the world of creation, as fallen, cannot stand 
without the redemptive act of God, it still has not lost God's blessing; God the Creator 
not only to know but even to desire its overcoming. In Christian theology, it is 
exactly the vision of the original creation in God's unalloyed satisfaction ("Indeed it is 
very good!" [Gen. 1:31]) that provides the presupposition of the recognition of man's 
fallenness and longing for redemption. Though under misery and contradiction, 
creation is not totally meaningless; labor and marriage outside the revelation of Christ 
still retain vestiges of the blessing of creation. Our bare existing is of infinite value to 
us. For this reason, we cling to life in the face of death. MacGregor, to whom 
"'bare' existence" is already the summum bonum, says meaningfully: "I wish to 
suggest that 'bare' existence is the most priceless because it is the most basic of all 
possible gifts. There is nothing for which I could be more grateful, for every other 
possible object of my gratitude would depend absolutely upon it" (16). In this sense, 
Kitamori's totally negative view of creation is not only abstract but also disturbing. 
'We shall deal with the relationship between creation and redemption in more 
detail in the next chapter. Here my basic viewpoint on this theme is briefly 
mentioned. 
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works even in the fallen world as a merciful God even though His wrath and judgment 
are undeniable forces in it. The point is, the world is still God's, even if it is fallen; 
in His redemption He reclaims it because it is His own creation. As to the "origin" of 
man's existence, there will be no dualism in this conceptual scheme. Despite a deep 
sinfulness of human reality, an individual is totally and fully God's creation. In fact, 
only in this scheme one can speak meaningfully of the concept of creatio continua or 
God's universal activity in the world irrespective of man's knowledge. This divine 
activity in the created world is what we want to emphasize, not only as the judgement 
(and, even in this case, not for the sake of judgement itself) but more importantly for 
the sake of the preservation and redemption of the creature. 
As far as we can see, in Kitamori's basic scheme of thinking the order of 
creation and that of redemption constitute a sharp antithesis.' The reality of 
creation, "diabolized" by human sin and lying under the destructive forces of God's 
wrath, must be overcome by the reality of the redemption which God had provided by 
His Pain. The tension of both realities is, in Kitamori's idea, a reflection of the 
tension within God.' His often-recurrent formula, "Never God's, ever Christ's," 
strongly suggests this.' With this formula, Kitamori means that in the sphere of 
God, that is of "God im-mediate [God not mediated by Christ]," the reality of man 
does not belong to God, but to "the outside of God"; whereas in the sphere of Christ 
"See note 52 above. 
"See note 147 in Chap. 2. 
69Auto 1, 114. 
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—God mediated by Christ, the reality of man is absolutely embraced. As is seen here, 
the dialectic of the extra and the intra in his theology is also indicative of this sharp 
antithesis between the reality of creation and that of redemption.' 
"Salvation," writes Kitamori, "is the fact that God still loves man fallen 
outside of the love of God."" In short, "the love which embraces the extra into the 
intra' is the redemptive love. Using these categories of the extra and the intra, 
Kitamori explains the necessity of the Son's incarnation in history.' The love of 
God which loves the man fallen outside cannot remain inside of God; it is the love 
which "comes out" from God. The God who comes out to the human reality is the 
God incarnate, the man Jesus." For, Kitamori argues, the fact that God comes out 
from God Himself is God becoming an aliter of God, namely, man. This, in his 
view, is the very reason why the Savior can be the Savior only as an historical being; 
this being is Jesus." 
'The Ansatz for this distinction in Kitamori's thought seems to have been Th. 
Harnack's interpretation of Luther, that to the Reformer the way to grasp die gnadigen 
Gott is given by God Himself in His revelation in Christ: "Eben deshalb will er 
[Luther] auch, daB man lerne `Unterschied machen zwischen Gott und God', zwischen 
Gott aufier Christo und in Christo" (Luther's Theologie I [Munich: Chr. Kaiser, 
1927], 84; emphasis is added). It is probable that Kitamori builds his dialectic upon 
this distinction made by Harnack. 
"Logic, 38. 





Kitamori sees fallen mankind as "children of wrath."' Salvation of the 
children of wrath, he says, cannot be carried out by "mere" love. The wrath of God 
can never be overlooked, because in it God maintains His Deity. We recall 
Kitamori's quotation from Forsyth that "sin [read: the sinner] must die or God." 
Thus, God's wrath can never be silenced without the risk of placing His honor in 
jeopardy. Man's salvation, therefore, involves formidable commitment on the part of 
God, the Pain of God. "Atonement is," holds Kitamori,"the salvation which is 
brought into fulfillment by God's own taking upon Himself, in His love, the wrath of 
God."' 
In the explication of atonement, Kitamori emphasizes that Christ died 
bearing the wrath of God upon Himself; the wrath of God striking His Son on the 
cross. Thus, he stands in the doctrinal tradition of atonement as a poena a 
satisfactio.' Kitamori, however, feels it necessary to go further than mere statements 
of "punishment and satisfaction" to explicate the doctrine of atonement. To him, the 
Anselmian theory of satisfaction is "the first well-built doctrine of atonement and 
worthy of admiration as to its logical transparency . . . . It must be acknowledged 
that there is truth in his view." But, he says, this theory misses a crucial aspect of 
'6Eph. 2:3, (Logic, 39). 
'According to Ted Peters, the Anselmian alternative aut poena aut satisfactio 
is understood by Luther as satisfactio including also poena ("Atonement in Anselm 
and Luther," Lutheran Quarterly 24 [1972, 311]). Kitamori follows Luther's view. 
'Character, 13. 
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atonement, which must be recovered. Agreeing with Gustav Aulen's critique (in 
Christus Vktor) of Anselm, Kitamori sees a fatal weakness of the Anselmian doctrine 
in its rational character. Kitamori acknowledges the validity of both Anselm's 
Fragestellung on atonement and the structure of his solution. And yet, because of the 
rational character of his problem and solution, the great Scholastic missed "the 
vehemency [ gda ] inherent in the issue [of atonement]. e° In Kitamori's 
terminology,. the missed "vehemency" in Anselm's conception is the "quality" of the 
issue of atonement. By this term he apparently means the "quality" of the divine 
"pathos" involved in the issue of atonement. One needs, says Kitamori, "a qualitative 
expression for this contradictory struggle of [divine] righteousness and love."' If 
one leaves unamended the doctrine of atonement in the rational aridity of an 
Anselmian type, it would only "assassinate this issue [of atonement]. n82 For 
Kitamori, the need for the "qualitative expression" of atonement is only adequately 
met with the concept of the Pain of God, that is, God in suffering. 
Further, Kitamori highly values Christus Victor for Aulen's exposition, of 
Luther's concept of atonement. According to Kitamori's reading of Aulen, the basic 
line of Luther's concept of atonement is that the love of God struggles with the wrath 




'Ibid.: Kitamori uses the very term "to assassinate," " Mat& ." We 
attend to Kitamori's usage of strong vocabulary. 
'Ibid., 16. 
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Kitamori, that in Luther's thought the Swedish scholar finds God primarily as the 
active subject of the drama of the atonement rather than merely as the passive receiver 
of propitiation. Kitamori also holds that Aulen emphasizes the character of the 
irrational pathos of God in the work of atonement." Yet, Kitamori is not satisfied 
with Aulen's evaluation because of the latter's "one-sided" emphasis on the victory of 
Christ in the work of atonement. To him, Aulen dissolves the "struggle element" in 
Luther's concept into the "victory-motif."' This means that Aulen does not 
adequately sense the "qualitative" aspect of atonement implied in the idea of the 
"struggle" in God. The "struggle" element in atonement, Kitamori claims, must have 
its own "quality [independent value]' before the work of atonement is characterized as 
victory. This indispensable "quality" is the Pain of God.' 
The idea of the divine atonement, for Kitamori, should not deteriorate into 
rational aridity nor into a simple triumphalism.' It must retain the "quality" of the 
pathos involved and the "painful" struggle in it. Still, there is one more element in 
Aulen's doctrinal discussion on atonement which Kitamori sees it necessary to refute. 
We have seen above that Kitamori regards the punishment motif as essential to the 
idea of atonement. Kokichi Kurosaki, a Bible commentator affiliated with the 






too mechanical and impersonal.' Further, this Bible commentator felt it unthinkable 
that the Father, loving the Son so deeply, could seriously punish the Son with His 
wrath; he would hold that "objectively God's wrath did not assault the Son, rather the 
Father looked down upon the suffering Son in His deep fatherly love."" On an other 
occasion, Kurosaki even quoted Kitamori's opus magnum as a support for his critique 
of this punishment motif.' In reality, Kitamori's position is quite opposite 
Kurosald's. The punishment motif is the corner stone of Kitamori's concept of the 
Pain of God. Taking up Kurosald's critique, he concurs with the commentator, 
admitting that the traditional theory of punishment certainly has the tendency to 
become impersonal and mechanical. "In spite of this critique," Kitamori insists, "one 
cannot say that the theory as a whole is erroneous."' As far as the "form" of this 
theory is concerned, it has a truth element; but what is lacking in this theory is "the 
Discussed in Kitamori, ibid., 20-21. 
"Referred in Kitamori, ibid., 22. 
'What I want to say," writes Kurosaki, "is that, seeing from our human 
standpoint, we should have made apology to God for our sins by taking our own lives 
ourselves before we are destroyed by God's punishment; but Christ died in our place; 
if we see this from God's. viewpoint He has shown His pain over the depth of 
humanity's sins by the death of Jesus, sending the Son to death . . . (cf. Mr. 
Kitamori's The Theology of the Pain of God)" (quoted in ibid., 25). That is, though 
Kitamori's opus magnum has an abstruse background of speculation, the idea of the 
Pain of God is expressed in a language which appeals directly to the minds of 
"uncritical" readers. In my view, however, this way of reading Kitamori is not a total 
misunderstanding. The initial success of this book immediately after World War II 
can be understood as a result of this "understandable" side of the book. 
"Ibid., 21. 
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world of quality."' The concept of the Pain of God rectifies the shortcomings of this 
poena-theory." In this connection, Kitamori deals with Kurosaki's expression of 
"God's suffering and pain," an expression which the latter used in connection with his 
description of the Father as He looks upon the Son on the Cross with deepest 
sympathy. Kitamori makes a sharp distinction between Kurosaki's usage of the 
expression and his own, saying that Kurosaki's pain of God is that of "God's 
sentimentality" [ ]," while his own is the Pain of God in which God 
bears His wrath in His love.' "The Pain of God is the Pain of God just because God 
the Father assaults His beloved Son with His wrath," assures Kitamori." 
Thus Kitamori is adamant in his assertion of the absolute objective reality of 
divine wrath. As a matter of fact, the concept of the objective wrath of God is today 
reconfirmed as the fundamental factor of Christian faith and theology. In this 
particular regard, Kitamori's stance is the traditional Protestant stance, but this 
adamant assertion of Kitamori must be seen against the background of his concept of 
the Pain of God. This concept logically requires the wrath of God; where there is no 
wrath, there cannot be the Pain of God. There must be the wrath of God! 
For Kitamori, the Pain of God is the absolute theological axiom, a 






self-evident truth, or "the king of truth" as he says elsewhere." This means, in his 
practical theologizing, that everything in theology--whether doctrine or the life of 
faith--must be judged, understood and systematized in conformity with the concept of 
the Pain of God. In fact, we know that the absolute dominance of an axiom is what 
brings a set of ideas and thoughts into a system. Kitamori's theology is one example 
of this. We saw Kitamori's view of atonement in the light of the Pain of God. The 
Pain on the part of God is essential in this doctrine. This feature determines 
Kitamori's understanding of Christian existence in the Pain of God, as we shall see 
later in this section. 
The world lies under the wrath of God and the Pain of God. This 
perspective of two divine relationships with the world is similar to the Lutheran 
dialectic of God's wrath and God's grace. However, we cannot determine here 
exactly whether or not Kitamori's concept of this divine duality vis-à-vis the world is 
substantially identical with the Lutheran concept. We shall return to this question on a 
later occasion. 
However, on the basis of what we have observed in his idea of the sharp 
antithesis between the fallen reality of the created world and redemption through the 
Pain of God, we can here at least say that Kitamori has a highly idiosyncratic variation 
of this fundamental Lutheran dialectic. The very concept of the Pain of God also 
indicates this. "On the one hand," Kitamori describes man's situation in relation to 
God, "his [man's] existence, as far as he is one from the 'brood of vipers,' is the 
"Ibid., 51. 
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object of divine wrath, but, on the other hand, he is brought into existence also by the 
love of God, and thus he is in the Pain of God which is the unity of contradiction 
between God's wrath and His love."" We shall look at this passage a little more 
closely. God's love and God's wrath are here synthesized into the Pain of God." 
This means that Kitamori ultimately speaks of a single divine reality vis-à-vis man, 
the Pain of God.' Put differently, in Kitamori God does not simply confront man 
with the wrath of God nor merely with the love of God; He meets man in His Pain. 
"Logic, 42. 
"The original text reads: 
" ANIIPPOg 9 *Of k a*StI9K—L L' -0,111304A-OrPich ►  " 
'To Kitamori God in Pain is a primary experience. It is an "unanalyzable" 
reality. But, in his attempt to conceptualize it as God's Pain, Kitamori analyzes it into 
elements and synthesizes them again to a conceptual unity. In this, he recognizes the 
Pain of God as something different from God's wrath and His love, namely the 
contradictory unity of God's wrath and love. Kitamori calls this quality of God's 
essence tertium, relying on Th. Harnack. "Theodosius Harnack says that on the cross 
the third (tertium) emerged [ t t: ] from the two elements--the wrath of 
God and the love of God. This third is nothing but the Pain of God" (Itami, 21 
[Pain, 21]). What is Harnack's own view of this? The German scholar first observes 
a very strict dualism of divine wrath and love. In his view, Luther denied genetic 
relationship between the wrath of God to the love of God. But at the same time the 
Reformer was not satisfied with this acute dualism either. In Harnack's view, both of 
them are "nur Erzeugnisse eines verlegenen oder verzweifelnden Denkens" (Luthers 
Theologie: I, 338). Then he says: "Es gibt ein tertium, und eben dieses Dritte ist es, 
das such Luther, der Schrift und den Glauben gemiB, bezeugt und lehrt" (ibid.). 
From this reference we point out several things. First, Harnack himself does not 
embrace the idea of a development of love in God himself in Luther's thought (. . . 
daB er [Gott] Liebe absolut ist, aber der Zorn nur relativ, d. h. in Relation zur 
siindigen Welt . . ." ibid., 358). Second, Harnack does not use "Sich-Ereignen" of 
tertium, but simply: "Es gibt . . . ." Third, Harnack's tertium is not the result of a 
conflict within God. It is "Gottes Gerechtigkeit" which can effect both wrath and love 
toward the sinner (see further Gerhard Rost's critical evaluation of Harnack's 
interpretation of Luther, 3-4). One can therefore say that Kitamori's interpretation 
Luther via Harnack is "unwarranted" and that the content of the tertium is fully 
Kitamori's own. 
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This single reality is absolute salvation, but it still has two aspects; wrath and love 
side by side. The Pain of God is the love of God which bears upon itself the wrath of 
God. The wrath, or judgment of God, therefore no longer assaults man because of 
the Pain of God. (But this is so ontologically but not "phenomenologically."") Thus 
in Kitamori, the real dialectic of wrath and love exists in God Himself, and it is for 
this reason that God suffers Pain eternally. But there is no such dialectic in His 
relationship with us any more. The wrath now being borne by God Himself is 
ontologically overcome as far as our salvation is concerned; wrath remains now only 
phenomenologically present for us, and this phenomenological presence of wrath 
serves toward the actualization of and witness to the Pain of God by causing in us 
pains and sufferings in this world."' This ultimate overcoming of God's wrath by 
God himself can be seen in Kitamori's use of another image for the Pain of God, that 
of a "shield" which protects the sinner from the assault of the wrath of God." This 
image excellently matches his image above that the world lies under the wrath of God. 
A layer below this wrath, as it were, there lies the layer of the Pain of God and it 
shields us from the attacks of God's wrath. We recognize from this image that the 
Pain of God, now as the single mode of God's relationship with man, is the objective 
reality of salvation for the sinner. 
'To Kitamori, the Pain of God is the absolute salvation. The wrath of God 
which we should have experienced has been ontologically "taken care of." The 
"poison of the snake" which might be called the wrath of God is taken away from it 
(cf. Logic, 51). 
"See Chap. 5, 409ff. 
'Pain, 126. 
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Does this mean that salvation is now universal? That is, lying under the 
Pain of God, is every individual already in salvation, even though he may subjectively 
lack knowledge about it? Kitamori answers a definite "yes" to the question.'' In this 
"yes" one finds Kitamori's version of "the triumph of grace," which is the very 
heartbeat of Kitamori's theology. "We can turn our back on the love of God 
[immediate]," writes Kitamori, "but we cannot turn our back on the very love of God 
--the Pain of God, by which God loves us who defy that love of God. The only thing 
on which we cannot turn our back is the Pain of God, and by the Pain of God alone 
God triumphs over us."' Phrases like this concerning the triumphant Pain of God 
abound in Kitamori's writings. According to him, this is the absoluteness of God's 
Pain; the Pain of God being the absolute negation of man's negation of God. Man's 
falling from God's love, his betrayal of it, and his turning back to it cannot "outbeat" 
the Pain of God, which ever "outruns" man and embraces him from further 
outside.'' This notion of the Pain of God--the absolute love of God--presupposes his 
'In a section where he discusses the existence of the unbelievers in the order 
of creation, he says: "Lastly, I have to say something crucial. The unbelievers who 
are now without salvation are placed in the field of the Cross which is the theological 
axiom. They are not saved in actuality [ NM.: ], but they cannot go out from 
the Cross; the problem [of sin] has been solved on Golgotha. The 'not-yet-solved' 
reality [the existence of unbelievers] which we are now seeing is of reality in the 
solution [ *Molt: awim ]" (Cross, 34-35). See also Pain, 89. 
105Auto II, 25. 
'Perhaps we can visualize this structure of the Pain of God with three 
concentric circles. The innermost circle is the love of God which can be betrayed and 
stand against man in a relative Gegentiber, the second circle represents man's falling 
out from the innermost circle of divine love; finally, the outer circle stands for the 
Pain of God which embraces all. It would be helpful if we think of the Pain of God 
as absolutely greater than the second so that the second cannot outrun the third, largest 
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deep recognition of man's sinfulness. Man's defiance of God is infinitely deep; the 
Pain of God is still "more" infinite in embracing the sinner. Redemption is thus an 
absolute and objective reality in the Pain of God. 
Salvation is now objectively established for the sinner. Cursed things in the 
order of creation--life in its basic form in work and marriage included--are now 
embraced in the Pain of God and redeemed into blessing.'" Due to the Pain of God 
embracing the unembraceable, says Kitamori for instance, "marriage becomes a holy 
ordinance guaranteed by the will of God."' The Pain of God as the order of 
redemption embraces the fallen reality of man just as it is. This is, to Kitamori, the 
meaning of the forgiveness of sins. We can therefore say that Kitamori sees the 
forgiveness of sin as identical with God's absolute embracing of the fallen reality as 
such." 
From this "objective" idea of salvation, we may easily grasp Kitamori's 
concept of "faith." Faith, to Kitamori, is the act of a believing subject, by which he 
circle. 
mLogic, 47-49. 
'God has already justified us [by His Pain]. That we enter into the fact of 
this justification of God, that is [our act of] `faith'; God regards this as righteousness 
(Rom. 4:5)" (Auto II, 112). "According to the satisfaction theory," writes Kitamori, 
"the Cross is raised before the forgiveness of sins . . . . God crucified Christ in order 
to forgive our sins. According to 'the Pain of God' the Cross is raised after the 
forgiveness of sins. The Cross is the consequence of the forgiveness of sins. Since 
God has forgiven sins already, He crucified Himself in the Persona of His beloved 
Son" (Auto I, 220; italic is mine). But here we pay special attention to one thing, 
namely the universality of the forgiveness of sins. 
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enters into "the salvific love of God [t = the Pain of God].""" We now 
follow Kitamori's exposition of faith in order to understand his concept of faith. "The 
Pain of God [the Cross of Christ]," emphasizes Kitamori, "has actually occurred; it 
exists now as an objective fact; we are factually in this Pain of God."' Why can 
we not "see" then the fact of salvation, Kitamori asks, and the Savior? the fact by 
definition being something we can see! "Yes, we are actually in the salvific love of 
God," Kitamori says, "but it must be remembered that we, as the beings who have 
fallen from God's love, could not have been in the love of God, but actually we now 
find ourselves in this salvific love, a fact which could not have taken place but is a 
reality; a sheer paradox!"" To believe this impossibility is really "contrary to hope 
(Rom. 4:18)."' Thus, according to Kitamori, our incapability of seeing salvation is 
due to the fact that the impossibility of our being accepted by God is now an actual 
reality. To know the reality of salvation is salvation,' and in this fallen condition of 
humanity it is through faith alone that one knows the reality of salvation. 
In keeping with his general emphasis on the significance of knowing, 
Kitamori maintains also here that salvation is to know the salvation which has already 
been objectively given. To see this a little more closely, we take up one of his 
"°Logic, 41. 
"Ibid., 41-42. 
"For this "intellectualism," see also Chap. 6, 511-512 below. 
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discussions on this theme. The unbeliever, holds Kitamori, is also objectively in the 
Pain of God, but it does not mean that he is aware of this fact; "he does not yet take 
the act of faith."' So long as he remains ignorant of the objective fact of salvation, 
salvation does not become actual to him. To explain this, Kitamori uses terms from 
English and German: "actuality--Wirklichkeit--Tatsach." According to his 
etymological analysis, all these words include a component which signifies action, 
"act, wirken and Tat"; they indicate the nature of "actuality," and in Kitamori's 
context, the believing subject's involvement in the salvation through his act of faith. 
"Only through the act of faith, the salvific love becomes an actuality [ ]."116 
Faith is thus emphasized by Kitamori as the believing act of man. But he at 
once adds that this subjective act of faith is something impossible for man to 
undertake. It is only possible by "the power of the One who transcends the believing 
subject." The salvific love [of God] itself "pushes us into the salvific love."'" It is, 
then, the salvific love itself that ultimately makes salvation actual for man. For this 
reason, holds Kitamori, faith cannot be considered "a ticket for exchange of which one 
receives his ration." In keeping with the essence of the Pain of God itself, "faith is 
given equally to all men."' Since the Pain of God is the very love of God to those 






unbelief."' For they are already embraced by the Pain of God! 
Kitamori conceives of faith in its dual aspect: on the one hand it is a 
subjective act and on the other a gift of God. In putting forward this concept he 
stands in the doctrinal tradition of Protestantism. We can see here a theoretical 
paradox in the nature of faith: God's sovereign gift and man's "free" act of faith at 
one and the same time. Kitamori for his own part strongly underlines that though a 
gift of God faith never loses "the character of the subject's spontaneous decision.' 
Faith is a spontaneous act, holds Kitamori, because "salvation [by faith] is concerned 
with the problem of love through and through."' In his definition, love never 
knows coercion. Faith, as a spontaneous response to salvific love--the Pain of God, 
can include in itself unbelief, against which we have to struggle.' This means, says 
Kitamori, that in us there ever remains the "possibility of stumbling." Even in faith, 
we sinners can deny the Pain of God. However, the Pain of God already embraces 
this possibility, holds Kitamori, and for that very reason the triumphant love of God 
still remains as the Pain of God." 








maintain the absoluteness of the Pain of God? How can he ascribe irresitability to the 
Pain of God? Involved are two issues which need to be taken up here. 
One issue is whether his assertion of the absoluteness and irresitability of the 
Pain of God is already defeated by his own strong insistence on love's spontaneity. In 
this regard (and in general), Kitamori does not work with the doctrine of 
predestination. In fact, the idea of predestination is incompatible with his idea of love 
as the basis for his theological work. There seems therefore to be a logical as well as 
material contradiction here. Logically, freedom and irresitability are at odds with 
each other. Materially, love in Kitamori's own definition must be resistible. Love 
denies coercion as well as irresitability. Actually, we can resist the love of God, as 
Kitamori also admits. 
The other issue is whether the Pain of God as divine love "outrunning" 
man's constant denial is tenable in our reality, a reality where there are many cases of 
defiance of the love of God. In Kitamori's own argument, the objective reality of the 
Pain of God would be of little help unless one grasps it in faith. If man can infinitely 
continue to resist the Pain of God by his will, then the irresitable victory of the Pain 
of God will not be actualized and mean little. For not willing to know of the Pain of 
God is the same as being under the wrath of God, even if the Pain of God objectively 
should be a salvific love. 
Dealing with these two issues, we are seriously concerned about Kitamori's 
claim that the Pain of God is an irresistable love. In our view, this irresistibility of 
divine love cannot be postulated objectively and universally. It is meaningless simply 
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because love is resistible. In fact, when the "irresistibility of grace" is spoken of--
just as in case of predestination, it is as confession of faith. And a confession of faith 
cannot be objective and universal; it is a recognition of faith gained from personal 
commitment to the living Person. 
In Kitamori's thought, man's redemption by the Pain of God is an objective 
reality. For man to be saved is to know this fact of salvation through faith. Faith, in 
Kitamori's thought, is to know the Pain of God. Once known, the Pain of God is the 
power to overcome sinners' rebellion. 
We now examine Kitamori's idea of redemption. As an interesting feature 
of Kitamori's soteriology we mention his very reserved use of the concept of 
justification. It is therefore meaningful to see his view of redemption against the 
Reformation's justificatio sola fide. Except for his study on Luther's doctrine of 
justification, we do not come across this term very often in Kitamori's work.' Of 
course, we do not have to take this as a sign that the substance of the doctrine of 
justification is absent in Kitamori's thought. Particularly in an indigenous theology, 
traditional terms can be replaced with more familiar ones in the language in which the 
indigenous theology is formulated. As a matter of fact, Kitamori, like Luther, equates 
justification with forgiveness of sin.'' Our question is then: Does this lack of the 
term "justification" indicate Kitamori's independent understanding of this doctrine, or 
does he replace the term with a more adequate one while retaining its substance? 
'See Reformation, 78-145. 
'See note 109 above. 
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When we in Protestant theology speak of justification by faith, we could 
discuss a wide spectrum of dogmatic issues. But we admittedly cannot pursue it here 
at any great length. We want only to take up the basic issue of justification by faith, 
namely that man is constantly justified by his exercise of faith.'" In view of this, 
justification is not something "habitual" in the believer. To be justified before God is 
a constant movement of faith grasping the assurance of God's acceptance for the sake 
of Christ. Justification cannot be a state guaranteed by an objective salvific reality. It 
is not something objectively given as securitas. In the believer's existential situation, 
one is always driven to seek justification coram Deo through faith. In this connection 
faith as fiducia becomes meaningful, because with this trust one can grasp the promise 
of acceptance because of Christ. Through faith as fiducia a believer is granted 
certitudo even though he constantly knows that his sinful inclination is to live by his 
own resources rather than to live in God's justification in Christ. It is this experience 
of one's sinfulness that constantly drives the believer into Anfechtung and compels him 
to seek refuge in justification sola fide. Justification is not something settled once for 
all in the believer's life; it is the believer's mode of existence under the dialectic of 
Law and Gospel. 
In light of this concept of justification by faith, we recognize that to 
'See faith's character of Anfechtung, Carl Heinz Ratschow, Der an 
angefochted Glaube (Giitersloh: Gerd Mohn, 1967), particularly 233-294; Chitose 
Kishi, Luther's Theological Thought in His Lectures on Hebrews (Tokyo: Seibunsha, 
1961), 191-208. 
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Kitamori justification as forgiveness of sins is a "settled" issue.' The Pain of God 
is already the absolute, most comprehensive and universal reality which embraces a 
most umebraceable world. This view of Kitamori accounts for the fact that there is 
virtually no substantial reference, in his opus magnum (or other main works), of such 
loci classici of justification by faith such as Rom. 1:17, 3:24, 3:28, Gal. 2:16, 3:6-7, 
3:24. Perhaps Rom. 5:1 is the only Scriptural verse of this sort in his opus magnum 
which Kitamori uses in his discussion on Deus absconditus. In this verse we read: 
"Therefore, having been justified by faith, we have peace with God through our Lord 
Jesus Christ." Commenting on this verse, Kitamori writes: "Here Paul is saying that 
though he was once the object of the real wrath of God, now he is no longer so, and 
he has now obtained peace with God since Jesus Christ bore the real wrath for him 
and overcame it.' We note the last clause beginning with "since. . . ." 
Justification is understood as Christ overcoming the wrath of God. We see now that 
Kitamori has interpreted justification as the Pain of God embracing the sinner. 
Justification as certitude to be obtained through the daily exercise of faith is foreign to 
Kitamori concept. The Pain of God is absolute salvation, which knows little of tentatio.' 
Innis can be seen as closely related to his concept of the Pain of God as a 
contradictory unity of wrath and love or Law and Gospel, which is a dialectic in God 
and not vis-a-vis us. 
"Pain, 111. 
mro my knowledge Kitamori does not discuss the problem of Anfechtung in 
Christian faith. We understand this particular trait of Kitamori well when we consider 
what causes Anfechtung in the believer's life. Luther says: "Es muB Anfechtung 
sein: entweder widerfahrt dir Krankheit des Leibes oder deine Kinder sterben, daB du 
sagen m5chstest `ich wollt, du warst im ersten Bad gestorben', oder dein Weib ist dir 
untreu oder anderes Ungliick geschieht, so daB du denkst, Gott sei von dir gewichen" 
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The Pain of God is salvific love, which now embraces the unembraceable 
fallen reality of man just as it is. The wrath of God is a constant reality as the 
reaction to human sin; but the Pain of God constantly bears this wrath upon itself, the 
wrath which should have fallen upon man. Redemption is universal and absolute. 
The world is under the Pain of God, Pain which only waits to be recognized and 
received as the all-victorious love of God. 
Does this mean, then, that everything is harmonious with this all-embracing 
love of God called the Pain of God? In the theology of the Pain of God, what do we 
then do with the remaining problems, sins in ourselves, miseries, suffering, and 
meaninglessness in the lives of Christians as well as in the world at large? 
Existence in the Pain of God 
In an essay on Buddhism written by Kitamori, he quotes the well-known Zen 
scholar Daisetsu T. Suzuki as saying that the Absolute in the East, "like a mother, 
unconditionally embraces all and does not say whether one is good or the other 
evil."'" According to Kitamori, this saying was made in view of Christianity, 
(quoted in Ratschow, 234). In addition to these things which belong to "das gemein 
creutz," one sees his own existence under God's law which accuses him before God. 
In Kitamori, both elements are, so to speak, "neutralized" by the Pain of God; as to 
the former, sufferings in this world are made meaningful as a witness to the Pain of 
God, and as to the latter, the tension between God's wrath and love is transposed into 
the inner divine sphere. Although he speaks of the struggle of faith (Logic, 44-45; 
God, 118-119.), his conviction of God's absolute embracement a priori excludes the 
dimension of true Anfechtung of faith. 
13'Kitamori, Japanese Heart and Christianity (Tokyo: Yomiuri Shinbun Sha, 
1973), 26. 
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especially concerning its "legalistic" overtone.'" Discussing this "critique" of 
Suzuki, Kitamori defends Christianity with his idea of the Pain of God which 
embraces all sinners while maintaining the righteousness of the law.'" But, in turn, 
Kitamori criticizes this Zen scholar's saying as "a typical conservatism maintaining 
status quo.' Kitamori, in this essay, wants to advance his view that in true 
evangelical Christianity, that is, the Gospel of the Pain of God, one does full justice to 
the religious concern in the East and to the Christian notion of the Father who 
embraces all men while maintaining His righteousness intact. 
In Kitamori's view, a conservatism which only affirms the status quo, 
whether religious or ethical, is impossible according to the character of the Pain of 
God. In other words, Kitamori underlines a strong ethical motif and Ansatz in his 
theology. Above we saw the dialectic movement of the divine love in Kitamori's 
thought; the immediate love of God has turned into the wrath of God, then the love of 
God which bears upon itself the wrath of God is the Pain of God, and lastly the love 
of God based upon the Pain of God is the divine love triumphant. We also recall that 
this dialectic movement is not a linear development of divine love. It is at the same 
time the simultaneous coexistence of the divine love in three orders. The "field" of 
this coexistence is then the Pain of God. This means that the Pain of God possesses a 





field of this coexistence of wrath, Pain and love, the Pain of God is divine love of the 
second order. For the following presentation, we here again pay particular attention 
to this concept--the "structure" of divine love in Kitamori's thought. 
"The true essence of the pain of God," writes Kitamori, "is to be found 
when it develops directly into a love that is rooted in his pain."" This underlining 
of the development of the Pain of God is almost ubiquitous in Kitamori's writing. 
"The Pain of God is immediately the 'love' of God," he says also elsewhere."" 
Kitamori also emphasizes the renovative power of the Pain of God using abstract 
concepts: "The Ultimate and most Concrete [that is, God in Pain] is the Being who 
accepts and embraces all our contradictions and, at the same time, encourages us to 
wrestle with the contradictions for their concrete solutions."'" 
From the above observation we recognize that Kitamori is deeply concerned 
with the power of the Pain of God for the ethical renewal of man. As a matter of 
fact, this emphasis on the renovating power of the Pain of God is understandable when 
we consider Kitamori's concept of the triumphant Pain of God. This Pain of God 
must demonstrate its triumphant power in sinners.' This strong concern can be 
'Pain, 93; here the word "nature" in Pain is replaced with "essence" due to 
Kitamori's distinction between nature and essence. 
'Cross, 42. 
"Contemporary Man, 269; this formula is in fact Kitamori's synthesis of the 
viewpoints of his teachers in philosophy, Nishida and Tanabe. Theology embraces 
philosophy as well in Kitamori's thought. 
""We recall Kitamori's scheme of the development of divine love: wrath, pain 
and love. In Kitamori's thought, the effect of the Pain of God necessarily becomes 
manifest in the actual life of man: "The love of God by itself is a truth separate from 
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clearly seen in his way of dealing with the doctrine of justification. In his Theology of 
the Reformation Kitamori discusses Luther's theology as well as Calvin's.' In this 
work he tries to understand the two Reformers' respective theologies in the light of his 
own theology of the Pain of God. One of the major concerns in this work is the 
problem of justification and sanctification, or faith and works. In dealing with 
Luther's doctrine of justification, Kitamori approaches this central issue of the 
Reformation under the subtitle of "Justification and Sanctification."' As for 
Calvin's theology, Kitamori is mainly concerned with the Genevan reformer's 
recognition, in Kitamori's view, of the "theological axiom" of "sola fide" wherein the 
"theological reality" of "fides et opera" fmds itself."' 
the Pain of God, but it points to the truth of the Pain of God and confirms it; . . . the 
Pain of God itself is victory [over the power of sin], but the victory is still not actual 
but potentially so; because it is still potential, the Pain of God can not be received as 
the truth; it is then the love that actualizes the truth of the Pain of God and confirms 
it," (Logic, 56-57). This indicates that unless the Pain of God becomes manifest in 
love, its truth is not established in actual reality. In other words, it requires empirical 
confirmation. 
'See note 125 above. 
'Reformation, 78. 
"'Ibid., 195. It is helpful toward the understanding of Kitamori's theology to 
note his way of grasping the central problem of Reformation theology. Kitamori 
interprets both Luther and Calvin from the viewpoint of a synthesis between faith and 
works. His dialectic of "axiom and reality" represents the same issue: fides et opera. 
In his view, "Luther is strong in 'axiom' while not sufficiently strong in 'reality,' 
whereas Calvin was strong in 'reality' while his view is not so clear in 'axiom'" (Auto 
II, 225-226). In other words, Luther is strong in "faith alone," while Calvin is strong 
in love. This means that "Lutheranism should learn the aspect of 'reality,' whereas 
Calvinism the aspect of 'axiom'" (ibid., 226). Underneath this argument, we notice a 
conceptual presupposition which we think is significant, namely that, in Kitamori, 
faith first is separated from work and then the two are synthesized again as a 
conceptual unity. This presupposes that "faith alone" ('axiom') is "not enough" but is 
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Particularly significant is Kitamori's approach to Luther's doctrine of 
justification."' First, Kitamori establishes the pivotal significance of this doctrine in 
the Reformer's theology, referring to the Smalcald Articles. Then, he takes up the 
Counter-Reformation document of Tridentinum to examine the Catholic position on the 
doctrine of justification. He concludes that the ultimate problem of Catholicism [seen 
from Protestant viewpoint] comes to a clear expression in its assertion that justification 
includes not only the forgiveness of sin but also sanctification, which is understood as 
a "substantial change" in the justified. As for Luther's doctrine of justification, 
according to Kitamori, it is more complicated than the current interpretation of the 
Reformer's thought, in which sanctification is simply separated from justification; 
Luther, to Kitamori, has understood justification as including both the forgiveness of 
sin and sanctification. Admittedly, here we are not concerned with the question of the 
objective tenability of Kitamori's interpretation of Luther.' Our intention is only to 
to be completed by love ("reality"). Does he not here mean the very concept of fides 
formata caritate, against which Luther waged a death-struggle? See note 56 in Chap. 
IV above. Luther's concept of faith is different from Kitamori's concept of faith 
which, as the 'axiom,' is to constitute a dialectical unity with the "reality." Luther's 
well-known preface to Lectures on Romans speaks of the dynamic character of faith, 
in which faith is characterized: "0 es ist eyn lebendig, scheffig, thettig, mechtig ding 
umb den glauben, das unmuglich ist, das er nicht on unterlas solt gutts wircken, usw" 
(WA, Bible, 7, 9:30-10:23). 
'cReformation, 78-80. 
"Kitamori claims that in Luther's thought faith and works are separate things 
also to the Reformer, and constitute a dialectic unity. Faith in Luther's thought, as we 
saw in Note 141 above, is a God-given dynamic reality which involves the whole 
existence and work of man and therefore cannot be separated from it. Kitamori first 
separates it into two different things and again synthesizes to a unity. This conceptual 
operation alone calls for Occam's razor. More serious, however is the danger of 
transforming faith into something that only belongs to the inner sphere of man. 
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grasp his understanding of the problem of Reformation theology. On the basis of 
what we briefly presented above, Kitamori says: "Thus understood, the problem of 
Reformation theology is, after all, concerned with the relationship between justification 
and sanctification, or, in other words, with the question of how to relate sanctification 
in salvation [justification(?)].""" We note from this quotation that the question of 
sanctification in salvation is Kitamori's own concern in his theology of the Pain of 
God. We discern that salvation in the sense of remissio peccatorum is a settled issue 
in Kitamori; justification (if we may still use this term in Kitamori's theology) is 
already an acccomplished work in God. It naturally follows that Kitamori's attention 
is now directed to the question of how the believers who have already been brought 
into the Pain of God shape their lives in this reality. The Christian existence in the 
Pain of God is now concidered on the basis of this theological understanding of the 
accomplished "justification." 
Kitamori's understanding of the believers' existence in the Pain of God can 
be understood from two perspectives: one is an ethic based on the Pain of God; the 
other is the service to the Pain of God, which is their witness to the Pain of God in 
the world or the "evangelistic ministry" of the believers. We shall take up these 
issues below. 
Since the Pain of God in its essence develops into the triumphant love of 
God of the third order, it is logical for Kitamori to see that "the true nature of the 
"Teformation, 93. 
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ethic of pain must be an ethic of love rooted in pain."' Ethics in the evangelical 
faith is thus ethics based upon the Pain of God. But what does this "ethic rooted in 
the Pain of God" mean? Since the Pain of God is another name for the Gospel in 
Kitamori's thought, we formally designate his ethical thinking as based on the Gospel. 
In the section "the Pain of God and Ethic" in his opus magnum, he writes, "it is our 
evangelical understanding that the power of sanctification is contained in forgiveness, 
and one is sanctified because of forgivness."" 
We now examine Kitamori's view of sanctification. He pictures substantial 
change for the sinner, saying: "By the power of love rooted in the pain of God even 
real sinners may be changed into lovable people, people who are actually good."' 
(Certainly, Kitamori is aware of the incompleteness of this "change" in this life, and it 
is for this very reason that even the triumphant love rooted in the Pain of God still 
finds itself in the Pain of God, which embraces the unembraceable.") One will then 
ask: What is this sanctified "lovable people," theologically speaking? What does 
Kitamori mean when he says "actually good people?" Does he speak of these things 
in a common-sense meaning, that Christians by and large are better people than 
non-Christians? If so, Kitamori's view would be less problematic, though quite 
nonsensical. But, if he speaks in the language of theology, one would say that 
"Pain, 93-94. 




Kitamori operates quite superficially. Nevertheless, this facile statement gives us a 
clue to understanding his ethical thinking. 
"The love for the unlovable [the Pain of God]," says Kitamori, "when it 
carries its effects through, manifests its power of transforming the unlovable into the 
lovable.' It is true, we hold, that the Gospel has the power of renewing the old 
Adam into the image of the new Adam. But this remains a formal statement; no 
tangible content can be described because sanctification is paradoxical in nature. For 
the more sanctified one is, the less he knows of his sanctified state and the more he 
recognizes his true sinfulness, sinfulness which remains vera peccata before God.'5°  
Kitamori, however, seems to advance the view that the Pain of God provides the 
power of sanctification for the sinner, a kind of sanctification which is empirically 
"registerable." 
Now we recognize that in his dealing with ethics Kitamori argues from his 
basic idea of love, from the position we have termed "love-ism." We remember that 
his concept of love is of a "human, all too human" nature. In other words, Kitamori's 
basic stratum of thought pertaining to love is centered upon that of eros."' Eros is 
"%anti, 142 (Pain, 94): " PAONAL44306.4iZZ14-itt ta t. LI0'))11.:1 , 
*Nfiliz..*A- Lit-q- Labt,21,6"e 3 
Cf. Logic, 69. 
Grislis, "Luther on Sanctification: Humility and Courage," Conseusus 
9 (January 1983), 3-16. 
"'With this issue we shall deal shortly. Eros is a kind of love which is 
"dependent on value," a "natural" love not knowing any pain. God's love in the first 
order in Kitamori's thought is this kind of love, which he calls "God's love in law." 
We quote a passage Kitamori writes in connection with the possibility of a true ethic: 
"Man's natural love is an impure love, and as such it cannot build a true ethic, 
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the basic ingredient. The divine love is also described in terms of the dialectic of eros 
and agape with the former as the basic driving force.' 
Here in this connection, it becomes clearer to us that the category of "value" 
seems to be intrinsic to his theology of the Pain of God. It may be worthwhile to 
pursue this point further. 
The category of "value" is comprehensive and profound. Although it is not 
possible to go into an analysis of it of any length, we recognize the basic importance 
of this category. We need this category in our appreciation of our being. Our very 
existence, in the Christian faith at least, has its inestimable value because it is given by 
God. Love is the basic value in our life. We appreciate nature around us and all the 
spiritual and physical blessings as invaluable and indispensable. Tradition and culture, 
civilization and technology are of indispensable value. 
Here we shall limit our discussion to the category of value as found in the 
concept of eros. Eros is, as Kitamori says elsewhere, the love dependent on the 
because it is a love dependent on the value of its object. This impure love—that is, sin 
—is provoked by the mediation of the law (Rom. 7:8). Why is it so? It is because the 
law says that God loves those who fulfill [the commandments of] the law. What this 
is saying is nothing but that God's love in the law is dependent on value" (Kitamori, 
"The Inevitability of the Reformation--In View of Ethics," Kazu Yamamoto, ed., 
Protestant Ethics in the Present Era [Tokyo: Sobunsha, 1959], 32). 
'Agape does not simply contradict eros. Agape is agape because it abandons 
the eros intrinsic in it. The agape of the Father became manifest when He abandoned 
His beloved Son. For the Father, His only begotten Son is the fountainhead of His 
Happiness. By abandoning the most valuable Being (the Son), God actually became 
the God of agape. This is the reason why I [Kitamori] hold that agape is not simply 
a transparent love but the Pain of God" (Introduction to Bible, 153-154). See also 
Literature, 201-202. 
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values of its object.' Once the values disappear from eros' object, eros also 
disappears, however intense it may have been. The category of value is of 
constitutive significance to eros. In the case of Kitamori, however, eros is not as 
"bad" as might be characterized by Anders Nygren." According to Kitamori, it is a 
natural love which most clearly manifests the intrinsic nature of love, immediate, 
intense, flowing like a water from the higher place downward.' The very love the 
Father has toward the Son, for Kitamori, is love of this nature.' In short, it is the 
love with the basic characteristics of eros, an "erotic" love, as it were. 
We can illustrate this aspect of Kitamori's thought by the concept of the Pain 
of God in the following way. We saw above that the Pain of God has occurred, on 
the one hand, because God has loved those of "minus value." God's love cannot be a 
"single-minded" love because humanity is not worthy of God's love due to the 
ugliness of man. Just as in ordinary human experience, God must make an effort in 
order to love the detestable. When this love of God loves us (in spite of our "minus 
value") with the strenuous efforts of His Pain, it implicitly presupposes God's judging 
our value. This value judgment is of the same nature as ours. Put differently, God 
'See note 152 above. 
'Pain, 94-95. 
'Ibid., 118, 122. 
'Speaking of the three orders of divine love, Kitamori discusses the love of 
the first order [the value-dependent love]: "The object of this love [of the first order] 
is the person worthy of receiving it. This immediate 'love of God' is expressed in the 
father-son relationship when God the Father loves his completely obedient son. We 
must consider such a Son, who deserves his Fathers's love, as none other than God 
the son, Jesus Christ" (ibid., 117). See also note 152 above. 
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basically operates with the same value category as humanity. Only on the basis of this 
value category can we understand why God must go through Pain when God loves the 
unlovable. It is painful to love those who are unlovable! 
Another aspect of the Pain of God is that it occurred when the Father gave 
up His Son unto death for sinners. In this case, the Pain of God means that the Father 
has abandoned the unabandonable, His only Son, "the foutain of his joy and 
happiness."'" This is a real sacrifice on the part of God, because the Father has 
abandoned the Son, a Being most precious to Him."'" Admittedly, these viewpoints 
involve many problematic issues; the most serious one would be Kitamori's 
"phsychologization" of God's inner consciousness,. a highly debatable operation 
indeed. But our concern here is limited to calling attention to the fact that such a 
"value" category as is found in eros is the main ingredient of Kitamori's version of a 
theology of love. 
Before we go further, we need to see Kitamori's position in a different light. 
It is a basic self-recognition of the believer in the Protestant faith that he is totally 
valueless in and of himself; he is nothing before God. This had to be true, even if 
man had never fallen and never been the sinner. We are never "valuable" by our own 
'Introduction to Bible, 153. 
'"We see here a synthesis of agape and eros in Kitamori's thought, which is 
now the Pain of God. It is true that also in Kitamori God's love as agape is an 
unconditional love toward man, but this agape as an "unconditional" love is not a 
natural one, "not from the beginning," as it were; but it is a "processed" love. The 
conditionality of love is overcome already in God, in His Pain. Concern here is 
whether or not one is disturbed by this idea that God makes psychological efforts to 
love us, because of our unworthiness before His sight. 
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right; because we are God's creatures, our existence is totally dependent on God's 
mercy. The fall is nothing but man's attempt to secure his own value by his own 
right. But when we are actually sinners with a bottomless abyss in ourselves, this 
truth applies to us all the more. In this sense, Kitamori rightly emphasizes our 
ugliness, detestableness and unlovableness. In fact, in terms of ethical values, we 
remain so even after we are justified and even "sanctified." But, on the other hand, 
we are told that God loved us so deeply that He even gave Himself for our sake in the 
Son. It means, as we understand it, that we are "valuable" in His sight despite our 
deep sinfulness and rebellious nature. This is an evangelical comfort which a sinner, 
deeply acknowledging his unworthiness, may receive from God the Creator and the 
Redeemer in all humility. Man is not at all worthy in his own right before God either 
religiously or ethically, but he is truly worthy of God's love, because he is God's 
creature; he is given a value, an ontological value, as we may call it. We understand 
this as the nature of divine agape.' 
"Seiichi Hatano, who also inspired Kitamori, discusses the nature of agape in 
his Time and Eternity. Admitting that our love in actual reality cannot transcend the 
character of eros, Hatano sees that agape helps eros transcend its limits. Then he 
characterizes the nature of agape as follows: "In contrast [to the limitations of eros] 
the first characteristic of agape consists in the fact that it unconditionally makes the 
[benefit of] other [human beings] its own principle [of being], transcending the 
mediating limiting principle [of eros]. Seen from the subject [of agape], it has 
nothing to accomplish [for its own sake by loving] nor must anything necessitate [its 
loving from outside]; seen from the other [to be love in agape], [all concerns for] the 
quality or qualification and all the value concept [in the person to be loved] are 
completely overcome" (in 77te Complete works of Seiichi Hatano: vol. 4, Takenosuke 
Miyamoto et al. eds. [Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1969], 427; emphasis mine). 
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"A true ethic," writes Kitamori, "is possible only when love is intense.' 
The term "intense" is a key word in Kitamori's ethical thinldng. This term denotes 
the intensity of love, but in addition to this it also connotes the genuiness of love. 
The commandment "Love your neighbor as yourself' affirms, says Kitamori, the 
intensity of self-love, not self-love itself. The basic issue in Kitamori's ethical thought 
is that our love for our neighbors must be intense and genuine. Thus, he reads the 
commandment of love: "You shall love your neighbor as intensely as you love 
yourself."' "Rejoice with those who rejoice, and weep with those who weep" 
(Rom. 12:15) is another Scriptural basis for Kitamori's ethical thinking. The intensity 
and genuiness of love find its expression when one rejoices and weeps in solidarity 
with those rejoicing and weeping.'' 
Conceiving his ethical ideas during "the days of pain," Kitamori naturally 
identifies his theology also as an ethic of Pain. When sorrows and pains are 
predominant, ethics must become the ethic of pain. This ethic consists of a genuine 
solidarity with those who are in pain and sorrow.' In other words, love, in 
solidarity with those who weep, must be as genuine and intense as if the neighbor's 
pain and sorrow were one's own. If, with "a pained appearance" and a pretension of 
sympathy "with our neighbor's pain," "we actually only want to stare curiously at him 
'6°Pain, 85. 
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pain," it surely is a sin "worthy of death."'" 
Kitamori's orientation is toward an individual ethic, and belongs to the 
so-called "Gesinnungsethik," in which the individual's inner quality is of central 
concern. Love in genuiness, purity and intensity in the individual's ethical 
consciousness is the scope of Kitamori's idea of ethics. To him, one of the tasks of 
ethical thinking is finding out how to restore love to its proper intensity and genuiness. 
Thus, in keeping with his doctrine of sin, or the fundamental disorder of man's 
existence, "love's disorder," Kitamori posits that the goal of ethics is the restoration of 
love in the man who is allowed to enter into the Pain of God.' 
Following Karl Holl's interpretation of Luther in his "Der Neubau der 
Sittlichkeir , Kitamori sees the realization of a true ethic is found in the dialectic 
movement, a movement of the initial ego-centered, natural "Gewolltes" through the 
"Gesolltes" to the final "Gewolltes" in which the natural inclination of human will and 
the objective ethical demand find their synthesis.' In Kitamori's view, there is a 
development of this ethical concept (though not following a temporal sequence) which 
can be traced from Augustine through Kant to Luther.' Translated into Kitamori's 
category of love, eros love ("Gewolltes") is to be elevated by the Pain of God 
("Gesolltes") to agape love (nGewolltes"). On this final stage, agape love is a 
"Ibid., 85-86. 
'"The core of ethics," writes Kitamori, "consists in pure love [ ]," 
(Yamamoto, Protestant Ethics, 19). 
'Ibid. 97. 
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synthesis of "Wollen" and "Sollen" with genuiness and intensity--the true nature of 
love. Our "ethical imperative" is fulfilled in this higher order of the Gewolltes of 
love. 
Kitamori's ethic is a strongly individualistic ethic. Does this then mean that 
he has no scope for social ethics from the viewpoint of the Pain of God? Not at all. 
Yoshio Noro, a former student of Kitamori, informs us that Kitamori was a theologian 
who more than anyone else pointed out the Church's responsibility to social and 
political issues.' As a matter of fact, Kitamori often speaks of socio-ethical issues 
in his earlier writings. The Pain of God is not a partial truth; rather, it is the truth 
embracing the complete reality of man, including also social reality. Once before he 
spoke of the nation of Japan as "a collective neighbor," indicating his concern for the 
Kitamori also theologically grounds the socio-ethical commitment in his 
concept of the Pain of God. His argumentation for ethics based on the Pain of God 
'"Against this tendency of the church to isolate herself from the 
contemporary social and political matters, Professor Kitamori points out that, if the 
church wishes to be the witness to the love of God, she has to extend herself outward 
in order to fight, forgive and embrace man's disobedience to God which is the real 
problem of social and political matters" (Noro, Impassibilitas, 87). 
'Looking back to the nation of Japan during the war, Kitamori reflects on the 
relationship between Christians and the nation: "The nation as a worldly order 
belongs to the sphere of darkness, an institution breaking the order of creation; I could 
not find a good side to our nation. The most clear evidence of this was that she was 
waging war and going along the way of destruction and tribulation. But was it then 
sufficient for the Christians only to curse the nation and pronounce its destruction? Is 
it not possible for us to conceive of the nation as 'a collective neighbor' and therefore 
as the object of the Christians' love? Or is it totally impossible for the Christians to 
have patriotic love? (Auto II, 179). 
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runs as follows: the salvation given to us in the Pain of God bears the character of 
pain; in other words, the Pain of God involves a "radical contradiction" within itself. 
"Since the completeness [of salvation] is based upon the Pain of God," warns 
Kitamori, "it never allows him [the believer] to sit in a [laissez-faire] affirmation of 
the status quo [of social injustice].' "The hearts of [those who believe in this] 
salvation" know in themselves a sincere desire to ameliorate and remove concrete 
contradictions in society at large."' The Pain of God necessarily develops into a 
love which conquers contradictions in human reality. "This love," says Kitamori, "is 
the principle that works for the change of current situations.""2 Man's love, 
energized by the love of God in Pain, mobilizes him to change the social status quo 
into a better condition. In social practice, advises Kitamori, the believers must learn 
shrewdness from the children of this world in order for their efforts in society at large 
to be effective."' Thus, in the believer's concrete ethical life, the Pain of God 
provides the basic motor for socio-ethical efforts, whereas practical measures for their 
effectivity need to be learned and thought out concretely. 
Kitamori's theological reflection on ethics does not go beyond this principle. 
In other words, he has no specific social ethics on the basis of his theology. We 






nature of his theology.'" This leads us then to speculate whether Kitamori's 
assertion of the church's socio-ethical responsibility really contains a formative force 
in it,'" since in order for his theology to have a formative force, the assertion needs 
to be specified and applied theologically.' 
Above we pointed out that in Kitamori's thought the order of creation does 
"'Because Kitamori is concerned with the restoration of the purity of love in 
the subject and confines his ethical reflection as a Christian theologian to the level of 
Gesinnung, it is only natural for him not to have a specific Christian social ethic. 
What this does entail is clear: concrete ethical measures largely tend to be taken from 
worldly practice. This in itself is not questionable, but does become questionable 
when one loses the sight of the "sharp" edge of the divine commandments which 
should urge the Christians to speak out for love and justice. In addition to this, we 
have to say that, being justified by faith, the purity of our inner disposition should be 
"immaterial." One is reminded of Luther's bold words to Melanchton: Pecca 
fortiter, sed fortius fide! 
'Noro, who informs us that Kitamori was a theologian most sensitive to 
socio-ethical matters in his years at seminary, in the same dissertation, reflects on his 
previous remark: "Although I wrote that he is different from other Japanese 
theologians . . . , he does not give us in his theology the power to fight evils in our 
political and social life. His theology gives us the impression that we should rather 
stay in the pain caused by these evils" ("Impassibilitas," 99). 
"We have remarked above that Kitamori's ethical thinking is focused on the 
purity of the disposition of an individual ethical subject. This ethical orientation in the 
direction of Gesinnungsethik is more aldn to the traditional Japanese judgement of 
ethical conduct. If the motive of an individual in his action is pure, the action can be 
pardonable even when it is objectively breaking an established law or results in an 
irresponsible action. The Lutheran ethics is contrary to this type of "ethics of 
disposition." The following word of Dietrich Bonhoeffer can be a critique to 
Kitamori's ethical thinking: "Whoever wishes to take up the problem of a Christian 
ethic must be confronted at once with a demand which is quite without parallel. He 
must from the outset discard as irrelevant the two questions which alone impel him to 
concern himself with the problem of ethics, 'How can I be good?' and 'How can I do 
good?', and instead of these he must ask the utterly and totally different question 
`What is the will of God?'" (Eberhard Bethge, ed., Ethics, tr. N. H. Smith [London: 
Collins Clear-Type Press, 1968], 188). It is suggestive that Bonhoeffer's ethical 
concept has been one of the major socio-ethical resources in the post-war Japanese 
Protestantism, particularly in the Kyodan (cf. Chap. 2, 45-46, above). 
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not have its own positive meaning, lying in the shadow of the order of redemption. 
Creatio continua is totally missing from Kitamori's theology. This fact pertains to the 
formulation of theological ethics in that his theology is formalistic and passive. In 
other words, the theology of the Pain of God is less than conducive to a positive 
formulation of Christian social ethics. One of the reasons for this is to be sought in 
the fact that in Kitamori's theology the use of the Law has no significant place, not 
only its usus civilis but also usus spiritualis. 177 We can see this in his understanding 
of the Law in particular. It is reduced to the category of love in his love-ism. He 
says for instance: "Law is, in short, the will of God which loves only the 
lovable."' An ethic based upon the Gospel alone (as is the case in Kitamori) is 
bound to be limited in its scope."' When Kitamori reduces all the theological issues 
into the category of love in his love-ism, its effect is most visible in the narrowing of 
the ethical scope. 
InTo my knowledge there is no passage in Kitamori's writing which deals with 
the traditional understanding of the Law's preserving function in the fallen world. 
This is an expression of God's love which, while accusing and preserving, leads to the 
encounter with the Gospel. Since Kitamori sees the fallen reality lying outside even 
the preserving love of God and under the wrath—divine love betrayed, it is logical for 
Kitamori not to have any "positive" idea of the Law. One may suspect that this 
absolute antithesis between the wrath and the love of God is something which is 
required by the iron-firm scheme of thesis-antithesis-synthesis in his theology. 
"Pain, 91. 
"When Kitamori conceives of the Gospel solely in the category of love—in his 
narrower, personalistic sense, it is natural for him to interpret the Gospel as the 
restoration of this love. To him, the Gospel alone realizes a true ethic, and the 
content of this realization of a true ethic is, as we saw, the purification of love. This 
internalization of ethics inevitably narrows the scopes of ethics. The Gospel cannot be 
the content of ethics in this world. Rather, the Gospel supports man's broken ethical 
existence. 
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Though obviously concerned with socio-ethical issues, he is hardly a social 
revolutionary. In dealing with concrete social issues, he is an earth-bound realist. 
Perhaps it can even be said that he is too realistic. A sophisticated political deftness is 
acknowledged by Kitamori himself.' The rules of play of this world, holds 
Kitamori, should not be discarded in a puristic naiveté. Tactical insights are needed 
to achieve designed goals in this world. Behind Kitamori's ethical "realism" we 
readily recognize his deeply pessimistic view of the fallen world under the wrath of 
God. The reality of this world is formidable, against which human efforts for its 
betterment often avail little. In view of this, we can now see that on the one hand 
Kitamori insists on the necessity of social commitments for the believers, but, on the 
other hand, he also warns that socio-ethical commitments do not solve the deep 
problem of human existence.' 
Kitamori's sober recognition of reality is surely important. In fact, there is 
no place for a utopian optimism in this world. In this sense, Kitamori's viewpoint is 
quite balanced. The question will then be how the theology of the Pain of God locates 
a relative betterment of reality in its system and how it works this out in its actual 
practice. 
Characteristically, Kitamori sees intercessory prayer as the basic link which 
'Recalling the difficulty to involve Shigehiko Sato in JELC's commitments--
Sato was aloof from the "synodical" fellowship, causing a lasting friction within this 
church body in 1930—, Kitamori says: "It would have been far better if Dr. [J. M. 
T.] Winther had had higher political skills and could hold Sato in his hands" (Ruteru, 
December, 1971). 
'My Reflection on Life, 12-13. 
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relates those who are in the Gospel (the Church) to the "outside" world. "Believers," 
says Kitamori, "are to seek the most effective possible means of socio-ethical work, 
and at the same time they must be aware of the existence of the bottomless abyss, [an 
awful reality] which opens its mouth under the [relative] problems on the surface of 
reality."'" It is the Christian's duty to "bring intercessory prayers to the merciful 
Lord for the forgiveness of the fallenness [of the 'outside' society]."'" The fallen 
world lies under the wrath of God, but, says Kitamori, in the light of the 
commandment "you shall love your neighbor as yourself," one must include the 
unbelievers in understanding of the phrase "your neighbor".'" UnbelieVers are 
borne by the believers and carried by their intercessory prayers into the Pain of 
God.'" In this sense, the world is sustained by believers who are already in the Pain 
of God. In Kitamori's thought, this intercessory praying is the most essential work 
Christians and the Church should perform for the outside world. In comparison with 
this, concrete socio-ethical commitments are of only relative significance.'" Against 
this background, we now better understand the conservative tendency of Kitamori's 
socio-ethical thinking. 





'See Chap. 2, note 77 above. 
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efforts, the sum total of the abysmal reality is the manifestation of God's wrath.' 
For this reason, Kitamori so strongly emphasizes the believers' intercessory prayers. 
By regarding intercessory prayer as the ultimate form of the believers' commitment to 
this fallen world, Kitamori lets us understand more clearly why he does not develop 
social ethics despite his claim of the socio-ethical impact inherent in the concept of the 
Pain of God and why he has confined Christian ethics to the realm of individual 
Gesinnungsethik. Even Christian ethics does not avail very much. How then can 
Christian existence become meaningful in this world if not in ethical sphere? 
But in this reality Kitamori sees salvation. Not beyond this reality but in the 
midst of this reality he finds salvation. What is this salvation? Now, the meaningless 
reality of suffering is made into the symbol of God's suffering in Pain. The deeper a 
suffering is, the deeper it symbolizes the Pain of God. In a deeply moving tone, 
Kitamori writes about the sufferings of the Japanese people during World War IL The 
period was characterized by the popular saying of the time: "Life lasts only 
'In the above we established that in Kitamori's thought there is no more 
wrath of God in an ontological sense, but at the same time it exists in a 
phenomenological sense. When we again have to speak of the wrath of God, we 
understand this in a phenomenological sense. The wrath of God still remains a 
formidable reality even if it is ontologically overcome. Certainly, it can be questioned 
whether this circular operation of taking away, and replacing again, the wrath of God 
contains a theological paradox relating the problem of the suffering of both God and 
man. Be this as it may, Kitamori also makes the following distinction regarding the 
reality of the wrath of God vis-a-vis the world: "When man is brought into the Pain 
of God, the wrath which has been directed to him is resolved [ Ank toz ] and his 
pain healed. But that the love of God has overcome the wrath of God means the 
overcoming [ not the dissolution [ of the wrath of God; for 
this reason the love of God must [continually] bear the wrath of God upon itself" 
(Character, 60). 
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twenty-five years.'" Hardly any family was without war casualties. At that time 
Kitamori wrote: "In our time infinitely precious resources [the suffering of the 
people] have poured into the making of our age to the age of pain."" Even if all 
the efforts of the world turned out to be meaningless, wrote Kitamori, one thing would 
never become meaningless, the fact that "the world has suffered today as never 
before.' Kitamori should assert this; this could not be left unsaid. The suffering 
the people experienced was beyond description. How could all the sufferings have 
any meaning? "It is," Kitamori writes, "because the suffering and pain of the world is 
the symbol of God's suffering and pain."'' Suffering and misery which fall upon 
man under the wrath of God are now given a profound meaning as they become the 
symbol of the Pain of God. 
It is in this context that Kitamori pronounces with a strong conviction that 
the Pain of God is "the ultimate truth of salvation and the king of all truth."' The 
truth that God Himself is in Pain for the love of the world, holds Kitamori, would 
have never been actualized if it were not for the suffering of Japan at that time.' 
The sufferings then were instrumental to the articulation of the truth of the Pain of 
'Itand, 208 (Pain, 137). 
'Pain, 137. 
'Rand, 208-209 (Pain, 137). 
"Ibid, 209 (ibid.). 
'Ibid. (ibid.) 
` 93Pain, 137. 
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God. Thus, even the most meaningless suffering is given meaning, the meaning of 
serving God who is in Pain. One can readily see that Kitamori is here dealing with 
the problem of suffering. Surely, he assures us that his primary theological concern is 
with the Pain of God and not with man's suffering. But in Kitamori's theology the 
doctrine of God and that of man's salvation are indivisibly interwoven with each 
other. In Kitamori's thought, theology is soteriology. Soteriology inevitably reflects 
the deepest concern of man's existence in reality. Thus seen, the theology of the Pain 
of God is to a great extent motivated by the problem of human suffering, and that of 
theodicy.'" 
According to Kitamori, man's suffering (which by itself is "dark, 
'"It is recognizable that this theodicy motif has been latent in Kitamori's 
theology. However, in view of his earlier writings, he does not seem to have been 
aware of this himself. Even throughout his career as theologian, he has been 
convinced that the Pain of God is not anthropologically conditioned. It, to him, is a 
divine revelation ("we cannot believe the pain of God unless it is his revelation" [Pain, 
25]). But three decades later, in connection with his review of a work of Rinzo Shiina 
(a novelist who became Christian in the early 1950's), Kitamori expresses a clear 
theodicy motif in his theology. In this work (Three Accusations, [published almost 
simultaneously with Kitamori's opus magnum1), Shiina accuses God for His making 
this world so inexorably dualistic and contradictory: "0, God! [You made two human 
beings, a male and a female, the creation which, I believe, symbolizes the 
contradiction in Yourself.] Due to the fact that the expression of Your love is the 
contradiction of two things, humanity from its very beginning has been trapped in the 
tragedy of contradiction. In the beginning there was a contradiction. And there will 
be a contradiction in all eternity" (quoted in Kitamori, Literature, 64-65). Kitamori 
was overwhelmed when he read this work. We understand that the impact this 
experience had on Kitamori is due to his deep affinity with Shiina. In response to this 
viewpoint of the novelist, Kitamori writes: "The turning point of this man from God's 
accuser to His believer is to know that this accused God is already the executed God. 
I intuitively felt then that a man [like Shiina] who accuses God and wants to kill Him 
is only hair-breadth from [the faith in] 'the Crucified God'" (ibid.; emphasis is mine). 
Perhaps this response is a clear expression of Kitamori's theodicy motif in his own 
theology. 
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meaningless and barren") is brought into the sphere of light when it is allowed to 
serve as a witness to the Pain of God.' By serving as a witness to the truth of the 
Pain of God, man's pointless suffering is given meaning and, by the same token, its 
meaninglessness is overcome. Kitamori speaks of the conquering of the 
meaninglessness of man's suffering as follows: 
By serving as witness to the pain of God, our pain is transformed into light; it 
becomes meaningful and fruitful. By the pain of God which overcomes his 
wrath, our pain, which had hitherto been the reality of the wrath of God, ends in 
salvation from this wrath. By serving the pain of God which is the glad news of 
salvation, our pain ends in sharing this salvation.'" 
In this passage Kitamori tries to express his strong conviction that the meaninglessness 
of man's suffering is overcome through its service as a witness to the Pain of God. 
How can our suffering witness to the Pain of God? We shall deal with this issue at 
some length later. This much is to be said here: our suffering makes it possible for 
us to recognize God's suffering and through our suffering the revelation of the Pain of 
God becomes actual.' Yes, for man to know that God is suffering is indeed to win 
salvation in the midst of his desperate suffering! God also suffers like us! Then, it is 
not only to give witness to the Pain of God, but also, through his own suffering, man 
becomes united with God in Pain. Unio mystica in dolore! 
From the passage quoted above, we realize that to know and to let others 
know that God is in Pain is salvation itself. Only on the basis of this concept can we 
'Pain, 52. 
'Ibid., 52-53. 
"The Pain of God is "a new pronunciation" of "the old words" (Pain, 59). 
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understand Kitamori's idea of overcoming of the meaninglessness of human suffering 
under the wrath of God. But in order to know more about the nature of the 
conviction of Kitamori, we need to consider more closely the logic behind it. 
But, before a closer examination one specific matter needs to be mentioned: 
Kitamori's basic idea that the Pain of God must be witnessed through our suffering. 
When Kitamori says that the truth of the Pain of God would have never become actual 
if it were not for the mediation of the suffering of the Japanese people, we see the 
focal point of his basic idea.' Already Kitamori's idea of the suffering of man 
serving as a witness to the Pain of God implicitly indicates the necessity of human 
suffering in order for the Pain of God to be known. This basic idea is expressed with 
clarity when Kitamori writes: "The Pain of God must be witnessed. For this purpose 
man's pain must occur to become the symbol of the Pain of God. In other words, the 
wrath of God must be made actual. Thus, we come to seek the wrath of God."'' In 
Kitamori's view, the Old Testament prophets sought the wrath of God, and even wrath 
for the sake of wrath. Likewise, we seek the wrath of God, says Kitamori, but, 
unlike the prophets, we seek it in order that the Pain of God may be witnessed by our 
'Pain, 137. 
"Itami, 90 (Pain, 64). The Pain of God must be witnessed. But the Pain of 
God cannot be recognized by man immediately. The Pain of God must be witnessed 
by the pain of man. For this reason, the service [of human pain] is called to be the 
witness to the Pain of God" Character, 56). "In order for the Pain of God to become 
recognizable, the pain of man must serve as the witness to the Pain of God. Since the 
Pain of God is the Pain of God, it would remain transcendent and apart from man's 
recognition if it were not for the witness [through human pain]" (Logic, 55). 
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pain, Kitamori's idea of pain brought forth by the wrath of God.' Kitamori's idea 
here is to positively seek the wrath of God and our pain. 
Here we encounter a striking idea from Kitamori. Together with his already 
pronounced concepts of the relationship between the pain of man and the Pain of God, 
this constitutes a complex of thought with various ideas interwoven with one another. 
Though complicated, this thought complex is able to reveal the very basic theological 
concern in Kitamori. 
There are four components here. First, the pain of man is the manifestation 
of the wrath of God. This is a clear concept. Second, the Pain of God occurred in 
order that it might heal the pain of man, the Pain of God bearing upon itself the wrath 
of God. "Our God is the One who resolves our pain and the Lord who heals."' 
We can grasp this idea easily. Now, third, the pain of man is healed when it serves 
as witness to the Pain of God. Although this thought is not as clear as those 
preceding, we interpret this as indicating that meaningless sufferings can be made 
meaningful if they serve the Pain of God. Finally, Kitamori says, as we have just 
seen, that the pain of man must occur in order to give witness to the Pain of God so 
that people may know God's Pain as the salvific reality. None of these four ideas are 
difficult to understand when taken individually. 
What is the problem then? Each item, taken by itself, is understandable. 
When put together, however, their relationship with one another becomes difficult to 
2cItami, 90 (Pain, 64). 
3MPain, 20. 
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grasp. The problem is as follows: What does Kitamori mean by "healing" when he 
holds that the Pain of God occurred for the healing of our pain? We raise this 
question because Kitamori seems to advance an opposite view to this postulate when 
he strongly insists that our pain must occur to give a witness to the Pain of God. In 
other words, he seems to be taking away what he gave previously. Or the goal (the 
healing of man's pain) and the means to the goal (the Pain of God) are made so fluid 
that the goal becomes the means and vice versa. Put pointedly, the Pain of God, 
which is said to heal the pain of man, needs the pain of man as a witness to itself; but 
this witness to the Pain of God is intended to make known to those under the wrath of 
God the message that the Pain of God heals man's pain. The key to the understanding 
of this circular thought complex can be found if we ask what Kitamori means by the 
term "resolving" or "healing" our pain through the Pain of God. This brings us back 
to the question we raised at the beginning of this paragraph. 
When using the terms "resolving" and "healing," an actual resolving or 
healing of man's pain is usually understood. In eschatological fulfillment the final 
healing will be established; there will be "no more death, nor sorrow, nor crying," 
nor any more "pain" (Rev. 21:4). But Kitamori uses the terms "resolving and 
healing" in different meanings. Kitamori is, we believe, thinking of the conquering of 
the meaninglessness of suffering by knowing its God-given meaning, instead of the 
actual removal or healing of man's pain. Elsewhere Kitamori says that the real nature 
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of suffering consists in its unintelligibility.' In other words, for man to be resolved 
and healed from pain is to know the meaning of his sufferings. Such an 
"intectualized" understanding of "resolving" and "healing" is often helpful in the face 
of senseless empirical reality. In fact, when one knows the meaning of the suffering 
he undergoes, the suffering becomes not only tolerable but also meaningful. 
However, the problem with such an understanding is the inherent danger that the 
actual overcoming of suffering and meaninglessness is put aside while suffering and 
pain are made indispensable for the knowledge of a reality which is supposed to 
overcome these evils. The more overwhelming in value this "resolving and healing" 
reality is to a thinker, the more acute this danger would become. If such a 
preposterous development takes place in a system of thought, then it obviously fails to 
accomplish what it intends. 
To Kitamori, the reality of suffering and pain remains for the believer as 
well. This suffering reality is employed by God as the witness of His Pain.' Thus, 
'Using the analogy of an "impossible" division (e.g., 10 divided by 3), 
Kitamori identifies the real feature of suffering as its rational "indivisibility," saying: 
"The proper force of suffering consists in its 'indivisibility.' A suffering, the riddle of 
which is solved, is rationally 'divided' and whose fang is taken away; it is no longer 
suffering in its proper sense" (Character, 36). Without making any caricature of this, 
one would ask a question: if this be so, would the suffering of God still be suffering 
in its proper sense? For it seems that the suffering of God is meaningful; it aims 
namely to save a lost humanity. If divine suffering is not suffering in its proper sense 
due to the meaning given by love which overcomes suffering's meaninglessness, one 
can see that love and suffering are not intrinsically related, contrary to what Kitamori 




the remaining suffering is given an indispensable value by playing a role in the 
actualization of the knowledge of the Pain of God. Above we identified Kitamori's 
logically circular structure of the relationship between the pain of man and the Pain of 
God. The meaning of this structure now seems to emerge: the suffering of God and 
the suffering of man move in the same orbit of perpetual suffering; the Pain of God 
seeks the pain of man so that it may be known to suffering man; the suffering believer 
seeks the meaning of his suffering in its witness of the Pain of God. Thus, all reality 
ultimately converges on the suffering of God. The Pain of God has ultimately become 
the sole, absolute reality and value, to which the very existence of man 
is subordinated. God in suffering is to be glorified through man's suffering. This can 
be characterized as Kitamori's understanding of Soli Deo gloria.' 
The problem of suffering and evil is acute everywhere in our present aid)v. 
A reality filled with meaningless suffering often overwhelms man and leads him to 
absolute nihilism. Even though the sufferings man experiences can certainly be 
considered the result of the wrath of God, this conception should not be understood as 
a rational and objective theory; if it were so, the evangelical doctrine of God as a 
merciful Father would inevitably be jeopardized. The suffering under the wrath of 
God, even if it is formulated in rational terms, must ultimately remain an insolvable 
mystery. In this sense, it is helpful to read: "ReligiOse Frage werden nicht 
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[theoretish] gelost, sondern [praktisch] iiberwinden."' If one rationalizes the 
problem of evil in whatever way, it is inevitable for him to justify evil itself and give 
a meaning to it so as to justify the perpetuation of evil. 
We strongly perceive this danger in Kitamori's thought. Even a cruel reality 
can be made to serve the purpose of God, a theological procedure which brings the 
image of God to a point far away from the immediate presentation of Scripture. A 
typical example of this danger is found in Kitamori's exposition of "the Love of God" 
in his book, On God." In this discourse he takes up the awful cases of tragedy 
found in the Old and New Testament: Abraham who was ordered to sacrifice Isaac, 
Jacob and Rachel who lost their Joseph, and those mothers whose sons, under two 
years of age, were killed by Herod in connection with the birth of Jesus, an 
unintelligible event of which it is said: the prophesy of Jeremiah concerning the 
lamentation of Rachel is fulfilled. Kitamori then asks why the prophecy of Jeremiah 
must be fulfilled in the event of the birth of Christ? "Only through the deep sorrow 
and pain of those people who have lost their most beloved ones," writes Kitamori, "is 
the deep sorrow of the Father who has abandoned His most beloved Son 
witnessed."' In his view, this sacrificial love of God "must" be witnessed by man's 
sacrifice of his loved ones.' To serve the Pain of God with their utmost pains was, 






holds Kitamori, "the meaning of their [Abraham, Jacob and Rachel, and the mothers'] 
lives."' On this point Kitamori writes: 
God demands from man the sacrifice of everything to the service of His glory. 
But this God is also the Savior. To save man is to say that this God will do 
everything for the sake of man. Here is the most vital truth . . . . The 
traditional idea soli Deo gloria tends to affirm the Selbstsucht of God directly 
. . . . We understand this service to the glory of God as our service to God the 
Savior. The God who demands the service from man to His glory is the God 
who totally abandoned Himself for man. Man will therefore abandon everything 
to glorify the God who became the Savior of man, the Savior who has abandoned 
His glory.' 
It is clear that in Kitamori's thought God and man find themselves in the communion 
of suffering;2" God suffers for man's salvation, and man suffers for the glory of the 
God who suffers. God and man suffer for each other. In view of this, our 
observation above is confirmed; the Pain of God is considered the sole, absolute 
reality and value, to which man's life in pain is to be subordinated. We emphasize 
here that the Pain of God is the absolute reality in the sense that it is beyond the'  
"ordinary" blessing or suffering of human reality. In other words, man's suffering is 
unified with the Pain of God, the absolute Good. In this way, the pain of man is also 
glorified. The field of this communion of God and man is a tragedy of love. The 
"Ibid. 
"Ibid., 100. 
211Kosuke Koyama, who was "rewarded" by Kitamori with "a middle-sized 
pumpkin" for his bringing the manuscript of the teacher's opus magnum to the 
publisher, writes humorously: "Since then the sight of pumpkin has become a 
reminder to me of the truth of 'communion in pain' which Dr. Kitamori shares with 
us in his lucid exposition of the Pain of God" (116; italic is mine). Mutatis mutandis, 
"communion in pain" is an apt and pertinent expression of Kitamori's concept of the 
divine-human relationship. 
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whole issue bears the tone of tragedy. To properly describe this scheme of thought 
we scarcely have any word more suitable than pan-tragism. 
It is Kitamori's repeated admonition that "we must focus all of our concern 
on the Pain of God."' Behind this admonition there are two ideas present. First, 
Kitamori holds that a preoccupation with one's own suffering is a typical sign of 
sin." In Kitamori's view, sin diminishess the glory of God; man's concern with his 
own suffering is a concern for his own happiness. A true conversion, therefore, 
means that man is more concerned with the glory of God than with his own suffering 
or happiness.2'4 Second, so long as our suffering remains our main concern, we can 
never find its solution. The true conquest of our suffering can be obtained only when 
it is used by God Himself as a witness to His Pain." In addition to these clearly 
formulated ideas, it cannot be forgotten that Kitamori's vision of the Pain of God has 
a strong overtone of mysticism as we have already noted above. These three 
elements, presented by the Japanese theologian, true conversion, healing of suffering, 
and joy in the Pain of God, seem to account for the fact that Kitamori has made the 
Pain of God, or God Himself in Pain, the absolute reality, or the absolute Good. In 
one context, Kitamori says: "If we are so concerned with the Pain of God that our 
'Character, 40. 
=pain, 53.  
'Character, 42, 59. 
'Pain, 54. 
358 
own pain fades away, then we are saved from our sin."' In this short sentence the 
three elements are unified with the Pain of God as its center. 
Are then both the joy and the meaning of our existence ultimately found in 
the Pain of God? In other words, are they possible only through our actual suffering, 
suffering that results in living within God who is eternally in Pain? It is by now clear 
that Kitamori's answer to this question is definitely affirmative. To remain in the Pain 
of God through one's own suffering is the meaning of the existence of man. As is the 
case for the Biblical figures whom Kitamori cites in connection with his dealing with 
the sacrificial love of God, the believer's life is a life of dedicating his suffering to the 
witness of the Pain of God; at the same time the believer remains under the wrath of 
God, so that he really suffers pain. With his own pain the believer serves God in 
Pain. 
In this regard, it is highly significant that Kitamori takes up the "problem" of 
a situation in which "a shortage" of suffering becomes actual. Kitamori observes that 
in history there are two types of eras; one is "the era of life or joy" and the other "the 
era of death or pain."' When one finds himself in the era of joy, then, says 
Kitamori, one cannot serve the Pain of God because pain does not exist. This is "the 
problem of the era of joy."' Kitamori admits that ordinary happiness is a gift of 
God, which belongs to the sphere of the love based on the Pain of God, the love of 
2161tami, 75 (Pain, 54). 
'bid., 208 (ibid.,136). 
2' 8Character, 72. 
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the third order.' The "problem" of the lack of suffering in "the era of joy" to 
serve God in Pain is now solved by the "monastic ideals."' Kitamori holds that the 
monastic virtues (obedience, poverty, labor, fasting, celibacy, etc.) can be understood 
as the visualization of "the day of pain."' In other words, there must necessarily be 
"a double standard of moral [or Christian existence]": one standard for the "happy" 
majority (including the ordinary believers!) and the other for the exceptional 
minority.' Those who are exceptional, however, cannot provide suffering by their 
own making; if so done, their suffering would be only "a play."' In order to 
actively dedicate their suffering in service to the Pain of God they must possess 
"material" (that is, suffering), which must be true suffering, not self-made. The thing 
that is then left for those exceptional few to do is to pray to God that He provides the 
pain necessary for them to serve God in Pain.' To us who may happen to live 
more or less in "the era of life and joy," this may seem amazing, not to say absurd. 
Yes, it is a highly idiosyncratic idea of Kitamori that the era of joy (not a decadent 
joy, but a God-given "healthy" joy) becomes a "problem" that requires solution in a 







'Ibid. See note 200 above. 
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theology. The Pain of God is indeed the absolute value. 
"When I am dissolved in the pain of God and become one with him in pain," 
writes Kitamori, "it is pure joy, and there can be no greater happiness for me. In the 
Pain of God my pain is healed, my old self dies; I become God's obedient servant and 
am resurrected into a new life."' The highest form of man's existence is his 
existence in fellowship with God in His Pain. In this Pain of God there is an eternal 
bliss and resurrection to a new life. 
But we are strongly tempted to ask here at the end of this section: Is there 
then no real (we mean, not merely intellectual) overcoming of our actual pain and 
suffering? Is there any room for an eschatological hope in God in which we may 
expect "no more death, nor sorrow, nor crying," nor any more "pain" (Rev. 21:4)? 
The Eschatological Fulfillment of Salvation? 
"What will be the sign of Your coming, and of the end of the age?" (Matt. 
24:3). With this question that the Disciples present to Jesus, Kitamori begins the 
writing of his view of eschatology in his opus magnum.' To him, the sign of the 
end is ultimately not related with "the appearance of antichrists, wars, famines or 
earthquakes.' Certainly they are signs of the end, but with these signs the end has 
not yet arrived. Matt. 24:14 shows, he believes, that the Gospel alone is correlative 





rule of God.' This rule of God, says Kitamori, is made actual not by the power of 
God but by His love, His love being in fact the Gospel. Thus, the advent of the rule 
of God takes place when the Gospel [the Pain of God] is thoroughly and fully actua-
lized in the world "just [as] the air encircles the globe."' "A complete diffusion of 
the Gospel," writes Kitamori, "this is the sign of the End."' What does happen at 
the end? What is Kitamori's vision of the end? Unlike the richness of eschatological 
images contained in the Bible, Kitamori's vision of the end seems to be comparatively 
abstract and scarce. To Kitamori, "the End is the time when the ultimate thing is 
realized and the world finds its conclusion."' What is the conclusion the world 
finds at the end? "All unsolvable questions will be answered, all doubts will be 
resolved, and all tears will be wiped away."' "In short," writes Kitamori, "the 
world finds salvation."' 
Throughout Kitamori's eschatological discourse in his opus magnum, we do 
not find very much specific thought on the eschatological issues found in traditional 








Judgment, eternal life, the consummation of the Kingdom.' Surely, this particular 
feature of Kitamori's treatment of eschatology can be explained by the nature of 
eschatology itself; the reality of a new heaven and earth is largely beyond our 
comprehension. But we do not think this is a complete explanation of the scarceness 
and abstractness of Kitamori's view of the end. A full explanation is rather to be 
sought in the nature of Kitamori's theology. We have seen that in Kitamori's thought 
all human beings are already embraced in the Pain of God, thus objectively forgiven. 
This provides no room for the thought of a Last Judgment. We may also ask whether 
there is room in Kitamori's thought for the vision of an eschatological restoration of 
the world such as John the Seer saw on the island Patmos (Rev. 21:1-6) or as the 
Prophet Isaiah saw (Isa. 9:6-7, 11:6-9). With his idea of the eternal Pain of God, 
these blissful visions of the new heaven and earth may have been difficult for Kitamori 
to incorporate within his system.' 
In contrast to this relative silence on the end of the age, Kitamori deals 
'In Chapter 8 of his &planation to the Confession of Faith of the Kyodan, 
Kitamori seems to avoid going into the section "From thence he will come to judge 
the living and the dead," saying that he will omit an explanation of this section since 
he has "dealt with this in Chapter 5" (74), in which, however, there is no explanation 
of the Last Judgment. 
'To my knowledge, there is only one place where Kitamori explicitly takes 
up Rev. 21:1-4. In his Short Meditation, Kitamori characterizes this verse as "the 
most beautiful description of eschatological faith" (220). "The starting point of this 
ultimate solution [ Rffintxx& ] is based only upon the fact that 'God is with men.' 
The riddles imposed upon the world and our lives are, according to the Bible, due to 
our being not with God" (ibid.) The last meditation in the book (224-225) reproduces 
the viewpoint of his opus magnum as we have presented it above. As we see here, 
the main emphasis is on God's being together with us as the solution of the riddles of 
reality. 
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extensively with the "correlation" between the Gospel (as the Pain of God) and the 
tribulation of the world at the end. Kitamori finds a correlation between the Pain of 
God (which is, says Kitamori, also "God's tribulation" [ #vet J) 
and the eschatological tribulation of the world.' The end is the time, holds 
Kitamori, when the Gospel or the Pain of God is thoroughly and fully actualized.' 
Since the Gospel is the Pain of God, he sees, the tribulation of the world at the end 
will be also thoroughly and fully actualized.' That is, the eschatological tribulation 
will be of such an extent as to be proportional to the depth of the Pain of God. This 
tribulation will be a witness to the Pain of God. That the end is not yet, he interprets, 
means that the pain in the world is not yet fully actualized.' (For the end to come, 
must there be an unimaginable catastrophe, such as nuclear annihilation on a global 
scale proportional to the Pain of God?!) So the true sign of the end can be found by 
the extent to which the pain in the world is actualized. Through the tribulation which 
is intensified as the end approaches, holds Kitamori, we shall devotedly look to the 
full manifestation of the Pain of God.' This tribulation, by itself, is a dreadful 
reality because it is the manifestation of the wrath of God. But due to the grace given 
in the Pain of God, even this tribulation will be used as the witness to the Pain of God 
46Itanzi, 214 (Pain, 140). 
237Pain, 141. 
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and, by the same token, also healed.' This is analogous to the believer's 
experience of pain.' Here Kitamori follows the Biblical witness to the eschato-
logical sequence of events which Jesus Himself foretold in His "apocalyptic" 
discourse. Thus, Kitamori foresees that the end will be an intense tribulation, but at 
the same time humanity caught in it will be healed by the Pain of God, becoming a 
witness to it. 
In view of the Word of the Lord, we believe, we are to be prepared to meet 
the coming eschatological tribulation. However, Kitamori's attempt to correlate the 
tribulation with the actualization of the Gospel is an original interpretation of 
eschatology. Now, there arises a concrete problem. If the Gospel can only be 
actualized in proportion to the intensity of tribulation and if the end takes place when 
this tribulation reaches its deepest dimension, then what significance does our work for 
the betterment of the world have? Are we not commanded to work for the betterment 
of this created world, according to the will of God the Creator, even if we can only 
make relative improvements? Is it not necessary for us to work for our neighbor as 
well, while being prepared for the eschatological tribulation? Surely, we admit a 
paradox here. It seems, however, worth considering whether it is correct for us to 
directly correlate the actualization of the Gospel with an eschatological tribulation. 
For one thing, it deprives humanity of a foundation for both positive, constructive 
work and preventive endeavors. For another thing, it does not do justice to the 
'Ibid., 142. 
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judgmental aspect of the eschatological tribulation. These two issues are, however, 
each in its own way, in keeping with Kitamori's basic theological view: world 
pessimism and the all-embracing nature of divine Pain. 
Above we have paid attention to the abstractness and the formal character of 
Kitamori's eschatological view. We are deeply "curious" about what Kitamori has to 
say regarding eschatological fulfillment. Certainly, here in time, we cannot fully 
comprehend the whole range of eschatological hope. But one thing is a firm 
conviction of Christian faith relative to the end. "For I consider," writes Paul, "that 
the sufferings of this present time are not worthy to be compared with the glory which 
shall be revealed in us" (Rom. 8:18). But is it possible for Kitamori, with such a 
strong emphasis on the eternal Pain of God, to form any idea of a positive 
eschatology? When we use the term "a positive eschatology," it is Rev. 21:4 that we 
have in mind: "God will wipe away every tear from their eyes, there shall be no 
more death, nor sorrow, nor crying, no more pain, for the former things have passed 
away." If we follow Kitamori's line of thought, it would be quite natural to suppose 
that there is no room for such a "happy" eschatology. If he had such an eschatology, 
then he would be inconsistent with his basic idea of the Pain of God. It is, we 
believe, no accident that Kitamori does not have any positive vision of the 
eschatological fulfillment. To our knowledge, there is no clear statement in 
Kitamori's writing that pain will ultimately be removed from reality. Most probably, 
it is not possible for Kitamori to say that. If he had said so, then the Pain of God 
could not be eternal. 
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As a matter of fact, the chapter on eschatology is perhaps the weakest 
portion of his opus magnum, and this in terms of both forcefulness of language and 
richness of content. Only a cursory reading of the last few paragraphs would betray 
this weakness. What is, then, Kitamori's own notion of eschatology? The answer to 
this question is unmistakably given in the concluding chapter of Kitamori's opus 
magnum: "My prayer night and day is that the love rooted in the Pain of God may 
become real to all men. All human emptiness will be filled if this gospel is known to 
every creature, since the answer to every human problem lies in the gospel.n2" This 
statement actually summarizes what he says in the chapter of eschatology. 
But, we ask further, what does Kitamori mean when he says that the Gospel 
--the Pain of God--becomes actual? If there is no positive eschatology in Kitamori's 
theology, then only one possibility seems to remain: one's unio mystica with God in 
Pain. In fact, as long as the Gospel is understood as the Pain of God, an intrinsically 
negative reality, a positive eschatology is impossible. Further, if we recall our 
discussion on the ontology of love (love is suffering intrinsically), then it is only 
logical that Kitamori has no positive eschatology. 
In keeping with this train of thought, we can say that Kitamori's eschatology 
belongs to the type of "realized eschatology." Admittedly Kitamori mentions, though 
briefly, one aspect of the hope of the end. This hope is mainly, or rather only, 
concerned with the resurrection of "the body." Even this, however, is reinterpreted 
by Kitamori according to his basic idea of sin as falling from God's love. For 
'Ibid., 150. 
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Kitamori, "the body" represents "the mode of the fallen existence of man."' In 
contrast to this, says Kitamori, "the spirit" is the mode of being saved by and brought 
into the Pain of God despite this fallenness, and is already now life together with 
Christ.' From this contrast of spirit and body, we discern that Kitamori thinks of 
"spirit and body" as corresponding to the formula of semper Justus and semper 
peccator. "The body" then stands for semper peccator. This aspect of "always 
sinner" is to be fully brought into the Pain of God, or "spiritualized" to use Kitamori's 
own terminology. Accordingly, says Kitamori, "the resurrection of the body means 
"the fulfillment of salvation from the remaining mode of fallen existence."' 
Formally speaking, Kitamori thus captures one basic aspect of eschatology, a total 
redemption. But it is not in the "literal" sense of the resurrection of the body. What 
we are totally missing in Kitamori is the eschatological restoration of man and the 
world, or eschatology as the restoration of creation. We regard this as vital because 
in this alone we find hope in its proper sense, hope in the total renewal of man and 
the world into an eternal joy without the mingling of pain. Even with Kitamori's idea 
of total redemption, we are not quite sure whether this is a redemption of sheer joy. 
Is it even a continuation of man's mystical union with God, which is certainly joy--
but joy in Pain, since the essence of God is the Love based upon His Pain? For the 





thing seems to stand fast: the very concept of the Pain of God makes it ultimately 
impossible to have certain hope of salvation in eternal blessing and joy.' Kitamori 
says that the Pain of God stands for the love based on the Pain of God, but still, with 
his "essentialization" of the Pain of God, the aspect of love has been unmistakably 
overshadowed, to say the least. As long as God's love is eternally in Pain, we can 
never have an unmingled hope of His blessings in the world to come. The existence 
in the Pain of God knows no eschatological fulfillment of God's positive salvation. 
Transcending the empirical pain and suffering, the Pain of God is the absolute Good 
in which man finds his ultimate meaning and bliss, for in pain man is united with God 
in Pain, Pain as the character of God's love. 
Summary 
In Kitamori's thought God has brought man into being out of His love in 
such a way that man responds to God's love freely and spontaneously. Due to the 
nature of love which excludes any coercion, God's creation of man as the object of 
His love involves the risk of man's "betrayal" of divine love. Seeing that man's 
freedom and spontaneity in response to God's love de facto can only be actualized in 
man's defiance of divine love, God's creation of man already involves the Pain of 
247A remark made by Marshall Randles in his The Blessed God—Impassibility 
(1900) on the problem inherent in an outright affirmation of divine passibility is, 
mutatis mutandis, pertinent here: "If His sympathetic pity for us involves His 
suffering on our account, our pity for Him as the greatest of all sufferers must involve 
our deep suffering on His account--a state of things which cannot but disturb and 
depress our feelings as we approach Him for worship and communion, and thus alloy 
what should be our purest bliss on earth or in heaven" (176; quoted in Mozley, 170). 
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God. In fact, man has betrayed divine love and fallen from the sphere of His love. 
God's love in which He created man has turned to wrath as an ever-remaining reality. 
Man's own love is essentially corrupted and perverted. Because of divine wrath, 
man's reality as a whole has become ugly, absurd and meaningless. 
The fallen world lies under the wrath of God. But this wrath is borne by 
divine love. God Himself bears His own wrath upon Himself, which is God in Pain 
or the Pain of God. The curse and condemnation which should have been imposed 
upon man in the reality of creation are borne by God Himself in Pain. Thus, divine 
wrath no longer seeks the eternal annihilation of mankind. Objectively man finds 
himself in God's salvation. The reality of humanity is now in the Pain of God. 
Salvation is an objective and universal reality for man. God's Pain means the 
universal justification of humanity, but man must know this objective reality for this 
reality to become actual for him. Faith is then understood as knowing this reality and 
moving into the sphere of the Pain of God. 
To exist in the Pain of God means that man's love which has been corrupted 
and perverted is now restored to a real and authentic love toward both God and 
neighbor by the power of the Pain of God. Thus salvation signifies a renewal of 
man's ethical disposition. The restoration of pure love as the synthesis of Sollen and 
Wollen is the content of salvation. Justification and sanctification are coordinated in 
the sequence of ordo salutis. 
Another aspect of man's existence in the Pain of God is that man serves God 
by his own suffering and pain. Man's existence in service to God through his pain 
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has two aspects. One is that man serves as witness to the Pain of God through his 
own pain, and another that man is brought into unio mystica with God in Pain. Thus, 
in man's existence in the Pain of God, suffering and pain in the reality of humanity 
play a vital role. This presupposes that divine wrath is an indispensable component 
in Kitamori's understanding of man's existence. Although divine wrath no longer 
presents an ontological threat to humanity, it remains as phenomenological reality, 
which takes the form of man's suffering and pain. In fact, the suffering reality of 
humanity is the reflection of the suffering within the triune God Himself. Understood 
in this way, the ultimate reality which includes both God and man is Pain; love as the 
ultimate category of the relationship between God and man entails this tragic state of 
affairs. But all this does not result in a pure tragedy; rather, in and through tragedy 
and Pain an authentic fellowship of love between God and man has been established. 
In Kitamori's thought, there is therefore no need for a positive eschatology. Man's 
ultimate bliss is already realized in the midst of the reality of suffering and pain by 
being united with God in Pain through one's own suffering and pain. Thus, the Pain 
of God signifies the ultimate meaning of man's existence. God and man exist in the 
community of Pain. 
The Pain of God as Theological Methodology 
Kitamori's Understanding of Theology 
and Its Methodology 
"My theology," wrote Kitamori when his first work, The Lord of the Cross 
was published, "must function as the answer [to all the theological questions]. It must 
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save all the errors in theology instead of denouncing them."' As a matter of fact, 
he asserts in the same work that "a theological statement worthy of its name must not 
be simply a question but also always be an answer; the procedure of theology, when it 
questions [the validity of other standpoints], must first give its own answer [to them] 
before it proceeds to question [them]."' As the truth on which one will stake all 
his being, theological truth must not be uncertain. "In this sense," Kitamori further 
asserts, "theology must be the theology of the Gospel. In other words, it should not 
be a theology having the Gospel merely as its object, but it must be the Gospel 
itself."' In Kitamori's view, a true theology is not merely a relative reformulation 
of the Gospel given at a particular junction of time and space. It must be capable of 
claiming the absoluteness of the truth of its statement.' 
Auto II, 218. 
[A bibliographical note: Those of Kitamori's works which are of primary 
significance and therefore quoted frequently are abbreviated like the note here. The 
list of those works is found at the end of the Introduction.] 
'Cross, 3. 
`Whether a theology can claim absoluteness in its statement of God or the 
Gospel is a problematic question. This depends on what is understood by "theology" 
and what nature theological truth has. A reflection on the relationship between dogma 
and theology may shed light on this problem. The dogma of the two natures of Christ 
and the divine Trinity in its intrinsic relationship with justificatio solo fide is absolute 
truth for the Protestant Christian faith. Theology as the explication and actualization 
of dogma is relative to man's historical situation. Dogma is infinitely deep in its 
implications because it "refers" to the Triune God Himself in its most general terms; 
theology reflects on this dogma in order to listen to what God speaks through this 
fundamental dogma. As long as one understands his theology as an actual 
interpretation of dogma, one's theology remains relative and limited as to its truth 
claim. But when he regard his "discovery" of the mystery of God as eternally valid as 
the truth, it is natural for him to regard his theological statement as of equal footing 
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Obviously, the truth of the Gospel to Kitamori is the Pain of God. The truth 
of the Pain of God is certainly articulated under a specific intersection of time and 
space—during World War II in Japan; nevertheless "it is truth acceptable all over the 
world. This universal truth would not have been discerned without Japan as its 
medium."' The Pain of God discovered by Kitamori as the very content of the 
Gospel is thus the universal truth of the Gospel. It is the answer to the questions 
asked by all theologies.' Further, this truth claim of Kitamori is not confined to the 
sphere of Christian theology. It is also valid as absolute truth in the sphere of other 
religions and philosophies. This is to be inferred from his argumentation that even 
though the Pain of God is a divine revelation, "the deepest thoughts the world has 
ever produced unknowingly have searched for the pain of God."' In Kitamori's 
with dogma. Advancing the absolute truth-claim for this concept of the Pain of God, 
Kitamori may be thinking that the Pain of God has the status of dogma. But is this 
view of Kitamori tenable? This is my question to Kitamori's theology. We shall have 
further occasions to discuss this issue. 
Pain, 137; emphasis is mine. Schmerz renders: "Es [der Schmerz Gottes] 
ist die 5r die ganze Welt griltige Wahrheit. Jedoch Witte sich diese algemaingiiltige 
Wahrheit nicht verwirklichen Onnen ohne die Vermittlung Japans" (137). 
'Commenting on an apparent empirical contradiction between the reality of 
God's salvific will in Christ and the fallen reality of created world, Kitamori holds 
that neither Brunner (Ankniipfungspunkt) nor Barth ("Nein!") nor Althaus 
(Uroffenbarung) has given a satisfactory answer to the Reformation dialectic of the 
Gospel (which, to Kitamori, is the structure of the Pain of God), that is, the 
"theological axiom" (grace) embracing the "theological reality" (the fallen world in 
creation). With his notion that God's grace in Christ has already solved the 
"unsolved" actual reality, Kitamori writes as follows: "The order of [the fallen] 
creation which is the theological reality finds itself in the field of God's grace in 
Christ. Thus, I believe that I have answered the views of Brunner, Barth, Althaus, 
etc. at once" (Auto II, 185). 
'Pain, 25. 
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thought, therefore, theology in its true sense must be identical with the Gospel itself, 
theology as the Gospel, and at the same time it must be universal truth as well. 
In view of this sweeping claim Kitamori makes of theology, one feels 
compelled to reflect more closely upon the nature of theology as such. Can human 
theologies possess absolute validity? Can a particular theology be identical with the 
Gospel itself? Or is it possible for a theology to "discover" the ultimate truth so that 
upon the basis of the discovered truth the particular theology may claim to be identical 
with the Gospel itself?' Apparently Luther claimed his doctrine of iumficatio sola 
fide to be the content of the Gospel. The Reformer held that it is the re-discovery of 
the Pauline sola fide. A certain parallel can be found between Luther's conviction of 
sola fide as the absolute truth of salvation and Kitamori's claim of the Pain of God as 
the same. In the next chapter, we shall deal with common traits and differences 
between Luther and Kitamori in their theologies.' But here it may be said that we 
should make distinction between fundamental assertions on the Gospel and derivative 
Since the content of the Gospel conceived by a theologian inseparably 
presupposes the doctrine of God Himself, our question can be also formulated: Can 
theological statements about God be considered as describing God as He essentially is? 
Or more radically: Can God be defined by human theology in analogy with other 
objects in the empirical world? 
Still, a note will be appropriate here. Whereas Luther's sola fide is an 
existential, unspeculative soteriological concept in which the Reformer "passively" 
remains within the confines of the revelation in the crucified Christ, Kitamori is more 
inclined to "actively" penetrate the eternal essence of God, thus being more 
speculative and attempting to gain the knowledge of God. Luther has the following 
understanding of the theme of theology: "Theologiae proprium subiectum est homo 
peccati reus ac perditus et Deus iustificans ac salvator hominis peccatoris" (WA. 40 II, 
328, 17). 
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elaborations of the fundamental assertions. Although to Kitamori himself the doctrine 
of the Pain of God is the most fundamental truth of the Gospel, we, on the basis of 
what we have seen in the previous presentation, are very much inclined to hold that 
his conception of God as being eternally in Pain is a highly debatable doctrine. As to 
the fundamental articles of faith, Christological and Trinitarian dogma which is 
revealed in the message of iustificatio sola fide, is not subject to any theological 
relativism. It is sine qua non for the Christian faith. But as to "secondary" 
elaborations of the fundamental dogma, it is not possible for any theology to lay claim 
to absoluteness. When we regard Kitamori's concept of the Pain of God as a 
secondary elaboration of the Gospel of the Cross, we have already made our own 
interpretative decision, making at the same time a qualitative distinction in theological 
significance between Luther's re-discovery of solus Christus et sola fide and 
Kitamori's Deus in dolore. Luther's discovery must be regarded as the axiomatic 
reconfirmation of the very foundation of the Christian faith since the Apostle Paul; this 
is a recognition we a posteriori gain when we understand the Biblical message of 
salvation in the light of the Reformer's theology. It is on the basis of this decision 
and distinction that we analyze Kitamori's theology. 
Beyond this axiomatic datum of the Christian faith, all theological 
formulations are relative to a specific historical context. Luther is no exception in this 
regard; his further elaboration on iustificatio sola fide into various loci must be 
critically evaluated and reinterpreted in the light of Scripture and in reference to 
contemporary situation. Thus, any theology as a particular response to the impact of 
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the Gospel maintains the character of theologia viatorum. In addition to this, it is an 
obvious fact that no one theologian, however profound and genius, can hear the whole 
truth of the Gospel alone. When we acknowledge the distance between the Gospel 
itself and human explication of it in a given historical context,' then we have to 
question Kitamori's sweeping claim of the universal validity of the concept of the Pain 
of God. 
But Kitamori's understanding of the nature of theology helps us to grasp the 
character of his own theology from a methodological point of view. On what basis 
can Kitamori claim his theology to be the absolute truth of the Gospel, or the theology 
which is to "answer" all the questions other theologies have been asking? Questioning 
in this way, we return to his concept of the Pain of God. Kitamori does not conceive 
of the Pain of God merely as a particular experience of the Gospel conditioned by his 
own personal historical circumstances. It is the direct revelation of the Gospel or of 
God Himself in His eternal essence.' Standing firmly on this conviction, Kitamori 
feels obliged to assert his "discovery" as the conclusive articulation of the Gospel in 
'If we take the Pauline "God in Christ" (2 Cor. 5:19) as the pregnant 
expression of the Gospel, we can at the same time regard it as the formal description 
of the Gospel, which serves to the continuous actualization of the salvific reality of the 
Gospel in a given historical context. Thus the Gospel is not a static Lehrsatz, but a 
reality to be concretized and actualized by man's response to the living Triune God. 
Thus understood, the dogma which is the formal expression of the Gospel is the 
exclusive framework in which alone the concretization of the Gospel takes place 
through human theologies at every given historical time. We can say that the Gospel 
to which the dogma points is the constant whereas theologies which respond to the 




One may then ask: If the Pain of God is the ultimate truth of the Gospel 
which has already been made known to Kitamori, formulated by him in his opus 
magnus, and then only waits to be appropriated and actualized, is it still relevant to 
speak of theological methodology? If what a theology strives to grasp has been laid 
hold of, there would be hardly any reason for reflection on methodological problems 
in theology.' But as a matter of fact, Kitamori places strong emphasis on the 
clarification of this methodological question. "Luther in the Reformation era took 
pains for the establishment of `sola fide' as the 'content' of theology," observes 
Kitamori, "but the central issue of contemporary theology is the problem of 
theological methodology."' Why does he hold that the issue of prolegomena is so 
crucial today as the sola fide was in the period of the Reformation? As we shall see 
shortly, Kitamori holds that evangelical theology is threatened by the theology of Karl 
Barth, which according to Kitamori is a legalistic deviation from the Protestant faith. 
And this alleged legalism is due to his prolegomena, which Kitamori understands to be 
'See 427-433 below of this section. 
'To elaborate on this point a little further, we take note of a difference 
between iustificatio sola fide and "the Pain of God" as to their theological character. 
Whereas iusnficatio sola fide is formal in character thus enables one to explore its 
ever-actual implications in any given historical context, the Pain of God is material 
and definite, which means that it is already a specific elaboration on the dogma of the 
Trinity given in iustificatio sola fide. However, methodological questions are raised 
when a theologian tries to elaborate on the dogma. But if the result of the exploration 
of the Gospel's implications is already given (as is the case with Kitamori), then there 
is no need for reflection on methodological questions in an ordinary sense. 
`Auto II, 121. 
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based on the First Commandment. 
What should then be the nature of theological prolegomena? Kitamori holds 
that it must be "evangelical." The theology of the evangelical Church must be also 
evangelical in its methodology, otherwise a truely evangelical faith would not be 
established. In Kitamori's own word, "the content of theology [the Gospel] should 
come out from the content of theology and become the prolegomena [for theology] as 
well."' In Kitamori's thought, this involves two methodological concerns. The one 
is that only the methodology which is based upon the Gospel (the Pain of God) can 
constitute theology as the sinner's endeavor; the other is that this methodology alone 
makes it possible for the theologian to be obedient to the total message of the 
Bible--for instance the Pauline iusnficatio sola fide and the iustificatio per opera in the 
letter of James--the obedience which is of fundamental importance for theological 
work. For Kitamori, the Gospel is the power which saves the sinner's theology and 
lets him be obedient to God in his theological efforts; the Pain of God embraces sinful 
realities and realizes itself through them while not negating them nor simply absorbing 
them, and this holds true of the sinner's theological work more than anything else. 
According to Kitamori, it is important to note that the nature of a 
Christian Culture (Tokyo: September, 1950), 45. "It is Barth who took the 
problem of prolegomena seriously, but my own thought then [on the issue of 
prolegomena] involved confrontation with Barth's conclusions on prolegomena. In 
Barth's thinking, the word of man is made transparent and required to be obedient to 
the Word of God. But I denounced it as legalistic. What I wanted was to bring the 
Gospel fully into the question of prolegomena," recalls Kitamori during his 
confrontation with Barth in the early stages of the Japanese theologian's theological 
development (Auto II, 147). 
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prolegomena determines the whole character of the theology which is built upon the 
particular prolegomena. If prolegomena is formulated with a primary concern for the 
Law--the First Commandment as is the case with Barth in Kitamori's view, then the 
whole theology becomes legalistic, even if in this or that specific locus it presents an 
evangelical discourse.' 
Thus, Kitamori has in mind Barth's allegedly "exclusive and negating" 
prolegomena, and disputes him, for Barth's theology as a whole, to Kitamori, is 
legalistic in its "real intention" [ 44,E 1." "Prolegomena," says Kitamori, "is a 
thinking which, prior to speaking of the content of theology, deals with the formal 
question by what right theology can be constituted as man's endeavor."' Here we 
find Kitamori's fundamental concern with prolegomenal issues. 
"How is it possible [for us theologians] to be obedient to all the aspects of 
""Whether a theology is legalistic or evangelical can be seen in its 
prolegomena. Even if a theology speaks of the Cross of Christ in one of the chapters 
of its dogmatics, it does not necessarily follow that the dogmatics is evangelical. But 
when the Cross of Christ which is the object of dogmatic discourse comes out from 
being the content of dogmatics and embraces the dogmatician's work itself, then it 
becomes an evangelical dogmatics" (ibid., 151). 
'Discussing the problem of prolegomena in terms of scriptology, Kitamori 
argues that Barth would conceive of the nature of Scripture only in analogy with the 
Incarnation and does not go further to the Cross, that is, the Gospel. This would 
determine, writes Kitamori, the basic character of the theology of Barth, and he 
continues to argue: "This of course does not mean that Barth does not take up the 
Cross as the 'content' of the Bible. How can it be possible for a theology not to take 
up the Cross! But if a theology fails to acknowledge the crucial significance of the 
'form' of theology (prolegomena), that theology does not yet take up the Cross as its 




the Word of God?--this exhausts the problem imposed upon us. Think, is there any 
other problem [for theology today] except this?' This Kitamori's concept of 
methodological problem may be unintelligible without reference to Barth's concept of 
divine mandates imposed upon dogmatics. Barth's main concern is how theology can 
be obedient to what the Word of God speaks here and now through the Bible. For 
Barth this obedience is divine challenge to believers in general and theologians in 
particular who are placed in the grace of God. But Kitamori maintains that Barth's 
methodological position neglects the most fundamental issue in theological obedience, 
namely the fact that the theologian is a sinner. What Barth presupposes as already 
given prior to his theological work--the forgiveness of sin, is not a matter of course in 
theology and is still an unsolved problem for Kitamori. In other words, the 
prolegomena' question to Kitamori is not a question how it is possible for a forgiven 
sinner as a finite being to speak of God—the totaliter aliter (as is the case with Barth), 
but for a sinner who remains a sinner to give witness at all to the Gospel in 
obedience. For Kitamori, "to be a sinner means to dominate God and God's 
Word."' We cannot exist, he holds, without dominating and defying God and God's 
Word.' Even when we give witness to God, we speak with our own words.' 






"transparent," as Barth allegedly presupposes that they can be. To Kitamori there are 
no transparent human words which let the Word of God go through without any 
impediment. But at the same time it is impossible to give witness to the Word of God 
without our sinful words. In this sense, a theologian needs the forgiveness of sin in 
his theologizing. "We cannot speak of the Gospel," says Kitamori, "for we always 
dominate the Word of God.n27' How can we serve God with our theology? It is the 
Gospel itself that, while forgiving our sin in theology, supports it and uses it as 
witness to the Gospel. The Pain of God is the solution of the fundamental problem of 
disobedience in theology.' 
In contrast to this "evangelical" prolegomena, holds Kitamori, Barth's 
methodology is ruled by the First Commandment. According to him, Barth would 
have answered the basic prolegomenal question raised above, the question of 
obedience to God's Word: "The obedience to God is only possible by obeying 
God."' Kitamori is aware that this is a tautology, but he says that "this is a 
`substantial' answer, seeing this as an expression of the Law's dominance in Barth's 
'Cross, 3. 
"'That we are sinner means that we try to subjugate [even] God by our own 
power or the Word of God to our own word. . . . How can we speak of the Gospel 
when we are such sinners? Thus before we begin to speak of the Gospel, we find 
ourselves in the midst of the fundamental problem. For us to speak of the Gospel is 
already the problem itself. But it is the Gospel itself that solves this problem" (Cross, 
1-2); "the Gospel which is spoken of by its witness is the very Gospel which lets the 
witness speak of itself. I am going to speak of the Gospel of the Cross, but that I can 
speak of it is now possible because I have been possessed by the Gospel of the Cross" 
(ibid., 6); "Insofar as the Gospel of Christ is the Gospel of the Cross, it should signify 
something crucial to interpret the Gospel of the Cross as the Pain of God" (ibid., 13). 
'Auto II, 152. 
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theology.' In Kitamori's view, Barth can answer in this way because the Swiss 
theologian has overlooked the existential problem of man's sin in doing theology. 
For, argues Kitamori, one cannot render obedience to the Word of God by making 
"Let God be God" the theological prolegomena. Only the Gospel, the truth of God in 
Pain who embraces the unembraceable, saves man's disobedience in theology and 
accomplishes obedience to the Word of God in a sinner's theology. 
Kitamori's basic concern in the question of prolegomena is thus 
"soteriologically" conceived rather than epistemologically.' Kitamori claims that 
when both the content and method of theology are determined by the Gospel itself, a 
theology first truly becomes an evangelical theology. This view, to Kitamori, is far 
from Barth's legalistic orientation in prolegomena. In the next chapter, we shall deal 
with Kitamori's confrontation with Barth in detail, so we here leave open the tenability 
of Kitamori's interpretation of Barth on this issue. At this juncture we are concerned 
with the fact that Kitamori has an entirely different concept of prolegomena by his 
"soteriologization" of it; he narrows the scope of theological prolegomena!' 
'Ibid. 
'Ibid. 
"'How can we grasp Kitamori's "soteriological" concept of prolegomena if it 
is not, on his part, a misunderstanding of the concept? Is not my total being as a 
Christian forgiven before I undertake my theological efforts? Is not theology possible 
only with this general presupposition of the forgiveness of sin? In other words, do not 
the problems of prolegomena, that is, of the relationship between faith and systematic 
understanding through rational examination of the contents of faith, stand on a 
different plane than that of the "dying and rising up again in daily repentence?" If 
there is something in doing theology which still causes a serious concern with sin, this 
problem should perhaps be dealt with in the domain of repentance than in theological 
prolegomena. As for Barth's theological methodology, this Swiss theologian strictly 
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Kitamori's problem in theological prolegomena is thus exclusively concerned with how 
a sinner can theologize and how evangelical theology can be brought forth, and these 
two things are only possible by integrating the Gospel itself into methodology, or "the 
redemption of theology by the theology of redemption," to use his own 
terminology.' 
Kitamori's Theological Epistemology 
By now we have clearly seen that the concept of the Pain of God functions 
as the very pivot of Kitamori's theological prolegomena. It is the keystone of his 
theological arch. As the keystone, the concept of the Pain of God is expected to be 
methodologically well-substantiated in order for Kitamori's hermenutical circle to 
properly function, otherwise the whole of this theological system would quickly 
collapse. 
Kitamori also calls the Pain of God a "theological axiom." Certainly an 
axiom in the mathematical sense is a basic, self-evident truth upon which further 
understanding of mathematical relations is built. Analogically, a theological axiom 
would be the truth which is "self-evident" to all the believers. In fact, it is not 
confines his reflection on method within the relationship between "Glauben and 
Erkennen." See for instance his Fides quaerens intellectum: AnseIms Beweis der 
Existenz Gorses im Zusammenhang seines theologischen Programms (Munich: Chr. 
Keiser, Verlag, 1931). 
'Introduction, 116. 
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unproblematic to introduce such an abstract concept as "axiom" into theology.' If 
however we should follow Kitamori's own scheme of thought, we might include in the 
category of theological axioms such fundamental truths as the doctrine of the Trinity, 
the two natures of Christ, justification by faith and Scripture as the ultimate norm of 
doctrine and life. No one can deny any of these without ceasing to be a Christian in 
the sense of the Protestant faith. For Kitamori, however, the Pain God is the 
self-evident theological reality par excellence, and thus it has the status of a 
fundamental dogma in his thought.' It is literally the "theological axiom," according 
to Kitamori, that all doctrines of Christian faith—Trinity, Christology, Soteriology, 
Ecclesiology, and so on--should be grasped from the preeminent concept of the Pain 
of God. 
To the critical examiner, the Pain of God gives a strong impression of being 
an assertion which exemplifies petitio principii. The question is, namely, how one can 
be sure that Kitamori's primary vision of the Pain of God is an authentic recognition 
of the essence of God, and not an individual theologian's private, even erroneous, 
perception of God. The validity of this question is intensified when one is deeply 
uncertain of the tenability of Kitamori's exegetical, doctrinal and church-historical 
substantiation of the concept of the Pain of God.' It is difficult to escape the 
'The expression "theological axiom" itself is borrowed from the title of Karl 
Barth's essay: "Das erste Gebot als theologisches Axiom" (1933). For this essay and 
Kitamori's reaction to this essay, Chap. 6, note 37. 
218See note 4 above. 
'See the section of "Application of the Pain of God as Method" beginning 
with 415 below. 
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suspicion that the concept of the Pain of God a priori dictates exegetical results, the 
outcome of his doctrinal discussion or the conclusion of his church-historical 
investigation. So we are compelled to ask: how can we then know "objectively" that 
the concept of the Pain of God is not Kitamori's theological "illusion" but a 
trustworthy penetration of the essence of God? 
We realize from his writings that Kitamori himself has already anticipated 
this question. To see this problem more closely, we need to trace an interesting 
feature of Kitamori's understanding of the term of the Pain of God. 
The substance of the ideas of a suffering God has been in circulation in the 
history of theology from the very beginning, even in the Japanese Protestant tradition 
(thus the Solomonic saying would apply to theology as well: there is nothing new 
under the sun!).' But the very term "the Pain of God" is still Kitamori's own. 
'A brief overview of the idea of God's suffering in church history is included 
in the next chapter. As for the notion of divine suffering in the Japanese Protestant 
tradition, we have seen Uemura's thought in the above (see note 87 of Chap. 4). 
Here we shall include another Japanese theologian, Danjo Ebina, whose thoughts on 
divine suffering are strikingly similar to Kitamori's, also in terms of vocabulary. He 
was, as we recall, the opponent of Uemura in the Christological debate in the early 
Protestant history of Japan (see note 43 of Chap. 2). Ebina writes: "Seeing that even 
Christ, the perfect Personality, had to suffer, we must conclude that the root of 
suffering is to be sought deeply in God Himself. When St. Paul wrote that the Spirit 
makes intercession for us with groanings which cannot be uttered, he meant that God 
suffers among men. Truly, we are to be thankful for this. We find the true notion of 
Christian salvation right here. Our religious longing will never be satisfied until we 
find God's suffering. In other words, there is suffering and pain when God reveals 
Himself to the extreme point" (quoted in Yoshitaka Kumano, A History of Theological 
Thoughts in Japanese Christianity, [Tokyo: Shinkyo Shuppansha, 1968], 163). It is 
most probable that Kitamori is well acquainted with this prolific but rather speculative 
thinker. If so, it is an interesting question why Kitamori does not mention Ebina's 
name in his writings. Is it because Ebina is less orthodox in his theology? 
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And to Kitamori the concept of the Pain of God cannot be substituted by another 
concept. The term is the alter ego of Kitamori as the theologian. Because of this 
"absoluteness" of "the Pain of God" in his theological reflection, he has had a strong 
affection for this term. When he was at the Lutheran seminary, he had to struggle 
with this "affection." Although he was aware that the term "the Pain of God" 
should not be any more than a finger pointing to the crucified Christ, he even "felt 
more love for this term than for the term: 'the Cross of Jesus Christ."' This was 
even a temptation! One day he determined to give up the use this term.' In 
retrospect, Kitamori tells us that this "heroic" determination was motivated by Barth's 
"Let God be God" and, following this Barthian demand, decided not to use the term 
which he felt was a human term.' Be this as it may, we notice here two things in 
Kitamori's "struggle" with his affection for the expression "the Pain of God." First, 
Kitamori indirectly says that he loved the term as his own so deeply but, second, he 
was aware that it is not identical with "the crucified Christ." One month later, 
however, he resumed the use of the term. In fact, we observe that this "giving up and 
"Auto II, 18. 
"Ibid., 20. 
""To you, the term 'Pain of God,' I say 'Sayonara!'" wrote Kitamori in his 
diary the day he determined to give up the term, "to this day you served me well as 
the term pointing to Christ the Crucified; I thank you; you are not Christ the Crucified 
Himself, you shall not be loved by more than He!" (Ibid., 21). 
'Ibid., 27. 
386 
using again" of the term is the basic pattern Kitamori has followed throughout his 
life.' This state of affairs leads to interesting questions: why has Kitamori had to 
waver between the terms "the Pain of God" and "the crucified Christ" in his 
theological endeavor? Why does he feel the consant necessity to give up the term? 
Does the "temptation" persist in his mind? If so, what does it mean when Kitamori 
has still been unable to give it up totally? And why does he retain the term 
throughout his theological career despite his declared abandonment of the use of this 
term? Perhaps we are not totally mistaken when we suggest that the reason for this 
life-long retention of the term is the deep difference between the theology of the Pain 
of God and Luther's theology of the cross. To this important issue we shall return in 
the next chapter.' 
'In the preface to the Fifth Edition of his opus magnum, Kitamori writes: "I 
myself do not find the necessity of using the term the 'Pain of God' as a theological 
term any longer, since this term has served its purpose adequately in stressing the 
mediatory and intercessory love of God over against the immediate love of God. The 
appearance of the Japanese Revised Standard Version [which adopted the translation 
'My heart yearns over him' (Jer. 31:20)] may necessitate my using this term 
consciously again" (Pain, 16-17). Whether his continuous use of the term "the Pain 
of God " is conditioned by the appearance of the Japanese "RSV" [more correctly, 
"the Japanese Colloquial Version" (1955)] is open to discussion. It seems that 
Kitamori would never have been able to abandon this term irrespective of any external 
circumstance. Without this term Kitamori's theology does not function. 
'In this connection, only the following is noted: Luther's theologia crucis 
has a very close relationship with his idea of Deus absconditus, both of which in turn 
have to do with God's self-revelation to us sub specie contraria. With regard to the 
revelation through the crucified Christ, Luther does not go beyond this historical 
revelation itself; and for him to know God is to learn to rely on Christ, that is, what 
God has done for us. To go beyond this beneficia inevitably leads to speculation 
about the majesty of God. Kitamori means to see the very eternal essence of God 
through the event of the Cross of Christ, which is hidden in the revelation of Christ. 
To Kitamori the historical Cross of Christ is crucial as the vestibule to the holy of the 
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We observe the nature of this struggle in Kitamori's mind in a somewhat 
different light when we read his justification of the concept of the Pain of God through 
his so-called analogia doloris. He "problematizes" the application of analogy in the 
discourse of God. "Do not the willfulness, illusion, and disobedience [of man]," 
Kitamori questions, "accompany our service to God, a service which is done on [the 
basis of] similarity [analogy]? When we dare to speak [of God] with similarity as our 
medium, are we not making the mistake of ascribing to God what should not be 
ascribed to Him?"' Mutatis mutandis, this concern with analogy can also be seen 
in Kitamori's understanding of the very concept of the Pain of God. Is it totally 
excluded that the concept of the Pain of God does not ascribe to God what should not 
be ascribed to Him? Kitamori has not been totally unconcerned about this issue; the 
very question above indicates this. What then is the solution of this deep problem? 
Kitamori writes: 
The only analogy which can solve the problem of disobedience so helplessly 
entangled in every vanity of analogy, is the analogy of pain (analogia doloris). 
In the pain of God is his power which completely conquers the disobedience so 
deeply embedded in all human activity. In the analogy of Pain, man's pain 
serves the pain of God, who completely conquers our wilfulness, illusions, and 
disobedience.' 
Here Kitamori speaks of the conquering power of the Pain of God, meaning that God 
in His Pain forgives these sins and still uses them as service to Him. We again 
holies, but not the ultimate, the Pain of God; the Cross of Christ is the historical 
"concretization" of the Pain of God. This may be the reason why the Pain of God and 




observe his soteriological approach to theological method. Also in his exegetical 
discussion (included in his opus magnum as appendix), he advances a similar 
argumentation. "When those who cannot pursue theological activity without falling 
into disobedience," argues Kitamori, "are loved and accepted by God, their theological 
intention can no longer fall into disobedience. The use of the Biblical word ['my 
bowels ache' (Jer. 31:20)] as a theological term and the use of human experience 
[pain] as the symbol for divine reality are now liberated from disobedience."' 
Disobedience in theology is conquered by the forgiveness of God in Pain! 
No doubt, this is part of the consolation and encouragement of the Gospel in 
our theological endeavor. But where can we make the distinction between remission 
and permission of "sins" in our theological pursuit? To stay in "sin" or "error" in our 
theology has "more" serious consequences than "ordinary" sins. If Kitamori means 
"methodological" forgiveness by the conquering power of the Pain of God, then he 
would imply that man is permitted that "sin." Certainly we are sinners, and we can 
be disobedient to God also in our theology and bring the Gospel into serious jeopardy. 
We, however, need a methodological "repentance" and amending of our theological 
procedure once we realize that our theological concepts or methodology are erroneous. 
The Gospel is infinitely more important than our theology. In fact, it is for this 
very reason that Kitamori himself contends with Barth's theology in particular. As we 
cannot confuse the. (a posteriori) remission of sin with the (a priori) permission to sin 
'Ibid., 164. 
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in our life, neither can we do this in our theology.' 
But here again it becomes necessary to raise a serious question concerning 
Kitamori's argument to justify the use of the Pain of God. Is not his argument a 
closed circle? He says that his concept of God in Pain can be liable to his "wilfulness, 
illusion and disobedience." But the disobedience which may be involved in his 
concept of the Pain of God as the expression of the truth of God's essence is healed 
and conquered by the very concept of the Pain of God. Is this not a perpetual 
"self-justification" of the concept by the concept itself? If some elements of 
"wilfulness, illusion and disobedience" are suspected in a theological concept, they 
must be "checked" by something other than that very concept. In Kitamori's case we 
see that the often legitimate "hermeneutical" circle is totally closed by his idea of 
"self-justification." Kitamori's conceptualization of the Pain of God undoubtedly 
includes elements of truth, and that is one of the main reasons why his theology has 
survived till the present day. But if Kitamori's concept of the Pain of God involves a 
serious theological error, as we suspect, where can he find a place to break his 
erroneous circle? Or does not erring in theology belong to us mortals? 
When Kitamori maintains the conviction of the truth gained through his 
'Actually we cannot deal with disobedience in our Christian existence and 
"disobedience" in our theological endeavor as problems in the same category, for the 
former belongs to the spiritual kingdom, as it were, whereas the latter as a problem of 
our "work" belongs to the worldly kingdom. And "disobedience" in work cannot be 
embraced; it should be rectified once its error or deficiency is suspected and 
recognized. For this very reason, we must constanty confront different theological 
formulations for the sake of die Sache selbst! If this criticism of Kitamori is correct, 
there actually is a categorical confusion here on the part of Kitamori. 
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primary experience, despite these apparent logical difficulties, we suppose that there 
must be "something undeniable" in such a primary experience. A thousand 
contra-arguments would not be able to shake this primary convictionWhat then is this 
"something undeniable?" Reflecting on this, we arrive at Kitamori's "epistemological" 
conviction. Unfortunately, however, Kitamori has no separate elaboration of his own 
theological Erkenntnislehre. So we need to reconstruct his doctrine of cognition on 
the basis of evidence from his writings. 
What is it, then, which constitutes the principle of cognition in Kitamori's 
thought? It is chokkan or immediate cogniton and perception (and also the cognate 
modes of perception). An axiomatic conviction in Kitamori's epistemology is, it 
seems, that the true nature of things is to be recognized not by analytical reasoning but 
by immediate intuition..` Analytical reason follows intuition to "verify" the truth 
the chokkan has intuitively grasped.' Certainly, this chokkan is not everybody's 
possession but is given only to a selected few (as is the case with Kitamori himself). 
But once given, this is virtually infallible. Reading Kitamori's two volume 
autobiography, we come across this term (or its cognates) on virtually every crucial 
point in his theological development; and there is no doubt concerning its reliability. 
The fact that we are in the love of God, holds Kitamori, cannot be experienced as 
"See Chap. 4, note 27 above. 
nt is evident that one often starts theinvestigation of some object with a kind 
of intuition that helps one set up a "working" hypothesis; and this is followed by 
trying to see whether or not the hypothesis can be verified. It would be, however, 
another thing if one is so confident of one's own intuitive capacity that one only needs 
to verify a posteriori what one claims to have intuitively recognized. 
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reality immediately, but in Christ we can really perceive it. "I really experienced 
[ ] that the Cross of Christ is the Pain of God," says Kitamori." On 
another occasion where he reflects on Barth's dealing with the issue of the election of 
Esau and Jacob in his Ronterbrief, Kitamori "intuits" [ ft61-.6 ] in Barth's 
thinking "a [painless] smoothness."' On still another occasion, when Kitamori felt 
that he had touched upon the "untouchable" sanctity of God's innermost essence [the 
Pain of God], he experienced a threat of death, but still "immediately perceived" 
[ ] that he would not die because he was in Christ.' Though we 
could quote still more examples,' the above sufficiently shows how crucial a role 
chokkan or cognate terms play in Kitamori's thought. We said that this chokkan is 
virtually infallible. As a matter of fact, most cognitions perceived through his 
chokkan are later "confirmed."' 
It is necessary here to also touch upon Kitamori's view of the "Japanese 
'Auto I, 137. 
"Ibid., 198. 
'Ibid., 201. 
""I had already then chokkan that 'esprit of fine sensitivity' (Pascal) is needed 
for a precise theology not to fall into an arid formalism" (ibid., 190); "S8ren 
Kierkegaard will answer the question: 'What does it mean to love God?'; I will 
answer the question: 'What does it mean to be loved by God?'. . . Thus I had 
chokkan of the essence of [the thought of] Kierkegaard" (Auto II, 10); see also ibid,. 
14. 
'Only one place, Kitamori says that his chokkan "hit the mark half and 
missed it half' concerning the Christian Rinzo Shiina's conversion (Literature, 67; for 
Shiina, 194 in "Man in the Pain of God" in this chapter). 
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heart."' Speaking of his so-called "Gospel History," he discusses each nation's 
particular contribution in enfolding the truth of the Gospel. He advances in this 
connection his viewpoint that the "Japanese heart" has a sensitivity particularly 
congenial with the Pain of God, and explains what the people's "heart" is: "The 
`heart' is what we call 'sensitivity' [ ], which is not thought nor theory, nor 
spirit [ fop ] either! It is something more profound and more concrete, namely 
sensitivity."' By this "more profound and more concrete sensitivity" Kitamori 
means an epistimological faculty which is capable of immediately grasping the deepest 
reality. "The Japanese heart" has then a particular "sensitivity" to penetrate the very 
reality of the divine essence. This "Japanese heart," according to Kitamori, is mainly 
represented by ordinary, uneducated people.' They know, without being 
specifically taught, the deep tragic dimension of human relationships which are 
governed by inter-personal obligation of duties (between superior and inferior) and 
which therefore often occasion the sacrifices of (inferior) individuals' "unsacrificeable" 
objects of love, a son dear to his father in particular. The "Japanese heart" which 
perceives the depth of tragedy in inter-personal relationships is, in Kitamori's view, 
most clearly observable in the popular stories now played in the form of Japanese 
dramas called Kabuki. To designate the perception the "Japanese heart" experiences 
vis-a-vis the inter-personal tragedy, Kitamori "technicalizes" the rather common 
2"" ." (Itami, 208 [Pain, 137]). 
Ibid., 209 (ibid.). 
'Ibid., 203 (ibid., 133). 
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Japanese term "tsurasa."' Then he finds an analogy between God in Pain for 
giving up His Son and a Japanese father sacrificing his son to save another (the son of 
his feudal lord for instance)." By generalizing the term of tsurasa he holds that the 
"Japanese heart" is now given a divine assignment to make manifest the innermost 
essence of God, or God in tsurasa. "The Pain of God is brilliantly discerned by the 
Japanese heart and particularly adored by it.' 
In Kitamori, chokkan and sensitivity (or kankaku) to tsurasa become the 
"'The English version, Pain, offers an explanation of the term "tsurasa" as 
follows: "The sense of tsurasa is best expressed by the Latin phrase lacrimae ren4m. 
It is the feeling of inevitable fate and sorrow that overhangs human life. Star-crossed 
lovers, parting never to meet again, feel the tsurasa in their destiny" (177). Although 
Kitamori holds that the term "tsurasa" (the noun form of an adjective tsurai) is a 
particular Japanese vocable for this particular emotion, it is rather a common word 
designating "bitter, sad, hard, painful" ("It is tsurai to get up early in the cold 
morning"), which can be used even in the title of a popular comedy movie ("Otoko wa 
tsurai yo!" [We (guys) has it rough!]). This tsurasa is, therefore, Kitamori's own 
technicalization of the term. 
'This interpretation by Kitamori of the popular stories (for the content of the 
stories, see Pain 177, and the petit section of Schwa, 132-134), which originated 
from the early tenth century and were "dramatized" in the eighteenth century, was 
questioned by critical reviewers. One of the dramas, Terakoya (A Temple School), in 
which Kitamori finds a father-son relationship analogous to the Father-Son relationship 
in the Pain of God, is in its original form a drama of revenge and belief in the 
revenge of the spirits of the dead. The spirits are governed by feudal ethics. 
Observing the drama and its usage by Kitamori, Shozo Suzuki writes: "Kitamori's 
logic is not aware of the qualitative difference between the human pain which the 
father felt when he gave up his son--to show fidelity to his feudal lord and thus to 
destroy the lord's enemy--and the love of God who gave His Son to the enemy (this 
world)" (Christianity and Daijosai [the Emperor Deification Rite], [Tokyo: Shinkyo 
Shuppansha, 1987], 304). Katsumi Takizawa writes that these dramas "by no means 
reflect the genuinely Japanese spirit but only a form [of the Japanese spirit] distorted 
by feudal society" (Religion, 135). 
"Itami, 209 (Pain, 137). 
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cardinal media in grasping the Pain of God.304 In other words, through these intuitive 
faculties, even the deepest theological truth is recognized. This is the substance of 
Kitamori's epistemological axiom. (In rough terms, this is akin to Zen epistemology in 
which analytical reasoning is ultimately considered inadequate to grasp the inner-most 
dimensions of reality.) Due to this epistemological axiom, we believe, Kitamori has 
not felt the need for theoretical elaboration on theological epistemology. What, 
however, does this imply for Christian theology which is based on historical 
revelation? if we follow the traditional "Western" distinctions, we might maintain that 
Kitamori's chokkan and sensitivity belong to the sphere of natura in contrast to gratia. 
Transcending this scheme, however, Kitamori presupposes that man's natural faculty 
of cognition is indispensable in penetrating the truth of God.' A question arising 
from this concept is how one can solve the problem inherent to everything natural, a 
question of which Kitamori himself is aware. This epistemological feature is again 
"Kitamori is aware of the problem inherent in these natural media and tries to 
solve it in the following way: "We grasp the Pain of God with the sensitivity to pain 
[ litio.NoDSU ]. Insofar, however, as this sensitivity is that of man, it retains 
arbitrariness and disobedience. This disobedience of human sensitivity must be 
overcome by the Pain of God. . ." (Itami, 210 [Pain, 138]). 
"Kitamori's implicit assumption here, as everywhere in his theology, is that 
we are obliged to know God in His inner-most essence. This intends beyond the 
external historical revelation and recognize God in His essence. The historical 
revelation of Christ certainly provides the clue to the penetration. One must "see 
into" the reality of God implied in the event of the crucifixion (Character, 10; this 
seeing-into is decisive and essential to the constitution of divine salvation in us). But 
what plays a decisive role in discerning the truth beyond the historical revelation is 
man's natural faculty. If man's natural faculty is accorded such a crucial function as 
seeing the essence of God, then a serious danger is at hand, that man conceives of 
God according to natural human categories and thus de facto denies God's absolute 
transcendence. See further 410-412 of this section. 
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"justified" by the same circular argument that the Pain of God has already resolved the 
problematic aspects of man's natural intuition and sensitivity.' 
We can now characterize Kitamori's theological epistemology as having 
"immediate" access to the knowledge of God. To grasp this, we may draw an 
interesting parallel from Kitamori's own thought. We have seen that Kitamori's basic 
contention is that the love of God is not an immediate love; it is mediated by Christ, 
the persona of Pain. We cannot stay in the immediate love of God because it is His 
wrath. But in his theological epistemology, that is, in his cognition of the Pain of 
God, nothing ultimately mediates between God in Pain and the knower. In view of 
Christ on the Cross, the "heart" immediately intuits the essence of God.307 "In our 
mode of the thinking through which we grasp and adore the figure of God [ 11000 ]," 
maintains Kitamori, "this sensitivity plays a crucial role."' 
When Kitamori conceives the Pain of God as the ultimate truth of God in an 
intuitive manner, we have to ask its methodological consequences in his theology. Put 
"See note 302 above. Kitamori's justification is only logically tenable if the 
Pain of God is the truth itself; this truth guarantees the validity of natural recognition 
as long as it grasps the Pain of God. Kitamori is consistent in his thinking in this 
sense. The problem we again feel in view of this is that the Pain of God a priori 
justifies questionable means such as intuition or "sensitivity" in theological 
recognition. 
307We interpret that Kitamori's primary experience of God had this 
"immediate" character. The result is that his idea of God is strongly 
"anthropomorphic," that is, very close to human psychological experience. This 
occasions, we believe, the danger that God eventually is absorbed into human reality. 
Where is the Pauline cry in Kitamori's theology: "Oh, the depth of the riches both of 
the wisdom and knowledge of God!" (Rom. 11:33). 
mItami, 203 (Pain, 133). 
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in a somewhat simple manner, intuitive recognition in religious experience 
presupposes a direct and immediate relationship between the knower and the Object of 
knowing. And in this process of intuitive knowing, the subject and the Object are in 
an intimate unity. We should say that in knowing and being known the Object is the 
subject and vice versa, for it is the Object which "takes" the initiative (if it is 
conceived of as a personal Being) or "moves" the knower to know (if an impersonal 
Reality) in the process of knowing. It can be the Object's self-development in the 
knowing "subject." This pattern can be clearly observed in Kitamori's thought. 
"There is logic in the Gospel," says Kitamori, "and the logic is not an abstraction of 
reality but it is the way in which the reality reveals itself."" This reminds us of a 
Hegelian pan-logicism; an idea includes in itself its own logical or conceptual 
development. This metaphysical presupposition deeply affects Kitamori's theological 
method. Put pointedly, the logic supposedly inherent in the Gospel follows its own 
development. This means that the logical necessity of the Gospel has produced 
dogmas and theologies.' It sounds somewhat impersonal and gives the impression 
that this inherent logic of the Gospel is the norm of all theologies."' But this does 
'Character, 236. 
"See 43-53 of this section. 
"'It is one of the conspicuous features of Kitamori's theology that various 
concepts are "hypostatized" and have logical movement. We have already come 
across such sentences as: "The Pain of God is the fact that the love of God bears the 
wrath of God upon itself." We have here a typical example. This feature gives 
Kitamori's theology an abstract character. But the conceptual abstractness of his 
theology is interwoven with a very strong "anthropomorphic" way of speaking about 
God. We can observe this singular mixture of the two contrary ways of theological 
speech in Pain, 117-119, where Kitamori speaks of the three orders of the love of 
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not mean, of course, that Kitamori dismisses Scripture, creeds, confessions or 
traditions. On the contrary, he uses them extensively to confirm the validity of his 
concept of the Pain of God. This means, however, that he interprets these sources 
according to the already established truth of the Pain of God. In other words, these 
norms have no "creative and originative" function but "confirmative" significance. 
We understand that behind this procedure there is an implicit assumption in Kitamori's 
thought that all "norms" without exception witness to the Pain of God; there cannot be 
any contradiction between the orthodox traditions of the Christian faith and the Pain of 
God. It is therefore natural for him to bring these norms into a logically harmonious 
relationship with the Pain of God and make their "hidden" meanings explicit. 
The conceptual development of the Gospel takes place according to its 
inherent dynamics. In Kitamori's view, the Gospel or the Pain of God precedes to its 
conceptualization, and this conceptualization follows the development of the Gospel 
itself.' A critical examiner, however, can see this process in a different light. We 
have already observed that the initial vision of the Pain of God is still conceptually 
undifferentiated. Still one thing is absolutely clear to Kitamori, namely that God is 
"aching" for the sake of the sinner. God in Pain is not simply God in love in the 
God. We can observe this singular mixture of the two contrary ways of theological 
speech in Pain, 117-119, where Kitamori speaks of the three orders of the love of 
God. 
'That a concept has an inherent dynamis is a dialectic way of thinking. 
Kitamori speaks of his way of thinking: "I can at least confess that this dynamic way 
of thinking of mine is here influenced indirectly by the philosophy of the Kyoto 
School" (Auto II, 148). 
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ordinary sense; it is much more than that! In his conceptual analysis of the Pain of 
God, Luther's idea of the wrath of God is included as an important Ansatz. But what 
has shaped the conceptual development of the Pain of God is actually the philosophy 
of the Kyoto School. The decisive influence of this school on Kitamori's theology is 
beyond doubt. "The love of God toward this world [the Pain of God] is," says he, 
"the self-identity of absolute contradictions."' Speaking of the inter-relationship of 
the three Persons of the Trinity, Kitamori uses the very term "the self-identity of 
absolute contradictions. "314 We thus clearly discern that the conceptual framework of 
Kitamori's theology is that of Nishida Philosophy. Kitamori, however, maintains that 
the influence of the Kyoto School remains formal in his theology. But in view of 
Kitamori's formulation of the Trinitarian dogma, one cannot but see that Kitamori 
"capitulated" to Nishida Philosophy. 
We dare to maintain that the theology of the Pain of God is, to a 
considerable extent, a theological version of Nishida Philosophy. Although this is not 
the place for an in-depth discussion on the relationship between Kitamori's theology 
and Nishida Philosophy, it is still necessary for our present discussion to look at a 
313Ibid., 171. 
314"When the doctrine of the immanent Trinity is integrated with soteriology, 
the character of the doctrine changes considerably. In the divine Trinity there are now 
contradiction, discontinuity and friction. The aspect of one-ness in the Trinity as the 
theological axiom and the aspect of the three-ness in the theological reality are mutual 
contradictions to each other. But this absolute contradiction is integrated in the Trinity 
which is the 'axiom' and the 'reality' at one and the same time. Thus, the Trinity is 
the self-identity of absolute contradictions" (Creeds, 22). It is clear that a Trinitarian 
concept which quite alien to the Biblical witness is observable here. For an 
interpretation of this dialectic of the 'axiom' and the 'reality,' see 425-426 below. 
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specific passage from Kitamori and see whether our above contention is warranted. 
An article written in 1948 under the title of "On Nishida Philosophy—the 
Philosophy of Nothingness and the theology of the Pain of God," Kitamori explains 
that Nishida's concept of the Absolute (which is "the Absolute Nothingness") 
ultimately remains in the reality of "tranquility," acknowledging no pain in the 
Absolute?' What seems striking to us in Kitamori's discussion is the following 
passage in which he comments on a quotation from Nishida: 
"The Absolute God ["says Nishida,1 must include in Himself the absolute 
negation. He must descend into the [sphere of] extreme evil . . . . Only the God 
who saves the [sinners of] extreme evil and wrong doing is truly the Absolute 
God." In this saying, I should say that Nishida Philosophy stands most closely to 
evangelical theology [the theology of the Pain of God]. Here we must be most 
precise in our theological examination. So long as Nishida's God is identified 
with the Absolute Nothingness, it must decisively part ways with "the God in 
Pain. The form of the logic [of Nishida's God] is almost undistinguishable [from 
that of the God of the Gospel]. But the difference is apparent with regard to the 
quality of the logic [of the Absolute.]316  
In this passage Kitamori remarks on how close Nishida Philosophy is to evangelical 
theology. But he tries to draw a line of demarcation between Nishida and himself. 
We are not quite sure how successful Kitamori really is in this attempt to defend his 
theology against Nishida Philosophy by making a distinction between the "form and 
quality" of the logical structure of the concept of God (is this a real distinction, and 
not merely a terminological distinction?!). Though this issue is quite interesting, it is 
not our main concern here. Rather, we are interested in his way of describing the 
'Philosophy and God (Tokyo: Nihun-no-Barasha, 1985), 179. 
'Ibid., 190. 
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closeness of Nishida Philosophy and evangelical theology (that is, his own theology). 
In Kitamori's view, Nishida Philosophy is one of the most profound thought systems; 
it unknowingly seeks the ultimate truth of reality, which is to Kitamori identical with 
the truth of God in Pain. But to those who know that Kitamori's theology has been 
formed under the strong influence of Nishida Philosophy, Kitamori's argumentation 
seems preposterous. In other words, it is evident that Nishida Philosophy stands very 
close to Kitamori's theology because Kitamori has conceptualized the Pain of God 
according to the categories of Nishida. It is not Nishida's concept of God which 
stands so closely to Kitamori's. It is Kitamori's concept of God which stands so 
closely to Nishida's idea of the Absolute. If we were to rewrite, in an "objective" 
way, what Kitamori writes in the passage above, it would run as follows: "Kitamori's 
theology stands most closely to Nishida Philosophy. . . . The form of the logic [of 
Kitamori's Pain of God] is almost indistinguishable [from that of Nishida's God]." 
This analysis of Kitamori's methodological feature shows that Kitamori has run the 
risk of bringing the whole framework of Nishida's metaphysics into his theology."' 
Kitamori's epistemology consists of his personal conviction of an infallible 
intuition and of the metaphysical dynamism which corresponds to the notion of 
intuition. This main characteristic of Kitamori's theological epistemology is quite akin 
to Nishida Philosophy. 
'For more of Kitamori's relation to the philosophy of the Kyoto School, see 
448-450 below. 
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Analogy and Symbol 
In theology--or philosophy, psychology or the other human sciences which 
have as their task the inquiry into the ultimate ground of reality and the depth of 
human reality, analogy and symbol are of crucial significance. They are the means by 
which man's cognition transcends its immediate limitations, the limitations which are 
conditioned by man's mode of being, namely, man as a spiritual and physical being. 
Theology extensively uses analogy, disregarding how the nature and function of 
analogy is conceived by different theological traditions. Analogia entis in the 
Thomistic tradition is well known; Barth's analogia fidei (revelationis seu relationis) is 
widely discussed."' Even other theological systems still presuppose some form of 
analogy and understanding of the nature of symbol even if inexplicitly. 
From the outset, the theology of the Pain of God bears the obvious marks of 
an "analogical" theology. Pain ascribed to God is unmistakably conceived in an 
analogical sense. Kitamori discusses the issues and problems of analogy in his opus 
magnum, even if he deals with them only briefly. Kitamori, like Barth, holds that 
there is a serious problem in the Thomistic analogia entis. But the Japanese 
theologian shows more sympathy than Barth does concerning the intention of this type 
of analogy, for according to Kitamori, it is an expression of "a positive theological 
""A lucid presentation of the issues of analogy is found in: Horst Georg 
POhlmann, Analogia entis oder Analogia fidei? : Die Frage der Analogie bei Karl 
Barth (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1965). POhlmann argues against the 
alternative "either analogia entis or analogia fidei" and tries to do justice to both types 
of analogies by placing the analogy of being in the sphere of general revelation and 
the analogy of faith in the sphere of special revelation according to the Lutheran 
scheme of Law and Gospel. 
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attitude."' When theology dares to speak of God, holds Kitamori, the use of 
analogy is inevitable. In its use of analogia entis Roman Catholic theology is not 
unaware of the existence of the distinction between God and man; Kitamori means the 
continuity between God and man in this concept of analogy is "continuity in 
discontinuity.'" As to Barth's concept of analogia fidei, however, Kitamori is 
critical, saying that "[in this theology] the proper meaning of analogy seems to have 
evaporated from the very beginning."' 
What then is Kitamori's own concept of analogy? Is there any need for him 
to investigate the implications of analogy in theological epistemology, given his strong 
reliance on intuition in grasping the essence of things and of God? Are the problems 
of analogy relevant for Kitamori, or for the intuitive thinking pattern as such for that 
matter? "Our pain," says Kitamori, "should serve as testimony to the Pain of God: in 
theological terms; there emerges between God and us an analogy (analogia) through 
the medium of pain."' This is the only sentence in his opus 
3191tami, 77 (Pain, 55). 
'Ibid., (ibid.). 
'Ibid., (ibid.). This judgment of Kitamori is obscure; he gives no 
substantiation for this statement. It is well-known, however, that Barth's use of 
analogy as his theological method is extensive, although his analogia revelation has its 
basis on von oben (from Creator to creation), in distinction from analogia entis von 
unten. Barth's analogy as analogy is not questioned, although his "overuse" of it is 
widely criticized (see Heinz Zahrnt, Die Sache mit Gott [Munich: Piper Verlag, 
1966], 123-125. 
'Pain, 54; italic is added. We are not certain of the meaning of this 
sentence. The translation in Pain seems to reflect a similar uncertainty. It can mean: 
Since there has been an analogy between God and man through the mediation of pain, 
man's pain can become the witness to the Pain of God (like analogia entis). It can 
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magnum in which Kitamori speaks of analogy as related to his own theology. And 
analogy in his theology is not something which a priori functions as a theological 
method of cognition. It is rather an a posteriori observation of its emergence through 
the union of God and man in "pain." Theoretically, it would be possible to suppose 
that this analogy that emerges serves as the point of departure within a hermeneutic 
circle. But the fact that the analogy in Kitamori's thought is an a posteriori 
consideration tells us that it, as a method of theology, is wholly dispensable in his 
thought. This is why he deals with it so scarcely. 
Instead Kitamori approaches the problem of analogy "soteriologically." He 
sees the sin of disobedience also in analogy as a theological method. "In short," he 
writes, "man's disobedience is part of man's nature. The paramount problem of the 
Roman Catholic 'analogy of being' is that it hurriedly sought the solution without 
seriously thinking about what was basic in human existence. Catholic analogy has 
been unable to solve the question of disobedience because it went no further than the 
also mean: Since God uses man's pain as the witness to His own Pain, there emerges 
an analogy (like analogia revelationis). Schmerz seems to accept in the former sense 
when it is translated as: ". . . zwischen Gott and uns eine analogia besteht, die durch 
den Schmerz vermittelt wird" (52). The original term is seiritsu suru, which literally 
means: "to constitute itself." So Pain faithfully translates the original wording, though 
perhaps uncertain of its meaning. In Kitamori's thought these two meanings need not 
be differentiated. It may mean both. But here Kitamori seems to intend the latter 
sense, namely that analogy emerges because the Pain of God uses the pain of man as 
its witness. In my view, however, there has never been a real problem concerning 
analogy as a theological method in Kitamori's thought since he means that our 
intuition or sensitivity plays a vital role in grasping the essence of God. Analogy, to 
him, is an a posteriori problem as it were, and it is the question of its "justification" 
by the Pain of God. 
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analogy of being."' What, then, is the proper "remedy" for this deficient Catholic 
analogy? "The only analogy," Kitamori maintains, "which can solve the problem of 
disobedience . . . is the analogy of pain (analogia doloris). In the pain of God, his 
power completely conquers the disobedience so deeply embedded in all human 
activities."' 
This "soteriological" approach of Kitamori to the problem is fully in accord 
with what we have seen above in Kitamori's idea of the "redemption of theology." 
Sin is ubiquitous in man's existence as a whole, including his theological endeavor. In 
one sense, one could say that Kitamori may have seen "the very bottom" of the human 
situation also in this issue; but it is in fact quite "a matter of course," for Christian 
theology is a human endeavor only possible as theologia regenitorum, which means 
that a theologian is already forgiven his sins as a Christian before his theological 
efforts begin (as is the case with all his other activities). The forgiveness of sins is the 
"evident" presupposition for the sinner's continuing existence as a whole. However, 
the problem of analogy is, like other related methodological issues, that of 
epistemology which deals primarily with the law of human cognition; the question 
concerning analogy is whether one uses it correctly or incorrectly, and the answer is 
to be sought in epistemological reflection regarding one's use of analogy. Is it 
congenial with the Biblical witness?' It is not a matter of the forgiveness of sins 
n 'Pain, 56. 
'Ibid. 
"See note 73 above. 
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but of rational reflection about the suitability of a specific usage of analogy and of 
readiness to strive after its best possible use. 
What is far more important than analogy in Kitamori's thought is "symbol." 
This can be seen in the fact that he reserves one whole chapter in his opus magnum 
for discussing the relationship between the Pain of God and its "symbol." First we 
examine what Kitamori means by "symbol." Speaking of the Pain of God as the 
tertium emerging from divine wrath and love, he says: "However, we cannot know 
directly what the pain of God is; we can know it only through our own pain. Our 
pain must witness to the pain of God by becoming the symbol of the pain of God."' 
We notice here three points: first, Kitamori implies that there is distance between 
God and man; second, God's Pain can only be known through our pain; third, our 
pain becomes a symbolic witness to the Pain of God. These are the three major 
components of his dealing with the "symbolization" of our pain as a witness to God in 
Pain. 
Now Kitamori briefly explains the nature of symbol while relying on 
Calvin's commentary on Jer. 31:20 (the very "proof-text" of Kitamori's theology). 
The Genevan reformer writes while commenting on this verse that the Lord is a long-
suffering God who shows His love to the defiant people of His election on the basis of 
His covenant. At the end of his commentary no this verse, Calvin says concerning 
"the sounding of His bowels within Himself": "Sic etiam ubi Deus suscipit in 
se teneri patris affectum, dicit viscera sua sonuisse, quoniam velit rursus populum 
326Pain, 54; italic is mine. 
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ipsum recipere in gratiam. Hoc quidem proprie in Deum non competit, sed quia non 
potest aliter experimere magnitudinem sui erga nos amoris, ideo crasse loquitur, ut se 
ruditati nostrae accomodet." Here Calvin emphasizes God's accommodation in 
conveying "the greatness of His love toward us" through the expression of the sound 
of His bowels. God uses, according to Calvin, this expression "where He has a 
tender fatherly affection in Himself." But this viscera sua sonuisse does not properly 
belong to God and Calvin emphasizes this by quidem and crasse. Kitamori quotes this 
part of the passage: "proprie in Deum non competit, sed quia non potest aliter 
experimere," because in this he finds the essence of symbol "expressed perfectly.' 
In the phrase "non . . . proprie" Kitamori sees "inappropriateness [ 
[of symbol?] while in "non . . . aliter", "the necessity of it [ cxpAtt ]." This 
part of his discussion is not very clear. What does he consider by "inappropriate?" 
The term for "inappropriateness" which we give in the original Japanese characters 
reads hi-honraisei. This can refer either to "the Pain of God" or to an essential aspect 
of a symbol in its relation to that which it symbolizes. When in the English version of 
Pain this term is translated as "inappropriateness," the term is understood as referring 
to symbol, that is, the symbolism of a symbol is an inadequate pointer to the object. 
Kitamori, however, seems to indicate that the term refers to the Pain of God when he 
says that "because of this hi-honraisei [in the expression of the Pain of God], man, 
'Corpus Reformatorum, 66, 677; emphasis is added. 
Pain, 60. 
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essentially different from God, is required as a witness."' That pain (or the like) 
"properly" does not belong to God is Calvin's meaning. In view of Kitamori's use of 
Calvin's commentary on the verse, it seems as if Kitamori had concurred with the 
Genevan reformer on this point in order to "explicate" the meaning of symbol. But 
this use of hi-honraisei in referring to the Pain of God would be an "absolute 
contradiction" to his idea of the Pain of God as the essence of God. This is an 
obscure way of reading Calvin, because Kitamori changes the reference of the 
hi-honraisei from what Calvin means by "non . . . proprie," namely God's viscera 
sua sonuisse, to the "inappropriateness inherent to the essence of symbol."' In 
'Ibid. 
"In response to the criticism that pain does not belong to God, raised by 
Masaichi Takemori, a New Testament scholar and Kitamori's colleague at TUTS, 
Kitamori writes: "The issue itself which is identified by the expression 'the Pain of 
God' undoubtedly exists in God and is therefore essential to God. But the expression 
'pain' which points to the issue is, as Calvin says, a 'human emotion' and as such 
does not belong to God. A symbol has this two-fold aspect. Takemori thinks that 
since the 'expression' of pain does not belong to God, the issue itself does not belong 
to God either; this is apparently a misunderstanding due to the lack of a proper grasp 
of the meaning of the concept of symbol" (Character, 86). As far as Calvin's view is 
concerned, the reformer means that although the "issue" [the pain in God] does not 
belong to God, the "expression" is unavoidable to convey God's mercy to man; Calvin 
considers divine mercy the main point while pain is an expression which must give 
way once the main issue is gotten across (see further, Mozley, 120-122). Kitamori 
seems to have turned the meaning of the Reformer around. In addition to this, a very 
intricate problem of theological language is involved . Kitamori holds that the 
"expression" (that is, "human pain" in Kitamori's view) does not belong to God. In 
so saying, he makes it clear that there is a distance between God and man, a distance 
the analogical language presupposes. But the analogical language also presupposes a 
continuity between "analogatum" and nanalogans," and that is why analogia entis is 
always exposed to the danger of gliding into a direct continuity. And it is, perhaps, 
even in the analogous sense that Takemori denied the pain in God. In fact, all the 
positive statements about God by human language are invariably analogous, and it is 
in the analogous level of language that we defend or challenge the passibility of God 
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other words, the inappropriateness of symbol is emphasized, but the question of the 
inappropriateness of the very ascription of "pain" to God is not questioned. 
This is a "difficult" rhetorical operation on the part of Kitamori, but the 
motif behind it is clear, namely, on the one hand to assert the appropriateness of the 
concept of "pain" for God's reality and on the other hand to drive home the point that 
man's pain is "necessarily" required as a symbol to the Pain of God. "The essence of 
symbol lies in its hi-honraisei and necessity," says Kitamori, for this reason "man, 
essentially different from God, is required as a witness; because of the necessity, God, 
of necessity, requires man.""' What he is saying is that the transcendental Pain of 
God is different from the pain of man. Therefore it cannot be known directly. In 
order to make the Pain of God known, God requires the pain of man as a symbol for 
His Pain. Because of the distance between God's Pain and human pain on the one 
hand and the need for a witness to the Pain of God on the other hand, the use of 
symbol is called for. This way of understanding the nature of symbol seems nearer to 
the concept of analogy.' It is exactly this condition of "inappropriateness and 
or for that matter all other positive statements about God. The question then is 
whether the Pain of God, in an analogous sense, can be considered the essence of 
God. Our overall impression of Kitamori's discourse of the Pain of God, however, 
borders on a univocal direction of theological discourse, and attributes pain to God 
almost in its univocal sense. Kitamori's reson for using this rather intricate conceptual 
operation is clear: it is further defense of the essentiality of the Pain of God. 
'Wand 84, (Pain, 60). 
"The meaning of symbol varies greatly, but we are interested here in its 
religious sense, namely, as a means with which to represent the transcendental reality. 
Apparently, symbol and analogy are closely related as, for instance, in the baptismal 
water; just as ordinary water cleanses, so the baptismal water cleanses man's impurity 
of sin. We can say to our present purpose that when a cognitive concern stands in the 
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necessity" under which analogy constitutes a bridge between God and man. In other 
words, one uses analogy where qualitative difference between an analogatum and an 
analogans is observed but still it is necessary for man to speak of the "analogatum" by 
the help of the "analogans." But Kitamori prefers symbol to analogy. We shall see 
the main reason for this preference toward symbol in the following. In passing, 
however, we mention another reason for the preference. Analogy emphasizes an 
essential difference between analogatum and analogans, God's Pain and human pain. 
But Kitamori's real inclination (contrary to his declared position) is to the effect that 
God's Pain is not qualitatively different from human pain; difference is found only in 
intensity. Kitamori is deeply devoted to the meaning of symbol. It has a 
"methodological" import in his theology, and this import is conceived not only on a 
theoretical level but also on an existential level. 
We shall now see how Kitamori explains the meaning of symbol. The point 
of departure for his explication is the etymological analysis of the Greek term 
"symballein." According to his etymology, this Greek term means "to unite."' "A 
symbol," says Kitamori, "witnesses to divine truth by uniting human and divine truth. 
Man's pain becomes a symbol of the pain of God because God and man are united 
foreground, the analogical aspect of a symbol becomes predominant, whereas when 
the participation in the divine reality is the primary concern, the symbolical aspect of 
analogy comes into play. This close relationship between analogy and symbol is 
observed in Kitamori's thought. For the meaning of symbol, see E. Buess, "Symbol," 
in Religion in Geschichite and Gegenwart, 3rd ed.; J. M. Sommerville, "Symbol," in 
New Catholic Encyclopedia. 
'Creeds, 72. 
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through this condition in man."' 
Apart from the question of whether or not his etymology of symbol provides 
a convincing basis for an important argument,' his point is clear: man is united 
with God through the "symbolization" [ mkt of his pain as a witness to the 
Pain of God. 
To Kitamori, it is only through this "symbolization" of man's pain that one 
knows what the Pain of God actually is. In this "symbolization" there are three 
elements involved; the recognition of the Pain of God, the witness to it, and the union 
with God in Pain. In other words, in the symbolization of man's pain, theology, 
Christian existence and union with God are intimately integrated with each other. Let 
us now read what Kitamori writes about this triad in his theology: 
The Pain of God is not the pain of anybody else; it is the Pain of God. The most 
difficult problem lies right here. We understand the pain of other human beings 
well. But we cannot know of the Pain of God. God is only God in so far as He 
is "qualitatively different" from man; God who can be known by man 
immediately is not God at all. For this reason it is said that God is known only 
by revelation. The Pain of God is only known by divine revelation. But how 
does the divine revelation become actual? It becomes actual only by the help of 
[man's] witness. God's truth is revealed through [man's] witness. But what is it 
that witnesses the truth of God? Nothing but the truth [pertaining to the reality] 
of man [ AratiM ]. The truth of God is revealed through the witness of the 
truth of man. In witness the truth of God and the truth of man are united. But, 
'Pain, 60-61. 
'Etymologically, the word 'symbol' can be traced to the Greek, 
'symballein,' which means to 'throw together' or simply to 'place together,' as when 
two things are juxtaposed for the purpose of comparison. In one of its noun forms, 
the comparing or setting together refers to the custom of tallying or dovetailing the 
two halves of a broken coin, called 'symbols,' in order to establish the identity of one 
or both of the persons possessing the matching halves" (Sommerville [see note 81 
above]). 
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as we saw, divine truth and human truth are separated from each other by a 
"qualitative difference." In witness the two things which are infinitely separated 
are united. This "unity in the total discontinuity [ ]" we call 
symbol. Symbol[ization] is the act of uniting (synzballein) things which are in 
total discontinuity. . . . When the Pain of God is revealed, our pain must 
become its symbol as a witness to the Pain of God. That man's pain becomes the 
symbol of the Pain of God is to say that God and man are united in the condition 
of pain.' 
We notice here a peculiar mixture of distance and closeness between God and man. 
Some logical inconsistencies are also observable. The nerve of the problem in this 
passage, however, is his understanding of the "actualization" of revelation. According 
to Kitamori, man's witness must have a constitutive significance in order for divine 
revelation to take place. Without a human witness, revelation cannot be actualized. 
What does Kitamori means by this? We recall now that the content of God's 
revelation is the Pain of God. The truth of man must serve as a witness of the Pain of 
God. And the content of this "human truth" is the "ordinary" suffering of man. 
When we follow Kitamori's implicit argument in connection with this, we recall 
quickly what Kitamori expressed concerning the examples of Abraham, and Rachel, 
and the mothers whose infant boys under two years of age were killed by Herod.' 
Kitamori thinks of the sufferings of these men and women as witnesses of the Pain of 
God. It is also with this understanding that Kitamori says that the "truth of God and 
the truth of man" are to be united in order for the Pain of God to become actual. And 
in this actualization, God in Pain and human beings witnessing to the Pain of God are 
'Character, 51-52. 
'See 355-356, above. 
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united in Pain. When Kitamori implicitly equates the divine and human truth with 
"common pain," we again discern how fundamental the concept of pain is in 
Kitamori's theology; it surely gains the most fundamental ontological status. In this 
regard Kitamori seems to suggest that the ultimate thing is Pain as a mystical reality, 
even if it might be "qualified" by love.' 
However, our crucial question to Kitamori's concept of revelation is this: is 
not the revelation by the Son (including the prophetic and apostolic witnesses to this 
revelation) complete by itself? Is not the divine "symbolization" of His loving will 
through the incarnate Son not sufficient for us to know the "heart of God?" Did not 
the disciples behold "His glory, the glory as of the only begotten Son of the Father, 
full of grace and truth" (John 1:14), without the mediation of human sufferings? Did 
not the hearts of the two disciples on the way to Emmaus burn within them while the 
risen Jesus talked with them and while He opened the Scriptures to them (Luke 
23:32)? All this without any witness from the "human truth" of suffering! But when 
Kitamori says that the "human truth" of suffering must assist the actualization of the 
revelation of the divine truth (the Pain of God!), he must mean that the "ordinary," 
"external" word given in the Scriptures is not sufficient (although the Scriptures are 
traditionally understood as letting us encounter the triune God through the work of the 
Holy Spirit). This implies, then, that the Pain of God as the Gospel de facto is the 
deepest meaning and it can only be known through human suffering, especially 
through the suffering of those few who are qualified to perceive the Pain of God with 
'See 367-368 above. 
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their keen spiritual sensitivity. Ordinary Christians may enjoy their "happy" days, but 
the selected few should never abandon their pain in order that they might witness to 
the Pain of God.' 
But by what right, we must ask, can human suffering as such be qualified to 
such cardinal significance as the medium of divine revelation? Kitamori repeatedly 
emphasizes that human suffering is the expression of the wrath of God as His reaction 
to human sin. This fact of human pain, however, is embraced by the Pain of God and 
is changed into light as it is made to witness to the Pain of God.' Kitamori finds a 
profound paradox here; human pain which, as the result of God's wrath over sin, is a 
radical separation from God is now made the sole means by which man is united with 
God. For Kitamori, this "paradox" again confirms the ultimacy of the Pain of God as 
absolute human salvation.' Thus when the Pain of God is understood as the 
ultimate truth hidden far behind the "clear" meaning of the Word of God, this ultimate 
truth, as "the King of Truth," must logically dictate in advance the result of Biblical 
exegesis, historical investigation, dogmatic examination and ethical thinking. Is this 
not the result of the closed circle which we mentioned above? With this 
methodological circle, it is quite natural that Kitamori's theology shows no substantial 




development since the day when "the theme" for his theology was revealed to him! 
This would also raise the question of whether Kitamori's theology has authenticly 
heard the Word of God in its totality and diversity or if it has simply reflected other 
sources. 
Analogy and symbol are methodological concepts, but in Kitamori's thought 
they are soteriologically developed. They are also absorbed into the Pain of God. 
The concept of symbol is filled with the content of the Pain of God, that is, "man's 
being united with God in Pain." "We recall," Kitamori writes, "that the word 
`symbol' means union [ ] in its original Greek sense. The 
transformation of our pains into a symbol of the pain of God signifies our unity 
] with God through pain. What does this union of God and man 
imply? It is a mystical condition, union mysitca. It is clear, then, that the mystical 
3421t has been unfortunate for Japanese Protestantism that Kitamori did not 
develop his theology in a direction which could have been more effectively 
communicated to other theologians in Japan. One of his close friends, Yasushi 
Kuyama, wrote in 1953 of Kitamori's opus magnum that "the criticism Kitamori has 
made toward other theologies and philosophies hit the mark but it still seems to be 
only like memos; it is not a full-fledged [academic] confrontation with them." Carl 
Michalson, who introduced Kitamori to the West for the first time, wrote of the 
prospect of Kitamori's theological development: "It would be difficult to recall 
anyone in Western Protestantism of whom it can be said more truly than of Kitamori 
that the human imagination has been placed at the disposal of theology . . . . Will he 
[Kitamori] content himself with developing theological essays, not taking the trouble to 
construct a systematic theology? Or will he one day write the dogmatics implicit in 
'the theology of the pain of God'? . . . In the case of the theologian who is still in his 
early forties, there is no real urgency about an answer to the line of questioning." 
In fact, Kitamori does not develop his theology beyond his opus magnum. The main 
content of the publications in recent years (under new titles) are the reprints of his 
writings from the 1950s and 1960s. It would be interesting to know whether or not 
his theological Ansatz has hindered him from further elaboration of his own theology. 
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[reality] is contained in the concept of symbol(!)."' 
Application of the Pain of God as Method 
"The Cross is the only loophole through which we gain the overview of the 
whole of God," wrote Kitamori when he was a university student.' To him, the 
Cross is another name for the Pain of God. When we examine his theological 
methodology, we only confirm that he has followed this conviction consistently. 
Every theme of import is looked upon through the loophole of the Pain of God, and 
every profound idea is brought into harmony with the Pain of God. We now 
understand more what Kitamori means when he says that the Pain of God is not only 
the ultimate content of the Gospel but also his theological methodology as well. The 
Pain of God is really a powerful methodology in Kitamori's theology in the sense that 
it leads his exgetical, historical, systematic and practical investigations, from the very 
outset to the goal. The result of every investigation he undertakes eventually flows 
into the Pain of God. The sure goal is given and all that is left to do is to "walk" 
toward this goal or to "retrace" his steps from the goal to the point of departure. 
"Look out, look out, look out," he wrote while he was still struggling with Barth, "the 
only way I can walk without erring is the narrow way of the Cross."' We shall 
now examine how the Pain of God as a method has functioned in Kitamori's theology; 
343Pain, 70. 
""Auto II, 85; " -Mt424*-IiickittA664-0(grirkb ." 
'Ibid., 120. 
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first, we shall see his "exegesis" of Scripture; second, his way of dealing with 
historical materials; third, his interpretation of dogmatic issues; and lastly, his 
"conversation" with non-Christian perspectives. 
First, what is Kitamori's "exegetical" method? Before we examine this, it is 
necessary for us to briefly review his understanding of the Bible. In his article 
entitled "Another Aspect of Scriptology," he first maintains that various problems 
pertaining to the view of the Bible are not yet solved.' In his view, the traditional 
discussion on the nature of the Bible has gone largely in the "noema-tic" direction,' 
that is, in a direction in which the Bible is "objectified" and considered of as the 
formal and external authority standing over against the believer.' Kitamori 
understands this view of the Bible to be legalistic. Being legalistic, the "objectified" 
Bible demands our obedience. But as an expression of the Law, this view only 
provokes sin, or disobedience of the Bible.' The only way to solve this 
'Character, 199-201. 
""Noema-tic" is here defined to explain Kitamori's use of the term. This 
term is originally from the Greek, noema, "a thing recognized." Together with this 
noema, another term noesis ("recognition") is used as a technical term in Nishida 
Philosophy. This also shows that Kitamori is deeply immersed in this philosophy. 
What Kitamori wants to say is that a proper view of the Bible should be formed in 
connection with "the existence of the believer," that is, the Bible is the Bible only 
insofar as it proclaims the Gospel to sinners. So to view the Bible independently from 
this speaking the Gospel to the sinner is irrelevant to Kitamori (ibid., 202). In his 
view, the unity of noema and noesis aspects is required also for the actualization of 
the meaning of the Bible. 
'Character, 204-205. 
"Ibid., 205; "When one maintains [as the `noema-tic' aspect of the Bible] that 
`God is the author of the Bible,' one cannot but acknowledge his obedience to the 
Bible. . . . This way of approaching scriptology is legalistic. . . . [As to the 
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fundamental scriptological problem is to regard the Bible as Gospel, that is, as the 
(expression of) love of God (the Pain of God!). When one is within the victorious 
love of God, it is impossible for sinners to fall outside or be disobedient to it. What 
Kitamori is saying is that to be in the Pain of God is to be de facto obedient to God. 
This same "principle" is also to be applied to the view of the Bible. According to 
Kitamori when one interprets the Bible under the norm of the Pain of God, this fact 
itself "guarantees" obedience to the (perhaps) "true" intention of the Bible.' 
Formally speaking, Kitamori follows Luther's view of Scripture with the priority of 
the material principle as typically expressed in the dictum "was Christum treibet."'' 
Kitamori substantiates his viewpoint by referring to Luther. As we readily notice, 
however, the content of "the material principle" in Kitamori's thought is the Pain of 
God, altering the dictum of Luther to read: "was den Schmerz Gottes treibt." 
Beyond this Kitamori does not deal with the problems of scriptiology."2 
Orthodox view of the Bible] one should say that it is legalistic. The Bible which 
speaks of the Gospel. is looked upon legalistically as far as its formal aspect is 
concerned. Contradictio in adjecto!" (ibid.). 
""As long as the Bible stands over against us, we can be outside the Bible 
and our disobedience to it is possible. This is why the legalistic view of the Bible 
does not save us [from our disobedience to the Bible]. But how will it be if the Bible 
embraces us disobedient sinners within itself. In other words, if the Bible becomes to 
us the fact of the love of God? When we are embraced by the love of God, our 
disobedience becomes impossible. Since disobedience is going away from the love of 
God, our disobedience becomes an impossibility when we are embraced by the love of 
God in such a way that we cannot go away from it" (ibid., 208). 
"'Ibid., 209-211. 
"He mentions the inspiration of the Bible and also of the theory of verbal 
inspiration, but does not elaborate. His practical attitude toward the Bible is to accept 
the Bible as the divine word, without questioning the formal issues of the Bible. 
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One particular feature of Kitamori's understanding of Scripture needs to be 
mentioned: Kitamori reads the Bible more as an "esoteric" document which contains 
the eternal truth of God which man seeks to find out through his intuition and 
sensitivity than an historically conditioned document which is to be read in the light of 
historical contexts.' In other words, the Bible hides profound truths of the divine 
mystery (the Pain of God!), truths even independent of the original intentions of the 
"human" authors. Thus, in some places he pays minute attention to various individual 
terms used in the Bible.' Thus Kitamori's "exegesis" is to be characterized as an 
"in-depth method" in contrast to a historical and "contextual" method. This gives the 
impression that he espouse the verbal inspiration of Scripture, which he does not.' 
To Kitamori, the Bible is itself powerful without any formal support, because it 
materially witnesses to the Pain of God.' With this overview we proceed to look at 
some "exegetical examples" of Kitamori's work. 
John 3:16 is known as the "little Bible," the Gospel condensed. "For God 
so loved the world that He gave His only begotten Son, that whoever believes in Him 
'For this "esoteric" reading of the Bible, see Pain, 124-126, where he deals 
with God's love and His wrath on the basis of Luke 12:4-7. 
"'See Pain, 44-45, where Kitamori on the basis of eprepen in Heb. 2:10 reads 
that the Pain of God is essential and necessary to God. 
""Yet we exclude from our discussion on scriptology the positive extreme of 
the theory of verbal inspiration and the negative extreme of 'liberal investigation' of 
the Bible (Character, 206). 
"Kitamori's favorite expression is that "the Bible has a real power [to 
convince]," or " MA)] t•  t, -,-0.1.6 " (his utterance in Kuyama, Companion, 
119). 
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should not perish but have eternal life." To Kitamori, this is certainly a joyful 
message, but he says it is "by no means easy to understand; we need to give 
explanation to it for the truth in it to become actual."' Why is it difficult to 
understand this verse? It is because the love of God here expressed is not simply 
love. In his view, "the love of God which had never become actual before the giving 
up of the Son has now become actual by this very giving."' So he reads the "little 
Bible" as follows: God now loves the world because He gave up His only begotten 
Son.' To him, this central verse cannot be the expression of God's "immediate" 
love; it must be the expression of (the love based upon) the Pain of God. 
Accordingly, the verb edoken is not a "simple" benevolent divine giving; it primarily 
signifies an "abandoning" [Atz ];" "God the Father has abandoned God 
the Son in order to save the world."' Thus, John 3:16 is the "tragic word" of 
God.' The traditional reading of this verse, in Kitamori's view, is then a 
superficial reading, having no sensitivity for the deepest meaning of God's love 
through Pain. To him, therefore, it is essential for the believer to keep in mind that 
God's love for the world is divine love through God's Pain. 
'Short Meditations on Biblical Verses (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobo, 1964), 96. 
358Auto I, 211. 
'Ibid. 




The second "example" is taken from Luke 16:19-30. This passage is 
discussed in connection with the "symbolization" of man's pain to witness to the Pain 
of God that man might become united with God in Pain. "Does not the story of the 
rich man and Lazarus . . . shed light on the above-discussed point [man's union with 
God in Pain]," writes Kitamori." In his comment on this passage, he warns that 
"we should not read into this text a value judgment of good or evil, nor faith and 
unbelief. "361 In Kitamori's "exegesis" (and not eingesis!), this story should mean 
that "man [as Lazarus] (regardless of his goodness or his faith) is united with God by 
his pain; man [as the rich man] (regardless of his goodness or his faith is severely 
estranged from God by his lack of pain."' But the rich man in Hades, where his 
pain is now actualized, "too . . . saw from far off the symbol of the pain of God," 
and "cannot we then say," Kitamori asks, "that he also is received into union with him 
[God in Pain]?"' "Is this not the truth of Christ's 'descending into hell,' as well as 
the truth [ ANigiga ] of the doctrine of universal salvation?" How can we 
characterize this is "exegesis" of Kitamori?!" A speculative exgesis or rather 
eingesis?! This has only been possible, it seems, because Kitamori is so absolutely 







The third case is also from his opus magnum. In the chapter dealing with 
the "Transcendence and Immanence of the Pain of God," Kitamori takes up Matt. 
25:31-26:13 in order to substantiate this notion of the dialectic of 
transcendence/immanence. What Kitamori wants to demonstrate in this chapter is 
the priority of the Pain of God over man's pain. In other words, the priority of the 
forgiveness of sins must be maintained over socio-ethical concern. So Kitamori 
proceeds in his explanation of the point. In connection with the "prophesy" by Jesus 
of the Last Judgment, Kitamori writes that according to this story God's judgment 
"will finally determine our destinies."' And the criterion of this judgment is "the 
love toward this actual world." "What we learn from this Scripture passage," he 
writes, "is that God expects us to love Him, not as the immediate object of our love, 
but rather through love for our neighbors.n3'J0 God is in solidarity with suffering 
humanity; that is, the Pain of God is immanent in this world. So it is vital for the 
disciples of Christ to love suffering neighbors as if the suffering neighbors were God 
Himself. But this is not the whole story. In the following story, in which we read 
about a woman who poured very expensive ointment on Jesus for his burial, Kitamori 
finds something diametrically opposite to what Jesus described of in His judgement 
"prophesy." In Kitamori's reading, Jesus commanded His disciples to be in solidarity 




strongly," he interprets Jesus' intention, "Jesus would say: 'you [the disciples] may 
leave the poor to themselves; you have to concentrate your concern on me.'"37 This 
should be a surprise to the disciples, explains Kitamori, because in accusing the 
woman of wasting the expensive ointment (which could have been exchanged for 
money and given to the poor) they only "applied" what the Master had taught. But 
they are now reproached by the Lord. Kitamori, however, sees here the 
transcendence of the Pain of God. In view of the solemn reality of the Pain of God 
"that God himself in the person of the Son is about to be buried," all the other human 
pains totally lose their colors.' In so arguing, Kitamori tries to secure the 
transcendence of the Pain of God, because it corresponds to the priority of the 
forgiveness of sin vis-à-vis "worldly" help for one's neighbors. Thus on the basis of 
the two stories, Kitamori finds the two aspects of the Pain of God, the immanent 
aspect and the transcendent aspects. Whether it is in accord with the intention of the 
text to teach us these two aspects of the Pain of God--we do not mean this literally but 
in its theological substance—is an open question. Apparently, on the basis of these 
texts Kitamori intents to find both aspects of Christian existence, for the Church as 
well as for individuals. But the net effect of this "exegesis"--also his intention--is to 
justify the Church's modus operandi in the actual reality, transcending the world only 
on its "surface level." But this interpretation of these Scripture passages in the scheme 
of the transience-immanence dialectic of the Pain of God has been severely 
Thltami, 152 (Pain, 100). 
'Ibid., 152-153, (ibid., 100-101). 
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criticized.' 
Lastly, we review his "exegetical" study of Jer. 31:20 and Is. 63:15. As we 
mentioned above, Jer. 31:20 is the "proof-text" of Kitamori's theology of the Pain of 
God. Is. 63:15 also contains the very term, hamah and for Kitamori this is the text 
which confirms that the Pain of God is "at once" the love of God, due to the fact that 
the one word has a dual meaning of both "pain" (Jer. 31:20) and "intense love" (Is. 
63:15). How is it with the Jeremiah verse? It reads: "Is Ephraim My dear son? Is 
he a pleasant child? For though I spoke against him, I earnestly remember him still; 
therefore My heart yearns ["My bowels ache" in an older Japanese translation] for 
him; I will surely have mercy on him, says the Lord." This "exegetical" study is now 
included in the opus magnum as an "Appendix," which was originally written before 
"Hidetoshi Watanabe, one of the most vocal critics of Kitamori, finds "a 
interpretative distortion. "in Kitamori's "reading out" of the transcendence of the Pain 
of God from Matt. 26:6-13. Watanabe writes: "But Jesus said: 'For you have the 
poor with you always (pantote), but Me you do not have always (ou pantote).' What 
is here compared is the contrast (made by the help of the two temporal adverbs) 
between the issue the disciples have with them 'always' and the issue of 'not always' 
(that is, the thing actual only now). In Kitamori this [temporal] contrast is changed 
into a non-temporal contrast of actual reality and the transcendental reality over it.. . 
. What Jesus emphasizes here is the historical ephapax of His Passion--`only now.' 
The Son suffers in the midst of history. Jesus walking toward the Cross is the pain of 
God itself, God in pain who becomes immanent the suffering of the world. How can 
we speak of the poor without gazing at the 'now' of the ephapax in the pain of God. 
. . . If we do not see in the Cross of Jesus God in pain who bears the pain of the 
world (and thus the world borne by the pain of God), we can never see the pain of 
God immanent to the pain of the world" (Contemporary Mission and Biblical Exegesis 
[Tokyo: Shinkyo Shuppansha, 1986], 69-70). This criticism is significant because, as 
we see in the quotation, Watanabe regards the pain of God as a valuable theological 
insight. Watanabe criticizes Kitamori's logic in this exegesis: "We cannot accept a 
dialectic which cuts the head and the body from a living man and tries to put it back 
together claiming that 'now we have a living body'" (ibid., 68). 
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the opus magnum itself and included in his second work, Theology and Creeds. In 
distinction from his other "exegetical" work with Scripture (as we have seen above 
and other places), this study follows a more solid exegetical procedure; Kitamori 
compares various occurrences of hamah, consults lexicons, refers to Luther and 
Calvin and other modern authorities.' (This study seems to show the possibility 
that had Kitamori been more meticulous about his exegesis, his theology would have 
been more convincing and easier to communicate.) What he wants to "get across" is 
that Jer. 31:20 truly expresses the Pain in God, and not merely love. As far as this 
point is concerned, namely that God suffers pain, Kitamori's arguments stand well. 
God can suffer, and can experience pain. Beyond this, however, neither the Jeremiah 
text nor the Isaiah text "prove" anything; in other words, they do not by themselves 
support the Pain of God as the tertim emerging out of the wrath and the love of God. 
The Jeremiah text speaks rather of the love of God for the astray Ephraim; a "plain" 
reading of the verse shows that God has a painful feeling toward Ephraim "directly" 
and not a kind of love which had gone through an inner-divine struggle which 
Kitamori calls the Pain of God.' When Kitamori claims that "there is absolutely no 
Still Schmerz gives it as "Meditation aber Jer. 31, 20 and Jes. 63, 15" and 
not as "Exegese" (152; italic is added). 
'Jeremiah is the most tender-hearted prophet of the Old Testament. From his 
prophesy we can learn from his prophesy the love of God for straying people. We 
see God's unquenchable and longing love through the heart of the prophet, for 
instance in the verse: "'Return, backsliding Israel,' says the Lord, 'I will not cause 
My anger to fall on you, for I am merciful, says the Lord; 'I will not remain angry 
forever'" (Jer. 3:12; 4:1-3, 8:4-7, 15:5-8). Even in the fierce pronunciation of divine 
judgement, one reads God's sorrowful love toward Judah between the lines (cf. Jer. 
4:27-29). God's sorrowful love for His straying people fully sides with the people. 
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more appropriate expression of the truth of the Cross than this expression [found in 
the Jeremiah hamah],"" it certainly is beyond the warrant of the text, at least in the 
sense of the Pain of God. It is, in reality, Kitamori's own perception apart from the 
text. 
Our impression gained from even a cursory review of Kitamori's reading of 
the Bible has clearly revealed that the Biblical text does not support Kitamori's idea of 
the Pain of God but the Pain of God guides his readin gof the text; the idea of the 
Pain of God even "elucidates" the text's meaning beyond its "external clarity." In 
view of this we should perhaps recall that the Pain of God was "revealed" in 
Kitamori's vision prior to his "discovery" of the Jeremiah text!' 
The Pain of God as a theological method is used also in the field of 
"historical" investigation. Kitamori sees his concept of the Pain of God as the 
background of church history, especially of the history of dogma. His point is that the 
whole of the historical development of the central doctrine of Christianity has reached 
its zenith, as it were, in his concept of the Pain of God.' Briefly, we shall see 
Kitamori's method in tracing the line of the dogma-historical development of the 
Jer. 31:20 also depresses the undivided love of God for the people. In this sense, we 
cannot read the verse as Kitamori seems to: "My bowels ache in Me because your sins 
arouse My anger and I have to fight within Me to overcome My own wrath, thus 
having Pain in Me when I still want to love you." We should hold to a "plain 
reading," because it is this love God wants us to know more than what is going on in 
Himself. 
'Itami, 84 (Pain, 59). 
'See Chap. 3, 25. 
"See note 117 in Chap. 3 above. 
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doctrine of the Trinity. In two articles entitled "The Fourth Century, the Sixteenth 
Century and the Twentieth Century" and "The Ecumenical Creeds and the Particular 
Creed" in Theology and Creeds, Kitamori makes a short survey of the Trinitarian 
development in the Ecumenical Creeds (Apostolicum, Necae[no-Constantinopolita]num 
and Athanasianum) in trying to find out their inner connection with the "Particular 
Creed" (Confessio Augustana). In Kitamori's view, the development of the Trinitarian 
dogma from Apostolicum through Necaenum to Athanasianum has been driven 
forward by the inner necessity of the Gospel (the Pain of God!) itself.' He 
maintains that theologians through the centuries, while they took pains to formulate the 
Trinitarian dogma, in reality worked hard to do justice to the reality of the Gospel 
without knowing toward which specific goal they were striving.' 
Before we follow his "historical" survey, we recall his own understanding of 
the Trinitarian dogma in his scheme of the theological "axiom" and "reality." 
According to his conception, the threeness of the Godhead corresponds to the different 
aspects of man's existence before God; in other words, the Father corresponds to 
man's existence in the order of creation (under wrath!); the Son, in the order of 
reconciliation (the Pain of God); the Spirit, in the order of sanctification (God's 
triumphant power of love). This is what Kitamori calls the "theological reality." The 
"theological axiom" is identical with the content of the order of reconciliation in the 




aspects of the "theological reality" find themselves in a dialectical unity. This 
dialectic tries to do justice to all the aspects of man's existence before God; man under 
the wrath of God and in the hope of final redemption is ultimately supported by the 
reconciliation in the Son (the Pain of God). This soteriological structure corresponds 
to the Trinitarian structure as "axioms' and "reality," that is, as the theological 
"axiom" God is one (Solos Christus!), whereas as the theological "reality" God is 
three (Pater, Filius et Spiritus Sanctus). 
According to Kitamori, the proprium of each divine Person vis-a-vis man's 
existence is formulated in the Apostolicum "with astonishing clarity."' This, he 
says, is the creed of "the theological reality."' In this lies its strength. However 
this strength involves weakness as to the "axiom" aspect of the dogma.' In other 
words, wrath, reconciliation and redemption are all independent and not 
soteriologically integrated; in Kitamori's view the first article of the creed denies the 
forgiveness of the second article by its emphasis on divine wrath, while the third 
article is repugnant to the second because the third claims actual transformation of the 
sinner to actual righteousness. This weakness in the Apostolicum is bound to call for 
a creed which emphasizes the oneness of the Trinity.' 





Apostolocum and the Athanasianum, not only chronologically but primarily 
theologically. He maintains that "the Nicaenum is the creed of Christology," or "the 
creed of the [theological] axiom."' The main contribution of this creed, says 
Kitamori, is its establishment of the "essential" unity of the Father and the Son by the 
term "homo-ousios. "386  To Kitamori, however, this unity of the three Persons in the 
Godhead is a unity in the Son, or the Christiological unity. But a full-fledged 
formulation of the unity aspect of the Trinitarian dogma is not yet available in the 
Nicaenum. Even though the concept "homo-ousios" points to the unity of the Father 
and the Son, the "homo-ousios" of the Spirit is still "out of sight."' "The Nicaenum 
has opened the way," writes Kitamori, "in coming nearer to the truth of the unity in 
Trinity, which is of infinite importance."' 
The Athanasianum, he says, completed the classical development of the 
Trinitarian dogma by giving a "perfect expression" to the Trinity; Unum Deum in 
Trinitate, et Trinitatem in Unitate."' "How long the Church had waited for this 
truth [of the Trinity] to be formulated in a creed in such a way!"" He, however, 






the creed, holds Kitamori, one reads a somewhat Chalcedonian description of 
Christology. Still, "no necessary [organic] inner-connection between the first part and 
the second part can be recognized in it," observes Kitamori."' Thus, the way to the 
Christiological Trinity, which Nicaenum had opened, was closed again. In his view, a 
real integration of the Trinitarian dogma on the basis of Christology--that is, on the 
basis of soteriology—did not take place throughout this early development of the 
dogma, although the Nicaenum and the Athanasianum both tried to solve the problem 
left uncompleted by the Apostolicum. Thus creedal history develops into the 
Reformation era, jumping over the Middle Ages--the ages of "another gospel."' 
"Confessio Augustana," writes Kitamori;  "is the first creed [confession] of 
the Evangelical church" in which one can find "the particular force of all the 
Reformation creeds preeminently expressed."' He confirms that in it [Confessio 
Augustana] soteriology "or, put more exactly, the doctrine of justification" occupies 
the central place.' To Kitamori, however, neither the Augsburg Confession nor the 
Smalcald Articles of Luther is quite explicit with regard to "its inner connection with 





'Ibid., 64. Since Kitamori holds that Luther "just passed by this doctrine 
without particular attention," it is necessary for us to insert a comment on Luther's 
understanding of the doctrine of the Trinity. As to the "scrutinization" of the divine 
Trinity, writes Klaus Schwarzwiller, "Luther betant seine Hilflosigkeit diesem 
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of the Confession [viz., the trinitarian dogma] in a different light," and advances his 
view that the trinitarian article of the Confession be read as the "methodology" for 
[the understanding of] the soteriological truth which is developed in the following 
articles in the Confession.' For "the dogma of the Trinity is the structure of the 
Gospel and soteriology."' According to him, what the ecumenical creeds sought 
but failed to grasp and what the Reformation Confession now sheds light on, is "a 
Christological Trinity," that is a soteriological Trinity.' With this 
Gegenstand gegeniiber und desse Sprodigkeit gegen alle Logik wie iiberhaupt 
Uneinsichtigkeit fur den menschlichen Verstand, derzufolge man bier nur stammeln 
kann" (Theologia crucis [Munich: Chr. Keiser Verlag, 1970],' 201-202). But in 
establishing of the inscrutability of the divine majesty, says this author, it "suddenly" 
becomes necessary and meaningful. Only against this background does Luther's 
understanding of the trinitarian dogma gain its clear contour that "in Christum und 
seinem Evangelium, bier und nur hier begegnet Gott" (ibid., 205). One must 
conclude that Luther's concept of the divine Trinity is soteriological. Here 
"soteriological" strictly means that we recognize God as the Giver of salvation. In 
other words, it is not for us to speculate about Gott an sich, as we can see in the 
following passage from Luther: "Der Vater gibt sich uns mit Himmel und Erden samt 
allen ICreaturen. . . . Aber solche Gabe ist durch Adams Fall verfinstert und unnutze 
worden. Darum hat darnach der Sohn sich selbst auch uns gegeben, all sein Werk, 
Leiden, Weisheit und Gerechtigkeit geschenkt und uns dem Vater versiihnt . . . 
Weil aber solche Gnade niemand niitze wire, wo sie heimlich verborgen bliebe, . . . 
so kommt der Heilige Geist and gibt sich auch uns ganz und gar, der lehret uns solche 
Wohltat Christi . . . ." (WA 26, 505f., quoted in Jan Koopmans, Das altkirchliche 
Dogma in der Reformation [Munich: Chr. Keiser Verlag, 1955], 104-105). As we 
have seen, Kitamori also speaks of a soteriological doctrine of the Trinity, but we find 
a basic difference between him and Luther: while Luther sees the three divine 
Persons in Christ--and as pro nobis, Kitamori sees into the mystery of the Trinity 
through Christ--primarily Deus in se. For Luther, the full knowledge of the divine 
Trinity has been reserved until we shall see it in lumen gloriae. But for Kitamori it is 





"Christologization" of the Trinitarian dogma, the "inner connection" between the 
ecumenical creeds and the Reformatory, "particular" creed, holds Kitamori, is 
explicitly established. However, this explication of the latent inner connection between 
the ecumenical creed and the particular confession [of the Reformation] is not made by 
the Reformation itself, but by us.' Kitamori maintains that "our interpretation" of 
the Trinitarian dogma, formulated in Article I of Confessio Augustana as the 
methodology for understanding the Gospel, is "not an arbitrary act [on our part] but it 
is the result of our following the necessity which the issue [the Gospel] itself 
requires."'" 
Thus, what Kitamori sees as the ultimate formulation of the Trinitarian 
dogma is a "Christological Trinity," in other words, a soteriological formulation of the 
dogma of the Trinity. This means, in substance, that the Trinitarian dogma is nothing 
but the formal framework of the truth of the Pain of God.' In order for the 
Trinitarian dogma to reach final clarity and formulation, it had to go through the 
Reformation and eventually reach the theology of the Pain of God.' 
3"Ibid. 
"Ibid. 
''When we grasp the dogma of the immanent Trinity together with the 
existence of the sinner--or unite the dogma with the love of God in the Gospel, the 
dogma of the Trinity necessarily becomes the theology of the Pain of God. By the 
dogma of the Trinity, the truth that the Cross of Christ is in the divine 'inside.' This 
`inside' is nothing but the essence of God. When the theology of the cross and 
Trinitarian theology are integrated, the theology of the Pain of God necessarily 
emerges" (Character, 80). 
'O 2Creeds, 67. 
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We observe the same historical viewpoint in the presentation of Kitamori's 
so-called "Gospel History" in his opus magnum.'"' Taking Acts 17:26-27 as his 
point of departure, he argues that each nation has been divinely assigned its specific 
contribution to the deepening and clarification of the Gospel. The Jewish nation had 
its appointed time and assignment; the Greaco-Roman world had its own; the 
Germanic nation had its own. There have been antitheses between Jew and Gentile, 
between the Roman Catholic Church and the Protestant Church concerning the 
understanding of the Gospel. And in these antitheses it has been the latter (Gentile 
and Protestant) which preserved the Gospel and deepened the understanding of it. 
However, neither Germanic spirituality nor Greek spirituality possessed the crucial 
sensitivity to the Pain of God.' "Even in the case of the Gouesgestalt which Luther 
admired and adored," writes Kitamori, "we cannot but help saying [to the reformer], 
'Friend, not to that melody.' Certainly, Luther possessed a sensitivity to God's grace, 
but he did not grasp the meaning of grace as God's pain.' In fact, holds Kitamori, 
the Japanese people were uniquely qualified by their sensitivity to pain to grasp the 
deepest feature of God: God in Pain. But this view of God, Kitamori warns, is not a 
relative one that stands beside the Graeco-Roman view of God or the German 
view.' For "the Pain of God is the definitive expression of the Biblical view of 
'Pain, 128-130; see also Creeds, 28-30. 
'Pain, 133. 
'Wind, 202 (Pain, 133). 
'Ibid., 207 (ibid., 136). 
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God,"" in other words, the ultimate penetration to the essence of God. "The loss of 
this definitive issue [the Pain of God]," warns Kitamori, "means the misfortune of the 
Church in the whole world."' Following Kitamori's sweeping generalization of 
historical data, one is deeply astonished that it is possible for a theologian to quickly 
assert such an absolute claim about his view and his theological idea without supplying 
adequate documentary substantiation. Is this a prophetic vision? Given the fact that 
Kitamori does not elaborate on this gigantic claim, we have no grounds to assess his 
vision. What we have certainly learned, however, is that Kitamori sweeping historical 
perspective can only be founded on an extraordinarily strong conviction of the truth of 
the Pain of God. Kitamori's argumentations seem to be difficult to follow, but this 
fierce conviction of Kitamori alone stands out. The Pain of God is surely a 
"powerful" method, also in historical investigation. 
In examining the third point of Kitamori's idea of the Pain of God as 
theological method, we shall now see it applied to his work in dogmatics. In fact, we 
have already sufficiently seen the centrality of the idea of the Pain of God when we 
dealt with "God in Pain" and "Man in the Pain of God" in the previous chapter. The 
same feature can be seen also in his "historical" study of the Trinitarian dogma in the 
above; the Pain of God as "the conclusion" directed all the arguments to corroborate. 
However, it is still necessary to see one more aspect of his methodology which is 




To Kitamori's theology, Christology is of principal importance both in 
content and in methodology. He adopts two mottos as his own methodological 
standpoint. One is 1 Cor. 2:2: "For I determined not to know anything . . . except 
Jesus Christ and Him crucified"; the other is Luther's "Christocentric" dictum from 
the Heidelberg Disputation: "In Christo crucifixio est very Theologia et cognitio 
Dei." In fact, 1 Cor. 2:2 is also Luther's motto for his fist Lectures on the Psalms. 
In this sense, Kitamori has made these two "Christocentric" mottos his own. Now it 
is our interest to learn in what sense this "Christocentricism" is understood in 
Kitamori's theology; in other words, how is Christology conceived in relation to his 
basic idea of the Pain of God? 
We recall that his first publication was entitled "The Lord of the Cross." It 
would then be natural for us to turn to this work first. In reality, however, this work 
does not deal with Christology proper. It mainly deals with the issues of dogmatic 
"prolegomena," and we have already seen above what his concept of "prolegomena" is 
and how he has "solved" its issues. The table of contents of this work demonstrates 
what we have observed.' In this work, Kitamori characterizes "God the Son as the 
Pain of God."" "God the Son," he writes, "that is, Jesus Christ, is God for us only 
'The Table of Contents runs: 1. Introduction; 2. The Cross Alone; 3. The 
Trinity (the Love based upon the Pain of God); 4. God the Son (". . . Pain . . ."); 5. 
God the Father ("God . . . )"; 6. The Holy Spirit ( . . . Love); 7. The Gospel as 
Fact; 8. The Bible; 9. The True Church; 10. The Situation Today; 11. Conclusion; all 
these issues are condensed in 71 pages. 
410Cross, 23. 
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as the one God together with the Father and the Spirit."' "God the Son is the Son 
of God the Father," he continues, "and we show this [relation] by the fact that 'the 
Pain' is 'the Pain of God.' This means that the [real] subject of the Pain [observable 
in Christ] is God."' 
Kitamori shows that the designation of the Son as the Pain of God involves 
three things; first, what is revealed in Christ is neither God's wrath nor God's love, 
but the love conquering the wrath of God, "that is, the Pain of God" which is 
"self-identity of the two absolutely contradictory realities: God's wrath and God's 
love";" second, that the Son is the Pain of God points to the self-identity of God the 
Father and God the Son, or the self-identity of the God who "decrees the death of the 
sinner" and the God who "still loves this sinner as His own";4'4 third, that the Son 
Jesus Christ is the Pain of God points to the fact that "Law and Gospel are one in 
Christ," in other words, Christ was cursed by Law and crucified for us, but "Law is 
the will of the Lord of the Gospel, thus the Pain of God emerges.'s The detailed 









"provocative" viewpoints.' What we want to note is that Kitamori's Christology is 
a priori designated as the Pain of God. This means that the basic conceptual category 
for Christology is God's Pain. This is fully in keeping with his theology. 
What does this Ansatz of Christ as the Pain of God entail in Kitamori's 
Christology? His Christology is concentrated on the Cross of Christ as divine Pain, 
and this at the cost of other Christological aspects. Certainly, the Cross of Christ is 
the most essential reality of Christian theology, and concentration on the Cross as such 
can be said to be the touchstone of all true evangelical theology. But even this 
concentration on the Cross is not "free" of the danger of misinterpreting the 
Gospel.' What we have in mind is that according to our understanding of 
Kitamori, "Christ the Crucified" is made into a cognitive "tool" in the process of 
penetrating to the deepest mystery of God. As a matter of fact, after a thorough 
reading of his writings, we are left with a strange feeling about the meagerness of 
Christology in Kitamori's thought. Although he often speaks of the Cross of Christ, 
"E The last point sounds as if it were a "Barthian" statement of 
"Ojfenbarungsmonismus" in which "Gospel and Law" (in this order!) is defined as the 
one word of God. Formally, Kitamori follows the scheme of Barth. Further, this 
way of seeing Gospel and Law is also influenced by Nisida's dialectic, with the result 
that the antithesis between Law and Gospel, the traditional Lutheran understanding, is 
synthesized (or "aufgehobere) in the Pain of God. We shall deal with this issue more 
in the next chapter. 
"Here is a fine point which is of vital importance. When we speak of the 
Cross of Christ, the ultimate emphasis should not be on the Cross but on Christ, not 
on suffering as such but His suffering for our salvation. The Cross is the divine 
"means" to reveal His ultimate salvific will. When Kitamori makes use of the term 
the "Cross alone" (see note 158), a dangerous misconception of the Cross of Christ is 
at hand. 
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he devotes very little of his attention to the suffering of the earthly Christ Himself.' 
"We are thinking here of Christ's struggle and pain as Man in His earthly life from 
His birth through His public life to Golgotha, as is described for instance in Heb. 5:7-
10; 4:1516; Matt. 26:36-39. (Incidentally, we do not find these references within his 
opus magnum). In this regard, we can even say that Kitamori's concept of the Pain of 
God is overwhelmingly concerned with the Pain of the Father." In a sense, it is a 
striking feature. Perhaps, an accusation (by Yoshio Noro, for instance) of Kitamori's 
theology as a form of patripassianism may have been occasioned by this specific 
feature.' 
Still, some other features of Kitamori's Christology must be mentioned. 
Christ as the Pain of God can be designated as a "negative" Christology in the sense 
that this Pain is a negative reality. But when we refer to the New Testament, we 
"The Pain of God must be distinguished, writes Kitamori, "from what 
Ignatius calls the 'suffering of our God' (tou pathous tou theou mou, on Rom. 6:3). . 
. ," for this "position indicates only the suffering of Jesus on earth. . .". (Pain, 115; 
emphasis is added). 
4'9"The Son [, 'when the Father crucified the Son,'] is the Pain of God because 
the Son is the Son of the Father. And the Father is also the Pain of God because He 
is the Father of the Son. Since the Son is born of the Father, the Father is the first in 
the order [of the Pain of God]. The Son is the mirror of the heart of the Father . . . . 
`He who has seen Me has seen the Father' (John 14:9)", "The Recognition of God in 
Christ" (Graduation Thesis, Japan Lutheran Theological Seminary, 1937), 288; 
underline is original, while the italics are mine. We see here that the Pain of the 
Father is the main concern for Kitamori. In a recent publication, this point is 
criticized: "Though Kitamori speaks of the pain of the Father, does he develop the 
pain of God as the pain of the Son? The pain of God the Son is not his main theme" 
(Yoshild Terazono, The Range of the Theology of Banh [Tokyo: Jordan-sha, 1987: cf. 
note 373 above). 
"See Kitamori's defence on this point, Pain, 15-16. 
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observe a "positive" Christology, in which Christ is seen as the Healer and Conquerer 
of human predicaments, even of physical sufferings. Christ's answer to the disciples 
of John the Baptist is a case in point: "The blind see and the lame walk; the lepers 
are cleansed and the deaf hear; the dead are raised up and the poor have the gospel 
preached to them" (Matt. 11:5). And it may not be totally accidental that in 
Kitamori's opus magnum the reports of Jesus' miracle are entirely missing. 
Furthermore, Jesus promises the unalloyed joy to His disciples (John 15:11, 16:22, 
24). And according to the Gospels and the other New Testament writings, Christ is 
not only an embracing God as Kitamori claims; He pronounces judgment as well both 
in word and action. He cleanses the corrupted Temple; He utters "woes" to "the 
scribes and the Pharisees." According to Matt. 25:31ff., it is Christ who is the Judge 
of the Last Judgment, while Kitamori calls it "God's" judgment. In Rev. 6:16, we 
have the expression "the wrath of the Lamb." In a word, there is no difference 
between God the Father and God the Son with regard to judgement and mercy. Opera 
trinitatis ad extra sum indivisa! In fact, Kitamori has obvious difficulty trying to do 
justice to the whole range of New Testament witnesses to Christ!`` In view of the 
inexhaustible richness and depth of the Scriptural witness to the living Person of 
"One of Kitamori's consistent criticisms of Luther is that the Reformer did 
not do full justice to tota scriptura because of his concentration on sola fide. Kitamori 
finds an example of this "failure" of Luther in his depreciation of James as a letter of 
straw (Introduction, 124). Kitamori holds that the hermeneutical principle in the 
theology of the Pain of God alone is obedient to the whole range of Scripture. But we 
often find in his careful selection of the Biblical verses supporting his points the very 
opposite of what he claims vis-à-vis Luther. See for instance note 168, where we see 
he chooses John 14:9 instead of John 1:14 or 1:18. 
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Christ, one is compelled to conclude that it is impossible for any theologian to reduce 
the reality of Christ into one single category without doing violence to the very 
Reality. The infinite depth and wealth of the Biblical witness to Christ reflects the 
infinity of Christ Himself. Therefore, it seems that like any other so-called "genitive 
theology," Kitamori's theology of the Pain 'of God is not exempt from falling victim 
to the danger of unbalanced one-sidedness. Thus, when interpreting the significance 
of the Cross of Christ, one cannot isolate this cardinal event from either its 
precrucifudon or its post-crucifixion witnesses. 
In his opus magnum Kitamori explicitly deals with the relationship of the 
Pain of God to the historical Jesus. The view expressed is able to shed further light 
on our understanding of Kitamori's Christology." According to him, there are two 
directions of movement in this relationship between the Pain of God and the historical 
Jesus; the first one is from the historical Jesus to the Pain of God and the second one 
is from the Pain of God to the historical Jesus. The first direction Kitamori already 
dealt with in the chapter entitled "the Gospel as Fact" in The Lord of the Cross (and 
included in the opus magnum). Kitamori expounds on the movement. According to 
him, the Gospel is a fact independent of our subjective affirmation or negation, but not 
an objective fact pure and simple; at the same time it involves the believing 
subjects.' If one sees "the fact of Jesus" apart from the love of God which 




religion; His death, the catastrophic end of an idealist; and His resurrection, a 
hallucinatory product of religious enthusiasm.' "Only when the birth and death of 
Jesus Christ is seen as `the Pain of God' is the resurrection of Jesus Christ seen as 
`the love [based upon the Pain] of God."' This, says Kitamori, is the direction 
from the historical Jesus to the Pain of God. He seems to be saying that the fact of 
the historical Jesus should point to the Pain of God, although his argument rather 
suggests that the significance of the historical Jesus can only be properly understood 
against the background of the Pain of God. But he feels a need to complement this 
direction with another direction. This second direction demonstrates, holds Kitamori, 
that the historical Jesus is "a necessary constituent factor [ fv,AMtglitAgia ] 
of the Pain of God."' To explain this, Kitamori draws a parallel to Anselm's 
ontological proof of the existence of God. Just as the concept of God cannot be 
without the actual existence of God [the existence which is greater than a mere 
concept], so the concept of the Pain of God is impossible without the actual historicity 
of Jesus.' Explained by only a few lines, it is somewhat obscure but the point 
Kitamori wants to get across concerns the inseparability of the Pain of God and the 
historical Jesus. This seems to be required by Kitamori's desire to safeguard his 
'Ibid., 33. 
'Itami, 39 (Pain, 33). 
426Ibid. 41 (ibid., 34). 
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concept of the Pain of God against any accusation of docetism.' Therefore he 
warns that "the direction from the Pain of God to the historical Jesus does not simply 
mean that the Pain of God is the meaning of the historical Jesus nor that the historical 
Jesus is the concretization [ AWL ] of the Pain of God."' Although 
Kitamori argues that the necessity of the historical Jesus is inherent in the concept of 
the Pain of God, we are not sure whether his arguments are valid. The Pain of God 
is the eternal essence of God, which necessarily exists prior to the Son's incarnation. 
This has already been established on the basis of Kitamori's own often-repeated 
statements. If the Pain of God is the eternal essence of God, how can the incarnation 
of the Son in history be necessary for the constitution of the Pain of God itself, which 
was in existence prior to the incarnation? Did not, in Kitamori's view, Abraham 
serve the God in Pain with his sacrifice of Isaac? Did not Jeremiah see deeply into 
the heart of the God in Pain? Did not Hosea give witness to this Pain of God with his 
tragic experience? Kitamori seems somewhat ambiguous in defending his conception 
when he writes: "The Pain of God means that the love of God had conquered the 
wrath of God (which this historical world should have borne) in the midst of the 
'Despite this "safety-measure" on the part of Kitamori, Noro is not able to 
wipe away his suspicion of a docetic tendency in Kitamori's thought: "This [logical 
necessity of the historical Jesus in Kitaori's thought] is because he [Kitamori] does not 
limit the pain of God within its relation to the Jesus of history; but rather Jesus is only 
a symbol of the eternal fact of the pain of God. Jesus has only a shadowy existence in 
the theology of the pain of God . . . . Am I wrong in saying that there is a docetic 
tendency in Professor Kitamori and that ultimately we can even speak of the pain of 
God without any reference to the historical Jesus?" (Impassibi I itas, 88-89). 
'Itami, 41 (Pain, 34). 
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historical world. The Persona of the Pain of God [the Son] must therefore necessarily 
enter the plane of history."' What Kitamori attempts to argue is that the Pain of 
God requires the historical Jesus for its constitution. But when Kitamori presupposes 
"the Persona of the Pain of God" prior to the incarnation of the Son in history, had 
not the Pain of God already been established prior to the historical Jesus? Further, in 
the same context, one reads that "the direction from the Pain of God to the historical 
Jesus owes as its background the direction from the historical Jesus to the Pain of 
God," but he immediately adds that "the Pain of God is the infinitely deep background 
of the historical Jesus."' 
In supporting our view that the Pain of God constitutes itself independent of 
the historical Jesus, we shall consider two specific terms which do not appear in the 
English version of his opus magnum. They are oso [ tun ] and genso [ i#g ]." 
These two technical terms are used by Pure Land Buddhism. Oso means "going to 
the Pure Land to live together with Amida Buddha" and genso means "coming back 
'Ibid., 42 (ibid.). 
'Pain, 35; italic is mine. 
4nOn these Buddhist technical terms, Bettina Oguro-Opitz writes extensive 
excursus, where she means to find an indication of the "inhaltliche EinfluB dieser 
buddhistischer Denkstruktur auf munus Christi" in Kitamori's theology (Analyse and 
Auseinandersetzung mit der Theologie des Schmerzes Gottes von Kazoh Kitamori 
[Frankfurt a. M.: Peter D. Lang, 1980], 74; cf. 70-78). As we shall see, the 
influence of the Buddhist way of thinking is quite noticeable in Kitamori since he is 
influenced by the philosophy of the Kyoto School. It is very interesting to ask how 
deeply Buddhism in a technical sense has influenced Kitamori. The usage of oso and 
genso in our present context seems to indicate, however, that Kitamori does not use 
these terms in a technical sense but only to describe the directions. 
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from the Pure Land to this impure reality to lead all the living to the truth of Buddha 
[salvation]."' The "fixed point" of these movements is the Pure Land or Amida 
Buddha. In other words, the absolute point in this bi-directional movement is the 
transcendental Reality. Using this terminology, Kitamori implicitly indicates that the 
Pain of God is the reality which is already "established," the reality to which the 
historical Jesus owes His meaning. In fact, what he warned in his opus magnum he 
affirms a decade later when he writes in plain language: "Jesus of Nazareth as a 
historical being is the concretization [ ®{fit ] of the Pain of God and its 
Persona."' 
As the last point of this Christological examination of the Pain of God as 
theological methodology, we briefly look at his short essay entitled "Christology as 
Method."' According to him, Phil. 2:6-11. gives "a typical expression of the 
Christological truth."' God in Christ, holds Kitamori, did not cling to His own 
"stand," but rather took the "stand" of man who is a being other than Himself, served 
man and was crucified. This feature of God in Christ is "most unlike" God, but 
'See "oso-genso," lwanami Dictionary of Buddhism. 
`Introduction, 83. "As I said in the above, since the Absolute is actualized 
only in pain, I have chosen the religion of 'God in Pain'; and since the Pain of God is 
concretized on the Cross of Christ, I have chosen Christianity as my faith; and as the 
Pain of God is the love embracing the things in opposition, I enter into dialogue with 
other religions, which are in opposition to Christianity" (Japanese Heart and 




through this contrary feature God became most "God-like."' "In Christ," writes 
Kitamori, "God caused every knee to bow, every tongue to confess that `Jesus is 
Lord,' and thus established His sovereignty and received His glory."' In 
Kitamori's view, the truth of Christology is focused on the relationship between the 
"Self" of God and the "otherness" of man. (In other words, man is to God a being 
"other" than Himself; this "other" connotes man's sinfulness because of which God 
cannot embrace man without His Pain.) And "the central truth of Christology is that 
the `Self of God is established by the mediation of the [unembraceable] `otherness' of 
man." In a word, "the establishment of divine Self by the mediation of the `otherness 
[of sinful man]'" is the content of the Christological truth.' This means, maintains 
Kitamori, that the "greatest enemy" of Christology is the im-mediated self-assertion, 
because this self-assertion is Law as opposed to Gospel." "The First 
Commandment: `You shall have no other gods before Me' represents Law," holds 
Kitamori, "whose spirit is the Self-establishment by exclusion of the `the other.'""' 
In his view, the legalistic self-assertion, only provoking man's sin, is incapable of 
accomplishing the establishment of the divine glory and sovereignty among men. 
Only evangelical self-abandonment and self-establishment by the mediation of the 
"Ibid. 
439" MAP-09*g! ERIC. . V A 1-41(DMIVIW " (Ibid.). 
'Ibid., 124. We also notice that Kitamori has Barth in mind and criticizes his 
"legalism." 
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"other" is really capable of establishing God's glory and rule. Applied to the task of 
theology, this Christological method does not "legalistically" exclude the given [fallen] 
reality, even if it is "alien to Christology," but embraces the reality and makes it 
useful for the task of theology, and in so doing establishes the sole rule of Christ.' 
This is the structure of Kitamori's Christological method, and is nothing but the 
essential structure of the Pain of God. 
In the above we have seen that in the formulation of Christology Kitamori 
invariably thinks in the scheme of the Pain of God. The conspicuous point is that 
Christology is made abstract, schematic and even narrow, and is totally absorbed in 
the concept of the Pain of God. The reality of Christ is thus molded according to the 
formal character of the Pain of God. 
In our review of Kitamori's concept of the Pain of God as a theological 
method, we have now arrived at the last field, namely its praCtical application. By 
practical application, we are thinking of his dealings with socio-ethical issues and of 
his dialogue with non-Christian religions and thoughts. As to the socio-ethical 
application of this method, we have already seen in Chapter II how Kitamori dealt 
with these issues in connection with the Kyodan's Wartime Responsibility and Expo 
70." Here we only want to recall that his theology was finally denounced as a 
theology of the status quo, unable to challenge the Church in Japan to self-renewal and 
to socio-ethical commitments in society. As to dialogue with non-Christian religions 
'Ibid., 125. 
`See 92-102 above. 
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and thought-systems, we need to touch upon them briefly. Again it is necessary for us 
to find the "cases" of such dialogue and we choose, as representative of Kitamori's 
dialogue, a Buddhist "denomination," the True Teaching of Pure Land Buddhism, as 
well as Nishida's and Tanabe's philosophies. 
According to Yasuo Furuya, Kitamori is "the first theologian in Japan who 
took up the spiritual traditions of our nation, particularly Buddhism, theologically."' 
In other words, Kitamori initiated a theological dialogue with Buddhism. What then is 
the theological point of departure for such dialogue? What is the theological 
assumption for the point of departure itself? And what is intended by such dialogue? 
Although it is not our present concern to find the answers to these questions, we need 
to keep them in mind in order to understand Kitamori's basic idea of the Pain of God, 
an idea which supports the methodology of dialogue. 
In Kitamori's view, the basic presupposition for such interreligious dialogue 
is the concept of "the religious Absolute" [ Mitilett41- ]."5 What then is the 
true character of the Absolute? What can truly be called the Absolute? A Reality 
which stands over against other realities and asserts itself while negating them is not 
worthy to be called the Absolute, holds Kitamori." This kind of an assertive 
Absolute is the worst thing one can imagine. "The religious [and real] Absolute" 
writes Kitamori, "does not stand over against the other, nor contends for itself by 
'Yasuo Furuya, A Theology of Religion, (Tokyo: Jordan-sha, 1985), 107. 
'Japanese Heart, 16; Philosophy, 215. 
'Japanese Heart, 62. 
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force nor tries to annihilate but embraces the other . . . . The true Absolute is the 
abolition of opposition, and consequently `trans-descends'"" to the very bottom of 
reality in opposition and embraces it.' To Kitamori, this religious Absolute is 
nothing but "God in Pain." It is with this concept of the religious Absolute that 
Kitamori approaches Buddhism. 
Kitamori has written an essay on Tan'nisho or "Lamentation over Heresy," a 
doctrinal dictation made by Shinran (1173-1262), the founder of the True Teaching of 
Pure Land Buddhism in Japan. Shinran's Buddhism is also relatively well-known in 
the West due to the basic feature of this Buddhist saint's thought which is strikingly 
similar to the Protestant faith; Shinran emphasizes the radical predicament of human 
existence, recognizes the depth of man's sinfulness and sin's ineradicability by man's 
own efforts, and teaches that salvation is given only by uttering the name of Amida 
Buddha and relying on the salvific vows He made in His mercy; this is, in short, a 
Buddhist sola gratia and Bola fide!' 
447We have coined this term "trans-descend" following Kitamori's idea that 
God does not find himself in a sphere above human reality of sin and tribulation, but 
in a sphere under the deepest bottom of it. In other words, God does not transcend 
our reality in a traditional sense, but His transcendence goes in a downward direction; 
He "trans-descends" our reality. Compare the following view Kitamori expresses in 
connection with the concept of "absoluteness:" "The Absolute Being is a Being who 
abolishes relative polarity [between Himself and the finite beings]. This means that 
the Absolute trans-descends the bottom of relative reality [ "L& ] 
and embraces the oppositions on the surface [from the bottom]" (A God of Double 
Negation [Tokyo: Nihon-no-Barasha, 1984], 148). 
'Ibid., 16. 
"Tor Shiran's doctrine, see: Alfred Bloom, Shinran's Gospel of Pure Grace 
(Tuscon, Ariz.: The University of Arizona, 1965). 
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Kitamori's essay on Shinran's Tan'nisho was prepared at the request of the 
headquarters of this particular Buddhist body. Commenting on Shinran's recognition 
of the radical sinfulness of man and salvation only by "the power of the Other," 
Kitamori acknowledges that in Shinran's thought the basic structure of religion is 
"perfectly expressed."' Kitamori holds that the saint's recognition of the very 
bottom of human existence and his radical reliance on the mercy of Amida Buddha 
"cannot be criticized but only admired."' "A true religion invariably has this 
structure," writes Kitamori.452 But upon the request made by the headquarters to 
give a critique from "other standpoints," Kitamori takes up the issue of the religious 
Absolute in the "theology" of Shinran Buddhism. Buddhism, both in its original form 
and the contemporary Shodomon Buddhism,' deny the objective existence of the 
Other. In this form of Buddhism, which does not know the Other, Kitamori argues 
that it is impossible to conceive of the radical nature of man's existential predicament 
(for the recognition of man's sinfulness is only given vis-a-vis 'the Other' who is 
man's real Gegenaber). He also asks whether or not Shiran Buddhism ultimately 
shares this kind of non-existence of the Other and may therefore lose the "basic 
structure of true religion" despite the founder's deep religious experience and 
'Japanese Heart, 34. 
'Ibid., 38. 
'Ibid., 34. 
'Literally it means "the Holy Way" and is also called "the Hard Way" in 
contrast to Shinran's and his teacher Honen's "the Easy Way." While Pure Land 
Buddhism relies on "the poser of the Other" or Amida Buddha, Shodomon Buddhism 
attains the salvation by man's own power. 
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cognition.' This danger is acute, holds Kitamori, because the oriental Absolute 
does indeed embrace all, but does not know pain.' The Absolute knowing no pain 
inevitably loses the true Otherness, Kitamori seems to argue. What is the problem of 
this oriental all embracing Absolute? According to Kitamori, if the Absolute does not 
know pain, religion and ethics are severed, and the oriental Absolute, not knowing 
pain, cannot secure the true structure of religion, which in Kitamori's view consists of 
the dialectic between faith and ethics.' But according to Kitamori, Buddhism also 
has an Ansatz to this idea of the pain of the Absolute. It is the concept of ji-hi 
[ ] which is the idiomatic combination of "mercy" and "sorrow" in the Chinese 
character system.' But, explains Kitamori, in the original Pali language, the latter 
concept of hi [sorrow] does not connote pain but signifies only mercy.' If, 
therefore, Shinran's teaching remains in the original framework of Buddhism, a 
`'`Japanese Heart, 43. Kitamori's argument here runs as follows: "If the 
Oriental meonism [of the Absolute which does not know contradiction in itself] can 
also be found in Shinran, the two-ness of contradiction is negated. [Translated into 
religious terms, if Amida Buddha only knows mercy and not judgement, the tension 
between mercy and wrath is negated in the Absolute.] Does not the [concept of 
salvation as] 'becoming Buddha' indicate a tendency in this direction? If this should 
be the case, the Other ceases to be the Other and becomes another name of [the 
so-called] true self. But is it possible, then, to have true recognition of one's self as 
`an evil man' or 'a man with sins deep and grave' where there is no 'contradiction' [in 
the Absolute vis-a-vis the finite]? One questions in this way because [the recognition 
of the self as] 'a man with sins deep and grave' is only possible in the light of man's 






framework which does not know pain in the Absolute, even the saint's doctrine would 
ultimately not reach the true Absolute nor the true religious existence in total reliance 
on the Absolute on the one hand and the true ethical life on the other. "The very nota 
of the Absolute," writes Kitamori, "is the Pain which embraces the unembraceable. If 
`hi' . . . gains the meaning of 'sorrow and pain,' the faith of the 'power of the Other 
for salvation' constitutes the ethics of 'our own power,' and at the same time the 
absolute assurance of the 'faith of the power of the Other' [for salvation] will emerge 
from this eMbracing."' Somewhat unfamiliar concepts make this passage difficult 
to fully understand, but his point is clear: the Pain in the religious Absolute alone 
constitutes sola fide and fides et opera also in Shinran Buddhism. Kitamori here 
recommends to Shinran Buddhism his own dialectic of "theological axiom and 
reality," an idea derived from the Pain of God. 
When we proceed to Kitamori's dealing approach to philosophies of Nishida 
and Tanabe, we observe exactly the same critical viewpoint in Kitamori, namely, 
whether the Absolute is all embracing or not, and whether this includes Pain. This 
same pattern can be understood by the fact that both Nishida and Tanabe deeply breath 
the air of Buddhism, the former in Zen Buddhism and the latter in Pure Land 
Buddhism. According to Kitamori's characterization of the philosophy of Nishida, 
this philosopher's "Dialectic of Nothingness" has overcome both the abstractness of 
Hegel's idealistic dialectic and Marx's materialistic dialectic, and has also established 
the idea of the religious Absolute which embraces all the contradiction of reality in 
'Ibid., 47. 
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Itself.' But Kitamori questions: does the "contradiction" in Nishida truly bear the 
character of pain, even though this philosophy is based upon a deep recognition of 
reality as "the self-identity of absolute contradiction?" Contradiction as such, holds 
Kitaori, does not necessarily connote pain or tragedy.' The Hegelian 
"contradiction" is, for instance, a "comic" contradiction, says Kitamori (following 
Kierkegaard's characterization of the thought of the great Idealist philosopher). But 
how about the character of Nishida's "contradiction?" Since Nishida's concept of the 
Absolute is "Absolute Nothingness," argues Kitamori, "Nothingness as such" cannot 
have pain. Nishida's "contradiction" is neither comic nor tragic, maintains Kitamori, 
it is "null" (or we may say neutral)." Since the Absolute in this metaphysics 
ultimately does not know pain, holds Kitamori, the popular accusation that Nishida's 
thought is a philosophy of the status quo is not totally unwarranted. As a 
philosophical thought system, Kitamori remarks, this philosophy does not possess the 
power to free us for the task of socio-ethical renovation.' 
Tanabe, as we recall, was Kitamori's philosophy teacher at Kyoto Imperial 
University. Kitamori finds a marked difference between this teacher's thought and 
that of Nishida. Tanabe's critique of Nishida, explains Kitamori, consists in two 
points: first Tanabe clarifies "the negative moment" in his system and, second, he 
'Ibid., 140. 




emphasizes actual ethical commitment. These two points clearly contrast to Nishida's 
contemplative philosophy, says Kitamori." Due to Tanabe's recognition of "the 
negative" (or contradiction) in the Absolute, his thought has gained a strongly ethical 
character for the actualization of the Absolute through one's own act in this relative 
reality. But, to Kitamori, Tanabe's understanding of the Absolute has already lost the 
true character of the Other, for Tanabe thinks that the reality of the Absolute must be 
actualized through one's own act. This means, maintains Kitamori, that Tanabe has 
lost the truth element of Nishida's philosophy, namely the all embracing Absolute.' 
What synthesizes the truth elements of these "first class thoughts" is the idea of "the 
Real Being who resumes the responsibility of and embraces all our contradictions and 
at the same time urges us to seek the solutions of the contradictions; this Being is the 
Ultimate and most Concrete Being."' That is, God in Pain. 
In Kitamori's dialogue with Shinran's Buddhism and the philosophies of 
Nishida and Tanabe, the Pain of God functions as both method and criterion of truth. 
In so doing, Kitamori tries to demonstrate the higher degree of logical completeness in 
the concept of the Pain of God, perhaps even the ultimate logical formulation of the 
'Ibid., 145. Kitamori interprets Tanabe's thought in the following way: 
"When the negative character of contradiction gains definitive significance [in the 
Absolute], the affirmation of the status quo is abandoned, the merely contemplative 
life is broken and the subject is forced out to change the status quo. 'The Absolute 
Nothingness' is no longer the object of intuition as 'the field' [in which all things finds 
themselves and work with one another]. That is to be unceasingly actualized by the 




true Absolute. Although we should not be hesitant to acknowledge what should be 
properly acknowledged, and it may have been Kitamori's unique contribution that he 
has thus initiated an interreligious dialogue with Pure Land Buddhism (and also with 
Zen Buddhism), we still feel the need for a more thorough examination of such an 
interreligious dialogue. It seems that Kitamori begins dialogue with Buddhism and 
Buddhist (and Hegelian) philosophy with the latter's religious and metaphysical 
assumption as the point of departure (and this procedure is fully in keeping with 
Kitamori's methodological principle). Kitamori's concept of the religious Absolute is 
a case in point. One must seriously question whether this concept of the religious 
Absolute can really be congenial to the Christian concept of God. Can the God 
proclaimed by the Scriptures be defined by a concept like the religious Absolute?' 
'According to Kitamori, the Absolute or God would not or cannot stand over 
and against his negation. In so doing, God becomes relative to other beings. Surely 
God is not relative to another being on his level of reality. But does this mean that 
God cannot be relative to, or stand against other beings (men)? Is He a captive of His 
own absoluteness? In this connection it will be helpful to recall the concept of 
absolute in the Scholastic distinction of God's "power" between potentia absoluta and 
potentia ordinata. "Absolutum" in this context means "unrestricted" or "set free" 
(free from all limitations). The nominalistic concept of potentia absoluta thus 
indicates the basic trait of the Biblical concept of God's unlimited sovereignty and 
lordship. Although it is entirely legitimate to employ a human concept to describe the 
divine reality, the criterion of legitimacy in using the concept should be whether it is 
in harmony with the Biblical witness, disregarding whether its origin is in the West or 
in the East. In my judgment Kitamori's concept of God is confined within His own 
concept of absoluteness, which de facto cannot be normative for men. Kitamori bases 
the certainty (or security) of salvation on this absoluteness of God in Pain, but it must 
be given from time to time by Him who is absolutely free and sovereign over us in 
His wrath and mercy. 
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Or more radically, can we in the Christian faith "define" God at all ?" Even if 
Kitamori had been right in his "definition" of the religious Absolute and his 
"definition" had been applicable to the reality of God in the Scripture, it would still 
not be able to exhaust the infinite unfathomable reality of God. If Kitamori had been 
at all successful in his dialogue with these religio-philosophical partners (in 
establishing the common ground for the understanding of the religious Absolute, for 
instance), it would surely indicate that he had adopted his partners' scheme of 
soteriology and structure of ideas.' What would Kitamori say, if, for instance, 
Pure Land Buddhism would one day discover that its "he" should after all have the 
connotation of pain with the conclusion that the religious Absolute in this form of 
Buddhism also suffers pain? Then would the Christian Gospel and the Salvation of 
""Deus est mutabilis quam maxime," writes Luther (WA 56, 234.2; here 
quoted in: Haruo Kaneko, Luther's Anthrology [Tokyo: Sobunsha, 1975], 565). 
Commenting on this, Kaneko says: "The only attitude man can take in face of this 
living God who breaks all the human categories [of understanding] is obedience and 
humility" (ibid., 556). 
'Although it is not our main concern here to examine the content of the 
dialogue itself, it is still helpful to include a following note. The "critical" viewpoint 
of Kitamori which we have seen above in his dialogue with Shinran Buddhism and the 
philosophy of the Kyoto School is complete in itself and there is no further 
development in his thought. To my knowledge there is no more dialogue with these 
partners. Nor do I have any documentation of reactions from the scholars of Shinran 
Buddhism or from the direct disciples of Nishida and Tanabe. Nor does Kitamori 
report any response to his critique. We observe that Kitamori's thought, once given, 
stays there where it is given, and in this we see a parallel between his theology and 
his dialogue. In 1982, he was granted an opportunity to speak on "Nishida 
Philosophy and Christianity," starting his lecture with the following words: "My 
understanding of Nishida Philosophy has not changed very much since I wrote the two 
essays on it [one given in 1948 and the other in 1955] . . . . I apologize for speaking 
about this philosophy on the basis of these two old materials (Philosophy, 195). 
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Pure Land Buddhism be parallel expressions of one and the same religious Absolute? 
It might be simplistic to put the question in this way, but our elementary point is that 
the difference between Buddhism and Christianity is not simply a matter of the logical 
structure of the concept of the Absolute or of God; it touches the most basic and 
fundamental understanding of God, man and the total reality.' In regnum gratiae, 
we cannot form a concrete idea of God's universal rule. A "positivistic" concept of 
the Absolute is in fact contradictio in adjecto. We the finite cannot define the 
Absolute; a "definable" Absolute is no Absolute at all. If we still mistakenly dare to 
formulate the essence of the Absolute beyond the limits set by our finitude, "the 
formulation" would invariably remain a figmentation of human thought. 
It is deeply ironic, however, to recall that the theology of the Pain of God 
was denied and denounced by his opponents within the Kyodan as an theological 
ideology for defending the status quo in the Church and society, an accusation which, 
to Kitamori, should be the last thing directed at his theology of the Pain of God. 
'It is possible that Kitamori thinks that the Pain of God is the "(Iberbegriff" 
of all the "positive" religions under which Christianity as a historical religion comes 
(see note 83 above). He may have conceived of the Pain of God and Christianity on 
the one hand and Christianity and other religions (and philosophies, thoughts, etc.) on 
the other with his dialectic of "axiom" and "reality": Christianity as the religion of the 
Pain of God is a religious "reality" as all the other religions but at the same time it is 
the religious "axiom" in which all the other religions finds themselves with varying 
approximation to the Pain of God. Either way, Kitamori most probably thinks of 
Christianity as an all-embracing absolute religion, which according to his definition of 
absoluteness, shall not stand over and against the other religions but leads them to the 
Pain of God (each in its own way?). If we interpret rightly, Kitamori embraces an 
idea similar to Karl Rahner's anonym Christianity, even with a patronizing 
condescension (see Itami, 32 [Pain, 28]). 
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Summary 
Kitamori's theological methodology is derived from the intuitive conviction 
that the Pain of God is the divine truth itself. This absolute conviction itself is the 
cornerstone of his theology. As the absolute truth, the Pain of God is also the 
exclusive theological method. It is also the criterion by which all other theological 
systems and views must be judged, the guiding principle of all the theological 
investigations--whether exegetical, historical, dogmatic or practical, and terminus ad 
quem of all such theological inquiries. The Pain of God is thus the alpha and omega 
of Kitamori's theological methodology. The singular feature of Kitamori's theology is 
that the object of theological investigation and its method are totally identical. One 
can therefore describe this as a methodological circle. Since the object of 
investigation legitimately claims a method congenial to its own nature, a 
methodological circle is legitimate and inevitable. But the circle is valid only under 
the condition that such a methodology is fully open to the object of investigation and 
capable of modification whenever the object demands it. In order to secure this 
openness, there must be objective norms to "test" the results of investigation (or 
intuition); otherwise there would be no extra nos to guard against subjectivism. In 
Kitamori's theology, the Pain of God claims the validity of absolute truth. This very 
claim is itself deeply problematic, for no mortal can claim that his cognition and 
experience are absolutely true; this applies all the more to claims about the God who 
is deeply hidden even in his revelation. The problem becomes more acute when one 
recognizes that Kitamori's concept of God is profoundly influenced by non-Biblical 
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notions of God, man and salvation. We have seen how the concept of the Pain of 
God dictates the results of investigation in all the theological fields. Everything 
converges upon the Pain of God. In Kitamori's thought the Pain of God does not 
contradict Scripture, the dogmatic traditions of the Church; they should be more 
deeply explained, clarified and made explicit by the ultimate truth of the Pain of God. 
This results in the de facto conviction that the Pain of God is above all the norms and 
authorities. Since the Pain of God is the ultimate clarification of the truth of the 
Gospel, there cannot be any further development in Kitamori's theology (or any 
development in the history of theology for that matter). Our examination of 
Kitamori's methodology, however, has shown that Kitamori's theology is a closed 
circle in which the Pain of God turns upon itself. If "a tree is known by its fruits," 
we are led to suspect that Kitamori's theology of the Pain of God has some "built-in 
problem," which lies at the very root of his theology, namely the concept of the Pain 
as the eternal essence of God. 
CHAPTER 6 
THE THEOLOGY OF THE PAIN OF GOD IN DIALOGUE WITH 
THE REFORMED AND LUTHERAN TRADITIONS 
Although Kitamori has not written any extensive dogmatics on the basis of 
his concept of the Pain of God, his theology does have a systematic character. Both 
theological content and methodology, dogmatics and ethics, apologetics and dialogue 
are based on the sole principle of the Pain of God. So far we have occupied ourselves 
mainly with the analysis and understanding of Kitamori's theology as such. In this 
chapter we shall observe Kitamori's theological system in dialogue with the Reformed 
and Lutheran traditions. Up to this point we have occasionally touched on the 
influences the two Protestant traditions had upon Kitamori. We now attempt to 
examine in a more focused manner how Kitamori's theology relates to the Reformed 
and Lutheran traditions. First we take up his dialogue with the Reformed tradition. 
Under this section we shall focus our attention on Kitamori's life-long critical position 
to the theology of Karl Barth--the strongest theological stream in modern Japanese 
Protestantism.' Introductory to this, we shall look at Kitamori's general view of 
Calvin and Calvinism. After these examinations concerning the Reformed tradition we 
shall see Kitamori's theology in light of Lutheran tradition. At the end of this second 
`See 79-90 above. 
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section we shall attempt an overall assessment of Kitamori's theology as a Lutheran 
theology. 
The Theology of the Pain of God in Dialogue 
with the Reformed Tradition 
Kitamori's view of Calvin and Calvinism. 
Modern Japanese Protestantism has been influenced most by Calvinism.' 
Accordingly Calvin's theological ideas have been the guiding paradigm in Japan. 
Luther's name was known early in the history of Japanese Protestantism, but as to 
influence in terms of theological substance, he has been subordinated to the Genevan 
reformer. However, in Japanese Protestantism the two Reformers were considered the 
founders of the Evangelical Church defenders of the same faith, and were held with 
equally high respect and admiration. This is mainly due to the fact that Japanese 
Christendom did not see the "subtle" confessional differences between these two 
streams of the Reformation; the distinction, for instance, between communicatio 
idiomatum and extra Calvinisticum seems to have been "practically" immaterial Early 
Japanese theologians by and large saw Luther and Calvin as representing the same 
theological standpoint and thus in synthesis. 
In accordance with this general trend, Kitamori regards Calvin with deep 
reverence and admiration. Because of his early acquaintance with Shigehiko Sato's 
Luther studies, it is probable that Kitamori directly inherited positive view of Calvin. 
As we recall, Sato was originally Reformed and had never lost his interest in Calvin's 
'See 45 above. 
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theology, working throughout his life to introduce the Genevan reformer's theology 
into Japanese Protestantism, with the conviction that it was the Genevan reformer, and 
not Melanchthon, who was the true successor of Luther's theology and work.' 
In view of the relatively early reference to Calvin in Kitamori's theological 
autobiography, it is reasonable to conclude that Kitamori had begun to study Calvin's 
work, Institutio in particular, quite early.' The depth of his acquaintance with 
Calvin's theology seems to have been gained already during his university years.' 
Perhaps Kitamori read the Genevan reformer's work in parallel with Barth's writings. 
Besides these "external" stimulations in regard to the reading of Calvin's work, there 
must have been "internal reasons" as well for Kitamori's high admiration of this 
founder of the Reformed tradition. When we recall Kitamori's deep thirst for logical 
clarity of theological thoughts, it is not difficult to understand why Kitamori often 
employs superlatives to praise Calvin's precision of theological expression.' Calvin's 
'See Chap. 3, 114-115. 
'Auto I, 213-214: In the first year at the Lutheran seminary Kitamori had 
already read Barth's Kirchliche Dogmatik Ill and commented that the theological motif 
which he found in Barth is "not identical with Calvin's." This comparison of Barth 
with Calvin presupposes Kitamori's familiarlity with the Reformer by this time. A 
Japanese translation of the first of the three volumes of Calvin's Institutio was 
available by 1934 (the complete Institutio in Japanese was ready in 1939). 
[A bibliographical note: Those of Kitamori's works which are of primary 
significance and therefore quoted frequently are abbreviated like the note here. The 
list of those works is found at the end of the Introduction.] 
'Auto II, 225-226, see also 464 of this chapter below. 
"Calvin's exposition of the doctrine of the Trinity in his Insitutio 1:13 carries 
the mastery of perfection" (ibid., 226). 
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humanistic lucidity in theological style and stringently systematic theological 
presentation must have been very attractive to Kitamori. Even Calvin's theocentric 
orientation in theology and his stern theological ethos may have been closely akin to 
Kitamori's own thoughts.' 
Although this is not the place to deal with Kitamori's theological relation 
with Calvin in extenso, it is vital to recognize one particular aspect of Kitamori's 
interpretation of Calvin. In 1952, Kitamori wrote a paper entitled "A Direction of the 
Development of Calvin's Theology."' The main reason Kitamori wrote this paper was 
to show his own methodological idea of "axiom" and "reality" has also been 
established in Calvin's Institutio, in the Reformer's relationship between "nature and 
grace" and "faith and work." In Kitamori's view, the dialectic of "nature and grace" 
corresponds to relationship between "the order of creation and that of reconciliation," 
and the dialectic of "faith and work" coincides with the dialectic of the order of 
reconciliation and that of redemption. Kitamori sees tension in the "and" of each set, 
and also in the "and" among the three orders. This is, as we recall, his concept of 
"the theological reality." His thesis is that this tension threatens the very foundation 
of the evangelical faith which stands on sola gratia et sola fide, unless properly 
integrated. The order of creation threatens the sola gratia by introducing natural 
'Kitamori is perhaps emotionally more complex in his personality than 
Calvin, but he is no less determined in his theological conviction than the Genevan 
reformer. His concept of the Pain of God is not merely inclined to emotionalism; 
strange though it may sound, it also has a tone of rigorism particularly in his summon 
to serve God in Pain with one's own pain (see note 204 of Chap. 5 above). 
'Reformation, 193-211. 
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theology, while the order of redemption (sanctification) by leading to the idea of 
justification by works. But all three orders are proper aspects of the Word of God, 
which demand us to take them as they are revealed. This three-ness of the "reality" 
of the Word of God and the exclusive sola gratia pose a dilemma for Kitamori, and 
accordingly, Calvin's theology presents "a marvelous light to the solution [of this 
dilemma]." "When all the righteousness of work," Kitamori quotes Calvin, "is said 
to be based upon the righteousness of faith, the latter is still not at all diminished 
(imminui) by the former but confirmed (confinnari) because by it the latter shines still 
brighter."' "This is a marvelous statement," exclaims Kitamori commenting that 
here Calvin expresses that doing justice to the "theological reality" of "faith and work" 
is held together by holding intact the "theological axiom" of sola fide." Kitamori 
adds more "proof texts" from Calvin and continues his comments in the same vein. 
Moreover, Kitamori deals with Calvin's concept of "scintilla" (a vague natural light in 
man) and argues that Calvin has expressed the independence (proprium in Kitamori's 
terminology) of the order of creation over against the order of redemption.' Also 
referring to Calvin's recognition of relative "goodness and badness" among "natural 
men" in the empirical world on the one hand, and his recognition of the universal 
corruption of all men on the other, Kitamori sees that the Genevan reformer 
'Ibid., 194. 




juxtaposed the orders of creation and reconciliation.' Seeing these things together, 
Kitamori holds that in Calvin the orders of creation and redemption should have their 
own independence over against the order of reconciliation, thus doing justice to all 
three aspects of the Word of God. At the same time Kitamori maintains Calvin firmly 
preserved the evangelical sola gratia et sola fide, because the Genevan reformer had a 
Christological theology. Christology embraces all other realities in theology without 
denying their respective propria and at the same time unites them into a dialectic 
whole in Christology." In other words, Calvin's theological foundation is supposedly 
compatible with Kitamori's Christological trinity. 
This is Kitamori's interpretation of Calvin, and also his conceptual operation 
with which we are now familiar. Whether Kitamori's interpretation of Calvin is 
"objective" or merely an imposition of Kitamori's own preestablished theological 
scheme is not our concern here. We are interested in the fact that Kitamori believes 
that his view of prolegomena in agrees with the Genevan theologian when Kitamori 
spells out the implications of the reformer's view." 
'Ibid., 207. 
"Ibid., 209-210. 
'Ibid., 211. Referring to the Barth-Brunner debate on natural theology on 
the basis of Calvin's theology, Kitamori quotes Barth as saying that Calvin was 
"insufficient" in expelling from his theology any ansatz to natural theology (Kirchlich 
Dogmatik II/1, 140 [where however Barth does not mention specifically Calvin but 
"the Reformers"]). If Barth is right in his judgment that Calvin does not sufficiently 
deny natural theology, "how can we trust Calvin," writes Kitamori, "as one of the 
fathers of the Evangelical Church?" He then feels the need for a new interpretation of 
Calvin to do justice to the Reformer's view of the order of creation as independent 
from the order of reconciliation and at the same time to rescue him from the 
"disgrace" of having traces of natural theology. Kitamori holds that he himself has 
464 
Kitamori has already interpreted Luther's concept of justification as having 
the same methodological dialectics of "axiom and reality."' In his interpretation, 
therefore, the theologies of Luther and Calvin basically have the same methodological 
structure. Is there then any essential difference between these two Reformers? 
Kitamori has a short diary memo on Calvin: 
On Calvin: A theology which claims to be an evangelical theology must have the 
structure of "the love based upon the Pain of God" as "axiom and reality 
simultaneously." No theology which lacks this structure can be an evangelical 
theology. But in practice it is possible that an evangelical theology may have a 
stronger emphasis on one aspect than on the other; in fact we observe this 
difference in emphasis. Luther placed stronger emphasis on the axiom [sola fide] 
than on the reality [fides et opera], being insufficient as to the latter. In contrast 
to this, Calvin had a stronger emphasis on the reality, while not being as fully 
clear as to the axiom as is the case with Luther. . . . Lutheranism should learn 
the reality [ides et opera] from Calvinism, whereas Calvinism the axiom [solo 
fide] from Lutheranism. Evangelicalism in its fullest sense must be strong in 
both aspects.' 
Thus Kitamori is not unaware of the difference between the two confessions. But he 
sees this difference as one of degree only; one emphasizes one aspect over the other, 
but both operate within the same structure of evangelical theology. The theology of 
the Pain of God should then do full justice to both aspects. Kitamori believes his 
theological mission is to bring these two forms of evangelical theologies into a fuller 
synthesis. In another context, dealing with the Reformation Christology, he tries to 
synthesize the Lutheran Cummunicatlo Idiomatum and the Reformed Extra 
now spelled out the latent "ratio" in Calvin's thought on the relationship between 
creation and reconciliation and provided a new line of development of Calvin's 
theology. 
'See 323-326 above. 
'Auto II, 225-226. 
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Calvinisticum, holding the former as the constitutive principle of Christology and the 
latter as the regulative principle.' 
Kitamori's embracive approach to Calvin is clearly observable. His 
ingenious conceptual operation on the basis of his notion of the Pain of God argues, at 
least logically, for an agreement both between his own theology and Calvin's, and 
between Lutheranism and Calvinism.' It is Kitamori's conviction that the 
"profoundest Luther' (that is, Kitamori's interpretation of Luther's understanding of 
'Reformation, 244. According to Kitamori, both Luther and Calvin are 
faithful to the Chalcedonian formula of Christology, namely, the two natures in Christ 
being unmingled, immutable, indvisible and inseparable. But, maintains Kitamori, in 
Luther with his conmunicatio idiomalum the unity of the two natures is emphasized 
whereas in Calvin with his extra the distinction is stressed. The Lutheran 
communicatio idioinatum as the "constitutive principle" is the basis of the positive 
statement of the unity of the natures in Christ, whereas the extra Calvinisticum as the 
"regulative principle" serves to preserve the mystery of the union of the two natures 
from losing its extraordinary character. In Kitamori's view, the extra Calvinisticum 
reminds us of "the fact that the miracle of God's incarnation in Christ is the miracle, 
because God, who should not have become man, actually has become man" (ibid., 
246). (The expression of "constitutive and regulative principles" is perhaps borrowed 
from Barth [see note 49 below]). 
19Kitamori's operation of synthesis between Luther and Calvin is carried by 
two principles, "constitutive and regulative." We need to reflect here on Kitamori's 
procedure of investigation. In order to be objective in our investigation, we should 
give the constitutive significance to the sources although we need our own 
interpretative hypothesis as a "regulative" principle ("regulative" in the sense that our 
hypothesis is also derived from the sources and thus is not an arbitrary hypothesis but 
a substantiated one). But in Kitamori the relationship of the two principles is reversed 
so that the outcome of his investigation is quite predictable before reading his 
arguments. The sources are used in such a way as to serve as proof for his own 
viewpoints. Exactly on this point we have difficulty to assess Kitamori's theological 
achievement, and that is why we are so often compelled to suspend our judgment of 
the tenability of his arguments. Rather we have a strong impression that Kitamori 
develops his own monologues in most of his investigations. 
'Today, 135. 
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the Gospel) transcends the confessional distinction between Lutheranism and 
Calvinism; Luther is the cardinal basis for evangelical Christianity. In this sense, 
Kitamori has "no interest at all in any Lutheranism which would stand over against the 
Reformed."' 
It is of interest to note that Kitamori is more generous and less critical of 
Calvin than of Luther.' One can explain this as a product of Kitamori's theological 
Sitz im Leben; in the Kyodan he is the sole Lutheran theologian. It has been 
practically necessary for Kitamori always to have a "positive" attitude toward Calvin 
and to enlist Calvin's theology to legitimate his own. But this is apparently not the 
primary reason for Kitamori's sympathy towards Calvin. In addition to what we have 
already mentioned above, there is still another internal reason for Kitamori's being 
drawn to Calvin, and a weighty one at that. In one context where he speaks of 
dedicating our pain to witness to the Pain of God, Kitamori has the following to say: 
"We dedicate our pain to this revelation [of the Pain of God], and this means nothing 
but for us to serve the glory of God. On this point, the theology of the Pain of God 
'Ibid., 139. 
'Luther's so-called "inneres Vertrauen," however true and beautiful it may 
be, is not [identical with] righteousness. Man is not justified by offering his inward 
trust to God. . . ."This means that I was already then [in my first year at the 
seminary] freed from [uncritically following] Luther" (Auto I, 90); "Man is not 
justified by fiducia" (Ibid., 138) [the reason for Kitamori's criticism of fiducia is his 
recognition that a sinner trusts in God for the sake of his own inner peace; in other 
words Kitamori sees a selfish motive in flducia]. See also Auto II, 42 on Luther's 
exegetical method. 
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follows the tradition of Calvinism: Soli Deo glorial' 
Next to Calvin in the Reformed tradition, we mention the name of P. T. 
Forsyth in particular. We have already touched upon Kitamori's dealing with this 
Scottish theologian; especially during the writing of his opus magnum and the period 
immediately after its publication, Forsyth played a very important role in "confirming" 
Kitamori's theological conviction.' Among Japanese theologians, Uemura and 
Takakura are predecessors of Kitamori's type of theology.' Thus, in terms of both 
"church-historical necessity" and of theology proper, Kitamori has been quite open to 
the Reformed tradition, to the point that the Reformed tradition has become one of his 
main theological ingredients. 
Kitamori's Theological Confrontation with Karl Barth 
Kitamori has been one of the few declared "anti-Barthian" theologians in 
Japan.' One may even say that throughout the development of Kitamori's theology 
only the theology of Barth remains "unembraceable." But this characterization would 
be one-sided if we did not immediately add that Kitamori, in a qualified sense, is 
himself a Barthian.' What Kitamori presents in his opus magnum is said to be closer 
'Character, 58. 
"See 246 above. 
'See 45-46, 58-59 and 189. 
'By the publication of The Lord of the Cross Kitamori captured the attention 
of an observer of theological trends by the name of Yoshiki Shimizu, who mentioned 
Kitamori as one of the four anti-Barthians at that time (Auto II, 238). 
"See 39 below in this section. 510-521 below. 
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to Barth's doctrine of reconciliation than Kitamori himself acknowledges.' 
Kitamori's relationship with the Swiss theologian can therefore be characterized as 
highly ambivalent; his "anti-Barthianism" can even be considered within the general 
framework of the theology of Barth.' In the present part of this section we shall see 
Kitamori's interpretation of Barth, try to understand this interpretation within our 
present perspective and attempt to grasp Kitamori's theology in the light of Barth's 
theology. In this attempt we note that our discussion of Barth's theology will be 
restricted to the limits Kitamori himself sets in his confrontation with Barth. 
Kitamori's Criticism of Barth 
Initially Kitamori did not doubt the continuity between Luther and Barth." 
While studying at the Lutheran seminary in Tokyo, he even kept a photograph of 
Barth on his desk, (a portrait included in an anthology of Barth's writing edited by a 
Japanese theologian), "admiring him day and night."" Barth's two articles from the 
28Rudolf Weth, "Uber den Schmerz Gottes," Evangelische Theologie 33 
(1973), 436: Weth, wishing the German readers to be given more access to 
Kitamori's writings beside his opus magnum, writes; "Vielleicht wiirde auf diese 
Weise auch K[itamori']s kritisches Verhiltnis zu K. Barth faBlicher als in diesem 
Werk and im Vorwort zur deutschen Ausgabe (9-14). Denn der Sache nach scheint 
K[itamori] der Versiihnungslehre des spiten Barth, ohne die iibrigens auch die 
gegenwirtige Diskussion nicht denkbar wire, niher zu stehen, als er erkennen lilt" 
(436). 
''See below 510-517. 
"ICazoh Kitamori, "From My Personal Viewpoint," ed. Iwao Morioka, 
Japanese Christianity and Karl Barth (Tokyo: Shinkyo Shuppansha, 1986), 10. 
'Auto I, 124. 
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early 30s, "Die Not der evangelische Kirche"" and "Rechtfertigung und 
Heiligung"' deeply impressed Kitamori." Kitamori made particular note of Barth's 
words which strongly appealed to him: "Not with her [the Church's] own wealth but 
only by the mercy of God, not by the things of her own or in her but by what comes 
to her from outside, does the evangelical Church live."" 
Kitamori, however, gradually came to recognize something different between 
Barth's basic theological motif and his own. According to Kitamori, Barth's main 
concern was to defend "Deus dexit" against all the enemies in the man-centered 19th 
century theology, Kitamori's concern is to "the Pain of God" or "the Gospel of the 
Cross."' At this stage Kitamori believed himself to be exclusively concerned with 
"Zwischen den Zeiten, 9 (1931), 89-122. In this essay Barth emphasizes that 
the Protestant ("Evangelical") Church does not know anyone but the crucified Christ 
as her head. She therefore also exits under the Cross. Kitamori "has read this essay 
with deepest sympathy" (Auto I, 123) because of Barth's strong emphasis on the 
crucifed Lord. Barth, speaking of the "Evangelical" Church as the Church expelled 
from "the old Church," writes: "Die evangelische Kirche wurde und ist also 
konstituiert durch die Erkenntnis des DrauBensein des gekreuzigte Christus. Beides 
sein Gekreuzigtsein und sein DrauBensein, hatte fur die Reformatoren ebenso wie einst 
rur grundsitzlich Bedeutung" (92). A strikingly similar idea can be found in Pain, 
150. 
'Zwischen den Zeiten 5 (1927), 281-309. 
`Auto I, 123. 
"The sentence which Kitamori quotes here is perhaps the following: "Sie 
[die evangelische Kirche] kennt den Menschen auf der ganzen Linie.als den, der 
Christus gekreuzigt hat und der nicht von seinem Reichtum, sondern von Gottes 
Barmherzigkeit lebt, nicht von dem, was ihm eigen und innerlich ist, sondern von 
dem, was iuBerlich und fremd zu ihm kommt" (96). Does Kitamori quote here from 
the work of an insufficient translation? 
'Ibid., 213. 
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the very basic aspect of the Gospel, whereas Barth was confronted with a situation in 
which God's sovereignty was "domesticated" by man in the midst of Christianity 
itself.' It was one Barth's better-known articles written in 1933, "Das erste Gebot 
als theologisches Axiom,"" at which Kitamori was "appalled."" To Kitamori, it 
seemed impossible for an evangelical theology to present the First Commandment as 
the theological axiom. An evangelical theology cannot be built upon Law, Kitamori 
thought; theology can only be done properly when the Gospel itself embraces a 
theologian who is a sinner. In Kitamori's view, Barth has established God's exclusive 
sovereignty and lordship with his theology, but this was still formal, devoid of the true 
content of God's rule over us (His love); Barth sounded legalistic. Kitamori's position 
was that God's lordship can be established only by the Gospel; the Gospel alone 
conquers man's disobedience. This also holds true of the very constitution of 
theology.' 
Kitamori's polemics against Barth are concentrated on this issue of 
"It is apparant that the situation in which Kitamori found himself was totally 
different from that of Barth; Kitamori was still a seminary student who was seeking 
the clarity of his theological idea in a "non-Christian" nation while Barth was already 
one of the most responsible leaders of the renovation movement in the Church of 
"Christian" Europe since World War I. While it is an elementary issue that 
theological statements are to be intepreted in the light of their historical context, 
Kitamori tends to interpret them in isolation; the underlying assumption is that they 
are the formulations of timeless theological ideas. This unhistorical approach to 
theological ideas is a conspicuous feature of Kitamori's intepretation of theological 
texts. This also applies to his interpretation of Barth. 
'Zwischen den Zeiten 11 (1933), 297-314. 
"Morioka, Japanese Christianity and Karl Barth, 10. 
'See 378-379 above. 
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theological prolegomena. This concentration is due to Kitamori's understanding that 
the character of theology is determined by its prolegomena; when its prolegomena is 
conceived of legalistically, the rest of the dogmatic loci must inevitably be developed 
legalisticly. Although it is another question whether the the main tone of Barth's 
theology is in fact legalistic--as Kitamori understands it; Kitamori has never revised 
his initial interpretation of Barth.' 
Although Kitamori was appalled at Barth's article on the theological axiom, 
he did not discuss the details of the article. It seems as if Kitamori had regarded the 
title itself as sufficient to tell the basic position of Barth.' One may wonder whether 
it is legitimate to launch so critical an argument as was directed against Barth's 
theology without discussing the issue in extenso. Whatever the answer to this 
"Even after Barth's so-called "Wendung" in 1956 which was expressed in his 
essay "Die Menschlichkeit Gottes," Kitamori writes in 1959: "Barth does not see that 
as the crucial problem of the modern Protestant theology since Schleiermacher is that 
the Cross of Christ was brought to naught; this is particularly so in the early Barth. 
Later, Barth came to emphasize Christology and as we see more recently. But we 
have to pay attention to the fact that he still has the First Commandment as his 
theological axiom or the leitmotif of his theology. In place of the God of the First 
Commandment he only puts Christ, but his motif invariably is the Frist 
Commandment" (Introduction, 25-26). 
The gist of this article by Barth is to refute the theology of the so-called 
"Sch5pfungsordnungen" and its implicit theological axiom which, according to Barth, 
like a mathematical or logical axiom, has nothing to do with "lottlicher Wahl, 
BundesschlieBung, Gnade, Siindenvergebung" but leads to natural theology. "Das 
theologische Axiom aber gilt und erkannt im regnum gratiae und eben darum in der 
Kirche, wo die Botschaft von diesem Reich gehort geglaubt und verkimdigt wird" 
(304). Here Barth at least presupposes the Gospel before he challenges the decision to 
make the First Commandment the theological axiom. Without dealing with this aspect 
of Barth's viewpoint, Kitamori holds that Barth advances a legalistic position. In due 
course we are to examine Kitamori's concept of law, but our preliminary question is 
how he conceives of the meaning of admonishment to obedience to God? 
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question, the basis of Kitamori's categorical criticism fails to take fine modifications 
into consideration. In the same vein, he finds in the last section of Earth's Kirchlich 
Dogmatik 1/2, "the key that unlocks the secret of the theology of Barth."' To 
Kitamori, the most crucial pages to Kitamori of the section are 966-968 and 974-976, 
the latter of which he has copied verbatim into his theological diary. Since he later 
presents the "resume" of these pages in his Autobiography 11 as Barth's "fundamental 
thought,"" we can safely regard this as the basis of Kitamori's lifelong understanding 
of Barth's theological motif. We now dwell at some length on Kitamori's polemics 
against Barth on the basis of these pages. 
Let us now see what Kitamori says of Barth's position: 
According to Barth the "Hauptartikel" of the Reformation is, put pointedly, [the 
product of] "Willkiirakt," and the Church's confession of this is only a procedure 
"in bestimmter Zeit and Lage"; such a thing as "Grunddogma" is an arbitrary 
(verffigbare) truth. But [, I shall say,] the fact that Protestant Orthodoxy 
established articuli fundamentales proves that the truth of the Reformation still 
has not totally lost its fragrance. The Church was still aware of the truth then. 
If we should ever criticize Protestant Orthodoxy, the point should be that its 
awareness of the very truth [the Gospel of Christ/the Pain of God] has been 
gradually attenuated and then the sole articulus fiindamentalis broken down into 
the several articuli fiindamentale. All the articuli are [in reality] to be included 
in the field of the sole articulus." 
One can discern that Kitamori is committed to opposing Barth here. His way of 
presenting Barth's viewpoint carries a tone of deep indignation and borders on 
caricature. But Kitamori's main concern is clearly observable: Karl Barth has 




relativized the articulus stantis et cadentis ecclesiae. Kitamori sees in Barth's 
presentation "the main article" of the Reformation faith fundamentally threatened. 
In order to better understand Kitamori's point, it is necessary for us to look 
at what Barth himself argues in these particular pages. Dealing with the dogmatic 
method, Barth maintains that dogmatics must be "voraussetzungslos". The Word of 
God determines what the content of dogmatics should be. Barth understands the Word 
of God as God's sovereign revelation in encounter with man here and now. The 
Word of God in Barth's theology is therefore a highly actualistic concept. Thus it is 
not identical with the Bible. God never ceases to be the Lord over His Word. This 
means that dogmatics cannot be a system, because a system is built upon a particular 
axiom, or "Grundanschauung," which a priori dictates the content of dogmatics.' 
Only the Word of God is the legitimate and sovereign Lord of dogmatics. Barth 
writes: 
Das Wort Gottes ist . . . durch keine noch so reiche und tiefe und in ihrer Weise 
wohlbegrandete Grundanschauung vom "Wesen des Christentum" auch nur 
stellvertretend zu ersetzen und das darum nicht, weil sein Inhalt freilich 
Wahrheit, aber eben die Wahrheit der Wirklichkeit des in ihm sich ereignenden 
Werks und Handelns Gottes ist, die sich als solche weder in einer Anschauung 
noch in einer Idee noch in einem Prinzip auffangen und kondensieren lif3t, iiber 
die immer nur konkret. . . berichtet werden kann, ohne dal3 doch einem solchen 
Bericht die Stellung und Funktion des Gegenstandes der Dogmatik zukommen 
The Word of God in which God effects revelation is absolutely free in itself; no 
human concept of the Gospel can be identical with the Word of God itself. Does this 
*Ibid., 99. 
47Kirchliche Dogmatik (1CD) 1/2, 964-965. 
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mean that all dogmatic distinctions made by the Orthodox theologians between articuli 
fimdamentales and articuli non fundamentales were the result of arbitrary acts on their 
part? According to Barth in his minute exposition in the fine print, this procedure of 
distinction is the result of the Church's actual encounter with God's work and in His 
Word, and as such it is quite legitimate and required. One can think of various 
confessions of faith as the results of such an encounter; as the Church's historical 
encounter with the Word of God. In other words, "[i]m Bekenntnis berichtet die 
Kirche, ohne ihr Wort mit dem Wort Gottes zu verwechseln, aber die Erfahrung die 
sie im bestimmter Zeit und Lage mit dem Wort Gottes gemacht hat."' It is Barth's 
view that the historical confessions, insofar as they are also human products (even 
though made in encounter with God at work in His Word), are still to be under the 
sovereign Word of God. To transfer Barth's own ideas here, they are not the 
"constitutive" principle but the "regulative" principle.' Here Barth is consistent: 
"Die Feststellung bestimmter, ein fur allemal als solcher eingesetzer 
Fundamentalartikel wiirde ihr [Dogmatik] und mit ihr der Kirche den Ausweg ins 
Freie bzw. sie wiirde dem Wort Gottes seinen weiteren Laufe in der Kirche 
sperren."" In Barth's view, only by avoiding this fixation of the confessions can the 
various historical confessions be properly accepted as they are. As to the failures of 





is not "materially" condemnable; their reduction of the Word of God into a 
preconceived mold is unacceptable, because it binds the Word of God; it is an abuse 
of the confessions.' 
We now recognize that Barth's intention in the petite section is to make the 
point that norma nonnans [the Word of God in Barth's sense] should remain as nonna 
normans, and that nonna nonnata should not be changed into norma nonnans. 
Normans in norma normans should also then be taken in the strictly acutalistic sense 
of "ever-ruling." In other words, Barth seems to provide a means to break a 
self-perpetuating hermeneutical circle in dogmatics by introducing an actualistic 
concept of the Word of God." In so doing, however, he does not diminish the 
'Ibid., 968. 
'It is important, I think, to note the significance of this actualistic aspect of 
Barth's theology. Actualism in Barth's thought is not totally formal; it presupposes 
the whole complex of the Christian message of salvation. But as is often said both by 
Lutherans and the Reformed, the truth of the Gospel is not under our control, that is, 
we never own it as our habitual possession. For the Gosepl as man's ever-new 
existential experience is nothing but the living Lord. The articulus stantis et cadentis 
ecclesiae of justificatio sola gratia et sola fide is not a theological formula which can 
simply be repeated or repristinated; it cannot dispense with an ever-actual 
appropriation in the enconter with the living God. And this encounter of man with 
God--it is God Himself who takes the initiative in this encounter—has infinite depth 
and infinite wealth corresponding to God's own reality and His way of dealing with 
man in Law and Gospel. In this sense the cardinal article of faith, justification by 
grace alone and faith alone, is to be understood as the most comprehensive description 
of the God-man relationship which is to be filled materially by man's ever-new 
encounter with the living God. Kitamori's theology of the Pain of God is to be 
understood as one expression of such an encounter (as he himself says, his theology is 
a new pronounciation of the Gospel). But this means that a time-conditioned 
theological formulation cannot be eternal or perpetuated. A theological achievement 
can be considered a contribution to a deeper understanding of the Gospel, but every 
new generation must listen to the Gospel afresh in light of old experience. In this 
sense it is essential for a theology to be open to God's speaking to us here and now, 
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importance of the confessions.' In fact, he emphasizes how critically important it is 
for a dogmatician listening to the "Teachers of the Church" in order to make a proper 
exegesis of Scripture.' His intention is therefore to subordinate all human 
theological "products" under the ever-actual, ever new revelation of God in His Word. 
Indeed, Barth as a Reformed theologian is faithful to the tradition to which he belongs, 
especially with respect to the concept of confession of faith; a confession of faith is the 
Church's response to the Word of God "in bestimmter Zeit und Lage." One can now 
easily see why Kitamori reacts to Barth so passionately. While Barth, acknowledging 
God's absolute freedom and lordship, allows no habitual possession of divine truth and 
conceives of it as an event occurring ever anew from above, Kitamori's concept of the 
truth of the Gospel [the Pain of God!] is definite as to its content, and as such it is 
valid as the truth irrespective of time and space." 
for God meets man in his concrete history. 
It is unnecessary to specifically document this point. His Einflihrung in den 
Heidelberger Katechismus (1938) and Die Christliche Lehre nach dem Heidelberger 
Katechismus (1948) witness to Barth's "confessionalism." His Credo (1935) and 
Dogmatik im Gnu:drift im Ansch11413 an das apostolische Glaubensbekenntnis (1947) 
show Barth's fundamental anchorage in the Church's tradition. 
"See KD 1/2, 673-677: "Ist die heilige Schrift allein der g8ttliche Lehrer in 
der Schule, in der wir uns befinden, wenn wir uns in der Kirche befinden, so kOnnen 
wir uns doch auch nicht in dieser Schule der Kirche befinden wollen ohne unsere 
Mitschiiler, nicht ohne Zusammenarbeit mit ihnen und besonders nicht ohne 
Bereitschaft, uns von unseren Alteren und erfahreneren MitschAlern belehren zu 
lassen: als von Mitschillern, aber belehren zu lassen" (677). There is no collision 
between the First Commandment and the Fourth Commandment! (652). 
"As to Kitamori's understanding of the nature of theological truth, we can 
summarize his thoughts as follows: theological truth, the most fundamental of which 
is the Pain of God, has been "discovered" by successive theological epochs (the 
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Let us now examine more closely Kitamori's criticism of Barth, which he 
places in his autobiography in connection with pages 974-976 of Kirchliche Dogmatik 
1/2. According to Kitamori, there are three points in Barth's presentation here which 
deny the theology of "Luther's cola fide fundamentally": first, Barth should recognize 
"the word of reconciliation `nur als ein Moment'" in all events [of God's salvific 
work]; second, he should consider the selection of "the word of reconciliation" [on the 
part of the Reformers] as the "Hauptartikel" as an "arbitrary act"; third, he should 
maintain that God's lordship as God is not to be absorbed into the word of 
reconciliation but maintained by the doctrine of God which is independent of the word 
of reconciliation.' We shall examine each of these items in the light of Barth's own 
text. As to the first point, in what sense does Barth contend that the word of 
reconciliation is "only one factor in the whole of God's salvific work?" 
"[W]eil Gottes gnadige Herrschaft in einer Uberwindung menschlichen Not 
besteht," writes Barth, "ist Offenbarung sachlich dasselbe wie Vers-ohnung: der Akt 
Gottes, in welchem er dem menschlichen Widerspruch iiberlegen widerspricht and 
damit die Not des Menschen wendet zum Heil.' To Barth, in other words, divine 
forth-century, the sixteenth century and his own twentieth century), and the 
discoveries of theological truth have followed an evolutionary development so that the 
last one, that is, the truth of the Pain of God, has the ultimate validity. In addition to 
this, Kitamori conceives of theological truth as an objective reflection of God's reality 
itself so that one may deduce other derivative truths from the fundamental truth. In 
this sense, Kitamori's concept of theological truth is basically static and analogous to a 
mathematical axiom. 
Auto II, 99. 
"KD 1/2, 974. 
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revelation is materially identical with reconciliation. After establishing this material 
"equation" of revelation and reconciliation, Barth proceeds to ask the question whether 
we should make this equation the "Grundanschauung" for our dogmatic work; both the 
Reformers' theologies and the Bible itself seem to support this procedure. If so, one 
should cast away any hesitation to employ systematization in dogmatic work, with the 
word of reconciliation as the "Grundanschauung." But in reality, says Barth, "the 
Word of God itself' does not force us to take this path, but calls us back from this 
procedure. Certainly, Barth holds, dogmatics must be fundamentally Christological 
and only Christological. Christology in dogmatic work is, however, not that narrowly 
limited Christology, "als ob die Offenbarung des Vaters durch den Sohn Jesus 
Christus und des Sohnes durch den Heiligen Geist in der Sache nur jenes Handeln 
Gottes in der Uberwindung des menschlichen Widerspruch und der menschlichen Not 
ware.' Undoubtedly reconciliation is the center, writes Barth, but this center 
should be seen in connection with the other acts of God, namely creation and 
redemption. Against this background, the critical phrase of reconciliation "als nur ein 
Moment" appears: 
Vorausgegeben ist uns Jesus Christus als das durch den Heiligen Geist zu uns 
gesprochene Wort des Vaters, aber damit keineswegs im Besondern, keineswegs 
in abstracto die VersOhnung, sondem die Versiihnung doch nur als ein Moment 
des ganzen damit--aber doch nur: auch damit!--bezeichneten Geschehens." 
Here Barth labors hard to defend his conception of the unconditional sovereignty of 
'Ibid., 975. 
"Ibid.; italic is added. 
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divine revelation on the one hand and to preserve the centrality of reconciliation in 
dogmatics on the other hand. Nonetheless, his point is clear that even the 
Reformation traditions of, and the seemingly evident witness of the Bible itself to, the 
cardinal significance of the word of reconciliation does not surpass divine revelation 
which actualizes itself in the acts of God through these means. But Barth's contention 
seems to be rather shaky because he only asserts his point without further arguments. 
In view of this, Kitamori exactly captures Barth's point. However central the locus of 
reconciliation is in Barth's thought, it is one of the features of God's word to man.' 
As to the second point of Kitamori's criticism, we do not find that they are 
valid. Nowhere does Barth say that the word of reconciliation was made the "main 
article" by an "arbitrary" act.' Rather, Barth means that to do so seems almost self- 
'In a somewhat simplified manner we can understand this as follows: while 
the Lutheran emphasis is placed on justification by faith as the very context of all 
theological discourse, the Reformed view subordinates the soteriological to the theo-
logical so that the doctrine of God becomes the basic context of theological discourse. 
The Lutheran concept of favor Dei as the primary concern in theology can be 
compared with the Reformed concern with gloria Dei as the primary theme of 
theology. Kitamori's view is a peculiar mixture of these two motifs; the Lutheran 
motif of favor Dei is deeply qualified by the Reformed gloria Dei and the resulting 
view of Kitamori is dolor Del with a strongly theocentiric overtone (Cf. 7 above in 
this chapter). 
611CD 1/2, 966: Barth holds that the distinction made by the Orthodox 
theologians (Lutheran or the Reformed) between fundamental articles and 
non-fundamental articles is totally legitimate and its legitimacy cannot be denied, and 
as to the doctrine of reconciliation as the fundamentum dogmaticum Barth has the 
following to say: "Was man mit fisndamentum dogmaticum meinte, das war offenbar 
das, was wir den jeweils mOglichen und notwendigen Bericht der Kirche riber ihre 
jeweilige besondere Begegnung mit dem Werk und Handeln Gottes in seinem Wort 
genannt haben. Aber eben dieses Berichten als solches ist Sache des Bekenntnis. Im 
Bekenntnis berichtet die Kirche, ohne ihr Wort mit dem Worte Gottes zu 
480 
evident for a dogmatician when he tries to get on with his work.' And Barth's own 
theology is centered upon the doctrine of reconciliation, though differently than 
Kitamori's theology is. In the continuing pages, Barth argues that not only 
reconciliation but also creation or redemption cannot be set up as the 
"Grundanschauung."' Barth is attempting to do justice to 
the whole wealth of the truth of God's Word by obedience to God's sovereignty in His 
revelation, obedience which is a gift from God. 
As to the third point, namely that Barth would contend that God's lordship 
as God should not be absorbed into the word of reconciliation, Kitamori observes 
Barth's position correctly. Barth contends that God Himself or God's sovereignty 
cannot be subordinated to any reality which He Himself brings forth in the world. 
But he is at the same time very precise in what he means by this sentence: That God 
is God can only be brought to full expression when the doctrine of God is dealt with 
separately and independently, "ohne daB die Wahrheit der Versahnung auch nur einen 
verwechseln, iiber die Erfahrung, die sie in bestimmter Zeit und Lage mit dem Wort 
Gottes gemacht hat. Im Bekenntnis findet also selbstverstindlich angesichts der Ville 
der biblischen Wahrheitswirklichkeit eine bestimmte Auswahl staff, in welcher, geleitet 
durch die Situation, in der sich die Kirche dem Worte Gottes gegeniiber jetzt und jetzt 
befindet, Einige als zur Zeit wichtig hervorgehoben wird, Anderes als zur Zeit 
weniger wightig mehr oder weniger zuriicictritt." As to "Willkiirakt" of the Orthodox 
theologians (mentioned by Barth in particular is the Reformed theologian Turrettini), it 
is not a kind of denounciation on the part of Barth; he rather demonstrates it as the 




Augenblick aus den Augen zu lassen wire."" What we recognize from this way of 
Earth's writing is that he formally wants to secure the absolute lordship and freedom 
of God in his revelation but he materially tries to follow the truth of reconciliation in 
his dogmatic work. 
Kitamori's interpretation of Barth does indeed touch upon the vital point of 
Earth's basic motif. Kitamori thus accuses Barth of ruining the very foundation of 
evangelical faith, sola fide or forgiveness of sin, by his "relativization" of the locus of 
reconciliation. In this criticism, Kitamori defends the Lutheran understanding of 
articulus stantis et cadentis ecclesiae. But Barth, on the other hand, stays faithfully in 
the Reformed understanding of finitum non capax infiniti as well as in the motif of the 
theocentric gloria Del.' 
But Kitamori's confrontation with Barth does not limit itself to this 
Lutheran-Reformed difference. Even on Kitamori's own premises the difference 
between Barth and himself are not irreconcilable, since Barth de facto pursues his 
"Ibid., 976. 
'We understand that the emphasis on the distance between God and man 
expressed by these two Reformed theological motifs has been fundamental to Barth; it 
may be an interesting question whether the "crisis" theology in the beginning of this 
century also included this Reformed emphasis on distance. In view of this emphasis, 
it is totally natural that dogmas and confessions of faith, in the Reformed tradition, are 
understood as not being identical with the Word of God. About Barth's radical 
"relativization" of theological traditions, writes Bent F. Nielsen: "Nix man nu som 
Barth erkender alt menneskevasrlcs fundamentale krisis i forholdet til Gud, si er den 
menneskelig produktion af sEetninger om Gud, incl. dogmer og bekendelser i kirken, 
naturligvis ikke undta3get. Derfor stifles problemet omkring teologiens tale om Gud sa 
kompromislOst radicalt op i perioden netop efter `nybrudder ("Karl Barths teologiske 
grundafg8relser under utarbeidelsen af den dogmatiske metode," Dansk Teologisk 
71dssfrift 46 [1983], 49). 
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theological work Christologically with reconciliation as its center. In his dealing with 
Barth on another occasion, Kitamori accuses Barth's basic position of being legalistic, 
characterizing it with "three Gs: Gegeniiber, Gebot und Gehorsam."' Indeed, since 
this characterization is based on Barth's earlier works (such as Romerbrief [the Second 
Edition] and Das Won Gottes und Theologie), it would be natural for Kitamori to 
react to Barth's theology in this way; what Kitamori reads in these titles is "a 
despotic" judgmental God. Kitamori's early reaction was quite categorical, perhaps 
lacking a proper historical perspective to properly view Barth's earlier writings. This 
in itself is easily understandable when we consider Kitamori's idea of God in Pain. 
But, in view of this, it is interesting to ask why Kitamori can be so sympathetic to 
Today, 161-162: Kitamori tries to find this motif of the three Gs from the 
earliest works of Barth; he believes to find these characteristics of Barth's theology 
most clearly expressed in the following sentences KD 1/2 603-604; ". . . Empfinger 
der Offenbarung werden und sind sie [die biblische Zeugen: Kitamori "erroneously" 
translates this "sie" as "die Kirche"], weil und indem ihnen Offenbarung gebieterisch 
begegnet und weil und indem sie ihr gehorsam werden" (603); "Kirche Jesu Christi 
kann also jedenfalls nur da sein, wo es zu einer Wiederholung dieses 
Gehorsamsverhaltnisses kommt. . . . Die Existenz der Kirche Jesu Christi steht und 
alit mit dem erkennbaren und jederzeit aktuellen Gegentiber von Menschen und 
Offenbarung, das keine Umkehrung zuliBt, in welchem der Mensch empfingt, lernt, 
sich ffigt und sich richtet. . . ." (604: the italicized parts are given in the original 
terms in Kitamori's quotations). Commenting on these quotations, Kitamori writes: 
"the three Gs of Gegeiiber, Gebot and Gehorsam are the summary of Barth's 
prolegomena." It would be interesting to study Kitamori's translation of Barth's texts 
into Japanese and the significance of the parts he omits. Intentionally or not he 
translates "GegeniTher" constantly as tairitsu, which in Japanese means "opposition," 
usually with the connotation of antagonism. Apparently "Gegeniiber" would mean in 
the present context as well as in ordinary theological usage the framework of Personal 
"Begegnung." One would therefore say that this reading of Kitamori is somewhat 
inadequate and "unfair." The part of the text omitted by Kitamori is quite delicate for 
him, because there Barth speaks of the illegitimacy of any claim by the Church to the 
habitual Possession of the truth of God, the claim which in Barth's view invalidates 
the Church as the Church of Christ. We shall see this issue in the below. 
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Calvin whose idea of God is no less "despotic" and stern?' If Kitamori is able to 
integrate Calvin's theology as being strong in the aspect of the "theological reality," 
why is Kitamori so categorically antagonistic to Barth when the Swiss theologian, 
regardless of his formal relativization of reconciliation, still materialiter has so strong 
an emphasis on it in his theology? 
The reason for Kitamori's rejection of Barth must be seen in Earth's 
thorough argument that setting-up a dogmatic system with a particular 
"Grundanschauung" as its principle is impossible and illegitimate if dogmatics is to be 
obedient to the Word of God. Though it looks strange, Kitamori does not discuss this 
issue directly at all,' but this methodological view of Barth must have been like an 
axe at the root of the tree of Kitamori's theology. If Barth's argument is valid, 
Kitamori's theological "system" is totally ruined. As we readily understand, 
Kitamori's theological endeavor is based upon exactly what Barth calls a 
"Grundanschauung," namely, the Pain of God as the ultimate divine reality. In the 
'The God of Calvin is the omnipotent Will, ruling throughout the world; the 
God of Luther is the omnipotent energy of Love manifest in Christ. In the one case, 
we have acts of compulsion even in the heart, subjection, law, service; in the other, 
inward conquest by the power of love, free self-surrender, filial love without 
compulsion. . ." (Reinhold Seeberg, Textbook of the History of Doctrines, tr. Charles 
E. Hay [Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1952], 416). 
63According to his own account, Kitamori had read KD 1/2 thoroughly. But 
he does not contrast his own view with Earth's. I think the nerve of the 
prolegoomenal confrontation between Kitamori and Barth is found exactly on this 
point of the "Grundanschauung" in dogmatic method. It seems that Kitamori carefully 
avoids this delicate point and beats around the bush without coming to the issue itself. 
This is, one may imagine, why Kitamori's confrontation with Barth does not gain a 
conceptually sharp focus. 
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same section of Kirchliche Dogmatik, Barth meticulously delivers his argument with 
which Kitamori must have been struggling throughout his life. Let us now consider 
Earth's argument briefly. 
According to Barth, a system is a stringent connectedness between premises 
and their consequences, and thus it inevitably has the character of law. This means 
that a systematic work is nothing but an analysis of the premises and their course of 
logical development. When one applies this procedure to dogmatics, maintains Barth, 
the openness to the Word of God, openness which is the basic requirement of 
dogmatics, is a priori excluded. In other words, a system-building in dogamatics with 
a particular "Grundanschauung" would make it impossible for a dogmatician to be 
obedient to the Word of God and free in his dogmatic work. This means that the 
dogmatic "Grundanschauung," on the basis of which a system is set up, inevitably 
takes the place of the Word of God and itself becomes the very object of dogmatics.' 
Speaking from another viewpoint, Barth maintains that theological axiom cannot be a 
content-filled concept but must be of a formal nature, that is, obedience to the Word 
of God or to the First Commandment. But if a material axiom or "Grundanschauung" 
is set up, dogmatics would shut itself up to the real Object of its work and cut itself 
off from this Object. As a result, one loses contact with the event of revelation. 
Barth holds that all that remains in such a theological endeavor is, "sich in dem durch 
vermeintlichen vorgegebene Grundanschauung bezeichneten Kreis zu bewegen."' 
69KD 1/2, 963. 
"Ibid., 965. 
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Barth rejects the retort that even in this circle-movement man could be obedient to the 
Word of God. Barth sees that in this setting-up of "Grundanschauung" a dogmatic 
work is ultimately based on a "Willkiirakt." It is interesting, however, to note that 
Barth can admit the a posteriori emergence of such a "Grundanschauung" in 
dogmatics. This can be seen when we read his distinction between an a priori desire 
for a system and an a posteriori resulting system: 
Der Wine zum System wird doch auch daraufhin nicht erlaubt sein, daB es eine 
Vergebung auch der Siinde unerlaubten Systematisierens geben und daB endlich 
und zuletzt auch in der fatalen Gestalt eines an unerlaubter Systematisierens 
wirklicher Gehorsam sich bewahren und dann auch der Schatten der Wahrheit 
sichtbar werden mOchte." 
Is this Barth's "self-justification?" In fact, Barth's gigantic dogmatics is one of the 
most systematic achievements in the history of the Church. And the 
"Grundanschauung" in the so-called "'late Barthian' Barth"' would be the triumph of 
the eternal grace of God. Man's will to obedience and openness to the Word of God 
can ultimately take the form of a system based on a "Grundanschauung," as we can 
understand Barth, and there can be forgiveness for the sins found in these a posteriori 
results. What he maintains in the above quotation is that dogmatics must always be 
"Ibid., 971. 
Will Herberg offers a helpful scheme of the theological development of 
Barth; "(1) first, 'pre-Barthian' Barth of the 'liberal' period; (2) next, the 
`proto-Barthian' Barth of the first edition of The Epistle to the Romans; (3) then, the 
early Barthian' Barth of the second edition of The Epistle to the Romans (1922) and of 
the Christian Dogmatics (1927); and (4) finally the 'late-Barthian' Barth of the Church 
Dogmatics (1932 to date)" ("The Social Philosophy of Karl Barth," an essay given as 
the introduction to: Karl Barth, Community, State and Church [New York: Doubleday 
and Company, Inc., 1960], 15). 
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open to the Word of God. This point can be seen in Barth's concept of his own 
theological works (including Kirchliche Dogmatik), that they are relative human 
responses to the living Word of God, thus subject to revision under the sole lordship 
of the Word of God.' In other words, Barth holds that an evangelical theology is, as 
it were, theologia semper refonnanda verbo divino. 
In view of these arguments of Barth, several points of contrast between 
Barth and Kitamori surface. First, because Barth considers "Grundanschauung" 
something which must be clearly distinguished from the Word of God, he recognizes 
the relativity of theology; Kitamori conceives of "Grundanschauung" (the Pain of God) 
as something which is given to him as divine revelation, given materially once and for 
all. This then means that Kitamori's theology is identical with the Gospel itself, thus 
claiming absolute validity. Second, Barth contends that the theological axiom must be 
obedience to the Word of God in the sense of the First Commandment in dogmatics, 
"At the end of his essay "Das erste Gebot als theologisches Axiom," Barth 
urges "die Theologie heute" definitely to part from natural theology and to go through 
the narrow way of the divine revelation in Christ. In this context he implicitely holds 
the viewpoint we have in our text: "Aber auch die Theologie wird tatsichlich the 
durch das gerechtfertigt sein, was sie als Leistung rechten Gehorsams, als Er511ung 
des Gesetzes nach bestem Wissen und Gewissen meint denken und sagen zu sollen. 
Keine Theologie Jede Theologie hat auch 'andere GOtter' und sicher immer da am 
meisten, wo man und wo sie selbst es am wenigsten merkt. Darum muB Rede und 
Gegenrede stattfmden, darum muB Streit sein in der Theologie, damit es nirgends zu 
einem Frieden komme mit den sicher 5beraB mit herrschenden und mit anerkannten 
`anderen G5ttern'. . . . Nur in gemeinsamer Hoffnung kann der notwendige 
theologische Streit recht gefiihrt werden" (313-314). But this viewpoint does not 
mean that Barth embraces an idea of doctrinal relativism; he holds, for instance, that 
the Lord's sovereign grace in a dialectic relation to human doctrinal work provides the 
doctrinal authority the Church needs in history (see Die Theologic und die Kirche 
[Munich: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1928], 317). 
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so that dogmatics is a human service to the living Word of God who actualizes the 
Word through this service; Kitamori holds that the theological axiom must be another 
name of the Gospel which leads one to the whole of divine truth and which actualizes 
itself as the theology of the Pain of God. Third, whereas Barth argues that if 
"Grundanschauung" becomes the object of dogmatics both dogmatics and the Church 
will necessarily suffer "Erstickungstod,"' Kitamori contends that the Pain of God as 
the new pronunciation of the "Gospel of the Cross" must ultimately be the sole object 
of dogmatics as well as its method; that is, the Pain of God alone is evanglium 
vivificans and truly available in the reality under the wrath of God. Fourth, Barth 
observes that a theology with a material "Grundanschauung" as its theological axiom 
would inevitably be bound within the circle which it has drawn by the 
"Grundanschauung," which is the very symptom of disobedience to the Word of God; 
Kitamori is convinced that the Gospel of the Pain of God leads the dogmatician to full 
obedience to the Word of God since the Pain of God forgives the sin of disobedience 
(which is inevitably attached to dogmatic work) and even uses the sinful procedure of 
dogmatic work to achieve its own actualization. Lastly, whereas Barth condemns the 
a priori setting-up of a "Grundanschauung" as an "arbitrary" act of the dogmatician, 
Kitamori cannot but proclaim the Pain of God as the ultimate truth of the Gospel 
because the Gospel itself urges him to do so. 
Thus in Barth's view, Kitamori's idea of the Pain of God would be nothing 
but a "Grundanschauung." Kitamori who meticulously studied this particular volume 
75KD 1/2, 968. 
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of Barth's dogmatics must have been aware of the critical points we mentioned above. 
But Kitamori is adamantly convinced that the theology of the Pain of God represents 
the unshakable truth of God Himself. How can the problems raised by Barth 
concerning "Grundanschauung" be solved? In the light of what Kitamori writes 
during his earlier career,' we can safely conclude that this methodological stance of 
Barth has been the basic problem in the first phase of Kitamori's system-building. In 
Kitamori's eyes the dogmatic method presented by Barth is legalistic in the sense that 
it first demands obedience to the Word of God; legalistic because a dogmatician who 
as a sinner cannot be obedient to the Word of God is here urged to be first obedient to 
it. Kitamori feels that a theologian must be forgiven of doing theology even with a 
particular "Grundanschauung," and the very Gospel of the Pain of God forgives sins 
in theology and makes it possible for a theologian to do his work. In Kitamori's 
view, this is the ultimate issue of prolegomena, in which one asks how theology as a 
human attempt to speak of God can be constituted. We have thus seen why Kitamori 
felt compelled to "soteriologize" the prolegomena of theology. 
But Kitamori's argument fails in its attempt to escape the closed 
circle-movement to which Barth objects. Kitamori's methodology is based upon the 
idea of the all-embracing Pain of God, but the idea of the Pain of God can only be 
established as valid by the very method which is deduced from the idea of the Pain of 
"'The very title of Kitamori's first work, The Lord of the Cross, is the most 
programmatic expression of his anti-Barthian struggle; it is not Christ simply, but the 
crucified Christ that Kitamori upholds against Barth. The title can be properly 
understood only against the background of Kitamori's fundamental struggle with 
Barth's methodological view. 
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God itself. As we saw, it is the self-justification of the concept of the Pain of God 
through itself. The devastating problem of petitio principii is clearly at work in 
Kitamori's theology. How can he defend himself against Barth's accusation that such 
a "Grundanschauung," or the Pain of God in Kitamori, is a "Willkiiralct?" As Barth 
would suggest, it is quite another thing that the Pain of God a posteriori might emerge 
as the cardinal view of God in Kitamori's theology as a partial witness to the infinite 
reality of God. However, it is quite clear that Kitamori's theology is what Barth 
describes, a theology captured by its own "Grundanschauung," only moving within the 
circle of its own drawing." In contrast to this, Barth's theology has a methodological 
tertium, which in principle makes it possible to break the hermeneutical circle, when 
necessary, in its encounter with the Word of God. To illustrate, Barth with his 
"open" methodology proved that even his enormously prolific life was no match to the 
object of dogmatics (he even left his multi-volume dogmatics "unfinished"); Kitamori's 
productivity in terms of theological substance was terminated by the completion of his 
opus magnum.' Although we must admit that there is a difference between Barth 
and Kitamori in terms of intellectual disposition and power, we do not think that the 
relatively short-lived theological development of Kitamori is due to his limited 
"We have touched upon the problem involved here in 386-387, namely 
Kitamori's confusion of a posteriori remission and a priori permission to sin in 
theological work. "Das rechte Gehorsam, das gate Werk in der Theologie muB in 
einem rechtem theologischen Denken and Reden bestehen" (Das erste Gebot, 313; 
emphasis is added). As also clearly seen in this essay, Barth presupposes the 
forgiveness of sin in his doing theology. And his urge to be obedient to the Word of 
God is the same as pursuing theology in the best way humanly possible. 
'See 414 above. 
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theological capacity. Kitamori could have accomplisehd a much greater theological 
achievement which certainly would have contributed more to Japanese Protestant 
theology. 
We saw that Kitamori's interpretation of Barth is limited to the locus of 
prolegomena. There Kitamori found his most crucial death-and-life struggle with 
Barth's theology. But Kitamori does not deal with the "late-Barthian" Barth, that is, 
with the material aspects of Barth's later theology. In fact, already in the very volume 
Kitamori meticulously studied, Barth is said to have gradually replaced his initial 
prolegomena centering upon the Word of God with a Christological prolegomena." 
"In his intepretative presentation of Barth's theology, Hans Urs von Balthasar 
points out that Earth's methodological emphasis conspicuous changes from the Word 
of God to a more comphrehensive one of "the Son." Since the Son becomes man 
within creation, the whole of the created world is related to Him and He to the created 
world. With this shift, Barth's methodology of analogy based on the incarnation of 
the Son gradually develops in his thought. This shift towards a more concrete 
Christological orientation begins already in KD 1/2, 134-221, which is systematically 
developed in the KD 11/1. Balthasar writes: "Wenn vorhin der Begriff der Analogie 
bis zu einer Vereinbarkeit zwischen Gott und GeschOpf geffihrt wurde, so hat diese 
ihren letzen Grund und Beweis . . . im Wunder der Menschwerdung Christi. Und 
sofern Christus das Ma13 aller Dinge ist, kann an die Tiefe dieser Kompatibilitit kein 
Widerspruch mehr zwischen Gott und Welt heranreichen. Noch die Prolegomena 
sprachen von 'Gegensatz, Widerspruch' zwischen dem Wort Gottes und seiner Gestalt 
in der Bibel, Verkiindingung, Theologie. Dieser Gedanke--und darnit jede auf ihn 
aufgebaute theologische Methodologic--ist schlechterdings aberholt, wo der Gedanke 
der Menschwerdung durchgefiihrt wird" (Karl Barth: Darstellung und Deutung seiner 
Theologic, [Cologne: Verlag Jakob Hegner, 1962], 124; emphasis is mine). If this 
intepretation by Balthasar of Barth's fundamental change of methodology is correct, 
then Kitamori did not notice it and saw Earth's theology only in light of his first 
impressions. But that Kitamori was aware of Barth's emphasis on the incarnation as 
methodological ansatz can be seen in the following: "In the Gospel the primary words 
are 'the Father causes his Son to die'; the secondary words are 'the Father begets his 
Son.' The secondary words prepare the primary" (Pain, 47). Different concepts of 
the inner-trinitarian relationship between the Father and the Son have their counterpart 
in the understanding of the Son's incarnation. 
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This would mean that Kitamori had been struggling with the Barth whom Barth 
himself had discarded long ago. But this "petrification" of his first impression of 
Barth seems to be consistent with Kitamori's view of theology--that theology is a 
system of thought which must be built consistently upon its initial axiom; Kitamori 
does just this in his own theology, while the real Barth is much more flexible. One 
exception can be mentioned here in Kitamori's dealing with Barth beyond the issues of 
prologemena. Barth marked his so-called "Wendung" in 1956 with the well-known 
essay of "die Menschlichkeit Gottes."' Kitamori comments on this "Wendung" on 
several occasions, holding that Barth corrected the error that Kitamori pointed out in 
his early polemics against him." But Kitamori still finds the same problem of 
Barth's prolegomena, saying: "Despite the recent self-correction r Wendungl, Barth 
is about to conclude his theological life without correcting his prolegomena, which is 
the core of his theology.' 
Reactions to Kitamori's Criticism of Barth 
Although Kitamori has been known to be a vocal critic of Barth's theology 
'In: Theologische Studien, Heft 48 (Zurich: Zolikoln, 1956). For the 
nature of Barth's "Wendung," see Heinz Zahrnt, Die Sache mit Gott (Munich: Piper 
Verlog, 1966), where he presents Barth's own view that the emphasis on God's 
humanity was already present in the emphasis on God's deity which was advanced so 
one-sidedly and exclusivisticly more than three decades ago; the "Wendung" is the 
outcome of a consistent thinking-through of his initial theological ansatz. 
'Introduction, 41; Today, 219-221; Morioka, Japanese Christianity and Karl 
Barth, Tokyo: Shinkyo Shuppansha, 1986), 11. 
'Auto II, 122. 
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in Japan, there have only been a few explicit confrontations between the Japanese 
"Barthians" and Kitamori. And even the few confrontations are not properly geared 
with each other on an academic level. In a sense, this is understandable because, as 
we have seen above, Kitamori's criticism is confined to the basic area of prolegomena, 
having no ongoing confrontations with the material aspect of Barth's theology in such 
a way to generate sufficient interest.' Kitamori's "soteriologization" of dogmatic 
prolegomena has made it difficult for other theologians to grasp what Kitamori tries to 
get across. On the one hand, professional theologians' general hesitation to 
acknowledge Kitamori's theology as a full-fledged academic achievement has been less 
than fortunate, hindering a fruitful academic cooperation throughout the post-war 
decades. On the other hand, Kitamori has been rather categorical in his criticism of 
Barth, which has not been favorable for winning a sympathetic following of 
theologians and scholars. Critics of Kitamori unanimously claim that his view of 
Barth involves "elementary misunderstanding,' "accusation based on his own 
illusion [of Barth],"' or "an unintelligible misunderstanding."' 
In the following we shall briefly review how Barthians have reacted critically 
'The problem of Kitamori's "freezing" of his criticism against Barth in the 
latter's earlier stage of theological development is pointed out by Rudolf Weth, see 
note 28 above. 
'Keiji Ogawa, "On the Formation of Japanese Indigenous Theology," Gospel 
and World, 38 (Tokyo, March 1983), 79. 
'Yoshio Yoshimura, "On the Interpretation of Barth: A Review of K. 
Kitamori's Theology Today," Christian Culture (Tokyo: July/August 1950), 48. 
"Takizawa, A Problematization of Religion, (Tokyo: San'ich Shobo, 1976), 
125, 130. 
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to Kitamori. To my knowledge, Kitamori does not respond to any of the criticisms 
except the one raised by Yoshio Yoshimura. We shall take up the debate between 
Kitamori and Yoshimura to the extent that it will serve our purpose here. 
"According to Kitamori," writes Katsumi Takizawa, "Karl Barth does not 
know anything about the Gospel; there is only 'Nein' in Barth's theology. What we 
find in Barth is only the wrath of God over man and all human values. For Barth the 
First Commandment is the alpha and the omega in Christian theology."' Takizawa, 
philosophy professor of a national university in Japan, is a close student of Karl Barth, 
and has developed his own "Theology of Immanuel" on the basis of Nishida's 
philosophy and Barth's thought.' A tone of indignation toward Kitamori is clearly 
noticeable in this particular essay by Takizawa. "How can he [Kitamori] so coarsely 
misunderstand Karl Barth," continues Takizawa, "what does he read in Barth's 
writings?"' Takizawa tries to refute Kitamori's accusation of Barth as totally 
unfounded. Takizawa contends that his teacher never speaks of the Law as separate 
from the Gospel. According to him, Barth has found in Jesus Christ (the true 
God-man) the point of contact and the qualitative distinction-border between God and 
man. "On this very point the holy God grasps me the sinner and all mankind 
"Ibid., 125. 
'For Takizawa, see: Kazuo Hasumi, "Eine kritische Betrachtung japanischer 
Theologien," Evangelische Theologie 49 (1989), 552-555; Tokiyuki Nobuhara, 
"Katsumi Takizawa's Approach Toward a World Theology," Union Seminary 
Quarterly Review 41 (1987, 3), 39-54. 
8sTakizawa, 125. 
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radically and totally."' This is God's radical grace, Takizawa writes interpreting his 
teacher's thought, the grace which at the same time solemnly forbids us to have any 
other gods besides this one God. Barth's "Nein" is not merely a negative "Nein" but 
the clearest and firmest "Ja" on the side of God." In substance, Takizawa argues 
against Kitamori's accusation of legalism with the great dogmatician's idea of the unity 
of Gospel and Law: the Law is the form of the Gospel and the Gospel is the content 
of the Law. According to Takizawa, Kitamori also addresses what Barth addresses in 
his dogmatics--the pain of God (!), the suffering and death of Christ on the Cross as 
"die einzige Wirklichkeit." In view of this Taldzawa maintains that Kitamori's 
accusation of Barth is unintelligible.' But Takizawa finds the reason for Kitamori's 
"terrible misunderstanding" of Barth in the former's concept of the dialectic of love 
(immediate divine love, divine wrath, divine pain)." Takizawa then continues to 
argue on the basis of his understanding of Kitamori: "If human sin had not entered 
this world, the love of God would have lost its most essential core; in order that the 
love of God does not lose the core, or that it may become true divine love, it needs 







pseudo-academic manipulation of hollow concepts." Although, as we mentioned 
earlier, Takizawa is also deeply influenced by Nishida Philosophy, his criticism of 
Kitamori is made from a totally different theological and philosophical viewpoint and 
also on the basis of little familiarity with Kitamori's thought. One would say, 
therefore, that Takizawa's attack on Kitamori is no less "sach-gemaB" than Kitamori's 
polemics against Barth. To my knowledge, Kitamori did not offer his reaction to this 
indignant criticism by Takizawa. But this criticism does shows how little Kitamori is 
understood by his own contemporaries in Japan, even by a man like Takizawa who 
has the same philosophical background. 
The second critic we shall now take up is Yoshiki Terazono, also a 
university professor, who wrote a dissertation in Bonn on the theological relationship 
between Barth and Takizawa. In a lecture given in 1986 Terazono refers to 
Kitamori's understanding of Barth as characterized by the latter's "three Gs." 
"According to Kitamori," continues he, "the love of God of which Barth speaks is not 
love in pain but an immediate love knowing no Cross and thus it is nothing but the 
Law in Barth's thought.' Terazono can find "a certain parallel between Barth and 
Kitamori." "For instance," he writes, "when Kitamori speaks of the Cross as a divine 
work not alien to God but essential to God, . . . we may say so [that there is a certain 
parallel."' As Terazono formulates his criticisms of Kitamori's theology of the Pain 
"Ibid., 123. 
"YoshiId Terazono, The Shooting Range of the Theology of Barth (Tokyo: 
Jordan sha, 1987), 17. 
'Ibid., 18. 
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of God, his most important point runs as follows: 
Was Kitamori's intention successfully carried out when he tried to overcome the 
notion of theos apathes by his idea of the Pain of God? When the Pain of God 
presupposes a contradiction between God and God, this contradiction is between 
the passible God and the impassible God. Does this not mean that Kitamori pre-
supposes an impassible God contrary to his intention? In contrast to this view, 
Barth speaks of the event of the Cross as the possibility of God's love in His 
freedom and as such it [the Cross] is "suitable" to God Himself. Thus, Barth can 
speak of the Cross as rooted in the depth of God's being, the cross which is the 
free act of His love.' 
What Terazono wants to get across is that Barth's concept of the God who is free in 
His love is capable of speaking of divine suffering in a more adequate way than 
Kitamori's idea of God in Pain. It is striking to note here that Terazono does not 
problematize the notion of a suffering God. The difference between Barth and 
Kitamori now seems to consist in the question of which theologian, Barth or Kitamori, 
properly explicates the implication that the Cross of Christ is the suffering of God." 
The third critic is Keiji Ogawa. As we mentioned, in 1965 he wrote a book 
in German on Japanese Protestant theology, which mainly introduces Kitamori's 
'Ibid., 18-19. 
"In this volume Terazono includes an essay entitled "Is the Theology of Barth 
a Theology of the Cross?" (257-269). While quoting the viewpoints of H. G. Geyer, 
E. Jungel and B. Klappert on this question, who all speak of Barth's theology more or 
less as a theology of the cross, Terazono also argues for the interpretation of Barth's 
theology as such. "That the true God empties Himself to the depth of the Cross 
corresponds to the immanent history within God in which the Son obeys the Father. 
The event of the Cross must be understood as 'a remarkably consistent and ultimate 
continuation' of the inner-divine being of God's deity. Thus the analogy between the 
event of the Cross and God's being of immanent Trinity clearly characterizes Barth's 
theology as a 'theology of the cross'" (266). 
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concept of the Pain of God.' At the end of this book Ogawa advances critical 
remarks concerning Kitamori's theology, especially against the latter's understanding 
of Barth. First he acknowledges that the strength of Kitamori's theology consists in its 
"subjective appropriation of theological thinking and active interaction with the 
indigenous spiritual situation [of Japan]." Kitamori's theology is, according to 
Ogawa, thoroughly systematic. "Man k8nnte," he says, "ihren Standpunkt fast einen 
theologischen Panlogismus nennen."' The weakness of Kitamori's theology, Ogawa 
judges, can be found in its schematic understanding, as well as its categorical 
criticism, of the European theologies. A typical example of this is found in 
Kitamori's understanding of Karl Barth, writes Ogawa, and he reports that Kitamori 
understands "daB diese [die Theologie Barths] nicht nur eine exklusive Theologie sei, 
sondem auch in der Richtung der Gesetzreligion stehe."' What is the reason for 
this "one-sided, less adequate interpretation of Kitamori?" Ogawa finds it in 
Kitamori's view of the history of theology. According to him, Kitamori sees the 
development of theology in a dialectic triad: thesis, antithesis and synthesis. In this 
triad of development, the new Protestantism of the nineteenth century would be the 
thesis; the dialectic theology in the early decades of this century would be the 
antithesis to the new Protestantism; and the theology of the Pain of God would be a 
theology mediating "thesis and antithesis," and itself becoming the synthesis. Here 
"Keiji Ogawa, Die Aufgabe der neuen evangelischen Theologie in Japan 
(Basel: Friedlich Reinhardt, 1985), 114. 
101Ibid. 
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Ogawa finds in Kitamori a "Denkschematismus" which always follows its own way of 
logical development independently of the objective analysis of the issues 
themselves.' In Kitamori's Theology Today, says Ogawa, the weakness of his 
theological thinking becomes most obvious. Ogawa, speaking of perspective of 
missiology, emphasizes the importance of openness to the church-historical traditions 
and to the Word of God, and this particularly in view of Kitamori's theology. "Die 
allzu straffe Geschlossenheit der Denksystems und die logische Konsequenz," writes 
Ogawa, "ist keine hilfreiche Waffe fur ein theologischen Denken, sondem ein 
geffihrliche, zweischneidiges Schwert. Wenn wir diese Offenheit das Wort Gottes 
verlieren, wird die Heimischmachung des Evangliums zum Selbstzweck, und die 
theologische Undernehmung zur Leistung des menschliche Hochmutes.' Nor in 
his review of Kitamori's understanding of Barth, does Ogawa find Katamori's 
interpretation adequate. If Kitamori's criticism fails to adequately understand Barth, 
one could easily see why there has been no fruitful dialogue between the Japanese 
Barthians and Kitamori. 
From his own viewpoint, Kitamori would say that all the critics listed above 
do not capture the issue itself. His main issue is whether Barth's theological 
prolegomena can be an adequate basis for an evangelical dogmatic. None of the 
critics listed above takes up this problem. Is this because Kitamori's opponents do not 




Kitamori's problem is itself illusory? This issue came to the surface in the early 
fifties. As we mentioned, the occasion was the debate between Kitamori and Yoshio 
Yoshimura, the translator of Barth's Romerbrief into Japanese. 
In his review of Kitamori's Theology Today, Yoshimura held that 
Kitamori's criticism was based upon his own interpretation ("illusion") of Barth and 
not on what Barth himself had said.' Yoshimura protested against Kitamori's 
"summary" of Barth's theology as the three Gs: "Gegeniiber, Gebot and Gehorsam," a 
summary which in Yoshimura's view was unacceptable, although he admitted that 
Barth had used these terms often. The question is in what sense one should 
understand these terms of Barth. Yoshimura argues that Barth never uses these terms 
undialectically, nor does he emply these terms univocally to describe the relationship 
between God and man.' When Barth speaks of "Gegeniiber" between God and 
man, holds Yoshimura, he intends to negate the direct relationship between God and 
man at the same level of being. Paradoxically the qualitative difference between God 
and man becomes manifest in the person of Jesus Christ, the true God and the true 
Man. "What Barth means by the `Gegeniiber," writes Yoshimura, "is not an 
immediate opposition between God and man; it is the `Gegeniiber' of divine grace 
which comes to expression" "in the incarnation of Christ," "a paradoxical, immediate, 
absolute and merciful Gegeniiber."' In this sense, Yoshimura holds that Barth's 
'Yoshimura, 48. 
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theology is a theology of grace. In Yoshimura's view, Kitamori one-sidedly picks up 
the negative pole of Barth's dialectics while leaving behind the affirmative pole, 
forcing the conclusion that Barth's theology is a legalistic theology. Barth's 
theological statements made on the negative pole can be interpreted in their proper 
meaning only in light of the other affirmative, gracious and promise-filled 
statements.' Against the dialectic nature of this theological discourse, holds 
Yoshimura, Kitamori dissolves the two dynamic poles into static entities. "This would 
be," accuses Yoshimura, "not only a one-sidedness but a total distortion of the 
picture.' The same things can be said, contends Yoshimura, of the other Gs. 
Barth commandment and obedience is not meant legalistically; on the contrary, it is 
"God's commandment and obedience to God," God who is full of grace and 
mercy."° Following Barth, Yoshimura argues that there can be no commandment 
and obedience apart from the foregoing Gospel. In Yoshimura's view, Kitamori 
illegitimately interprets Barth as legalistic and falsely accuses the Swiss theologian of 
being legalistic."' Quoting from Barth's own preface to the English version of his 
Romerbrief in which Barth characterizes his own opponents in Germany as launching 




111.21  . 2
1010. , 48. 
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interpretative mistalce.12 
Kitamori responds to this critical review of Yoshimura in an article under 
the title of "The Fundamental Problem of Theology Today."' In this article 
Kitamori insists that his criticism of Barth is not based upon any misunderstanding of 
Barth. Kitamori contends that he has reproduced Barth's view with the author's own 
words in his Theology Today. "4 As for his opponents' criticism that Kitamori 
one-sidedly picks up the negative and silences the positive in Barth's thought, Kitamori 
refuses to acknowledge any validity of these criticisms; he is certainly aware of the 
fact that Barth speaks of the Gospel, for no Christian theology would possibly 
dispense with speaking of both transcendence and immanence, negative aspect and 
positive one, exclusiveness and inclusiveness, judgement and grace. His issue is not 
concerned with the content of dogmatics but "the form of dogmatics which qualifies its 
content."' In Kitamori's view, as we understand him, the Gospel alone that 
redeems man's sin inherent in theological work and thus constitutes evangelical 
dogmatics. If dogmatics is only possible, as Barth contends, on the basis of our 
obedience to the Word of God, which in Kitamori's view is impossible for a sinner to 
render, how can dogmatic work become feasible?"' Is it not doomed a priori, by 
'Ibid., 49. 
"'In Christian Culture, (Tokyo: September, 1950), 44-50. 
'Ibid., 44. 
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first asking a sinner to do what is impossible for him? This is the central problem for 
Kitamori. "The content of theology, i.e. the Gospel itself, does not remain to be the 
content of theology only but becomes the prolegomena of dogmatics as well," says 
Kitamori, "thus conquering [the sin of disobedience of] a witness himself [theologian] 
by its grace and making him obedient [to the Word of God].""' Kitamori observes 
that Barth in his prolegomena does not speak of the Cross of the Christ at all but only 
of the Word of God and obedience." This argument of Kitamori has failed to 
convince Yoshimura that Barth's theology is ultimately legalistic."' 
To understand the poor-communication between Kitamori and Yoshimura, 
we need to clarify the problem complex in Kitamori's Theology Today. This work is 
mainly directed against the theology of Barth, but in preparing for this criticism 
Kitamori deals with the liberal theologians of the nineteenth century: Schleiermacher, 
Ritschl, Hermann, Wrede, von Harnack, Althaus, Nygren and a few others. 
According to Kitamori the cross of Christ was significant to the liberal theologians; 




'It would be a challenging task to go through Kitamori's views of each of 
these theologians in this work, but due to the length of such a project we must leave 
that discussion to a future work. Still, the following is to be noted. To examine "the 
situation of modem theology" (39) Kitamori uses a single criterion, namely the Gospel 
of the Cross, the Pain of God. In this "simplification" (41) Kitamori means to follow 
Luther's example which in Kitamori's view would be summed up as "justification by 
faith or by work." Kitamori's procedure is then to see whether the Cross of Christ is 
brought to naught in each theological thought. Throughout his examination, Kitamori 
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Barth reacted, Kitamori holds, against the elevation of man at the cost of God's deity, 
for instance, Barth denounced Schleiermacher's psycholigization of faith in God but he 
did not react to the fact that the Cross was deprived of its cardinal significance in the 
theology of Schleiermacher.' In other words, Barth did not capture the very core 
deals with theological ideas without taking into consideration what historical 
background and presuppositions these theologies have; religous wars, enormous 
scientific discovery, enlightenment, and resulting changes of world view, 
anthropology, cultural and ethical consciousness, all of which necessitated various 
theological formulations. While we are saying this, however, we do not mean to 
imply whether these theologies were right or wrong. What we mean is that theology 
is bound to live in a concrete historical situation and tries to reach people with the 
Gospel as it hears with the ears of that time. We must therefore be prepared to see 
them in historical context before we apply "a simplified criterion" to them. To this 
viewpoint we add that Kitamori's concept of the Pain of God is one of the 
interpretations of the Cross of Christ. The Cross has, as the divine event, infinite 
dimensions and defies being defined by a single concept. It can be seen as the 
supreme manifestation of the "amazing grace" which is certainly wider, deeper and 
richer than all human conceptions, including the Pain of God. 
"Kitamori's criticism here is based on the following text of Barth: "Es war 
ein baser, baser Augenblick in der Geschichte des neuern Protestantismus, baser als 
Alles was in dieser Tragadie noch weiter sich ereignen sollte, als man anfing, das 
Haben der Gnade als eine Herzens-oder Gewissenserfahrung des frommen Menschen 
zu verstehen"("Rechtferting und Heiligung," 285). "To Barth," writes Kitamori 
commenting on this text, "the primary concern is not with the fact that in 
Schleiermacher and modern Protestantism the Cross of Christ is brought to naught but 
rather with the fact that here religion is understood as something to be grasped by the 
psychological and historical possibilities of man and thus is built upon something 
within man's experience" (Today, 18-19). Kitamori's analysis of the text is not quite 
adequate. What Barth is trying to do is emphasize the radical extra nos nature of 
justification and sanctification "mit Luther verstehen als justitia und sanctitas 
extrinseca, nicht intrinseca, aliena nicht propria, passiva nicht activa, extra nos 
habitans, nicht domestics" ("Rechtfertingung," 284, see also 285). It is true that Barth 
throughout this essay does not use the word "das Kreuz Christie" and that is one of 
the reasons why Kitamori concludes that "Barth is hardly concerned with the question 
of how the Gospel of the Cross stands in modern Protestantism" (Today, 19). But one 
may question what it does actually mean to speak of the Cross; in order to be 
reminded of God's suffering for us? or to know of His love through suffering? or to 
appropriate the "benefits" of it? or to learn of our discipleship in the shadow of the 
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of the problem of modern Protestantism. In Kitamori's view the true restoration of 
the evangelical faith is not by way of Barthian legalism, for it is little better than 
liberalism. 
Kitamori's dealing with Barth is complicated by the following: whereas the 
liberal theologians dispensed with the Cross of Christ and made Him to an ideal of 
human ethical aspiration, Barth rejected this elevation of human beings to the 
well-nigh divine, thus uncompromisingly proclaiming God's deity. In this negation of 
liberal optimism of man's ethical nature, God's doom became the main concern of 
Barth's theology. But the divine doom alone would not constitute theology. In the 
very "No" of doom the divine "Yes" was deeply involved. That is why Barth's 
theology was enthusiastically acclaimed and received.' But Kitamori tries to argue 
that the problem of theology today lies in the fact that the Cross of Christ has been 
absent in modern Protestantism or not taken as seriously as it should have been, and 
Cross? or what? When one spells out what the Gospel of the Cross means in specific 
terms, one could have such formulations as Barth's, and this without using the term 
"the Gospel of the Cross." 
mite theology of Barth deeply moved many Japanese Christians from the 
early thirties on. Mikio Sumiya, a Christian historian, to whom we referred earlier, is 
one such person. He writes recalling his days as student: "When I got sick and the 
doctor advised absolute rest . . . . At that time I came across the sermon-book of 
Barth-Thurneysen which was available in translation then and read it with tears 
flowing down my cheeks . . . . The theology of Barth radically dealt with the 
problems of real life and at the same time, beyond that, dared to believe salvation in 
Christ. I felt that I had found in this theology a new world of faith. As militarism 
advanced, I thought there was no compass in the harsh reality of life other than this 
theology [of Barth] . . . ." ("My Encounter with Barth's Theology" in: Morioka, 
Japanese Christianity and Barth, 15). 
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he reduced liberal theology and Barth's theology to this common denominator. But 
Barth's theology, though strongly anti-liberal, was not generally considered legalistic 
but intensively filled with divine grace and intensively Christocentric at that. And this 
"grace-orientedness" was already more conspicuous in Barth's theology at the time 
when Kitamori wrote his Theology Today in 1950. This state of affairs may have 
caused some confusion among the Barthian readers of Kitamori's work. 
In a "round-table" talk which was held between Kitamori and Yoshimura to 
settle the debate,' Kitamori tried to communicate his point but Yoshimura failed to 
understand Kitamori. "I understand," Kitamori said, "that grace permeates the 
theology of Barth . . . . What I see as the problem is how it is possible for us to be 
obedient to the Word of God. For I doubt if it is possible for our words to become 
transparent to or like a mirror of the Word of God [as Barth demands]. The issue is 
the fundamental problem of a man as man who speaks of the Word of God."' To 
this, Yoshimura replied: "It certainly is something self-evident; no human words 
cannot become pure as you correctly maintain, nor does Barth express the whole issue 
in that sense."' At the end of this discussion, Yoshimura asked Kitamori whether 
his theology is done in the forgiveness of sins. Kitamori answered yes to this 
question. So also Barth does his theological work, replied Yoshimura. Thus 
Yoshimura did not see that there existed a real problem as Kitamori so passionately 
1z'Kitamori-Yoshimura, "On the Motif of the Theology of Barth," Christian 





Having reviewed four theologians' reactions to Kitamori's criticism of Barth, 
we now mention the following points by way of summary. First, we ask whether it is 
possible for Barth to speak of the Cross of the Christ specifically as the issue of 
prolegomena in dogmatics. In Kitamori's view, the content of the Gospel must be 
prolegomena as well. Barth, however, refuses to adopt the definite content of the 
Gospel as a human "Grundanschauung" (such as the Pain of God for Kitamori) and 
consequently it is impossible for him to make such a "Grundanschauung" into a 
methodological foundation. To Barth, theology is constituted by God's sovereign 
lordship over the creature in His grace.' 
Second, even if the theological prolegomena had been "legalistic" as 
Kitamori maintains, the actual content does not necessarily become "legalistic." Barth 
is said to have abandoned his earlier prolegomena and switched to a Christological 
9t is unnecessary to substantiate this point by quoting Barth. But it would 
be helpful to include one passage from his ariticle on the First Commandment as the 
theological axiom: "Er [Gottl hatte sich schon erwiesen, mit Luther zu reden, als 'der 
[Gott] ein ewiger Quellbrunn ist, der sich mit eitel Gide iibergeuBet und von dem 
alles, was gut ist und heiBt, ausfleuBt' (WA. 30 I 136, 1). Dann und darauf hin tritt 
er mit seinem Gebot auf den Plan. Seine schon erwiesene Giite ist die Kraft des 
Gebotes. Sein Gesetz steht keinen Augenblick fur sich und auf sich selbst. . . . Der 
theologische Axiom laBt sich nicht Risen aus diesem soteriologischen oder sagen wir 
gleich konkret: aus diesen christologischen Zusammnenhang" ("Die erste Gebot," 
303). In view of this concept of theological axiom it is difficult to follow Kitamori's 
accusation that Barth's theology is legalistic even in its prolegomena. In faith as well 
as in theology obedience is an integral part. And Barth himself says in this very 
article that divine grace precedes divine commandment. The difference is then to be 
seen in how Kitamori or Barth sees the nature of divine grace, and not in terms of the 
false alternative "evangelical or legalistic." 
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method, and again, this can be said result from the openness of his theological 
method. The "Sache" itself modifies the method in theology.' 
Third, as we recall from the previous chapter, Kitamori consciously or 
unconsciously has felt that his personally "unabandonable"concept of the Pain of God 
needs to be "forgiven" and restored to serving as the witness to the salvific reality of 
God, a reality for which he had no other support than the Pain of God. This concern 
of Kitamori had difficulty claiming an objective validity in dogmatic prolegomena, for 
this prolegomenal "forgiveness" is needed for Kitamori's own theology, a concern 
which might be seen as Katimori's own "private" issue and therefore has been difficult 
for other theologians to grasp. 
And last, we shall mention that Barth's formal idea of God--the sovereign 
and absolute Lord, basic to the Reformed theology--is be deeply incompatible with 
Kitamori's idea of the all-embracing God. In Kitamori's view, God in Earth's 
theology is the "despotic" God to whom men must be obedient. For Kitamori, the 
love of God in Barth's theology is terminus a quo while the obedience to God is 
terminus ad quem. Kitamori thus holds that even the most eloquent exposition of 
God's grace by Barth is ultimately and legalistically directed to man's obedience to 
God the Lord. In other words, the main motif of Kitamori's criticism of Barth is that 
"'It is necessary to note here that in this comparison of Kitamori with Barth I 
am not concerned with "defending" Barth against Kitamori's criticism. As I shall 
examine shortly, Barth has theological traits to which I feel I must criticize. But it is 
quite essential for any theology to be open to God's actual dealing with us in our 
concrete situation. God leads us into an ever-deeper "expereince" of Himself, because 
He is living with us in concrete history, which ever-anew urges us on in the quest for 
God's speaking to us today. 
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Barth does not know God in Pain, which to Kitamori is the very core of the Gospel, 
and without which a theology inevitably degenerates into legalism.' It is, we know, 
obvious that Barth is deeply concerned with man's obedience to God and with the 
Law's significance in Christian existence. But to call the theology of Barth "legalism" 
would be too gross a simplification to be taken seriously as a valid criticism. Perhaps, 
Kitamori's "Denkschematismus" practically reduced Barth's theology to a caricature 
'Quoting Nishida's comparison between his philosophical idea of God as the 
"self-negating God" and the Western "despotic" God [ SIt$10#111 ], Kitamori in his 
essay, written in 1963, identifies this religion of the "despotic God" with the theology 
of Barth and writes as follows: "The theology [of Barth] which has the First 
Commandment as its theological axiom ultimately cannot but negate and exclude 
`human reality [as is lived by the sinner]' by its legalistic exclusiveness; it remains so 
even when it begins to speak of 'Gottes Menschlichkeit' unless its prolegomena as the 
basic method of theology is changed. The concrete manifestation of this exclusiveness 
can be seen in the fact that it negates and excludes [the approaches to] concrete 
exsistence and indigenousness" (Japanese Heart, 128). For Kitamori, Barth's 
prolegomena with which he struggled in his youth fundamentally determined the whole 
of Barth's theology as an exclusive and legalistic theology. As to the indigenousness 
of a theology, we have a comment of Barth on Kitamori's theology, a comment Barth 
wrote to the Preface of the Japanese edition of his Einflihrung in die Evangelische 
Theologie in 1962. By then Barth read Carl Michalson's book on Japanese theological 
contribution and was acquainted with Kitamori's theology. Barth wrote: "Rechte 
Theologen stehen und gehen flberall auf ihren eigenen Beinen, und das wird immer 
und oberall auch eine gewisse nationale Eingentiimlichkeit ihres Denkens in sich 
schlieBen miissen. . . . Immerhin: es kam bekanntlich nicht gut, als man sich zum 
Beispiel in Deutschland aufmachte, ein spezifisch `deutsches' Christentum und 
dementsprechend eine spezifische `deutsch' Theologie zu entwickeln und zu pflegen. 
So konnte auch bei dem Versuch einer spezifisch `amerikanischen' oder 
`schweizerischen' Theologie bestimmt nichts Erfreuliches herauszukommen, und so 
auch nicht bei einer spezifisch japartischen' Theologie. . . . In dieser Hinsicht 
machte ich zur `Theologie vom Schmerze Gottes' von Kazoh Kitamori, die mir unter 
den Michalsons Buch . . . dargesteliten Unternehmungen nicht nur geistvollste, 
sondem auch am meisten japanischen' vorkommt, ein ernstliches Fragezeichen setzen 
diirfen . . . Richtung auf eine Theologie, die nicht japanisch', sondern evangelisch, 
biblisch begriindete, Olcumenisch gintige Theologie in japanischer Eigentinnlichlceit 
sein wird" (quoted in Ogawa, Aufgabe, 112-113). 
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and thus hindered him from having critical but fruitful dialogues with Barth and other 
Japanese "Barthians." 
All the evidence now leads us to conclude that Kitamori has failed in his 
attempt to communicate his criticism of Barth to the Japanese "Barthians." His 
opponents are certainly partly responsible for this failure. But as we have seen, the 
material focus of Kitamori's criticism is not quite clear; his criticism does not match 
the "real" Barth. In view of this ambiguity, we are here compelled to speculate: 
why, materially and beyond the somewhat vague prolegomenal issue, has not Kitamori 
developed his criticism of Barth on the basis of his own vision of God in Pain, and 
this particularly concerning the view of God? Is the difference in "Gottesanschauung" 
really vital and cardinal to Kitamori or is this only an apparent difference? Why 
doesn't Kitamori find anything substantial to criticize in the theology of the "mature" 
Barth? Do these things indicate that Kitamori's theology is not so materially 
incompatible with Barth's (except for the fact that Kitamori hesitates to abandon his 
old, "time-encapsulated" criticism of Barth)? 
The Theology of the Pain of God--A Barthian Theology? 
Though adamantly critical of his theology Kitamori is, nevertheless, deeply 
influenced by Karl Barth. When his writings are read somewhat attentively, one can 
hardly escape the impression that Kitamori's theological ground-scheme is strikingly 
similar to that of Barth. In fact, he himself acknowledges that he deeply breathed 
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Barthian air during the formative years of his theology.' "From now on," Kitamori 
can write, "for anyone who wants to do theological work it is unavoidable to become 
a Barthian once; I for one cannot but confess that I am also a Barthian in this 
sense."' In this connection we recall that Kitamori had been under the influence of 
Nishida Philosophy. It is then highly interesting to speculate on the relationship 
between Barth's theological thought and Nishida's philosophical ideas. Although 
presently it is nothing more than mere speculation, these two thinkers may not be 
totally separated from each other; they may have an interesting philosophical affmity 
for each other. Kitamori may be an example of the compatibility of Barth's theology 
and Nishida's philosophy.' This issue is a theme for another study. What we wish 
to point out is that Barth's influence and the influence of Nishida philosophy are not 
totally unrelated; in formal aspects they may have some affinity for each other. But 
'"During the first half of the twentieth century the theological world was 
filled with the air called the theology of Barth. To be born as a theologian in this age 
means to be born in the air of Barthian theology. It was then natural for me to inhale 
and exhale the air of Barth's theology," writes Kitamori (Morioka, Japanese 
Christianity and Barth, 10). 
"'Today, 20. 
'For the interesting relation between Barth and Nishida, see Chap. 2, note 
94. There we mentioned that it was Nishida who strongly advised K. Takizawa, his 
young follower then, to study Barth in Bonn. In fact, the synthesis of Barth and 
Nishida became Takizawa's life-long mission (see note 88 above). Does this suggest a 
speculative character in Barth's theology which can even capture the attention of a 
Buddhist philosopher? Or the universality of the truth of the Christian message of 
salvation? We here have a highly interesting question regarding Barth's theology and 
the Christian faith's relation to Nishida philsophy. This question of the character of 
Barth's theology may further relate to the exceptionally enthusiastic reception of Barth 
by mainstream Japanese Protestantism. 
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presently we shall continue by answering the following: to what extent and in what 
sense has Kitamori been influenced by Barth? 
Kitamori had easy access to all major works of Karl Barth including 
Kirchlich Dogmatik 1/1 already during his years at seminary.' Additionally, some 
good introductory works to Barth's theology were then also available. The more one 
reads Barth's earlier works, the more one notices how much Kitamori has absorbed 
from these primary and secondary sources. His graduation thesis at the Lutheran 
seminary in Tokyo gives witness to an extensive reading of Barth's own works.13' 
As to the secondary materials, in addition to two basic introductory works written by 
Caiman and Kuwada, John McChonnachie's The Barthian Theology and the Man of 
Today, translated in 1934 by Chitose Kishi (an influential leader of Lutheranism in 
Japan) in collaboration with one other, also seems to have been carefully read by 
Kitamori.' Such an intensive study of Barth in the formative years, we must 
'"We mention some of the titles which appear in his graduation theses from 
the Lutheran seminary: Das Won Gottes und Theologie, Zur Lehre vom Heiligen 
Geist, Die Theologie und Kirche, Die Romerbrief, Credo, Offenbarung, Kirche, 
Theologie, Evalngelium und Gesetz. In addition to these titles there were several other 
translations of Barth's writings which we have already mentioned. 
inCitamori seems to have been a diligent note-taker in his reading. Though it 
is not necessary to have documentary substantiation, one comes across ideas and 
phrases which Kitamori borrows from Barth's writings although he rarely 
acknowledges them. We have already noted some of them, and will continue to do so 
when it is significant. 
'In this rather extensive introduction to the theology of the earlier Barth, 
there are two expressions which strongly speaks for Kitamori's in-depth reading of this 
volume. One is "the character of Almighty grace" which "demands the recognition 
that its [Reconciliation's] Subject is identical in the full sense with the Father" (The 
Barthian Theology and the Man of Today [New York: Harper and Brothers 
Publischers, 1933], 226; underline is mine). This word "character" has been 
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suppose, cannot but leave an indelible mark on the young Kitamori's mind and on his 
theological thinking. His lifelong criticism of Barth may give witness to his 
Barthianism with a negative signature. In the following we shall see several points of 
similarity between Kitamori and Barth.' 
Kitamori's favorite term for describing the Pain of God as the character of divine love 
(cf. the title of his book next to his opus magnum, The Character of the Gospel). The 
second is the non-identity between love in creation and love in reconciliation. 
McChonachie summarizes Barth's exposition of reconciliation which is found in KD 
1/1, 430-431, which must have been of great significance for Kitamori's 
conceptualization of the Pain of God. For a better observation we give here the text 
of the particular summary in Barth's original: "Das Unbegreifliche der Offenbarung 
als solcher, der Offenbarung als der VersOhnung, die nur von Gott aus Wirklichkeit 
sein kann, dieses Unbegreifliche ist das Faktum des Sohnes Gottes, der in unserer 
Mitte, also mitten in unserer Feindschaft gegen Gott, der Herr ist. Weil diese Liebe 
Gottes, die in diesem Faktum offenbar wird, nicht identisch sein kann mit der Liebe zu 
der Welt, die er schaffen wollte und erschaffen hat--zwischen dieser Welt und unserer 
Welt liegt ja die Sande und der Tod--weil die in diesem Faktum offenbare Liebe Gottes 
vielmehr gerade seine Liebe zu der verlorenen Welt des an ihm schuldig gewordenen 
Menschen ist (Joh. 3,16), zu der Welt, deren Kontinuitit zu jener urspriinglichen uns 
vollig verborgen ist--darum kiinnen wir das Herrsein Gottes hier mit dem Herrsein 
Gottes dort nicht verwechseln, nicht direkt identifizieren, darum massen wir dort (im 
Blick auf die SchEopfung) von einer ersten, hier (im Blick auf die VersOhnung) von 
einer zweiten Seinsweise Gottes reden" (italics is added). This differentiation in 
Barth's thought between the love to the world and the love in the Son of God is very 
close to what Kitamori uses as another expression of the Pain of God. "When we 
want to grasp the meaning of the Cross of Christ exactly, we have to say the 
following first," writes Kitamori, "namely, the love of God in Christ is qualitatively 
different from the love of God without Christ" (Introduction, 42). In another context 
Kitamori also writes: "Even if the expression of 'the Cross' is used, the content of it 
is nowadays changed into the immediate love [of God without Christ], we therefore 
use the expression of the 'Pain of God' in order to make the distinction between the 
love of God in the Cross and the immediate love of God" (ibid., 44). Due to this 
similarity and Kitamori's intensive reading of this particular volume of KD, it is most 
probable that Kitamori's conceptualization of the Pain of God found its direction in 
this Barthian idea of a distinction in divine loves, although Kitamori filled this 
distinciton with other ideas. 
'36In the following review of similarities between Kitamori and Barth we have 
no choice but to proceed in the form of short summary. Our purpose here is to gain a 
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First, we see Kitamori's dependence on Barth with reference to dogmatic 
methodology. Although Kitamori is critical of Barth's prolegomena, the motif of 
Kitamori's reflection on methodology moves within the Barthian motif, namely, how 
we can be obedient to the totality of the Word of God. Whereas Barth sees that we 
can do full justice to the Word of God in all its aspects by being open to God's 
ever-new revelation through His Word, Kitamori argues that this full obedience can be 
possible only where one has the love of God in Pain.'" Given that what Kitamori 
general picture of Kitamori's dependence on Barth in his theological thinking. To 
substantiate Barth's points of view on the issues to be taken up, I mainly rely on 
secondary literature. To go into a detailed discussion on the primariy sources is 
beyond the scope of this present study. 
'""Only through the narrow way of 'the Cross alone,"' writes Kitamori, "can 
we come out to the broad way of obedience to the whole Word of God. No, when we 
are in the Cross of Christ, we are already obedient to the Word of God, because in 
the Cross we cannot rule the Word of God at all; in the Cross God is truly the Lord. 
But as long as one preaches `man's obedience' to 'the Lordship of God,' man can 
never hold the Word of God in all eternity, because this kind of relationship between 
God and man is nothing but a typical idea of justification by the Law" (Cross, 5). We 
observe that the terminology and thought-categories are thoroughly Barthian. But also 
in terms of content one can doubt whether there is any "material" difference between 
Kitamori and Barth when we read what Kitamori quotes above from Barth as the basis 
of his criticism, namely the following passage: "Wir sind ja gar nicht die, die Christi 
Gebote auch nur h5ren kOnnen, bevor wir durch die Annahme der Siindenvergebung 
unsere game Existenz und alle unsere vergangenen und kunftigen Werke in das 
Gericht und unter die Gnade Gottes haben stellen lassen . . . . Das Gesetz, das wir 
ohne das Evangelium zu hOren meinen, ist sicher nicht Gottes Gesetz. Wir werden 
dann also das Gesetz Gottes sicher nicht erffiillen, nicht weil es uns zu hart und 
schwer ist, aber weil wir es iiberhaupt noch nicht kennen. Kennten wir es, so warden 
wir uns an Christus klammern in welchem es erffillt ist und eben als solche auf Gnade 
Angewisenen und sich Verlassenden das `sanfte Joch', die `leichte Last' (Matth. 11, 
30) seiner Gebote und Weisungen auf uns nehmen, die zu halten nicht schwer ist! (1. 
Joh. 5, 3)" (Credo [Zollikon: Verlag der Evangelischen Buchverhandelung, 1935], 
53). The thesis that obedience to the Word of God or the Law is made possible only 
by one's being drawn into Christ is maintained materially in the thoughts of both 
theologians. 
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problematizes on the issue of prolegomena is irrelevant to Barth, and that Barth's 
theology is carried out in the framework of divine grace, the difference between them 
seems to be immaterial. Though Kitamori has a different idea of the ground for the 
constitution of theology, the motif that theology aims to be obedient to the Word of 
God belongs to the basic foundation of Barth. 
Secondly, we find a formal parallel between the two theologians with respect 
to the doctrine of the Trinity. We can designate their doctrines of the Trinity as 
Christologically determined. That is, they formulate the doctrine of the immanent 
Trinity on the basis of the revelation in Jesus Christ. Barth sees an inner-divine 
polarity between the Father and the Son in the unity of the Holy Spirit as the structure 
of divine life'; Kitamori attempted, as we have seen, to penetrate to an inner-most 
essence of God as "God in Pain" through the revelation of the crucified Son and tried 
to explicate it as the inner-trinitarian movement.'" The "quality" of this divine 
inner-life is different for Kitamori and Barth. In the former the Father and the Son 
'For Barth's doctrine of "the essential (immanent) Trinity," see Timothy 
Bradshaw, "Karl Barth on the Trinity: A Family Resemblance," Scottish Journal of 
Theology 39 (1986), 145-164: Bradshaw thematically writes of Barth's view of God's 
triune being revealed in the Christ event; "In Jesus Christ there is the unveiling of the 
veiled God and the impartation of that revelation. This dynamic movement 
corresponds with the trinitarian life of God in se, to Son, Father and Spirit, or to 
form, freedom and historicity" (144; cf. KD Ill, 351). The sequence in Barth of 
"Son [as `Offenbarung 1, Father [as `Offenbareel and Spirit [as `Offenbarseini" is 
adopted by Kitamori in his "prolegomenal" work, The Lord of The Cross (21-23). 
See further Zahrnt, 123-125. ; Tomiyasu Kakegawa, "The Immanent Trinity and the 
Economic Trinity -- in Karl Barth's Kirchliche Dogmatik," Theological Studies in 
Japan 21 (Tokyo: 1982), 15-35. 
"See 427-429. 
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are related to each other as wrath against love, which constitutes a tension-filled unity 
in Pain, whereas in the latter the Father as God's sovereign "freedom" and the Son as 
His self-limiting "form" constitute a unity filled with tension and movement in the 
Holy Spirit as His "freedom in form."' Still, we notice that there is a striking 
formal parallel between Kitamori and Barth. 
Thirdly, we point out a strong intellectualism in both theologians. In both of 
their theologies, faith is to be developed into knowledge of salvation or of God 
Himself; faith demands insight into the truth of salvation.'" In Kitamori, to know 
that God is in Pain eternally and has forgiven the sinner in His Pain is the essential 
aspect of salvation,' whereas for Barth to know that one is elected in Jesus Christ 
'40Bradshaw, 150-151. 
"'For Barth's intellectualism, see Regin Prenter, "Glauben und Erkennen," 
Kerygma und Dogma 2 (1956, 3), 176192: In this article Prenter goes through 
Barth's Anselmian quest for "intellectum" and holds that because of Barth strictly 
follows the logical necessity of given revelational data, this Swiss dogmatician is able 
to build a theological system, perhaps the greatest history has ever seen. From his 
Lutheran viewpoint Prenter presents critical arguments against Barth's strong passion 
for theological "Einsichten" and to his extensive use of the analogy principle which 
ultimately leads to unscriptural speculation. Prenter expresses his concern as follows: 
"Aber hier [wo es eine Geschlossenheit und Konsequenz gibt fangen die Gegenbemer-
kungen an. Wie wird es in der DurchfUhrung eben dieses Programms mit der 
exegetischen Treue gehen? Duldet das echte H5ren auf das kontingente, 
geschichtliche Wort der Offenbarungszeugen, das als Offenbarungszeugnis sich an den 
Glauben wendet, diese energische Wendung zu einer sich auf Boden erhebenden 
strengen und notwendingen Erkenntnis?" (178; emphases are oringinal). This 
criticism mutatis mutandis applies to Kitamori's theological methods as we have seen 
in the previous chapter. 
"See 313 above, particularly note 94 there. 
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from eternity is the thing one needs for salvation."' In both theologians the basis for 
salvation is made intellectually clear through the revelation of Jesus Christ. Related to 
this intellectualism, both Kitamori and Barth ultimately deny Luther's idea of deus 
absconditus. In Kitamori, the idea of a hidden God is soteriologized; he reduces this 
idea to the notion that God uses His wrath as a means to show His love and holds that 
the solution to the wrath of God is to be sought in the Pain of God.' Barth denies 
the idea of a hidden God on the grounds that this complicated idea of the Reformer 
cannot be maintained in the face of Scripture's simple witness.' This denial of deus 
"'Although Barth so strongly emphasizes the historical revelation and is 
considered to be a theologian with his foot in historical revelation, Prenter maintains 
in another article on Barth, it is important not to be misled by impression: "Barths 
Betonen der geshichtliche Offenbarung muss im dialectischen Zusammenhang mit 
seinem betonten Interesse f5r die immanente Trinitit, fa die iiberzeitliche 
Urgeschichte, fir die ewige Erwahlung gesehen werden. Fiir Barth stellt die 
Offenbarungsgeschichte das Erkenntnismedium fur ewige Urgeschichte dar. Gott 
lasst semen Sohn in die Fremde hinausziehen, damit wir zu ihm zwickvie,nden 
konnen. Die Inkarnation soll uns erm5glichen, hier in der Zeit zu erkennen, was wir 
ewig sind. Wir sollen jedoch hier in der Zeit nur insofern errettet werden, als wir 
erkennen, was wir ewig sind" ("Karl Barths Umbildung der traditionellen 
Zweinaturlehre in lutherischer Beleuchtung," Studio Theologica 11 [1957, 1], 77. 
'Pain, 110-112. We shall postpone a detailed discussion on this theme until 
we come to Kitamori's interpretation of Luther's concept of deus absconditus in the 
light of Luther's own thought. 
""Es ist bekannt, daB Luther die Erkenntnis der Sunde, den Schrecken vor 
Gottes Zorn, die BuBe, in der Regel auf eine besondere, von der Offenbarung der 
Gnade Gottes getrennte Gesetzes-, Heiligkeits- und Zornesoffenbarung, ja auf ein 
besonderes Wesen Gottes in seiner Majestat und Verborgenheit zuriickgefohrt hat. 
Wir folgen Luther darin nicht, weil dieses Schema sich dem scheinbar 
komplizierteren, in Wahrheit doch viel einfacheren Zeugnis der Schrift gegeniiber mit 
gutem Gewissen nicht aufrecht erhalten laBt" (KD 11/1, 407; Earth's more determined 
rejection of Luther's "nominalistischen These" is found in Ibid., 610). Gerhard 
Ebeling, to whom I owe the quotation above, has a criticism to Barth's rejection of the 
idea "deus absconditus": "Beunruhigender aber [als die Grenze der 
Luther-Interpretation Barths] ist eine Frage, die an Barths eigene Theologie richten ist: 
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absconditus is surely in keeping with both theologians' strong inclination to theological 
intellectualism."' 
Fourthly, strong objectivism is observable in the theologies of Kitamori and 
Barth. By objectivism we mean that man's salvation has been accomplished 
objectively and in a supralapsarian manner by God as the inner-divine event. In 
Kitamori, the Pain of God is the objective and absolute salvation provided by God's 
taking His wrath upon Himself, His wrath which is aroused by man's rebellion and 
which would have to be upon him.' Mankind is already in the salvation 
based upon the Pain of God, independent of the individual's subjective appropriation 
of it. In Barth's theology, the well-known doctrine of man's eternal election comes to 
the fore, namely the election of man by God in the Son in which He assumes man's 
condemnation upon Himself in the Son.' For both theologians the historical Cross 
KOnnte nicht infolge dieser [logisch-analogische] Art von Christozentrik [zum 
Unterschied von Luthers forensich-antithetischer Christocentrik] der Tendenz 
Vorschub geleistet rein, daf3 Gottesverstandnis in einer Einlinigkeit und 
Selbstverstindlichkeit auf den Nenner der Gnade zu bringen, die mutatis mutandis an 
die Theologie der Aufklirung und Albrecht Ritschls erinnert?" ("Karl Barths Ringen 
mit Luther," Lutherstudien III [Tubingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1985], 552). 
'When Kitamori says that "the Cross is the sole loophole through which we 
can see over the whole of God" (Auto II, 85; italic is mine), he expresses that God can 
be known fully through the Cross of Christ. Kitamori, like Barth, does not have a 
concept of God who transcends human comprehension. The knowledge of God in 
Pain exhausts the very nature of God. 
'See 307-308 above. 
"Prenter, "Umbildung," 69-71. 
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of Christ is the realization of the eternal (supralapsarian) salvific will of God.' In 
both systems this presupposes the idea that God foresees the consequences of His 
creation of man and has reconciled man to Himself before creation. In our own 
words, all the consequences of His creation of man--man's denial of God and rebellion 
against Him—have been already "taken care or in eternity.'" Thus, redemption has 
priority to creation, not only noetically but also ontically. Here we observe a strong 
speculative tendency in both theologians.' And it is logically consistent that 
"Zahmt, 141-143: Zahrnt writes about this a-historical feature of Barth's 
theology as follows: "Zugespitzt konnen wir sagen: Die gOttliche Dreieinigkeit hat in 
der Ewigkeit ein Drama geschaffen und unter sich, unter ihren drei Personen, 
uraufgeffihrt. Nun soil dieses Drama wie im Himmel auch auf Erden gespielt werden. 
Zu diesm Zweck schafft sie sich die Welt als Biihne und den Menschen als 
Zuschauer" (142). For Kitamori's view, see 438-444 above. 
'50In Barth's thought this eternal reconciliation is conceived as the election of 
the Son. We read the following passage: "Nun ist ja der erwahlte Mensch Jesus dazu 
bestimmt, zu leiden and sterben . . . Es ist der Gehorsam zum Tode am Kreuz, zu 
dem der seiner lottlichen Seinsart sich entausserende Sohn Gottes sich nach Phil. 2, 
6f entschliesst und eben dieser Entschluss ist der Inhalt des gOttlichen Beschlusses im 
Amfang aller Dinge . . . Das Erwahltsein des Menschen Jesus bedeutet also: Ein 
Zorn ist entbrannt, ein Urteil wird gesprochen, eine Strafe wird vollzogen, eine 
Verwerfung findet statt. Vor Ewigkeit her ist es so beschlossen. Vor Ewigkeit her ist 
Gericht vorgesehen . . . . DaB der erwahlte Mensch Jesus leiden und sterben muss, 
bedeutet nun aber nicht mehr und nicht weniger als dies, daB Gott - indem er selber 
dieser Mensch wird -- sich selbst fur den zu seinem Feind gewordenen Menschen 
verantwortlich und haftbar und dass er die ganze Folge von dessen Tun: seine 
Verwerfung und seine Tod zu seiner eigenen Sache macht . . . . So besteht nun das 
Wesen der freien Gnade fur einen Jeden, den Gott in dem Menschen Jesus erwahlte, 
darin, dass er darum weil in diesem Jesus Gott der Richter selbst seine, des 
Gerichteten Stelle einnimmt, von seiner Sande. Schuld und Strafe gulch 
freigesprochen ist" (quoted in: Prenter, "Umbildung, 71 [IG) 11/2, 130-134]). For 
Kitamori's view of this supralapsarian idea of reconciliation, see 267-270 above. 
"See Prenter's discussion on Barth's emphasis on "Erkenntnis und Einsicht" 
expressed in the latter's concept of the creation-redemption relationship ("Die Einheit 
von SchiSphfung und ErlOsung: Zur SchOpfungslehre Karl Barths," Theologische 
Zeitschrift 2 [1946], 161-182). Here Prenter takes up the problems of consistent 
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Kitamori and Barth came very close to universalism.' 
Lastly, we recognize that in Kitamori as well as in Barth divine grace is 
made triumphant in such a way that the existential struggle between faith and actual 
experience is in danger of losing its tension. Kitamori repeatedly staes that the truth 
of the Pain of God conquers all the denials and rebellions of man. No sinner can 
nullify the love of God which is based upon the Pain of God. The love based upon 
the Pain of God is the love which is never "beaten" by human sin.'' This is 
proclaimed even though a believer feels his denial of God from time to time. In 
Barth's thought, sin is made ontologically impossible; it has no ontological reality 
because God eternally denies it in His triumphant grace.'° Whatever happens in 
man, the eternal grace of God is unchangeable; what matters is to know this and 
rationalization, of dissolution and of the tension between the reality of creation and 
that of redemption by way of the eternalization of the salvific event in the Son. He 
writes: "Wie Gesetz und Evangelium, wie [unser] Kreuz und Dankbarkeit, wie Tod 
und Aufstehung, wie Gottes opus alienum und opus proprium, wie Sch5pfung und 
ErlOsung elm ist, wird erst im lumen gratiae einsichtig sein. Die Einheit liest in 
Gottes Handeln. Fiir uns, die wir diesseits des Sfindefalls und der Aufstehung leben, 
wird es geraten sein--und so zeigt uns auch die Bibel das Beispiel, die Grenze der 
supralapsarischen Spekulation und des eschatologischen Schauens nicht zu iibertreten" 
(182). 
'See note 150 above; also Zahrnt, 136-138. 
''See 253-256 above; cf. the following word of Barth which we quote from 
Zahrnt, 137-138: "[Nachdem der Eine, Jesus Christus, verworfen ist, ist fir die 
Vielen Verwerfung keine MOglichkeit mehr,'] [mOgen sie] wahlen, wie sie es tun--sie 
miten laufen, soweit sie kommen: die Stellung und das Los der Verworfenen, nach 
welchem sie in ihrer Torheit die Hande ausstrecken, werden sie bestimmt nicht 
erlangen . . . . Sie k5nnen der gottlichen Gnadenwahl wohl Schande bereiten; sie 
konnen aber nicht umstol3en und riickgingig machen." 
154See Zahrnt, 144-145. 
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believe this. In both theologies the existential tension of faith is about to be dissolved 
into the objective affirmation of divine grace. 
We have now sufficiently seen how close Kitamori stands to Barth's general 
framework of theological thinking. Is then the theology of the Pain of God a Barthian 
theology? This, of course, depends on what we understand by the "label" 
Barthianism. Barth's theology has gone through several developmental stages. But if 
there is some justification in characterizing "Barthianism" with the marks of 
Christocentric Trinity, intellectualism, soteriological objectivism, universalism, 
trimuphalism, and the idea of "redemption before creation," we can undoubtedly 
classify Kitamori's theology as a Barthian theology. This Barthian tendency in 
Kitamori has not been widely recognized.' Certainly, in terms of theological 
content, there is a clear contrast between Kitamori and Barth. We could perhaps put 
the issue in the following way: Kitamori has been composing a Barthian music of 
theology; whereas Barth himself has composed his melody in a jovial major key, 
Kitamori's melody is in a tragic minor key. Barth's God is too high in heaven, 
whereas Kitamori's God is too deep in the valley of tears. Both are faulted with 
placing their "Denkschema" prior to the actual reality of man existing in faith and 
hope which always escapes "neat" systematization. To illustrate this point, we refer to 
Reinhold Niebuhr who criticized Barth's theological "triumphalism" expressed in the 
'According to Yasuo Furuya Kitamori "highly regards Barth's theology even 
if he has been critisizing its legalistic exclusiveness" (Theology of Religion, [Tokyo: 
Jordan-sha, 1985], 108). Irrespective of Kitamori's subjective evaluation of Barth, 
Furuya sees that Kitamori is indebted to Barth. Furuya is one of the few who see the 
"Barthian" framework of Kitamori's theology. 
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latter's lecture under the title "Die Unordung der Welt and der Heilsplan Gottes,"'' 
a lecture given at the general conference of the World Council of Churches in 
Amsterdam in 1948. Niebuhr's criticism runs: "Sie [die Theologie Barths] ist nun in 
Gefahr, eine Krone ohne Kreuz anzubieten, einen Triumph ohne Kampf, einen 
Glauben, der die Verworrenheit menschlicher Existenz mehr ignoriert als 
verwandlt."1" Given that this criticism of Niebuhr captures the critical aspect of 
Barth's theology, we could characterize Kitamori's theology by twisting Niebuhr's 
criticism: "Kitamori's theology is now in danger of offering a cross without a crown, 
a struggle without a triumph, a faith which rather ignores divine hope given to the 
change of human existence than encourages the hope."' In a sense it seems 
instructive to note that with different "keys" the two theologies which share the same 
formal characters give exactly opposite theological profiles, though strikingly similar 
in structure. The one is said to be seeing man's reality from high above while the 
Evangelische Verlag, 1948. 
'Quoted in Zahrnt, 153. 
"If Barth has tried to overcome the contradictory reality of man's existence 
by his idea of the eternally triumphant grace which should drive away all the shadows 
in reality, Kitamori has tried to do the same by accepting it and remaining in it with 
his idea of God in Pain, being fearful of the trap of happiness. Whereas Barth has 
made light of the naked painful reality of man, Kitamori has refused to see what we 
may call the blessing of creation. Our experience of reality in faith is, however, not 
yet totally redeemed by divine grace nor totally abandoned to sheer nothingness. The 
world remains God's creation so that there are manifestations of the goodness of the 
Creator. If we fail to take both aspects in an adequate way, we misinterpret the very 
message of the Gospel itself. It is my observation of Kitamori's theology that the 
theology of the Pain of God, if one follows Kitamori's thought consistently to the end, 
should end up with what I have in the text, for if God is in Pain eternally, what can 
man expect but pain ultimately? 
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other from down below; both of the theologies are somehow out of touch with the 
actual reality of man in the tension of Law and Gospel. 
On the basis of our observation above, we can conclude that Kitamori's 
theological relation to the Reformed tradition is much closer than what is observed at 
first glance. Calvin and the Reformed tradition have been attractive to Kitamori's own 
theological disposition. The formation of the Kyodan has led Kitamori to adopt a 
mediating position between the Reformed tradition and his own Lutheran conviction. 
But the theology of Barth has been of critical significance to Kitamori, providing him 
with the general framework of his theology, being the antithesis to the material aspect 
of Kitamori's vision of God, and thus helping to articulate his own theology of the 
Pain of God. What does this mean to our understanding of Kitamori's theology as a 
"Lutheran" theology in Japan? 
Kitamori's Theology and Lutheranism 
What is Lutheranism? 
It has always been taken for granted that the theology of Kitamori belongs to 
Lutheranism. His friends and critics alike regard Kitamori's basic orientation in 
theology as Lutheran's and in fact, Kitamori himself is never ashamed of confessing 
that he is a Lutheran. More specifically, it is of particular interest that Kitamori's 
theology is considered an indigenized Lutheranism."' Yet our study so far leads us 
'See 14-15 above. 
'w"Lutheranism in kimono," an expression given in Hesselink's article 
mentioned in note 27 of Chap. 1, may reflect a common understanding of Kitamori's 
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to raise a crucial question as to whether Kitamori's theology can properly be identified 
as a Lutheran theology clothed in an indigenous garment. 
With this basic question in mind we start our investigation into the character 
of the relationships between Kitamori's theology and Lutheranism.' First, it 
immediately becomes necessary to clarify some basic issues about the theological 
identity of Lutheranism. With regard to "external" forms such as church polity, order 
of worship, and even in the form of piety, Lutheranism allows much freedom; in fact, 
there are various types of Lutheranism in the field: "state church Lutheranism," "free-
church Lutheranism," "pietistic Lutheranism," "conservative" Lutheranism, even 
"liberal" Lutheranism, and perhaps more. What is the nota by which one knows a 
Church, or its theology, as being Lutheran? Needless to say, the concern here is not 
with a confessional chauvinism but with the very identity of the Gospel itself. Behind 
this stands a firm conviction, the conviction that Lutheranism has a truly ecumenical 
concern, namely, aspiration for an evangelical catholic ("ecumenical") Church of 
theology; for Kitamori's own conviction of his Lutheran identity, see note 32 of Chap. 
1. 
'This question bears a controversial nature in itself and would require 
separate volumes to do justice to the complex problem of the identity of Lutheranism, 
as we see how demanding answering this question is, for instance, in Werner Elert's 
The Structure of Lutheranism (tr. Walter A. Hansen, St. Louis: Concordia 
Publishing House, 1962). It is neither required nor legitimate for the present study to 
discuss this question in extenso; what is required is to present an understanding of the 
identity of Lutheranism, an understanding which is based on clear evidence and is thus 
pertinent to the scope of this study. The comprehensive work by Elert will be of vital 
significance for the following discussion explicitly and implicitly. 
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Christ on the basis of the Gospel, for una sancta catholica Ecclesia!" Thus, if 
Lutheranism claims its theological substance to be a universally valid representation of 
the truth of the Gospel, there must be a definable Lutheran identity. And on the basis 
of this defined identity, one is in the position of judging whether a particular theology, 
claiming to be Lutheran, actually preserves an authentic Lutheran concern for the 
Gospel and further develops this concern in a given context of proclamation, or 
whether it deviates substantially from Lutheran theology, thus being Lutheran in name 
only. 
What is Lutheranism then? Some would define "Lutheranism" rather loosely 
to characterize any theological direction more or less influenced by Luther's own 
thought and Lutheran confessional ideas and ethos. However, Lutheranism defined in 
this sense is more or less irrelevant for our present purpose, for a much more exact 
definition is needed. Can we, for instance, define Lutheranism as the doctrinal totality 
laid down in the Book of Concord? This "definition" of Lutheranism seems to be 
useful, having a solid anchor in the primary confessional writings of the Lutheran 
Church. For it would be quite possible to discern the identity of Lutheranism through 
'This concern for the authentic and substantial unity of the Church is 
classically expressed by the "pure et recte" in Article VII of the Augusburg 
Confession. The Lutheran concentration on the purity of the doctrine of the Gospel 
and the "right" usage of the sacraments is not an ecclesiastical sectarianism but 
expresses its perspective of true ecumenism. For the fact that the Lutheran 
confessionalism essentially relates to the indispensable concern for the truth of the 
Gospel for authentic and fruitful ecumenism, see: Ronald R. Feuerhahn, "Hermann 
Sasse: Confessionalist and Confessor," in Gerald S. Krispin and Jon D. Vieker, eds., 
And Every Tongue Confess, St. Louis: The Nagel Festschrift Committee, 1990, 
14-37. 
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objective studies of the Book of Concord. But even with a written confessional 
document such as the Book of Concord, discussions of the identity of Lutheranism do 
not cease, for an ever-changing historical situation challenges these confessional 
writings to be interpreted anew for the actualization of their relevance today.' 
What then is a tertium which tests new interpretations of historical confessional 
writings? Or does Lutheranism more directly mean Luther's own theology which is 
compiled in the Weimarora? This particular understanding of the identity of 
Lutheranism would be quite natural, for it is Luther who has been most instrumental 
in the formation of what has been labeled "the Lutheran tradition." This way of 
defining the Lutheran now however cannot be held as valid without specific 
qualifications. The Church of Christ cannot be based solely on the experiences, ideas 
and concepts of an individual. In other words, one human being, however great and 
profound, cannot be assumed to be an infallible authority on every detail of doctrine, 
and Luther is no exception in this regard.' The theology of Luther as a theology of 
an individual theologian is not identical with Lutheranism; Lutheranism as the 
Church's understanding of the Gospel of Christ. 
l'Elert expresses the view that the confessional writings were conditioned by 
the actual historical situations. In Structure, 6, he makes a distinction between the 
Gospel's innate amorphous "dynamic" and its solidified "forms" in a given historical 
situation, and sees the body of the confessional writings as one of the "dynamic" 
forms. This means the meaning and relevance of the confessional writings is to be 
grasped ever anew in the light of the "dynamic." The "dynamic" is defined by Elert 
as "the impact of the Gospel" (der evangelische Ansatz). This is then his working 
hypothesis which he tries to validate by morphological studies. 
"Here we recall Luther's own well-known protest to identifying Luther's 
doctrinal follower's with his own name; see WA 38, 264. 
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Thus, finding the key to discern the identity of Lutheranism is rather 
complicated. In this connection it is instructive to observe that in the Book of 
Concord the confessional theologians often refer to Luther as an authority when 
delineating true doctrine in controversial areas. These theologians who work under 
the material principle of the pure doctrine of the Gospel for the "official" Church find 
firm guidance in Luther. In fact, this example of the confessional fathers provides a 
natural and legitimate interpretative direction, or a hermeneutic paradigm, for 
Lutheran theologians of later generations in their work of preserving and actualizing 
the Lutheran theological concern; they mainly referred to Luther when they were 
doctrinally and theologically in doubt. Luther is the fountain-head of Evangelical 
Christianity; it thanks him for the rediscovery of the Gospel. It is true that Luther is 
not infallible in every detail covered in his writings. Nonetheless, his theological idea 
and concept function as a kind of doctrinal norm in the Lutheran Church. What do 
we then understand from the duality of Luther's fallibility on the one hand and his 
"practical" status as a doctrinal authority on the other? The reason for this duality is 
to be found in the fact that the Gospel is not Luther's private theological invention; the 
Gospel has been rediscovered and expounded by him, a man enlivened by this very 
Gospel. It is this timeless, dynamic Gospel that has used this man as its powerful 
witness at the end of the Middle Ages. As a powerful witness to the Gospel, Luther, 
though not infallible in doctrinal and ethical "peripherals," functioned as an 
authoritative figure in the doctrinal essentials in the Lutheran Churches. 
To use familiar terminology, Luther is certainly not norma normans but he 
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is nonna nonnata par excellence. It is therefore legitimate for us to equate Luther's 
own theology in its evangelical substance with "official" Lutheran theology. Lutheran 
theology follows Luther with the assurance that in this man the Gospel is powerfully 
expressed in a manner which entitles the Reformer to function as nonna normata. It 
is therefore fully legitimate that when examining whether or not a theology is 
Lutheran, one directly compares the particular theology with the Reformer's 
theological ideas and concepts. 
With this preliminary conclusion concerning Lutheranism's formal identity, 
we have gained a methodological basis for examining whether or not Kitamori's 
theology is a Lutheran theology. We have not yet reached a material definition of the 
identity of Lutheranism, but this will be made clear as the presentation of this section 
proceeds. 
The Basic Traits of Kitamori's Interpretation 
of Luther's Theology 
A prominent theologian can often be a mirror upon which theologians of 
later generations reflect their respective views. This pattern holds true of the 
relationship between Luther and Kitamori. Luther is one of the most profound and 
multifaceted theological thinkers of the Christian Church, and the interpretative works 
of his theology abound throughout modern history.lm Kitamori is one Japanese 
theologian who has attempted to understand Luther, while criticizing the Reformer 
'See for instance Heinrich Bornkamm, Luther in Spiegel der deutschen 
Geistesgeschichte (GOttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1969). 
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with his own theological ideas derived from the concept of the Pain of God. 
First, we shall delineate the basic traits of Kitamori's interpretation of 
Luther's theology. On various turns in his theological career, Kitamori expressed his 
own view of Luther's person and theology.' Kitamori deals with the Reformer's 
inner experience of the fear of death; he speaks of Luther's struggles vis-i-vis the 
notion of divine wrath, interprets the deserted Monk's agony over the problem of sin 
and recognition of its nature, and presents the Reformer's discovery of the 
righteousness of God. Kitamori then analyzes the conceptual structure of Luther's 
doctrine of justification, and discusses the strength and weakness of the Wittenbergian 
doctor's theology. As we recall, Kitamori's lifelong interaction with Luther's 
theology is motivated not only by the fact that he is originally a Lutheran by 
confession but also by his theological intention (even ambition) which spanned his 
entire career: to "Lutheranize" the whole of Japanese Protestantism.' Kitamori 
''His first publication, The Lord of the Cross (1940), contains a short essay 
on Luther and Lutheranism titled "Lutheranism and Japan," in which he wrote: sola 
fide is the axiom of Protestant Christianity; Luther rediscovered it and made it more 
explicit than any other Protestant reformer. Kitamori's lecture on a future perspective 
of Lutheranism held on the occasion of the quarter centenary of Luther's birth is 
included in The Character of the Gospel (1948). In 1951 he published a booklet titled 
Martin Luther (Tokyo: Kobundo, 1951), which, though small in size, contains 
Kitamori's interpretation of the Reformer in a nutshell. The Theology of the 
Reformation (1956), next to the Theology of the Pain of God in academic 
achievement, deals with Luther's theology in detail: the concept of the righteousness 
of God, the doctrine of atonement, Christology, the relationship between justification 
and sanctification, and ecclesiology among others. Kitamori also held an expository 
lecture on the Reformer's Freedom of the Christian, which was published in 1966 
under the title the Problem of Freedom in Love (Tokyo: Tokai Daigaku Shuppankai, 
1965). 
'See above 154-158. 
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stands as one of a few theologians who have seriously labored toward the goal of 
bringing the Reformer's theology to fruition in the Japanese Protestant Church. 
Although Kitamori never doubts that his theology is confessionally Lutheran, 
he is never fully satisfied with the Reformer's theology, being quite cautious from the 
very beginning of his theological career to merely "repeat" verbatim what Luther 
wrote; in fact, Kitamori is a highly self-conscious theologian. For Kitamori, Luther is 
not the "final" authority; the Reformer is as liable to criticism as any other 
theologian.' Kitamori's critical attitude toward Luther, declared early in his career, 
would be legitimate by itself, but may at the same time also suggest that his 
interpretation involves a premature finalization of his understanding of the wealth and 
depth of the theological ideas of the Reformer. So far our study suggests this, and if 
this suggestion can be substantiated, it would be consequential in a proper 
analysis of Kitamori's Luther-interpretation. 
"How can I find a gracious God?" is the question with which Luther had to 
struggle in the years of his monastic life. With every means at his disposal 
(sacramental, ascetic, meritorious or satisfactory), Luther never received peace of 
mind, feeling rather an inescapable divine wrath and condemnation. Kitamori 
naturally pays attention to this fundamental problem with which the Reformer fought 
day and night. What actually was the problem? Kitamori, in keeping with his basic 
concept of sin as "impurity of love" or as love soiled by human egoism, identifies 
"For Kitamori's critical attitude toward Luther, see 9 above in this chapter. 
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Luther's ultimate problem as a struggle with "purity (or impurity) of love."'' 
According to Kitamori, Luther's initial problem upon entering the monastery was the 
fear of death; this fear of death was in fact, however, Luther's quest for his own inner 
peace, a "selfish" desire. Therefore, Luther's initial problem had its origin in a 
self-centered desire for personal peace. Luther sought God, but not for God's own 
sake but for his own sake, using God as a means to a selfish end.'7° 
Kitamori admits that it is natural for a man in misery to seek God for help; 
in fact, holds Kitamori, there is no other way to turn oneself to God except to be 
driven by the problems of life. It is then his view that even longing for God in misery 
is tainted by sin; there is no returning to God without sin. Man's motives are always 
tainted by self-love. Kitamori designates this initial turning of the self to God as 
"conversion," in distinction from "repentance" or penitence which, in Kitamori's 
view, is to be understood as "pure" sorrow over one's sin.' If man had "pure 
love" toward God, he would be moved more by sorrow over sins committed against 
`Freedom in Love, 63; "Luther's recognition of man's love as impure is of 
world-historical significance, for with this recognition he exposed the problem of 
man's love," Martin Luther, 27: "[In his long struggling for inner peace, Luther 
eventually recognized his inner motive to love God as an attempt only to secure his 
own inner tranquility.] Luther then was profoundly shocked, asking whether his 
tormenting pilgrimage of many years was in vain all, for all of his efforts to love God 
for the sake of God Himself were in reality not pure but impure, loving God for 
Luther's own sake. Luther's love of God is a deceptive love," ibid. 25. 
'Freedom in Love, 62. 
"'Reformation, 37-38. 
[A bibliographical note: Those of Kitamori's works which are of primary 
significance and therefore quoted frequently are abbreviated like the note here. The 
list of those works is found at the end of the Introduction.] 
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God than the sorrow over the misery incurred upon self; for sin hurts God whereas 
misery hurts oneself. Kitamori posits that even in "conversion," man thus betrays the 
very "impurity of love'; the problem of sin is concerned with the "quality of love" 
throughout. Invariably the question is whether one's love is "pure" or "impure." 
Kitamori has concluded that this fundamental problem is also the problem of Martin 
Luther."' Impure love is the very problem of sinful human beings before God. 
In view of this assumption made by Kitamori regarding the problem with 
which the Reformer struggled, we need to reexamine the issue: is it correct to 
conclude that Luther's problem can be understood in this way and explained by the 
idea of "purity of love"? Is this actually an adequate interpretation of Luther's 
`72Martin Luther, 24-27; "Sin is nothing but the deception of love. Even the 
natural man knows this," Theology of Dialogue (Tokyo: Kyobunkan, 19), 148; "The 
essence of sin, that is, the impurity of [man's] love," ibid., 150, 151. 
'"For Luther, the focus of the problem [of man's existence] is the problem 
of the purity of love of God and of his neighbor," (Theology of the Reformation, 33). 
To support his view, Kitamori cites the following from Luther: "Quia homo non 
potest, nisi que qua sunt, quaerere et se super omnia diligere. Que est summa 
omnium vitiorum," "Sic enim carnis prudentia sua quaerit tantum et puls timet 
miserariam suam quam ingloriam Dei," "Non potest homo naturaliter velle deum esse 
deum. Immo vellet se esse deum et deum non esse deum," "Sic enim discit homo 
pure Deum amare et colere, dum non propter gratism et dona, sed propter ipsum 
solum Deum colit" (quoted in Ibid., 32-33). Even with these sayings it is difficult to 
characterize the focus of Luther's problem is loving God "purely." Stronger 
emphasis is placed on man's not letting God be God, which is a more adequate 
characterization of man's sin before God. For man's relationship with God is more 
than love; it is rather "velle deum deum esse" and "colere Deum porpter ipsum": a 
Luther's exposition of the Fourth Commandment in his Large Catechism where he 
writes: "Denn es ist viel ein haler Ding ehren denn liebeni als das nicht alleine die 
Liebe begreift, sondern auch eine Zucht, Demut and Scheue als gegen einer Majestit 
allda verporgen," (BELK, 587). This applies much more to man's attitude toward 
God. 
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problem by which one can properly grasp the evangelical thought of the Reformer? 
What is the heart and core of Luther's personal battle and revelatory victory? 
Invariably, Luther's problem was how to fmd a gracious God. Even more 
strongly in German: wie kriege ich ein gnadiger Gott? ("fight for a gracious God"!) 
This way of approaching the problem presupposes some other means by which an 
individual works to make himself acceptable, or justified, before God. Luther tried 
all available means in vain. He did not find in himself any clues, sacramentally aided 
or unaided, in "winning" a gracious God. Even in the extremity of ascetic discipline 
he did not feel an inner peace in his soul, the peace which is a fruit of God's 
acceptance. 
The problem of how to fmd a gracious God cannot be solved by human 
achievements, whether or not sacraments are involved. In other words, the problem 
does not lie in the sphere where the very origin and nature of sin is considered 
something humanly intelligible and, to some extent, manageable. Luther's problem-
consciousness is much deeper; it is an inscrutable self-deification of man, the 
complementary to man's radical unbelief toward God. This duality of self-deification 
and unbelief is the very problem of man, the "real essence of sin."" The 
abandonment of this self-deification or the denial of the self then becomes a humble 
attitude to "let God be God." It is a sovereign God that solves man's problem in 
"See Structure, 40; Elert also refers to WA 18, 782, where Luther writes in 
his De servo arbitrio, commenting John 16:8-9: "Hic vides peccatum esse, non 
credere in Christum. At hoc non utique in cute vel capilis haeret, sed in ipsa ration 
et voluntate." 
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existence by His merciful justification, while destroying man's soteriological 
calculations made on the basis of human reason. At last, Luther found a gracious 
God, or rather, found himself accepted by God, in the divine imputation of institia 
alien to the sinner.' From this simple sketch of Luther's pilgrimage to salvation it 
is not difficult for us to see where the Reformer's real problem lies. The problem is 
not the "impurity of love" on the part of the sinful (this is merely an ethical 
consequence of the radical sin of unbelief) but the question of how God regards us, 
the radical sinners of unbelief, as righteous before Him. In Luther's thought, even the 
presence of a "purity of love" in his heart can not justify man before God; man's 
justification is solely and absolutely in the merciful will of God.' 
It is true that a sinner, being forgiven and imputed with the righteousness of 
Christ, begins to love God and his neighbor while struggling with his still lingering 
"As long as the "purity of love" toward God on the part of man is 
considered as the ultimate goal of salvation, one will inevitably look upon one's own 
inner quality, even when God is said to love man "unconditionally." Divine 
acceptance is ultimately dependent on the realization of subjective purity in loving 
God. It is the imputed righteousness of God that is man's eternal righteousness. In 
this alien righteousness there is absolute certainty of divine acceptance both here and 
in eternity. 
""The righteousness of God will not be or arise in us unless [our] 
righteousness falls utterly and our own righteousness perishes," quotes Elert Luther, 
Structure, 81. Here we see that God's righteousness and man's righteousness are set 
in diametrical antithesis. We find similar utterances of Luther in Elert's work, ibid. 
80-81. Luther emphasizes that we are to be brought to nothing. In the state of 
corruption this demand of man's self-nullification signifies a total negation of a sinful 
self, and the fact that Christ is our righteousness becomes even more clear. But even 
in the state of integrity, hypothetically speaking, Christ is invariably our righteousness. 
Man can in no way qualify himself for divine justification. Justification of man is 
God's prerogative; denying this, even with one's own "pure" love, is in reality the 
core of sin itself. 
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self-love. Perhaps, love practiced by a forgiven sinner may become "purer and 
purer." In this sense, "quality of love" is to be included in theological thought. But in 
view of the righteousness of God given to a sinner through faith, the question of the 
"purity of love" is soteriologically irrelevant."' In Luther's view of alien 
righteousness, there is no place for love's subjective quality to constite God's 
justification of the sinner either negatively or positively; God does not condemn the 
sinner because his love is impure nor justify him because his love is pure. God 
accepts the sinner in His absolute sovereignty and grace; this is what distinguishes the 
Gospel from religion or morality."' The inward quality of love is not relevant to the 
"'According to Andreas Nygren's Agape and Eros (tr. Philip S. Watson, 
[Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1953]), the main theological quest in the Mediaeval 
Era is this: how can the believer, with an ineradicable self-love as the starting point, 
attain the ability to love God purely. Nygren observes in the whole of Scholastic 
theology an upward desire of man toward God in his strive for pure love of God, and 
characterizes this upward-striving to God as ultimately man's egocentiric way of 
relating himself to God (see 638-658). As Nygren rightly points out, this is the 
scheme of soteriology under which Luther collapsed. Luther's problem was the nature 
of true penitence, the necessary condition for gaining the infusion of love. And true 
penitence consists of a genuine regret for sins, contritio, which is to be produced out 
of pure love for God, and not attritio which is arises from the fear of the punishment 
of sins. But Luther found it impossible to love God purely. Luther's discovery of the 
Gospel is exactly the cognition that man's righteousness before God is exclusively 
righteousness extra nos, the righteousness given by God, not the purity of man's love 
brought forth before or after divine acceptatio. This alien righteousness remains in all 
eternity as man's righteousness, never being replaced by "pure love" which may be 
given in eschatological fulfilment. The purity of love in Luther's thought is totally 
contrary to a soteriological concern and repugnant to his understanding of the Gospel. 
In contrast, one can ask whether Kitamori, with his persistent concern for the 
restoration of man's purity by loving God, is essentially different from the Scholastic 
scheme of ascending to God with man's pure love, and this even with his contention 
that God initially accepts man unconditionally in His Pain, for Scholasticism also 
never failed in its emphasis of gratia praeveniens. 
"See note 203 below. 
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issues of love in Luther's thought; what actually matters are the external acts which 
are rooted in a divinely given love, loving actions given to neighbors. Even the 
actions of love tainted by selfish motives are justified when done in faith. 
In fact, as long as an individual sees his problem before God in the sphere of 
the "purity of love," there can be no way of obtaining a truly comforting certainty of 
salvation. That Luther found the certainty of salvation outside himself indicates that 
Luther's ultimate problem was not concerned with the "purity of love" but rather with 
how to rid himself from this subjectively oriented soteriology. From this observation 
one may raise a question against Kitamori's own position of the "purity of love" as the 
basic theological category; as long as this theological category remains, can one 
become free of a subjective orientation toward salvation? In fact, it will ultimately 
lead to the soteriological view that the restoration of the "purity of love" is the 
ultimate goal of the Gospel. The Gospel of divine justification would then be made 
into something penultimate to the restoration of the "purity of love," and one's 
attention is also redirected to one's own inner quality. It may be said that this 
subjectivistic concern is the very sign of legalism which Luther painfully struggled to 
overcome. 
When we again briefly look at Kitamori's idea of love, we see that 
Kitamori's interpretation of Luther's thought is formulated in light of the former's 
own theology of the Pain of God. "Love" (more correctly designated "loveism" as 
536 
defined in the previous chapter) is the fundamental category of Kitamori's 
theology.'" One may even say that in Kitamori's thought the category of "love" 
corresponds to the category of "being" (ens) in Thomistic theology. In fact it is 
possible to regard Kitamori's theology as a theology built upon the analogy of love. 
Kitamori has developed his theology on a foundation of "love," the nature and 
character of which is common to both God and man; he often speaks of God's love in 
a "human, all too human" manner. In addition to this understanding of love, Kitamori 
has a specific concept of love's now; an authentic love, worthy of its name, is a love 
"flowing towards its object naturally and with no impediment like the water running 
downward."' Given that neither divine love (His love now involving pain!) nor 
I 79"The main concern in doing theology," writes Kitamori, "is not to examine 
whether a theology is theocentric or anthropocentric. . . but rather to watch whether 
the understanding, in respective theologies, of 'the love of God' (which involves both 
God and man) is purely evangelical. Neither Paul nor the Reformers were concerned 
primarily with the polarity of God and man [as we see in the problem of the early 
Barthian theology] but they are rather concerned with the question of whether 'the 
love of God' was understood evangelically or legalistically," On Love and Hatred 
(Tokyo: Kyobunkan, 1958), 186. 
"In discussing "three orders of divine love," Kitamori writes that love in the 
first order is "characterized as smooth, flowing and intense," love in the second order 
is pain being no longer smooth and flowing, and love in the third order is a love 
recovered by the mediation of pain to the love of the first order, "of the smooth, 
flowing and intense nature" (Pain, 118122). One can see how clearly Kitamori views 
as love's authentic character: smooth, flowing naturally and intense. This is akin to 
love which parents "naturally" have toward their children. In another context, 
Kitamori discusses the character of divine agape; he explains agape as self-sacrificing 
love. In order for agape to become really self-sacrificing love, he holds, there must 
be an eros element within agape, namely "natural" love. In Kitamori's view, God's 
pain is acute because He loves the Son so "naturally" (Literature and God [Tokyo: 
Nihon-no Barasha, 1983], 201-205). Under the present fallen condition, "now only 
Christ is its [the divine love in the first order] object" (Pain, 118). 
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man's love actually possesses this authentic characteristic, love is bound to develop 
itself dialectically into its own perfection, love worthy of its name. This dialectic of 
love applied to a forgiven sinner is then equated with his sanctification. Restoration of 
"pure love," or sanctification, then becomes terminus ad quem in the doctrine of 
justification. 
Kitamori employs this category of "love" when he deals with Luther's 
doctrine of justification by faith alone. He discusses this pivotal doctrine of the 
Reformation as the doctrine involving a "problem" in the relationship between 
justification and sanctification. At first glance, it may seem strange for a Lutheran 
theologian to understand and develop this doctrine in such a direction, but in reality it 
is quite natural for Kitamori to deal with the issue in this particular way. We again 
mention his Theology of the Reformation, for this work specifically demonstrates our 
point. In this work, Kitamori deals with justification as a problem, for he sees the 
relationship between justification and sanctification has not been clarified. Kitamori 
deals with the problem particularly in reference to the Tridentine's polemics against 
the doctrine of justification by faith and condemnation of its alleged ethical 
indifference and incompetence.' In essence, Kitamori sees Tridentine polemics as 
'See 328-332. In another context, Kitamori observes that "a danger of 
misunderstanding" is very acute in the formula of the Protestant sola fide, writing as 
follows: "Luther's Reformation can be considered primarily as a reformation of 'faith' 
or purification of 'faith.' From this state of affairs there can understandably arise a 
suspicion that Luther has made light of other vital truth in the Bible, namely the truth 
of 'love,'" Martin Luther, 49. With the following argumentation, Kitamori tries to 
put forward his thesis that "sola fide," as contrasted to the Catholic "fides formata 
caritate," serves the realization of the "purity of love": "[the formula `sofa gratis'] 
seems to make light of the deeds of love, but in reality it confirms the purity of divine 
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involving a legitimate theological issue. 
According to Kitamori, Luther attacked the Catholic concept of justification 
because he found in it the unacceptable thesis that justification is not only concerned 
with remission of sins but "includes" (read, "aims at") sanctification. Kitamori then 
explains that this Catholic concept of "sanctification signifies change of man's [moral] 
condition, an actual change in which man gains a higher value of himself."' 
Justification in this sense, Kitamori holds, inevitably becomes dependent on the 
(moral) value of those who are to be justified; but this "value-dependent love," which 
in Catholicism is attributed to God, is not the kind of love by which sinners are saved, 
because with this "value-dependent love" God would accept or reject sinners according 
to their ethical quality or value. In other words, this "value-dependent love" is utterly 
unable to provide certainty of salvation for struggling sinners, since men are never 
certain of their subjective [moral] value.' Contrary to this Catholic concept of 
justification, Kitamori says that Luther found the certainty of salvation in the kind of 
love of God which is not "value-dependent." Kitamori further explains that "God 
accepting the sinner while forgiving his sins" means that justification is identical with 
the forgiveness of sin, and this is an understanding of justification predominant "since 
the Orthodoxy of Protestantism [Lutheranism] [in which justification has been] sharply 
love which at the same time "also the fountainhead of purity of the human 
love"(Freedom in Love, 76-77). In this we can see the basic reference point in 
Kitamori's theology, a point which is actually aligned with that of the Catholic 
"Fragestellung." 
'Theology of Reformation, 92-93. 
93. 
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distinguished from sanctification."'" Thus establishing that the theology of Lutheran 
Reformation identified justification with forgiveness of sins, Kitamori would say two 
things: first, it is an established fact that the mainstream of 
Lutheranism considered justification exclusively as the forgiveness of sin; second, 
though fully justified in this exclusive emphasis on the forgiveness of sin, Lutheranism 
has lost sight of an alien reality which would even negate the exclusive emphasis on 
forgiveness of sin, namely sanctification. Here Kitamori observes a crucial problem: 
justification and sanctification stand against one another without being yet reconciled; 
the Japanese theologian sees that both the forensic declaration of forgiveness and the 
actual justification are essential, each in itself, but it is also vital for both to be 
integrated. Sanctification cannot be separated from the doctrine of justification. 
Kitamori continues his discussion: Yet, when we examine Luther's own 
texts, we find that concern that sinners' actual change for the better (sanctification) is 
not absent from his thought, and therefore, contrary to those interpreters of Luther 
who follow a strictly forensic line, there have been a number of influential 
Luther-scholars (Karl Holl among others) who properly emphasize the aspect of 
sanctification in Luther's concept of justification.' In Kitamori's view, the fact that 
there are two different approaches to interpreting Luther's doctrine of justification . 
indicates that they actually exist side by side in Luther own thought. Since the two 
interpretative directions have been kept in an irreconcilable either/or rivalry in 
9bid. 
'bid., 94-95, 97. 
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Protestant theology, Kitamori believes that it is now necessary for the two-fold 
meaning of "iustificare," declaratory and effective, to be properly integrated by 
theological work.'" "Conceived in this way," explains Kitamori further, "the core 
issue of Reformation theology ultimately converges upon the relationship between 
justification and sanctification, upon the problem of assigning sanctification its proper 
place in salvation.' 
In fact, describing the material principle of the Reformation theology in this 
way, Kitamori actually gives expression of his concept of justification. For him, 
justification by faith is not an absolute and independent reality in soteriology; it 
includes in itself sanctification as its own dialectic opposite.' He holds that 
sanctification, with its claim on the sinner's actually becoming righteous, is repugnant 
to a justification in which the sinner is declared righteous just as he is through the 
'Ibid., 137. 
'Ibid., 93. 
'Referring to Walter von Lovenich's observation of Luther's recognition 
(prompted by the Reformer's own deeper acquaintance with the Johannine writings) of 
"die dialektische Erganzungsbediirftigkeit seiner Rechtfertigunslehre," Kitamori 
specifies the content of dialectic in the doctrine of justification and writes: "'Dialectic' 
is the logic of mediation by something negative or by something other than the thing 
being mediated. That the doctrine of justification has its inner dialectic means that the 
doctrine of justification has, in its own constitution, an element which negates itself. 
And this element negating the reality of justification is man's own 'good works' or 
`love'. . . . This line of interpretation of Luther's doctrine of justification can be 
properly said to be an understanding of effectual justification," (ibid., 141). Namely, 
Kitamori wants to see a duality in Luther's doctrine of justification, a duality which 
consists of pure forensic justification on the one hand and effective justification 
(sanctification) on the other, negating each other and constituting a dialectic. It is, 
however, questionable whether Luther really felt the mutually opposing tension 
between forensic justification and effective justification. 
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forgiveness of sin. Thus, in Kitamori's thought, there is, in the dialectical relationship 
between justification and sanctification, a mutual negation. Kitamori sees that this 
dialectic relation is inherent in justification. Justification is a dialectic reality, and as 
such, demands its own opposite; nevertheless and at the same time, justification 
embraces this opposite in itself. With this somewhat intricate exposition of the 
relationship between justification and sanctification, Kitamori believes that he has done 
full justice to both the "axiomatic" concern for the remission of sin and the "actual" 
concern for sanctification. We now discern Kitamori's premise for the discussion of 
the problem: so far the doctrine of justification has been understood non-dialectically, 
either as purely forensic or effective. Neither understanding, holds Kitamori, has been 
able to do justice to the reality of the divine act of justification. In Kitamori's 
thought, justification without sanctification is meaningless, while sanctification without 
justification is only crude legalism. Actually, however, Kitamori's idea of dialectic 
integration of justification and sanctification reveals his own concern, namely for a 
personal sanctification. This causes us to doubt whether Kitamori is really in a proper 
position to understand Luther, for Kitamori theologizes with categories different from 
those utilized by Luther. However, in order to judge the point at issue aright, it is 
necessary for us now to take a look at what Luther himself considered the vital issue 
in the Christian doctrine of justification by faith. 
Luther's Concept Of Justification by Faith 
In the doctrinal tradition of Lutheranism, the forensic understanding of 
justification has been predominant, notably enhanced by the Lutheran emphasis on a 
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proper distinction between Law and Gospel. The forensic understanding of 
justification then primarily signifies the remission of sins. Luther himself emphasizes 
this particular aspect of justification. "Iustitia sit remissio peccatorum," he says.' 
In fact, it is urgent and essential for the Reformer to emphasize the significance of 
forgiveness of sins as strongly as he does, because of his acute recognition of radical 
sinfulness. When conscience is continually tormented by sinfulness, the forgiveness of 
sins must precede everything and abide in everything for man's existence. The more 
one becomes aware of the depth of one's sinfulness, the more one knows the liberating 
power of the divine word of forgiveness. As long as a sinner lives here on earth, he 
constantly returns to this Archimedian point. There he finds misercordia Dei propter 
Christum and is restored by it. It is therefore not a stage, in the ordo salutes for 
instance, which can be left behind at a given time. In this sense, the fact that Luther 
often identified justification with the forgiveness of sins is motivated by his recognition 
of the acute and axiomatic relevance of the forgiveness of sins for Christian existence. 
In Luther's thought, the very core of the Gospel is the forgiveness of sins. 
After establishing the pivotal significance of the identification of justification 
with the forgiveness of sin, we still need to state that the forgiveness of sins does not 
stand alone. It is pars pro toto for the overwhelming reality of salvation. As Luther 
says: where there is forgiveness of sin, there is also life and salvation.' So in his 
thought the forgiveness of sin contains in itself the whole spectrum of salvific reality. 
'"WA 34, 1, 407, here quoted in Kitamori, ibid. 97. 
19 See Elert, Structure, 319. 
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Justification is primarily the forgiveness of sins, and from this one can say: it is also 
the imputation of alien righteousness, the blessed exchange between Christ and His 
believers; the sinner's participation in God's righteousness here and now; the 
hope of eschatological fulfillment of the promised righteousness.' With rich 
variations of these and other terms Luther describes the blessing of salvation called 
justification through faith alone for the sake of Christ. This implies in fact that God's 
grace, shown in His justification of sinners in Christ, is inexhaustible in its wealth; 
accordingly the description of its salvific wealth richly multiplies. For Luther, 
justification by faith alone properly summarizes what Christianity is all about. Truly, 
justification is not one doctrine among others; the Gospel is ultimately justification of 
the sinner by faith alone for the sake of Christ. 
Here, however, we need to examine more closely the relationship between 
forgiveness of sin and justification so as to properly relate it to our critique of 
Kitamori's thesis that justification is a dialectic reality involving in 
itself a negating opposite. Our concern is that this thesis makes justification something 
penultimate to sanctification. Behind the examination of this relationship is the 
question of whether or not the concept of justification is more comprehensive than that 
of the forgiveness of sins. 
Needless to, say, two different terms or concepts can never be totally 
"For the inexhaustible richness of what the doctrine of justification by faith 
in Luther's thought implies, such as mentioned here, see Hans Joachim Iwand, 
Glaubensgerechtigkeit each Luthers Lehre (Munich: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1941), 
particularly 55-65. 
544 
co-extensive with each other; the same must hold true of the two terms remissio and 
justificatio. They are different both conceptually and theologically. This will be 
self-evident when we more closely review Luther's own description of God's 
righteousness imparted to sinners. We will now take a brief look at the concepts 
themselves. We see that the forgiveness of sins by itself means the removal of sin's 
guilt from the sinner, whereas justification is man being filled with divine 
righteousness.'' The former is salvation considered in a somewhat "negative" sense, 
whereas the latter is more "positive." In other words, forgiveness of sin centers upon 
the "negative" reality of human sins, whereas justification denotes God's "positive," 
constructive work with sinners. The most eloquent witness to the "positive" content 
of Luther's doctrine of justification would be his own narrative of the discovery of the 
meaning of justitia Dei, a narrative which Luther wrote in 1545 in the preface of his 
collected Latin works: "There [Romans 1:17] I began to understand that the 
righteousness of God is that by which the righteous lives by a gift of God, namely by 
faith. And this is the meaning: the righteousness of God is revealed by the gospel, 
namely, the passive righteousness with which the merciful God justifies us by 
'"To those who believe in the name of the Lord all sins are forgiven, and 
righteousness is imputed to them," quotes Elert as "the salient statement of Luther's 
doctrine of justification," Structure, 75. When we take into consideration what 
immediately follows in our presentation, the juxtaposition of forgiveness of sins and 
imputation of righteousness is not simply a conceptual hendiadys; it rather designates 
two different directions of the meaning of salvation, "negative" and "positive," as we 
have stated in the text. 
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faith."'" Luther says more concretely: "'the righteousness of God' must not be 
understood as that righteousness by which he [God] is righteous, but as that 
righteousness by which we are made righteous by him."'" What is expressed in this 
understanding of iustitia Dei is this: God is the One who gives man what He Himself 
is. "Just as the name of the Lord is pure, holy, righteous, true, good, and so on," 
writes Luther, "so does he make the heart like Himself through and through, the heart 
upon which He touches and which is touched by Him, the process which occurs 
through faith."'" 
This positive concept of justification in Luther's thought reaches its highest 
point in his view that it is Christ Himself who is given to the sinner as his 
righteousness!' For Luther it is of fundamental soteriological significance that 
Christ and the believer become one in faith.' Christ is not only the object of his 
'"WA 54:186, here quoted from Paul Althaus, The Theology of Martin 
Luther, (tr. Robert C. Schultz, Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1975), 117. 
'"WA 56:172, here quoted from Althaus, 117. 
'"WA 54:186, here quoted from Althaus, ibid. 
'96For the following viewpoint, in addition to Iwand, Ernst Wolf, "Die 
Rechtfertigungslehre als Mitte und Grenze reformatorischer Theologie," Peregrinatio 
Band II (Munich: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1965). 
'n"Darum muB der Glaube recht gelehrt werden, daB man durch ihn so mit 
Christus zusammengeschweiBt wird, daB aus dir und ihm sozusagen eine Person wird, 
die sich nicht trennen laBt, sondern ihm bestindig anhingt, als wollte sie sagen: ich 
bin wie Christus und umgekehrt, als wollte Christus sagen: ich bin wie jener Sunder, 
der an mir hangt. . . soda( mich dieser inniger mit Christ verschmelzt, als der Mann 
mit der Frau verschmolzen ist. So .ist der Glaube keine ruhende Qualitat, sondern 
unsagbar GroBe," WA 40/I, 285, quoted in Iwand, Gerechititigkeit, 64. 
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faith but is the very life that lives in him. He is the believer's very self.' So 
inseparably made one with Christ in faith, the believer can even "claim" that what is 
Christ's is his and what is his is Christ's; the believers are given "grace, 
righteousness, life and eternal life," whereas "the Law, sin, and death" became 
Christ's.' The "blessed exchange" takes place between Christ and the believers. 
The doctrine of justification signifies the Christ-centered salvific event; justification by 
faith is thus nothing but the Reformation Christology. In other words, Christology 
and soteriology are intimately interwoven, and this entails the inexhaustible wealth of 
the Reformation doctrine of justification, the wealth which breaks the framework of 
the forgiveness of sin (narrowly understood)." Thus the meaning of justification by 
'"The righteous man himself does not live; but Christ lives in him, because 
through faith Christ dwells in him and pours his grace into him, through which it 
comes about that a man is governed not by his own spirit, but by Christ's," WA 2, 
502, quoted in Althaus, Theology of Luther, 234. See Iwand's explication of this 
point, ibid. 
'9WA 40/1, 284, quoted in Iwand, ibid., 58. 
'Justification, understood as being allowed to participate in God's 
righteousness in Christ, has thus a broad perspective. Iwand gives an exposition of 
Luther's concept of divine righteousness, an exposition which elucidates our point 
here. After calling attention to the singularly pregnant content of "righteousness" in 
Luther's thought in connection with Romans 1:17, he writes as follows: "ICOnnen wir 
nicht Luther verstehen, wenn er ganz anderes Wort erwartete: in ihm [dem 
Evangelium] wird Gottes Barmherzigkeit offenbart, oder seine Lithe, seine 
Vergebung, seine Milde--aber hier steht, Gerechtigkeit? Gerechtigkeit Gottes soli der 
Inbegriff seiner neuen Offenbarung in Christo Jesu sein, soli also alles andere in sich 
begreifen, Liebe, Vergebung, Erbarmen, Barmherzigkeit? Also haben wir doch nicht 
begriffen, was Evangelium ist oder was Gerechtigkeit ist? Das sind die beiden Pfeiler, 
auf denen die Rechtfertigung des Menschen vor Gott ruht. Ehe nicht beides 
zusammenfillt, Evangelium und Gerechtigkeit, ehe wir nicht gerade sie im 
Evangelium suchen und ehe gerade Gottes Gerechtigkeit fur uns zum Inhalt der frohen 
Botschaft wird, die uns zum Glauben ruft, haben wir das Ganze [der 
Rechtfertigungslehre Luthers] doch nicht verstanden," Gerechtigkeit, 56. 
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faith alone is certainly not limited to the forgiveness of sin. Rightly understood, the 
"Hauptartikel" of the Reformation theology represents the immense dimension of 
salvation: sinners before God are made like Christ and participate in the glory of 
Christ, in His righteousness, wisdom, holiness and power. 
In Luther's thought the "positive" Christological content of justification also 
indicates the dynamic acts of God's new creation. God re-creates the image of the 
Son within the sinner. This creative act of God, however, also involves a destruction 
which brings the pride of the sinner to naught. Thus Luther writes in Operationes in 
Psalmos: "Quis volet iustus fieri, peccator fiat necesse est, qui volet sanus, bonus, 
rectus, denique deiformis, Christianus Catholicusque fieri, insanus, malus, perversus, 
denique diabolicus, haereticus, infidelis, Turca fiat, etc.n20' Though the rhetorical 
device of hyperbole is used, these words of Luther clearly state that the destruction of 
the old man is sine qua non for the restoration of the original image of God in 
man.' Understood in this way, justification encompasses not only redemption of 
the sinner from divine judgement through forgiveness of sin, but also the creation of a 
new man out of the old. In other words, the doctrine of justification expresses the 
reality of an organic and inseparable unity of redemption and new creation. Since this 
divine act of a new creation and "sanctification" are theological synonyms, it is 
'WA 5, 195, quoted in Iwand, ibid., 58. 
'It is God's nature first to destroy and to bring to nothing whatever is in us 
before he gives us of his own. . . . By this his most blessed counsel, he makes us 
capable of receiving his gift and his works," WA 56, 375, quoted in Althaus, 
Theology of Luther, 119. 
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completely legitimate to state that in Luther's thought, quite contrary to the thesis of 
Kitamori, there is no dialectic tension, a tension in which justification (narrowly 
understood as the forgiveness of sins) and sanctification allegedly negate each other at 
one stage in the ordo salutis; sanctification is not a dialectic opposite to justification 
but a very integral part of it. It would therefore be unnecessary for Luther to 
integrate justification and sanctification theologically; they are originally integrated. 
The crucial issue for Luther would then be to correctly grasp the divine grace of 
justification by faith alone.' Living in the faith of justification, rightly understood, 
one can never stay in sin gratuitously and never fail to try to live in obedience to the 
divine will, and yet one can never be concerned about his "accomplishment" in the 
realm of sanctification.' 
Speaking of the "positive" content of justification, we recognize that 
'Describing the need of differentiation between justification as something 
complete in faith and sanctification as "piecework," Elert still emphasizes the fact that 
they are essentially one whole thing and writes that "Luther used the concept of 
`sanctification' as a synonym for justification," Structure, 144, and see the quotations 
of Luther's own words there. 
'With this observation I question the validity of Kitamori's contention that 
Luther's doctrine of justification by faith has a dialectic with contradictory poles of 
imputative and effective righteousness. According to Kitamori, Luther's doctrine of 
justification has "at least two mutually contradictory lines of interpretation," and it 
"may suggest a lack of [logical] transparency in Luther's theology," (Reformation, 
137). He then takes Iwand, for example, to stand on the imputative line of 
interpretation. But it is not in keeping with Iwand's actual interpretation of Luther's 
concept of justification. According to Iwand, Christ, being the righteousness of the 
justified, is most dynamically effective in the justified, cf. his exposition of the 
righteousness of God in Luther's thought (Gerechtigkeit, 63). 
'Luther's famous description in his Preface to Romans points to faith as a 
dynamic reality: "Faith is a divine work in us which changes us and makes us to be 
born anew of God, etc.," here quoted from Althaus, Theology of Luther, 235. 
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sanctification is another term for God's new creation or His justifying act upon the 
sinner. For Luther, however, justification has nothing to do with moral and ethical 
perfection (conceived of as man's subjective quality) upon which man is judged 
righteous by God." In other words, sanctification is not the terminus ad quem of 
justification; on the contrary, justification is ultimate, having nothing beyond itself. 
Man's justification is forever grounded in God's absolute mercy toward man, totally 
apart from any good or bad quality before God, either morally or religiously.' As 
such, justification by faith is to be considered as the "Urverhaltnis" between God and 
man. This original form of the relationship between God and man is, as it were, 
supralapsarian in character.' We need to note this aspect of justification in Luther's 
thought, for it is of vital importance for the preservation of the Gospel, and for 
avoiding the fatal danger of making justification into something soteriologically 
penultimate. 
"Althaus, explicating Luther's understanding of the dying of the old man and 
the resurrection of the new man, writes that in Luther's thought "Christ's form takes 
shape within us through a lifelong ongoing event" or in other words a process 
"moving forward toward perfection" Theology of Luther, 245. But this Luther-scholar 
qualifies the concept "perfection" in Luther's thought as follows: "Luther, however, 
did not understand this perfection as an ethical high point but as the depths in which a 
man loses all trust in himself and purely and strongly desires to be completely free 
from sin and to be completely on with God's will, that is, he is ready and willing to 
die" ibid. 
'Therefore even if it were possible that you could do a work that would 
fulfill the commandment 'you shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, etc.,' 
still you would not be righteous before God for this reason. . . for the law does not 
make righteous even if it is completely carried out and fulfilled," WA Tr. 6, 6720, 
quoted in Althaus, Theology of Luther, 121. 
''See Althaus' comment made on the basis of Luther's texts, ibid., 236. 
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It is highly relevant for this present discussion to pay attention to the concept 
of faith in Luther's doctrine of justification. The concept of faith has a twofold 
significance; the one is existential and the other epistemological. We include the first 
aspect of the concept of faith here in this section, whereas the second aspect we shall 
take up in the next section in connection with Luther's doctrine of Deus absconditus. 
Faith in Luther's thought primarily means fiducia. It is a believing 
confidence which, against all appearances, rests solely upon the merciful promise of 
God. In Luther's thought, being already justified by faith is not identical with being 
justified also in sight. Luther's well-known dicta "peccator in re, justus in spe," 
"simul justus et peccator," and "semper peccator, semper justus," speak of this state of 
affairs. The tormenting tension inherent in the "simul" certainly leads sinners to more 
reliance on God's sovereign mercy for their justification, and it is deeply comforting 
for them to be reminded of the "original divine relationship" between God and man. 
Whether in the status integritatis or in the status corruptionis, man is invariably 
"justified" by God's mercy alone. In the justification of the "ungodly" by faith alone, 
God's sovereign mercy in the original relationship is made all the more manifest. It 
is, then, all the more comforting for us sinners to know by faith that we are to be 
redeemed from this tormenting tension in the eschatological fulfillment. Justification 
by faith is an eschatological hope as well. In the end we are saved fully: we are to 
become like our Savior.' Luther's concept of justification by faith alone thus 
'Commenting on Luther's thought on deiformitas which is present not in our 
"seeing" but in our faith, Iwand has the following to say: "Das Leben, die 
Gerechtigkeit, die Freiheit, der Friede, die mit ihm [Christus] gekommen sind, sind in 
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ranges over the total spectrum of salvation revealed and given in Christ. It designates 
the organic totality of the salvific message given in the Son. 
Luther's Concept of Deus Absconditus 
It has been widely recognized that behind Luther's doctrine 
of justification by faith stands his idea of God as Deus absconditus, or more fully, 
Deus absconditus in sua majestate.' There is an organic relationship between 
Luther's view of God and his concept of justification. This relationship can be clearly 
grasped from the fact that justification of a sinner by God is not rationally discernible. 
As a matter of fact, the doctrine of justification is inseparably related to the doctrine 
of predestination, predominantly as the expression of God's sovereign will of salvific 
grace. The reason why a sinner is accepted by God at all is exclusively due to His 
inscrutable mercy. It is then erroneous to search for any rationale, moral or religious, 
for man's justification by God. It is God's "arbitrary" will that stands behind man's 
justification by faith. In justifying man, God wants to be absolutely free and 
Wahrheit unsere Gerechtigkeit, Freiheit, Leben and Friede. Noch ist es in ihm 
`verborgen', erst mit der Auferstehung wird dieses neue Leben so unser werden wie 
das alte, todgeweihte Leben jetzt unser' ist" Gerechtigkeit, 60. 
210In his introductory work to Luther's De servo arbitrio, Klaus Scwarzwiller 
summarizes the relationship of Deus abasconditus and the sinner's salvation: "Gerade 
mit dem Theologoumenon des Deus in majestate absconditus ist die GewiBheit des 
Glaubens, die Rechtfertigung sola fide, die Errettung durch Jesus Christus theologisch 
gesichert," (Theologia crucis [Munich: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1970], 185). See also 
Althaus, Theology of Luther, 283. 
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sovereign; God wants to be a God beyond human scrutinization and 
comprehension.'" Just as the origin of man's sin is rationally inscrutable (even 
though man's guilt is not thereby abandoned), so is the divine justification of the 
sinner.' That man is justified by divine grace alone is ultimately a confession and 
praise of "Deum Deum esse."' 
As with the concept of Deus absconditus, Luther's concept of theologia 
crucis is also closely related to the doctrine of justification. Since it concerns Luther's 
view of God indirectly, it is necessary for us to take a look at what is implied in this 
'"Gerade im Bekenntnis zum ErlOser wird Gott als Deus absconditus, der 
frei und in uneinsichtiger Willkur und wider jeder Regel sein Werk tut, bekannt und 
anerkannt," writes Schwarzwiller, Theologia crucis, 59. 
"See for the inscrutability of the origin of sin, Elert, Structure, 31-33, 
Althaus, Theology of Luther, 159-160; cf. Schwarzwiller, Theologia crucis, 193-194, 
where he describes the inscrutability of God's "HaB und Liebe": "Man wiirde hier 
alles verzerren, versuchte man nun, von Luther iiber die UnmOglichkeit eines 
Ausgleiches belehrt, diesen HaB irgendwie systematisch zu beziehen oder einzuordnen. 
Man kann ihn nur bekennen, nicht aber erfassen und integrieren. Man kann ihn 
sowenig ableiten, ergriinden, und werten wie Gottes Liebe, die in die Absurditit von 
Menschenwerdung, Tod und Auferstehung hinein sich konkretisierte, die wider jede 
Gerechtigkeit den Gottlosen ohne jedes Verdienst und gegen Streben gerecht macht." 
2'3Referring to Luther's view of God as the Creator in all of God's dealing 
with man, Althaus in Theology of Luther, 118-129, has "Justification Means That God 
is God" as a caption for the section in which he has a lucid exposition of the 
Reformer's concept of justification by faith alone: God allows man to stand as 
righteous before Himself only by His own ineffable mercy, and this mode of 
relationship between God and man is not an accidental "Nothilfe," but the very 
expression of God being God in His relationship with man; "God wills," writes 
Althaus, "that under no circumstances is the relationship between himself and men to 
be determined by the law but solely and absolutely by his free grace received by 
faith," ibid., 121. God's absolute sovereignty in justifying the sinner also transcends 
man's rational comprehension. God does not work according to the best of human 
calculation, but in ways radically offensive to it. Also in this sense, justification by 
faith alone is beyond man's morality and rationality. 
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concept of theologia crucis. This investigation becomes even more crucial when we 
remember that Kitamori himself conceives of Luther's theologia crucis as nothing but 
another name for his own theology of the Pain of God. Namely, Kitamori sees God's 
innermost essence, the Pain of God, revealed in the cross. As a matter of fact, the 
main theme of the theology of the cross in Kitamori's understanding is "God in pain"; 
Kitamori is primarily concerned with God Himself, asking, in what situation God 
finds Himself and what His eternal mode of being is. By comparison, then, what is 
the actual force in Luther's own theology of the cross? 
According to Walter von Lovenich, the theology of the cross is first and 
foremost a theology of revelation.' Obviously, the theology of the cross has its 
basis in the revelation of the crucified Christ, but what is it that is revealed in the 
crucified Christ? As we have seen, Kitamori found in the crucified Christ a God 
suffering pain eternally. In other words, it is the revelation of God Himself, a 
revelation of His essence. In Luther's own understanding of the theology of the cross, 
however, the revelation given in the crucified Christ is primarily not a revelation of 
God in Himself or His eternal essence. The cross of Christ in Luther's thought has 
nothing to 
'Walter von Lovenich lists the following as five "essential" points of 
Luther's theology of the cross: 1) it is "a theology of revelation," 2) "God's revelation 
is an indirect, concealed revelation," 3) "God's revelation is recognized not in works 
but in suffering," 4) this "knowledge of God who is hidden in his revelation is a 
matter of faith" and 5) this manner of knowing God "is reflected in the practical 
thought of suffering," Luther's Theology of the Cross, tr. Herbert J. A. Bouman 
(Philadelphia: Augsbrug Publishing House, 1976), 22. These points together indicate 
that Luther's theology of the cross primarily concerns man's salvation, since its foci 
are revelation and faith, both of which are given to man for his salvation. 
554 
do with God's psychology, such as pain caused by the conflicts between love and 
wrath in His heart,' in such a sense God Himself is rather deeply hidden in this 
revelation sub specie contraria.' For Luther, God is to be acknowledged solely 
soteriologically, as Deus iustificans  et salvator hominis peccatoris.2" "Gott an sich" 
is something over us, which does not and should not concern us. Whether God in 
215Kitamo • n s notion of the Pain of God strongly psychologizes God in a 
directly human manner. He thinks that the suffering of pain on the part of God was 
inevitable in the process of saving sinful humanity despite His wrath. The cross of 
Christ was then a logical necesssity and an inevitable event and thus rationally 
understandable. But Luther, because of his keen awareness of Deum Deum esse, is 
definitely not in any position to psychologize God's way of providing salvation. In his 
theology of the Pain of God, Kitamori holds that he has penetrated into the very center 
of the mystery of God, namely, that God suffers pain because of His love for man the 
betrayer of His love. And in making this claim, Kitamori maintains that the cross of 
Christ reveals the innermost nature of God. But Luther, maintaining the 
impenetrability of God Himself, is far from asserting that he exhaustively knew of 
God and His way of salvation; God remains God without being fully known by us: 
"Gott geht in seinem Werk nicht auf, Gott is nicht seine Offenbarung und sein 
Heilshandeln, sein Sein und Handeln ersch8pfen sich darin nicht. Er ist vielmehr 
Herr seines Tuns und als dieser in Anbetung zu respektieren und zu verstehen," 
Schwarzwiller, Theologia crucis, 170. 
216"The theology of the cross as a theology of revelation stands in sharp 
antithesis to speculation," and "God's revelation is an indirect, concealed revelation," 
Lovenich, Theology of Cross, 22. 
'WA 40/II, 328, quoted in Ernst Wolf, "Rechtfertigungslehre," Peregrinatlo 
II, 12, where Wolf writes: "Gilt fur die Scholastik im allgemeinen die Antwort-
Gegenstand der Theologie sei der trinitarische Gott--`Gott an sich'—, so heiBt es bei 
Luther in betont schulgerechter Definition: `Theoloigae proprium subiectum est homo 
peccati reus ac perditus et Deus iustificans ac salvator hominis peccatoris. Quicquid 
extra hoc subiectum in Theologiae quaeritur aut disputatur, est error et venenum.' 
Nicht ein metaphysisches Wesen sondern ein konkretes geschichtliches Ereignis, 
Gottes Heilshandeln mit dem Siindermenschen, ist der `Gegenstand' der Theologie, 
und zwar der Theologie als Wissenschaft." 
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Himself is in pain or not should not concern us even if this were to be the case.' 
Rather, the revelation of the crucified Christ has to do with man's 
salvation.' This has two soteriological aspects, judgmental and existential. First, 
the cross of Christ is the revelation of human sin and its consequences. The cross 
definitively and totally dethrones human hybris, either apparent or disguised,' for it 
is sine qua non for man to be imputed with an alien righteousness. It deprives men of 
any ground upon which to claim their own justification for existence. Thus, the cross 
is the revelation of divine judgement over human self-righteousness and unbelief. The 
revelation of the crucified Christ becomes then the revelation of salvation; the Gospel 
follows the revelation of the Law. Thus understood, the motif behind the theology of 
the cross in Luther's thought is thoroughly soteriological. Second, the theology of the 
cross concerns the believer's continuing existence in this world under the cross. The 
suffering Christ as God incarnate and as true man is the paradigm of human existence 
2'sAlthaus, Theology of Luther, 280-286. Referring to various texts from 
Luther Althaus writes: "We should not concern ourselves at all with God insofar as 
he has hidden himself. God does not want us to know that much about him. He does 
not want us to confront him 'in his own nature and majesty. . . . We should not 
attempt to penetrate the mystery of his majesty but 'concern ourselves with the God 
who has become flesh,' with 'the crucified Jesus in whom are all the treasures of 
wisdom and of knowledge--even though hidden,'" 280-281. 
"Schwarzwiller writes summarizing Luther's insistence on the exclusiveness 
of Christ as the sole knowledge of God the Father: "Kurz begegnet in Christus Gott, 
so mithin kein Gnadenprinzip, kein Heilsgarant, kein theologisches Objekt, sondern 
eben: Gott. In Christus offenbart er - uns unsere Lage, nicht jedoch `sich selbst'. 
Sein selbst bleibt verborgen," Theoloiga crucis, 185, emphasis is original. 
'The cross of Christ," writes Luther, "has condemned everything the world 
approves of, even wisdom and righteousness," WA 2, 613, quoted in Elert, Structure, 
85. 
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in faith, and not dealing with divine suffering as such.n' 
Thus, by only a brief comparison of Luther and Kitamori with respect to the 
concept of the theology of the cross, two different versions of the same doctrine 
become readily apparent. While in Luther's thought, the suffering of Christ functions 
as the basic paradigm of man's salvation, Kitamori thinks of the cross of Christ as the 
paradigm of God's eternal suffering and His mode of being. From this fact we 
observe that the "theology of the cross" as a theologomenon is formal and that totally 
different theologies can have very different definitions for the "theology of the cross." 
When a specific theological formulation claims for itself the designation of theologia 
crucis, it becomes crucial to ask what kind of theologia crucis is actually being 
presented. 
In this chain of thought (since Kitamori sets the suffering of God in the very focus of 
his theology), it is essential for us also to ask questions regarding divine suffering, its 
possibility and nature. 
What do Christians, then, think of God's suffering? To clarify the question: 
'According to Lowenich, Luther's view of the suffering of Christ has 
nothing to do with God's suffering for the sake of His love toward the unlovable 
sinner, but rather with the mode of God's revelation only in which man really 
recognizes the cardinal significance of Deum Deum esse and that man's justification 
comes exclusively from God hidden sub specie contraria: "Into such a concealment 
[under the cross] God enters in order to reveal himself. If there is to be revelation of 
God, the visible God must become the hidden God. God becomes 'hidden in 
sufferings," Theology of Cross, 29. Thus understood, the primary purpose of the 
suffering of Christ in Luther's thought is to make man's faith possible, while 
destroying all human possibilities of knowing God by man's "natural" recognition and 
gaining salvation by his own power. In Luther's theology of the cross, the main 
emphasis is placed on the hiddenness of God in His revelation and only secondarily on 
suffering as the mode of that revelation. 
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Is God really passible? And if so in what sense is He passible? Given that God can 
suffer, what is the "structure" of God's suffering? How can and should we 
understand it and speak of it? With these questions in mind, we now deal with this 
crucial issue of divine suffering. At this point, it is important to note that it is God 
the Son who has suffered, not God the Father. Patripassianism is a doctrinal error, 
and the "anathematization" of it is valid also for today, for it preserves the vital 
soteriological concern, God's unchangeable, absolute blessedness.' God the Son 
endured all suffering and death as the incarnate God. This qualification of divine 
suffering is essential. In fact, on the basis of Luther's theological premises expressed 
in his idea of Deus absconditus, it is impermissible--even impossible--to univocally 
state that God Himself is suffering, much less eternally suffering. Rather, Christ, the 
Son of God, suffered as the revelation of God's salvific will, and the suffering of 
Christ on the cross primarily concerns our salvation. Again, we emphasize: the 
theology of the cross in Luther's thought is primarily of soteriological nature. 
It is highly relevant for us to now consider Luther's view of God since, in 
his thought, divine majesty cannot be put aside in the discussion of things divine, 
divine suffering included. Perhaps the German adjective "alleinwirksam" is the most 
pregnant term to describe the characteristics of the God Luther experienced; a God 
'Patripassianism has been condemned because it is the logical consequence 
of the modalistic concept of the divine Trinity. But the very viewpoint that God is 
totally absorbed into suffering and death must have been of a vital concern to the mind 
of the Ancient Church. The tenacious contention of God's impassibility throughout 
the history of theology suggests this vital concern: God's absolute blessedness. It is 
then important for us to be careful not to speak of divine suffering carelessly. 
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who is dynamic, all sovereign, overwhelming and vehement in power. This immense 
God rules the world. Before this majestic and sovereign God, man is nothing; man is 
totally passive before this majestic God. This state of affairs can be clearly seen in 
existential situations in which one does not see any meaning in the world, situations 
which have provoked various theodocies. However, in Luther's view of the majestic 
God, human beings have absolutely no right whatsoever to protest against Him even 
when reason finds ample grounds on which to accuse Him for His design of the world 
and His activity in history.' Since the idea of divine suffering often tends to be 
motivated by a desire to justify God in the face of various miseries and apparent 
contradictions in this world, it is appropriate to clearly state that in Luther's thought 
there is no room for theodicy.2' For him, it would be an impermissible blasphemy 
m"Reverently adoring God in his secret willing and working excludes the 
possibility that we men might be allowed to argue with God and accuse him of 
unrighteousness. . . . To our way of thinking, God's act of choosing one and rejecting 
another, even though he himself works everything in them, seems to be simply 
unrighteous and arbitrary. But Luther reminds us that we may not judge God's 
activity by the law and the human standards that determines what is right for us. We 
must consider the distance between God and man," Althaus, Theology of Luther, 282. 
'Observing in Luther's thought that predestination is a constituent element of 
the doctrine of justification, in which the free will of man is to be denied and God's 
sovereign and inscrutable activity alone rules, Schwarzwiller writes: "Auf dieser 
Basis befremdet die Fortsetzung nicht, daB es nicht nur keine Theodizee gebe, sondem 
keinesfalls geben kann. Nicht ohne Ironie stellt ja Luther fest: 'in omnibus alijs Deo 
concedemus maiestatem diuinam, in solo iudicio negare parati sumus, nec tantisper 
possumus credere, eum esse iustum.' Dagegen wird auf dem Hintergrund von Ram. 
11,33 und entsprechend Jes. 55, 8f darauf insistiert, daB Gottes Handeln fur uns 
uneinsichtig masse, daB unser Verstand nicht im entfernsten zu Gottes Weisheit 
emporreiche, so anders er eben Gott und Herr seiner Kreatur sei; daB mithin iiber das 
Anerkennen der Wirklichkeit Gottes hinaus die Moglichkeit seines Handelns gerade 
nicht nachgezeichnet werden kann," Theologia crucis, 98. 
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to summon God, as it were, to the tribune of human reason. The God who designed 
the history of the world is inscrutable to human comprehension. For Luther, He is 
the all-sovereign, absolute and "alleinwirksam" God. 
In view of this overwhelming majesty of God, we underline again the fact 
that it would hardly be possible for anyone to state without qualification that God 
suffers pain (as is the case with Kitamori's theological framework) because of an inner 
divine conflict between wrath and love. In Luther's idea of the "alleinwirksam" God, 
there is ultimately no room for divine frustration by any alien forces whatsoever; there 
are no limits to divine omnipotence, or omniscience, or omnipresence. Thus, nothing 
whatsoever in time and space is unknown to God, including the human fall into sin 
and the reality of evil; nor is there anything which is able to cause God's frustration 
"from outside." In view of this immense concept of God, it is impossible and 
irrelevant to adopt any psychologization or sentimentalization of God's reality; one 
cannot attribute human emotion to God without necessary qualifications. Truly, the 
idea of Deus absconditus in sua majestate solemnly preempts any human usurpation of 
rationally scrutinizing God's being as such. 
God transcends human judgment and scrutinization. Consequently He 
transcends man's psychological need or demand for God to be involved in the 
suffering of the world, the need and demand which often call for theodicy. But this is 
not the whole story of God in Luther's thought. Luther has an equally strong 
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emphasis on the "miraculous" immanence of God in the created reality.' By means 
of this emphasis, the possibility for divine suffering arises. In God's creatio continua, 
wonders abound, giving powerful witnesses to the presence of the "alleinwirksam" 
God in creation. 
In Luther's conception, God is thus not simply transcendent nor immanent. 
Nor does Luther try to rationally smooth over these two "antonymous" states. After 
all, God's reality (in both His transcendence and immanence conceived of together) is 
beyond our comprehension. What makes Luther's theology "sachlich" to the given 
reality is the fact that the Reformer is fully open to God's inscrutable reality and tries 
only to be "descriptive" about the indefinable being of God. For a further discussion 
of divine passibility, it is important for us to take note of this "descriptive" attitude of 
Luther toward divine reality. 
God's sovereign freedom to break the barriers of humanly set categories of 
transcendence and immanence manifests itself in the incarnation of the Son; Christ as 
""Nothing is so small but God is still smaller, nothing is so large but God is 
still larger, nothing is so short but God is still shorter, nothing so long but God is still 
longer, nothing is so broad but God is still broader, nothing is so narrow but God is 
still narrower, etc. He is an inexpressible being, above and beyond all that can be 
described or imagined," WA 29-339, here quoted in Althaus, Theology of Luther, 
107. 
"In connection with his discourse on the impossibility, in Luther's thought, 
of obtaining an objective and static principle in identifying the revealed and hidden 
God, Schwarzwiller has the following to say which mutatis mutandis is quite pertinent 
to our discussion here: "DaB Luther diese Beziige nicht systematisiert, hat also 
seinem Grund gerade nicht darin, daB Luther `Icein Systematiker' gewesen wire. Er 
war ein zu guter Systematiker, urn sich hierauf einzulassen. Jedes theologische 
System scheitert als solches an der Gottheit Gottes," Theologia crucis, 176. 
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vere Deus! The Son became incarnate and lived as a human under the limitations of 
time and space. And the culmination of His incarnate existence was the suffering of 
death on the cross. God the Son experienced the most painful suffering ever. He 
suffers it realiter and not docetically. In the suffering of the Son, the whole person of 
Christ as vere Deus et vere homo was involved. Overwhelmed by the incarnate and 
suffering Christ, Luther found irrelevant any scholastic distinction between the Son's 
humanity and deity which limited His suffering to His humanity. Certainly, the 
traditional concept of communicatio idiomatum helped to expedite the Reformer's 
theological discourse; it is "borrowed," as it were, to describe the indescribable.' 
God the Son suffered indescribable pain and even the most shameful death. 
God realiter suffered in the incarnate Son. Truly, God suffered! It is, however, quite 
essential to pay attention to the phrase: "in the incarnate Son," with emphasis on 
"incarnate." Divine suffering is preceded by the sovereign freedom of God in which 
God in the person of the Son entered the reality of human history. And in this 
sovereign freedom God actualized His love in the suffering of the Son. Here it is 
"For various theological and logical problems around Luther's use of the 
formula communicatio idiomatum, see Marc Lienhard, Luther: Witness to Jesus Christ, 
tr. Edwin H. Robertson (Minneapolis, Augsburg Publishing House, 1982), 335-334. 
After pointing out the inadequateness of describing via the formula "communicatio 
idiomatum" the paradoxical reality of the person of Jesus Christ even in Luther's 
thought—for it involves dangers of turning Christology either toward Doceticism or 
toward Monophysitism, Lienhard notes Luther's own reservation in using such 
metaphysically burdened formulas and writes: "Luther himself warned against those 
who wished to enclose the mystery of the hypostatic union within a metaphysical 
construction. As he says, that mystery is a res ineffabilis. Even the angels cannot 
comprehend it. According to him, a new theological language is required to attempt 
to express the mystery," 346. See also Althaus' critical question to Luther in 
Theology of Luther, 196. 
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necessary for us to note that if God suffered in the incarnate Son and the incarnation 
was an event in history filled with burden and contradiction, divine suffering is then 
limited within the historical reality to which the actual incarnation has addressed itself. 
Incarnation and divine suffering are closely related to each other. We notice 
in Luther's thought a structural analogy between incarnation and divine passibility. 
Just as the incarnation was a divine possibility incomprehensible to human reason 
(How can it be possible for the Creator to become a feeble creature in the manger?), 
so also for divine suffering on the cross (How can it be possible for the all-blessed 
Lord to be deprived of this blessedness and to place Himself under the tyrannical 
power of evil in order that He might suffer?).' Likewise we must point out that in 
these incomprehensibilities God remains God, the eternally blessed, perfect, sovereign 
God. Just as God remains God even in incarnation, not "exhausting" Himself in it, so 
also He remains as the perfectly blessed God even in the suffering of the Son, the 
'Luther holds that the deity of Christ, because of the incarnation and of its 
personal unity with the humanity, enters into the uttermost depth of suffering. 
However Luther did not teach 'patripassianism,' as modalists did, but `deipassianism.' 
He always regarded God's suffering as an incomprehensible mystery. It is a constant 
stumbling block to reason even the angels cannot fully understand, for it means 
nothing else than that God is at once completely above and completely below" ibid., 
197. The great paradox involved in the inscrutable mystery of the incarnation was 
also expressed by Iganatius of Antioch in the second century: "There is only one 
Physician; Very Flesh, yet Spirit too; Uncreated and yet born; God-and-Man in One 
agreed, Very-Life-in-Death indeed, Fruit of God and Mary's seed; At once impassible 
and torn By pain and suffering here below; Jesus Christ, whom as our Lord we know" 
(Letter to the Ephesians 7, in Early Christina Writings (tr. Maxwell Staniforth 
[Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, 1968]), 77-78. Here we see the profound 
wonder over the mystery of the incarnation continuously felt through the centuries, a 
mystery which involves also God's paradoxical impassibility and passibility. 
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divine blessedness not "exhausting" itself in suffering.' Accordingly we should 
understand divine suffering as subordinate to divine blessedness. 
God is impassible and passible. In the face of the divine revelation in the 
Son we must state both even if the two are contradictory. If in view of the "very 
good" in God's creation ("tob meod," Gen. 1:31) we deny that suffering possesses an 
intrinsic value and hope that suffering as a blatant manifestation of disorder in creation 
eventually is to be overcome, we cannot ascribe suffering, pain and the like to God as 
essentially inherent in Him. The impassible God is the very foundation of our hope 
for blessedness. But God in His sovereign freedom became passible because of His 
unfathomable love toward the lost sinner. His love knows no metaphysical barrier, as 
it were. God in the person of the Son really suffered pain and death, the utmost depth 
of human misery. Since the perfectly blessed God suffered the misery we human 
beings deserve to suffer and was victorious over it, we can live in blessedness even 
while our lives appear to be a seemingly hopeless pilgrimage. In Luther's thought 
both aspects are held together without any rationalistic "smoothing over" of the 
seemingly logical contradictions.' To respect this rational "dead-end," and to be 
"See 556-559 in this chapter. 
'Dealing with a seeming contradictio adiecto in Luther's theological 
recognition that Deus absconditus is Christologically substantiated and established, 
Schwarzwiller observers a profound truth in the Reformer's view: "Luther behauptet 
keineswegs, daB aufgrund des Christusereignisses nun nichts mehr im Zwielicht sei, 
Gott vielmehr im Sohn v011ig offenbar und ohne bedrar. igendes Geheimnis. Luther 
schlieSt vielmehr umgekehrt: Ihm folgt aus dem Christusbekenntnis als dem 
Bekenntnis zum Deus ipse, daB in Gott vieles verborgen ist. Gerade darum und damit 
hilt er am Evangelium fest: Hier und nur hier ist Gott offenbar, und er ist bier 
offenbar als der aus grundloser Barmherzigkeit und unableitbar Liebe uns wunderbar 
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thus humble, is sine qua non for evangelical theology; failing in this humility, a 
theology deteriorates into speculation and is unable to grasp the overwhelming impact 
of the Gospel. 
God's passibility and impassibility together fully express the need for 
theology to be open to the "antonymous" realities of God.' This need suggests that 
one pole of the paradox must not be rationally fixed into a static formula upon which 
man may build a theological system. "Antonymous" poles in theology must not be 
rationally dissolved but kept open as they are originally revealed in order not to 
impose any humanly construed scheme upon God's reality and thereby infringe the 
sovereign freedom of the living God. Luther's allegedly "unsystematic" thinking is a 
witness to the need for such an openness in theology. 
If God is hidden from human rational comprehension, it is through "faith 
alone" then that man knows of God; faith is the only means to gain the ultimate 
rechtfertigende Herr, dem gegenuber es nur glaubendes Vertrauen und demiitigen 
Gehorsam geben lcann," Theologia crucis, 127. 
""Ja die gottheit kan nicht leiden noch sterben / Soltu antworten / Das ist 
war. Aber dennoch weil Gottheit und menscheit ynn Christo eine Person ist / so gibt 
die schrifft umb solcher personlicher einickeit willen auch der gottheit / alles was der 
menscheit widderferet / und widderumb / Und ist auch also ynn der warheit," WA 
26:321. In this passage Luther had to launch a fundamental critique to Zwingli's 
alleosis, and emphasize the divine passibility in the person of the Son. But when the 
passibilty of God is one-sidedly dominant at the cost of this fundamental truth of 
God's transcendence over the passibility, it is important, from Luther's point of view, 
that we keep intact the fundamental truth of God's impassibility. In Luther's thought, 
the fact that God has suffered and died in the Son is the paradox of all paradoxes. 
This can only be possible only when God's eternal impassibility is presupposed. 
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"knowledge" of God.' By saying this, we now return to the second significance of 
"faith alone," which was discussed in the previous section. Faith in Luther's 
understanding is not only fiducia in an existential sense but also the sole principle of 
"knowing" both God and man. In fact, faith as fiducia and faith as the sole 
epistemological principle in theology are one and the same thing. For knowing things 
divine through revelation presupposes reliance on the faithfulness of God who reveals 
the truth of His salvific will and of sinful humanity. Faith is the human correlative to 
divine revelation. It is from this viewpoint that we should understand Luther's 
persistent critique of human reason. Human reason always "domesticates" divine 
revelation into something rationally comprehensible, insuring securitas. Such an 
attempt at domestication is tantamount to making God humanly disposable. Once 
God's salvific revelation is made rationally comprehensible, it is made into the 
Law.' Thus rational comprehension of revelation and legalism theologically go 
'Inserting a comment on Luther's well-known definition of faith: "Altera 
est, Quod fides est rerum non apparentium. Ut ergo fidei locus sit, opus est, ut omnia, 
quae creduntur, abscondantur, Non autem remotius absconduntur, quam sub contrario 
objectu, sensu, experientia," Schwarzwiller writes: "Nun wird dargelegt, daB und 
wie . . . Gott stets unter dem Augenschein des Gegenteils sein Werk treibt. Er 
verbirgt sich hinter Ungerechtigkeit und Zorn, der er doch barmherzig, der er doch 
der rechtfertigende ist. Der Glaube durchschaut das nicht einfach. Das ist vielmehr 
sein Wesen, daB ohne Rucicversicherung und gegen den Augenschein auf sein Wort 
hin Gott vertraut und dem Wort dahingehend Glauben schenckt, daB er Gott als den 
iustificans ac salvator hominis peccatoris anerkennt," Theologia crucis, 142. See also 
LOvenich, Theology of Cross, 21: "Revelation is there, of course, but in concealment. 
Revelation addresses itself to faith. In his early years Luther uses the word 
`understanding' to designate the perceiving organ of faith. . . ." 
'Kurz, diesem erkennbaren, durchsichtigen, nicht verborgenen Gott 
gegeniiber blithe man unter dem Gezetz. Solange man Gott gedanlich durchdringen 
und analogien zu seinem Sein und Handeln aufweisen kann, vernimmt man das 
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hand in hand. 
We have seen that Luther's doctrine of justification by faith alone is 
organically related to his concept of Deus absconditus, signifying God's absolute 
sovereignty. Luther sees then that the very Gospel of justification is based upon the 
absolute sovereignty of God. Ultimately in the inscrutability of God and His 
transcendence, even in His totally unfounded mercy, Luther found the unshakable 
ground for his own salvation and the salvation of the world. 
Kitamori's Theology in the Light of Luther's Theology 
"Theology is ultimately concerned with the view of God," writes 
Kitamori." He is correct in this observation. As a matter of fact, Luther's doctrine 
of iustificatio sola fide is organically related with the Reformer's view of God, Deus 
absconditus in sua majestate.' Now we focus on Kitamori's theology in the light of 
Luther's theology, especially with regard to the view of God. 
A note of procedure is presently required. In the previous chapters we, on 
Evangelium als das Gesetz. Denn solange nicht Grundlosigkeit, Unableitbarkeit und 
Unwiderstehlichkeit des gottlichen Handelns und gerade seines Heilshandeln in aller 
Scruirfe gewahrt sind, sondern noch irgend etwas einsichtig oder ableitbar ist, wird 
das Einsichtige zur Norm, der man zu genugen hat. . . ," ibid., 137, emphasis is 
original. 
'See 212 above. 
"Schl.varzwiller consistently points out that Luther's doctrine of justification 
by faith is exclusively based upon his view that it is totally beyond of human 
comprehension for it is given by God's inscrutable will or His hiddenness, and in this 
hiddenness "sola fide" finds its anchor. Schwarzwiller then writes: "Gerade mit dem 
Theologoumenon des Deus in sua maiestate absuconditus ist die GewiBheit des 
Glaubens, die Rechtfertigung sola fide, die Errettung durch Jesus Christus gesichert," 
Theologia crucis, 185. 
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many occasions, have discussed Kitamori's theology in the light of Luther's theology 
on a more or less implicit basis. When we now juxtapose Kitamori's theology with 
Luther's theology, it is inevitable that particular ideas and directions will surface and 
resurface. 
Kitamori holds that it is possible for us to penetrate into the very essence of 
God intuitively and to bring it under human rational comprehension; in his view, it is 
even required for us to do so. With an unshakable conviction, he posits that God is 
eternally and "essentially" in pain. In his attempt to elucidate this position which may 
seem somewhat peculiar, Kitamori gives various explanations of this concept, writing 
that the pain of God is shorthand for the love based upon God's pain and assuring his 
readers that the expression "pain of God" describes a specific character of God's love. 
On other occasions Kitamori boarders on stating that God is in pain physically; he 
asserts outright that pain as such is the essence of God. Regardless of how one is to 
interpret Kitamori's oscillating definition of the Pain of God as the essence of God, 
one thing in Kitamori's theology is clear, namely, one is able to rationally grasp and 
logically retrace the eternal essence of God. By contrast, Luther hesitates to speculate 
on the hidden area of the sovereign God.' In this regard, Kitamori and Luther are 
'In his pamphlet Der verborngen Gott bei Luther (Berlin, Furche-Verlag, 
1928), Fritz Blanke touches Luther's "Keuschheit and Furcht" (Ibid., 10) in the 
Reformer's "daring" attempt to perceive the hidden counsels of God; even in Luther's 
daring so there is an important presupposition, namely, God is absolutely sovereign. 
Presenting Luther's view of God's rule of history through various "masks," Blanke 
follows Luther in the question a Christian may raise why God uses them in His rule in 
history and writes: "Es scheint zunichst, als weise Luther die Frage nach diesem 
Warum zurick. Er gibt namlich kurzerhand die Antwort: Gott will es so. Er will 
nichts ohne unser Arbeiten tun. Er kOnnte auch ohne so. Er kOnnte auch ohne 
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opposites. This difference must have 
some weighty consequences on both theologies. 
In fact, the very concept of the Pain of God is employed by Kitamori to 
explain rationally why God, who is wrathful against the sinner, can embrace and love 
him. The whole explanation seems to be conceived in the framework of a 
"down-to-earth" human psychology. This makes the theology of the Pain of God 
easily understandable even to ordinary people (especially those living in Japan), people 
in the sphere of "nature," that is, outside the sphere of divine revelation.' But this 
explanation "naturally" and rationally given involves serious consequences which risk 
making the Gospel too similar to indigenous ideas of salvation. This whole procedure 
in the mind of Kitamori borders on a psychologization and rationalization of God's 
hidden mystery. 
It is apparent that rationalism and "naturalism" go hand in hand. Reason 
takes its operational starting point in the things given in "nature." In keeping with this 
fact, we would reasonably expect that Kitamori's theology involves many of the 
elements given in "nature." In fact, his concept of the Pain of God involves two 
KOnige and Frusten regieren, aber er will es nur durch sie. Gott hat diese Masken 
einfach geben, sie miissen sein" (ibid., 7). 
'In a discussion with Kitamori, a Lutheran pastor, Tuyoshi Okada, says: 
"Dr Kitamori, you established a theology in which you state that the "Pain" of God 
unites God's "wrath" and His "love," two contradictory forms of divine emotion. 
Apart from whether one agrees with your position or not, one can safely say that this 
theology is easily understandable for the Japanese people. In other words, your 
theology is quite congenial with the psychic and mental make-up of the Japanese," 
Literature and God, 166. 
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constitutive elements taken from different spheres in which "naturalism" operates. 
The one element comes from the sphere of the ordinary life of people; the other from 
the sphere of metaphysics. On the one hand Kitamori explains the "structure" of the 
Pain of God with "human, too human" illustrations (for example, from traditional 
popular dramas in Japan)." Just like humans, God suffers from excruciating 
emotional conflicts within Himself because of His love. On the other hand, in 
Kitamori's thought, God must metaphysically be the Absolute; God would not be God 
unless He embraced sinners (His "opposites"!) absolutely; and this absoluteness is 
demonstrated in "God in Pain," for in His pain God embraces the totally 
"unembraceable."' In the previous places we noted that the influence of the 
Buddhist-Hegelian concept of the Absolute found in the Kyoto School is apparent in 
Kitamori's conceptualization of the Pain of God. Thus, the line of demarcation 
between the revelation given in Christ and ideas taken from the sphere of "nature" is 
blurred in Kitamori's theology.' In the concept of the Pain of God there is a direct 
continuity between revelation and nature, even though Kitamori claims that the idea of 
"God in Pain" cannot be given but by revelation. It is therefore not unwarranted to 
'See for instance Pain, 133-135. 
'Compare this with Luther's acknowledgement of God's absolute sovereignty 
found in what Bert quotes: "It [Reason] tries again and again to find immanent 
grounds for excusing His attitude. 'But faith and the spirit judges otherwise: They 
believe that God is good, even if He were to destroy all men,'" Structure, 39. 
'It is our conviction," says Kitamori, "that the pain which is the only 
concern for Japanese tragedy corresponds most aptly with the pain of God. . . . Thus 
the Japanese mind, which had seen the deepest heart of his fellowman in pain, will 
come to see the deepest heart of the Absolute God in pain," Pain, 136. 
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state that Kitamori's theology is a theology which goes in the direction of natural 
theology. 
If theological rationalism (like any other form of rationalism) cannot tolerate 
any absurd realities repugnant to human intellect, it is only natural for such a theology 
to be forced to "justify God" in a world filled with unexplainable meaninglessness!' 
If an individual, through natural perception, cannot discern any meaning at all in the 
design of this world or in the unfolding of history, he would either deny a God of 
love and omnipotence, or envisage a God who suffers in solidarity with man in his 
miseries. The former alternative is obviously self-defeating for faith. The latter, 
however, would lose sight of God as sovereign and overwhelming.' Either 
alternative cannot sustain the Biblical image of God in the face of contradictory 
reality. Luther's idea of a God hidden to human reason, does justice to God in the 
Biblical revelation and to the given reality. The theology of the Pain of God, as a 
theology, goes in the direction of the second alternative: God in this theology stands 
before man as a suffering God. This theology portrays a passive God. If God 
eternally suffers pain, this is the inevitable consequence. Then, a question of 
consequence arises: how can a man who finds himself "in the depths" cry to such a 
God for help and rescue, a God who is Himself "in the depths"? On the contrary, -it 
is men who are summoned to a "sympathetic" solidarity with a God in suffering! The 
theology of the Pain of God may provide intellectual and psychological solutions to the 
'See above in Chap. 5, note 194. 
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problem of suffering and evils (perhaps only for the spiritual elite), but it seems 
unable to provide the authentic "solution" to provide endurance and hope to those who 
are in need of redemption from suffering. A quietism is at hand in Kitamori's 
theology.' 
Thus, the depiction of a passive God inevitably flows from the thesis that 
God is eternally suffering. As understood and considered by man, suffering God is 
very naturally passive. And this is exactly what happens in Kitamori's theology. God 
is on the stage, as it were, like an actor playing the main role of a tragic drama. 
While men watch him, their hearts are moved by His suffering.' The theological 
consequences of this view of God may be multiple in number and serious in nature. 
For our purpose here we mention only two of them: one pertains to the doctrines of 
justification, and the other to the doctrine of creation and eschatology. 
Dealing with the doctrine of justification, Kitamori equates justification with 
the forgiveness of sin. Though appearing similar to Luther's focus on the forgiveness 
of sin, Kitamori actually reduces the scope of justification to one point, namely the 
belief that justification is the forgiveness of sin narrowly understood. In Luther's 
thought, as we saw above, the forgiveness of sin is the signature of the multifaceted 
'See 343 above. 
"Kitamori's passionate interest in theatrical dramas is well known, see Pain, 
134-135; "Drama as literature," writes Kitamori, "belongs to the highest artistic 
expression of the mind of a nation, and at the same time, when presented as drama, 
fully permeates the people on the street," ibid., 134. We can read the following 
exclamations: "Listen! [rather, Behold!] Jesus is about be buried. God's only Son, 
God himself in the person of his Son is about to be buried," ibid., 101. 
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salvific reality and therefore has an unlimited perspective. Kitamori, on the contrary, 
sees in justification no other aspect than the forgiveness of sin. Again we see his 
reductionism here; it is exactly for this reason that Kitamori sees a problem involved 
in the doctrine of justification. Why, then, does this difference arise between 
Kitamori and Luther? As a matter of fact, even the very concept of forgiveness in 
Kitamori's thought is quite different from that of Luther's. Luther without reservation 
rejoices over the forgiveness of sin; he found the paradise in the very tidings of the 
forgiveness of sin. For God does "not remember" the sinner's sins (Is. 43:25). In 
contrast to this, Kitamori understands the forgiveness of sin as God constantly bearing 
man's sins upon Himself.' That God is in pain eternally is nothing but the 
counterpart of the fact that man constantly sins against God. God's love made known 
in His pain reminds the sinner that he allows God to suffer incessantly for his sins. 
This logically results in presenting the sinner from knowing true joy and peace in his 
heart. How can an individual be joyful when he constantly and incessantly causes the 
Other to suffer because of his own sins? This dilemma is a tension found in 
Kitamori's concept of the forgiveness of sin. This tension must be resolved sooner or 
later for Kitamori's system to remain standing. This means that the doctrine of 
justification by faith in Kitamori's thought is not the final message of salvation. 
Justification in this system must be completed by something which is beyond. 
That Kitamori's concept of justification by faith is basically insufficient is 
'See the parable of a "hand" protecting a traveller in lightening, Pain, 126. 
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confirmed by his own efforts to make up for the reulting lack.' The main emphasis 
in Kitamori's theological anthropology transfers to sanctification. Kitamori conceives 
of sanctification as the "restoration of the purity of love" in the sinner. In his thought 
this is the final stage of salvation, the stage which is conceived by in his particular 
logic of love. Ultimately, holds Kitamori, both God's love and man's love must 
develop into a love filled with natural smoothness and intensity. In his own 
terminology,' it is closer to the "eros" described in Andreas Nygren's work. For 
confirmation of our analysis here, it is helpful for us to recall the theme which was 
discussed in the previous section. In his analysis of Luther's doctrine of justification, 
Kitamori approaches the doctrine as something problematic, and he takes this approach 
particularly in reference to the "problematization" of the doctrine by the Tridentinum. 
He implicitly offers his solution to the "problem" of justification, a solution allegedly 
satisfactory to both Lutherans and Catholics." Justification is not merely the 
"For another aspect of Kitamori's concept of justification, see 323-326 
above. 
'See above note 22. 
"In his Theology and Creeds, Kitamori deals with the doctrine of the Trinity 
and holds that both Luther and Melanchton did not take up the doctrine of the Trinity 
for serious consideration because they thought that the doctrine did not involve 
controversial issues. In Kitamori's view, the doctrine of the Trinity could solve the 
crucial point of controversy between the Catholic Church and the reformers, namely 
the problem of "faith and good works." Kitamori consistently thinks that the problem 
of the Reformation is the relationship between faith and works. In this flow of 
thought, Kitamori writes: "If they [Luther and Melanchton] had used the doctrine of 
the Trinity for the substantiation of their soteriology, they would have won the victory 
for the Gospel without seeing the tragedy of the schism between the Roman Church 
and their Church, for the doctrinal point in the theology of the Reformation which was 
offensive to the Catholics was the latter's apprehension that by proclaiming `sofa fide' 
the Reformers would make it impossible to teach both faith and works," ibid., 11. 
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forgiveness of sin but a call for sanctification. In so arguing, Kitamori has already 
been drawn into a problem-category similar to that of Catholicism at the time of the 
Reformation: how can the place of sanctification be secured in view of an allegedly 
insufficient doctrine of justification? 
A word of clarification on the difference above between Kitamori and Luther 
is due here. Luther never thought of justification by faith as something insufficient as 
the message of full salvation. On the contrary, he thought a proper and diligent 
concentration on this cardinal doctrine would "automatically" take care of the issues of 
sanctification. A well-known dictum "faith alone, but faith never alone" makes the 
point in this connection. In distinction from this, Kitamori first reduced the 
multifaceted reality of justification to the forgiveness of sin in a way particular to him, 
and then tried to put together "justification" thus understood and "sanctification" 
conceived as ethical improvement. 
Even with regard to his concept of the "restoration of pure love," Kitamori 
gives the impression that he is oscillating between two conflicting views: on the one 
hand, Kitamori presents the idea that "pure love" is to be eventually realized, and this 
is a logical requirement of his idea of love's dialectic; on the other hand, another view 
asserts itself (again logically) that "pure love" cannot be restored, for if it could God 
would cease to be in pain and consequently pain would not be the eternal essence of 
God. Kitamori's theology betrays this oscillation. He claims that his theology is 
critical of the status quo because the very concept of "pain" involves a tension which 
is to be resolved by a defeat of the status quo ridden with evils. But he emphasizes 
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that human pain must remain in order to give witness to a God who constantly suffers 
pain. The net result of his theology in this regard is an a posteriori affirmation and 
explanation of the status quo. Kitamori's theology is thus a passive theology. 
In Luther's theology, faith plays a vital role in the doctrine of justification. 
Faith which trusts in the promise made by a forgiving and justifying God is capable of 
mighty works. Faith is the very mode of the believer's existence. Faith endures and 
hopes against all appearances. Faith lives in an intensive tension between God's 
promise and actual experiences in the world. We can say that faith sustains a 
believer's life here on earth, because it believes in the almighty God who gave His 
own Son for man and places fiducia in Him. In contrast, faith in Kitamori's theology 
is intellectualized and reduced to a recognition of a state of salvation objectively 
established by God in Pain. In Kitamori's thought, faith is not something which 
believes things unseen; on the contrary, it only acknowledges what is already seen.' 
As to the doctrine of justification by faith alone, we have seen that Kitamori 
has his own concept of justification, one passive in character, a concept fundamentally 
different from that of Luther. 
Now we proceed to give our observation regarding the impact the doctrines 
of creation and eschatology have in the theology of the Pain of God. We said that a 
concept of God being eternally in pain entails a passivity on the part of God; He can 
hardly be offensive in the struggles which are going on in the world, struggles 
between His will and evil powers. This is contrary to the Biblical witness of God, 
'For Kitamori's concept of faith, see 320-323 above. 
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according to which it is He who ultimately has dominion over the process of history 
and sovereignly leads it toward the fulfillment of His original intention. The 
Scriptural image of God as a powerful warrior (which found a mighty echo in 
Luther's famous hymn) is alien or even repugnant to Kitamori's thought of God. In a 
word, God in Kitamori's theology is not really concerned with the conquest of 
sufferings and miseries in the world in its authentic sense; in practical terms God 
would not be able to do anything but suffer in the face of more powerful onslaughts of 
evil. Accordingly, as we have seen previously, Kitamori's theology cannot contain a 
joyful expectation of an eschaton as the fulfillment of God's original intention of 
creation. It is only logical that Kitamori has no room for a theology of creation in 
which the joyful cry of "indeed it was very good" is the very signature of an indelible 
"optimism" of faith. By contrast, Luther's trust in God's "Geschichtsmachitigkeit," 
with all its realism in the estimation of the worldly reality, has never been shaken, and 
his conviction in this regard has its firm roots in his faith in God the Creator. As a 
matter of fact, Kitamori's concept of creation is at variance with the joyful signature 
of creation; creation, in Kitamori's metaphysics of love, is only possible by the pain 
of God. Suffering is namely a "built-in" feature in this created world from the very 
beginning; the negative reality is the constitutive ingredient in the universe.' For 
this reason it is not difficult at all to understand why Kitamori offers no substantial 
eschatology; where there is no proper, joyful protology there is no joyful eschatology 
either. Salvation in Kitamori's thought is the communion of God and man in pain, in 
°For Kitamori's idea of creation, see 264-268 above. 
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a colorless, melancholic moonlight, rather than a joyous "living together" of God and 
man in the morning sunlight of redemption and resurrection. 
Examining Kitamori's thought in the light of Luther's theology, we are now 
led to conclude that the theology of the Pain of God and the theology of the Reformer 
are substantially different on the basic doctrinal issues. Therefore, even though 
Kitamori's theology has been considered as "Japanized" Lutheranism, strictly 
speaking, this characterization is not adequate for the description of the theology of 
the Pain of God. Rather, Kitamori's theology is a singular, even syncretistic 
formulation of Protestant theology. To be sure, the theology of the Pain of God is 
partially inspired by Luther's theological ideas and concepts such as sin, divine wrath, 
forgiveness of sins and divine suffering, but it is, in substance, a theology with a 
deeply "indigenous" orientation, molded by a Japanese sentiment of tragedy and the 
philosophy of the Kyoto School. After all, the basic orientation of Kitamori in doing 
theology is substantially different from that of Luther;' while Luther's theology is 
molded by divine revelation essentially repugnant to the natural sentiment of man, 
Kitamori's theology is a form of natural theology shaped by man's emotive perception 
'Interestingly, Kitamori himself indirectly speaks of a difference at the 
fundamental point, which separates him and Luther. Discussing the psychic "aptitude" 
or sensitivity of different nations to the appropriation of the Gospel, Kitamori comes 
to the case of Luther's "aptitude" and writes: "It is true the German mind [as is found 
in Luther] strikingly differs in character from that of the Greek. But the pain of God 
does not seem to have aroused the interest of the German mind in the strict sense of 
the term. Even in the case of Luther's concept of God, we cannot help saying, 
`Friend, [yours is] not that melody [of the Gospel]'! Certainly, Luther possessed a 
sensitivity toward God's grace, but he did not grasp the meaning of grace as God's 
pain," Pain, 133. By saying this, Kitamori confirms our observation in this section of 
the chapter. 
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and immediate recognition of given reality. 
Summary 
Throughout his theological career Kitamori has always felt challenged by the 
task of bringing together the two major traditions of the Reformation, that is, 
Reformed and Lutheran. For one thing, Kitamori's ecclesiastical Sitz im Leben, which 
is the Kyodan, has constantly been threatened by the forces of disintegration due to a 
lack of theological identity. It has therefore been mandatory for Kitamori, ex officio, 
to formulate a synthesis out of the diverse views of major and minor confessional and 
denominational traditions found within the Kyodan. For him personally, however, due 
to his conviction of the "axiomatic" significance of Lutheranism for a unified 
Protestant Church in Japan, it is urgent to explicitly manifest the unity of the two 
major traditions, Reformed and Lutheran, a unity which, in his view, already exists in 
a latent form. It has also been his conviction that Lutheranism must be the core of a 
unified evangelical Protestant Church in Japan. Thus, the manifest integration of 
Reformed Christianity and Lutheranism is urgent for Kitamori both ecclesiastically and 
theologically. 
Kitamori consistently endeavored to carry out the challenge and mandate 
with Lutheranism as his theological "axiom." In this chapter, however, we observed 
that Kitamori's Lutheranism is not substantial. Rather, in Kitamori's theology the 
Reformed influence is stronger and more substantial than that of Lutheranism. This 
observation runs counter to a general judgment in Japanese Protestantism which has 
labeled Kitamori's theology as Lutheranism. We found, however, convincing reasons 
579 
which validate our observation. For one thing, the predominant theological matrix of 
Japanese Protestantism is that of the Reformed. In fact, Kitamori's formative years 
did not yet see any clear "weaning" of Lutheranism from the antecedent Reformed 
theology. Though baptized as a Lutheran, Kitamori unconsciously breathed in a 
Reformed theology and ethos. Naturally, Kitamori reveres Calvin and praises him for 
his theological clarity and precision. One can hardly find any critical comment against 
Calvin or his theology in Kitamori. 
Among the Reformed influences, it is Karl Barth's theology that has 
determined Kitamori's theological profile in its formal aspects. Barth's theological 
method provided Kitamori with the basic scheme for his theology. The Swiss 
theologian's neo-Scholastic rationalism and his Reformed theocentricism have shaped 
the formal character of Kitamori's theology. This origin of the formal principle of 
Kitamori's theology is understandable when we consider the fact that, as a seminary 
student, Kitamori was under the very strong spell of the rising Barthian theology 
which flowed into Japan through Reformed channels. 
Kitamori, however, became one of the most outspoken critics of Barth's 
theology in Japan, accusing the latter's theology of blatant legalism. The reason for 
this antagonism, despite Kitamori's theological affmities with Barth's thoughts, is the 
Japanese theologian's own unshakable conviction that the Pain of God is the ultimate 
truth. Kitamori cannot compromise this personal conviction. Barth's radical criticism 
against establishing any "Grundanschauung" for the field of dogmatics was certainly 
anathema to Kitamori's then nascent theology. 
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Though Kitamori has been critical of Barth throughout his career, his 
critique has not carried substantial weight in the history of Japanese Protestant 
theology. We saw that Kitamori's criticism of Barth does not go beyond the issues of 
dogmatic prolegomena, that is, he only criticizes formal issues. Why doesn't Kitamori 
continue this criticism when it comes to the material aspects of Earth's theology? An 
answer to this question, would be that materially speaking Kitamori's theology is quite 
similar to Barth's. The present writer would even posit that Kitamori's theology is a 
form of Barthian theology set in a melancholic minor key. 
In contrast to the conspicuous Reformed influences on Kitamori's theology, 
the impact of Lutheranism in his thought is limited. Kitamori's interpretation of 
Luther's thought is insufficient and often inadequate. In explaining this deficiency, we 
can point out three factors. First, there was not yet a developed theological milieu 
within Lutheranism in Japan then when Kitamori began to form his theological 
thought. Second, Kitamori had already attained a well-nigh absolute conviction of the 
Pain of God as the ultimate truth when he started to study Lutheran theology proper. 
On the basis of this conviction Kitamori prematurely identified his own theology with 
that of Luther's. In addition to these two factors, Kitamori busied himself more with 
digesting the theology of Karl Barth than embarking upon serious Luther-studies. 
In fact, on crucial doctrinal points such as the view of God, the 
understanding of justification by faith and God's rule in the world, Kitamori deviates 
fundamentally from Luther's theology, often in a diametrically opposite direction. 
Therefore Kitamori's theology cannot be designated as Lutheranism, regardless of the 
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certainty of Kitamori's personal identification as a Lutheran. Instead of inheriting the 
central evangelical concerns pronounced in Luther's thought, Kitamori interpreted 
Lutheranism in such a way as to fit the ideas and concepts deduced from his own idea 
of the Pain of God. In reality, Kitamori's theology as a whole only touches the 
surface of Lutheran theology and then goes its own way, which from a Lutheran point 
of view is liable to serious criticisms. 
Kitamori's theology is deeply influenced by the ideas and method of Karl 
Barth. Though less substantial, basic Lutheran concepts and ethos are observable in 
the theology of the Pain of God. In this theology, indigenous spirituality is intimately 
interwoven with the Protestant traditions by way of the Buddhist philosophy of the 
Kyoto School. On this observation, it is more accurate to characterize Kitamori's 
theology as "a Protestant mediating theology with substantial indigenous ingredients" 
than "a theology essentially Lutheran." In these characteristics lies the strength of 
Kitamori's theology. And, by the same token, the problems of the theology of the 
Pain of God are apparent. 
CONCLUSION 
Kazoh Kitamori's Theology of the Pain of God rightly assumes an important 
place in religious thought, demanding to be thoroughly examined by students working 
for the spread of the Gospel in a "non-Christian" country such as Japan. The concept 
of the Pain of God is challenging and provocative--historically, dogmatically, 
missiologically, ethically and culturally. The very idea that God Himself suffers pain 
compels us to reflect anew on what the suffering of God actually signifies 
dogmatically. What consequences does it have for the understanding of the doctrine 
of God, of Christ, of salvation and of hope? Further, the genesis of the idea of the 
Pain of God reflects the basic existential aspects of the Protestant Church in modem 
Japan; Japanese Protestantism seems to have been assigned the immense burden of 
bearing upon itself the whole of modem Japan with its political, spiritual, sociological, 
cultural and even economical aspects; a task totally out of proportion with the 
numerical strength of the nascent Protestant Church. 
Protestant Theology in Japan was destined to meet this challenge. With his 
idea of God in Pain, Kitamori offered a response to this challenge: God, in the 
crucified Christ, embraces Japan, a nation which in her own manner and depth shares 
this fallen reality of humanity. Kitamori's idea of the Pain of God is, however, 
particularly significant in the study of the Gospel's indigenization. Kitamori identified 
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the core of the Gospel as God in suffering, and claimed that specific experiences of 
"pain and suffering" born by the Japanese people through the centuries are most 
congenial to God's "experience of pain." In Kitamori's view, the quintessence of an 
indigenous culture and spirituality can be, and is to be, made a positive vehicle by 
which the Gospel is to be brought into the hearts of a people. 
The concept of the Pain of God has proven its capacity of 
systematic-theological comprehensiveness, and this can also be seen in the study of the 
ethical practices of the Protestant Church in the historical, political, sociological 
context of Japan. In the midst of a non-Christian population under the spell of dark 
powers, the Church is to both bear witness to God's will of salvation, and, identifying 
herself with God in suffering, embrace the fallen reality of the people. The theology 
of the Pain of God is a theological attempt to meet the challenge of the Gospel itself 
and of the specific sphere of the world into which the Gospel is being brought. 
As with most prominent and significant theological systems, the theology of 
the Pain of God has its origin in personal religious experience. Kitamori's visionary 
experience is that God is suffering pain, and he is fully convinced that "God in pain" 
is the ultimate truth. Again, as with the experiences of most influential theologians 
and religious thinkers, Kitamori's vision of God in pain is not an experience right "out 
of the blue." His "original" vision of God in pain owes much to intellectual 
acquaintance, spiritual encounter, cultural inheritance, existential pressures, and the 
contemporary situation. Being fully convinced of "God in pain" as the 
ultimate truth, Kitamori set out to "build" his own theology of the Pain of God, 
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digesting Luther's inner experiences and theological terms in his own way, studying 
the theology of the early Barth meticulously (while criticizing the Swiss theologian 
vocally), and absorbing much of the Buddhist-Hegelian philosophy of the so-called 
Kyoto School. 
What came out from this process of theological system building was the idea 
of a God who is eternally in pain and the concept of an all-embracing God. God in 
the vision of Kitamori is not a God who judges and rejects; on the contrary, He 
embraces sinners just as they are, in His eternal suffering. In Kitamori's thought, 
God who rejects His human creatures because of their sinfulness cannot have any 
dealing with men under their actual conditions. If salvation is at all possible for 
sinners, God must be absolutely embracing. Behind this thought one observes that 
Kitamori recognizes the real depth of the sinful reality of humanity. In his contention, 
however, this all-embracing God is not a God who allows things to go on as they are; 
on the contrary, He transforms the present reality into what it ought to be by first 
embracing things as they are. This contention of Kitamori is indispensable for the 
justification of his theology of the Pain of God. But despite Kitamori's assurance that 
the concept of the Pain of God includes in itself the power to transform a presently 
fallen humanity, the actual implications of this theology have defied the validity of this 
assurance; even this theology itself became inconsistent on this point in the fact that 
this theology takes away what it previously has promised to give. For the very idea 
of an all-embracing God who allegedly provides an absolute certainty of salvation, 
Kitamori's theology had to pay the price by implying that God is passive in His 
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dealing with the sinful reality of humanity, sacrificing the idea of God's sovereign 
lordship over men and the world. This is a costly price to pay, for the integral 
message of the Gospel of creation, redemption and eschatological fulfillment is 
reduced to a single idea of God's eternal suffering in "love." Behind the idea of 
God's eternal suffering and His passivity one senses the presence of the Oriental 
"mood" of resignation. This of resignation is contrary to the Christian teaching about 
a God who is all-powerful in the reality of men and the world, even though the actual 
work of His omnipotence is often humanly indiscernible. The fact that together with 
the eternalization of the suffering of God, humanity is also involved in the eternal Pain 
of God. Both logically and practically the eschatological hope of the humanity's final 
redemption to an eternal peace and bliss (the very shalom) is lost in Kitamori's 
theology; instead, God and men are united in the "communion of pain" now and in 
eternity. This is a curtailment of the dimensions of the Gospel. 
In Kitamori's thought, the concept of the Pain of God has a "logical 
structure," and this "logical structure" is the formal character of the Pain of God; 
embracing something which cannot be embraced because of mutually negating 
opposition. It is this formal character that made it possible for Kitamori to deal with 
pressing theological, political, religious, cultural and social issues. The concept of the 
Pain of God is thus methodologically pivotal and universal in its application. 
With this paradigm of "embracing the unembraceable," both as the content 
and the methodology of his theology, Kitamori identified himself with the historical 
Japan as it headed into the war. For him, the nation, though perhaps erring, was not 
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an object of critical watching primarily but of intercessory prayers; even cooperation 
would be appropriate. Throughout his career as a theologian, Kitamori consistently 
applied this paradigm in the field of politics. To be sure, he insisted that in this 
embracing, a critical attitude is something "built-in," but the effect was a de facto 
allegiance to the status quo. The same also holds true of his career as a church 
leader. Consistent with his paradigm, Kitamori interpreted the Kyodan (the united 
Protestant Church which was brought into existence by government war policies and 
without any theological consensus) as God-willed. In a series of articles, being 
consistent with his theology, Kitamori defended the birth of the Kyodan against the 
negative reactions of those who felt deep uneasiness with such an untheological 
formation of the Kyodan; Kitamori positively spelled out the Kyodan's God-given 
assignment as the Church in a "leading" nation. During the first decade after World 
War II, the same paradigm of "embracing the unembraceable" was also employed 
when the Kyodan was threatened with disintegration by the same factors that arose at 
its formation, and an immediate threat of the Kyodan's disintegration was averted. 
This paradigm of Kitamori, however, failed definitely to prove its tenability as 
political and ecclesiastical methodology, and his career was terminated by the struggles 
within the Kyodan, particularly by the campus tragedy of TUTS brought forth in 
connection with its Declaration of War Responsibilities and with the issues concerning 
its participation in the "Expo '70." 
Prompted by the truth of "embracing the unembraceable," Kitamori 
energetically engaged himself with dialogues in various directions, with Catholicism, 
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with Buddhism and other religions, and with philosophical positions and the world of 
literature. There is little of lasting fruits. After observing this tragic feature of 
Kitamori's career, one is left with an impression that Kitamori's idea of "embracing 
the unembraceable" is a contrived idea which is infeasible in reality. With his idea of 
the Pain of God in its material and formal aspects, Kitamori envisaged bringing the 
Kyodan fulfillment as a united Protestant Church with the theological substance of 
"Lutheranism" as its basis. Upon this, Kitamori added a vision of embracing the total 
spiritual and cultural reality of the nation. But none of these visions were realized. 
This chain of events arouses suspicion: to be sure Kitamori's theology envisaged 
embracing all, but did not the reverse actually occur? Is not Kitamori's theology 
absorbed into the indigenous realities of Japan (or simply remained in them)? 
It is of particular interest and concern to evaluate Kitamori's theology as an 
indigenized Lutheranism in Japan. Speaking in formal terms, by examining a theology 
which calls itself "Lutheran," one can indirectly observe how Lutheran theological 
concerns are accepted, digested and developed by a particular theology. Consequently 
one can judge how the claim of Lutheranism--the authentic representation of the 
Gospel--has been actualized in a nation geographically distant and culturally disparate 
from its birth place. Also in this examination, a crucial question is involved: Is 
Lutheranism confined only in the cultural sphere of its origin or does Lutheranism 
have a universal address (as the Gospel should), quite apart from the cultural 
conditions under which it is originated? We have considered Kitamori's theology of 
the Pain of God in this light. We conclude that the theology of the Pain of God does 
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not represent Lutheranism in terms of the latter's theological substance: the doctrine 
of iustificatio sofa fide with its organically related tripartite doctrines of God, creation 
and eschatology, and with its theological methodology. The differences between the 
two theological formulations are often diametrically opposed. The content of the 
doctrine of justification by faith alone is reinterpreted by Kitamori in such a way as to 
suit his own theological system. Perhaps it would not be fair to Kitamori to state that 
the Japanese theologian had very limited substantial theological relations with the 
Reformer's thought; surely he inherited from Luther the radical concept of human sin, 
a realistic estimation of the sinful reality of this fallen world, the idea of divine wrath 
and suffering, and the radical understanding of God's grace. Kitamori, however, cast 
all of these into the mold of his own concept of the Pain of God. What Kitamori 
made out of Luther's ideas could well have been made from indigenous religious ideas 
(found, for instance, in a form of Pure Land Buddhism by Shinran Shonin). It is, 
then, our observation in this regard that Kitamori's Lutheranism is little more than 
nominal Lutheranism. 
Kitamori never seems to doubt his Lutheranism. And, contrary to the result 
of this study, the theological community in Japan (including even Lutheran 
theologians) has never questioned Kitamori's Lutheran identity. These two issues 
require some elucidations. 
Firstly, why did Kitamori substantially deviate from his confessed 
Lutheranism? The one-phrase answer is the Pain of God. As we have already 
touched upon, Kitamori's vision of "God in suffering" was seemingly so 
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overwhelming and so unshakable that the theologian scarcely had opportunity or need 
to re-examine its truth-content. From the very beginning of his career as a theologian 
Kitamori held the Pain of God as the theological axiom. Certainly, we observe 
serious logical inconsistencies and even preposterous statements in not a few places in 
Kitamori's writings. In fact, Kitamori often oscillates even in his definition of the 
Pain of God. Despite this factual problem, Kitamori's rock-hard conviction has 
remained intact throughout his career. Kitamori has then absolutized and frozen the 
idea of the Pain of God; he lets all the other ideas and concepts converge upon this 
idea. The very problem of Kitamori's theology is right here, the absolutization of the 
Pain of God. The fact that the Pain of God, "God in suffering," is inherently 
contingent and negative, self-evidently demonstrates that this negative reality cannot be 
attributed to God as His eternal essence. The suffering of God can be described as a 
contingent expression of God's eternal love, but not as the eternal innermost essence 
of God. This is what turns everything upside down. And it is exactly this that 
occurred in Kitamori's theology. This absolutization of the Pain of God hindered 
Kitamori from realizing a fruitful elaboration of Lutheran theology in the Japanese 
spiritual soil. Not only this, the absolutization of the idea of God's Pain took away 
possibilities of fruition and development of Kitamori's own theology within Japanese 
Protestantism. 
Secondly, why has the theology of the Pain of God been uncritically 
accepted as a Lutheran theology in Japan, when one rather easily notices in Kitamori's 
theology something alien to Luther's theology? There are several reasons for this; we 
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mention here three in particular. First, Kitamori's frequent use of Luther's name and 
doctrinal terminology, and particularly his vocal support of Luther's Theology of the 
Cross (certainly in his interpretation), belied the real focus and thrust of Kitamori's 
own theology. Second, there have been few thorough examinations of Kitamori's 
theology by Japanese theologians, that is to say, examinations of it as a Lutheran 
theology. Kitamori's theological formulation may have been too prosaic to be 
examined with proper academic rigor. Surely, his theological writings involve 
ambiguities and elusiveness that are less conducive to a committed study. For 
Kitamori's own part, there have been no major works since his single opus magnus, 
so that some of the crucial issues in his theology remain unclear. Kitamori's theology 
thus suffers from the symptoms of a theological monologue. And third, the precision 
of the doctrinal understanding of Lutheranism in Japan is not as strict or as serious as 
it should have been, even among Luther scholars in Japan. This state of affairs is 
considered fatal for Kitamori's own theology as well as for Lutheranism in Japan. 
This also holds true for Kitamori himself. In his youth Kitamori studied Luther's 
ideas with a limited understanding and prematurely finalized his Luther-interpretation 
--in a quite "free" manner, and subsequently built his own theological system. A 
lingering question remains: if Kitamori had a real and substantial dialogue with 
Luther, would he have produced a much more viable theology, powerful and fruitful 
in Japanese Protestantism? It is difficult to answer, but with Kitamori's capacity, one 
may suggest, the affirmative answer would be more reasonable. It is, however, 
necessary to note that Kitamori's theology has failed to develop itself as a Lutheran 
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theology in Japan. 
We now conclude: Even if Kitamori attempted to Lutheranize Japanese 
Protestantism with his concept of the Pain of God and thus to bring the Gospel of 
Christ to the Japanese people, he was not successful in this attempt. This failure is 
due to the very concept of the Pain of God. Kitamori thought of this concept of 
the Pain of God as a discovery of the innermost mystery of God through a specific 
Japanese sensitivity, but it should be rather viewed as a "natural" product of the 
spiritual and cultural soil of Japan. It is then no wonder that his theology at one time 
enjoyed popularity and acceptance even among the non-Christian population, for the 
concept of a suffering God is not repugnant to traditional Japanese sentiment. Making 
the concept of the Pain of God his theological axiom, Kitamori cast the Gospel—the 
vital concern of Lutheranism--into the mold of Japanese culture and spirituality, quite 
contrary to what he intended. What resulted from this is: it is not the Gospel that is 
now in the process of transforming Japanese spirituality; it is the natural Japanese 
spirituality that devoured the Gospel and digested it as it own. What Kitamori did 
throughout his career was little more than an affirmation of the "natural" Japanese 
spirituality. Kitamori's theology, seen from the Lutheran point of view, has then 
contributed little to the furtherance of the Gospel of the crucified Lord in the land 
Kitamori felt called to "evangelize." 
Here at the end of this study it is necessary for this writer to offer, at least, 
a sketch of an alternative to Kitamori's work. Kitamori legitimately brought the 
reality of divine suffering of the Son to the forefront. The overwhelming intensity of 
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God's love towards fallen humanity is thus rightly expressed in his theology. But, 
being tailored to the indigenous, "natural" need, Kitamori's theology cannot retain a 
crucial factor which judges "naturally given" values and concepts, thus breaking the 
ground for an authentic acceptance of the Gospel. Lacking this factor, Kitamori's 
theology cannot pronounce the "revolutionary" cry of the risen Lord: "Behold, I make 
all things new!" (Rev. 21:5). Salvation is not to find an eternal truth given in 
"nature," but it is given to men through divine encounter given by God's revelation in 
the Word. 
Lutheran theology, as a theology "normed" by the Gospel, is critical to any 
form of "natural" theology which tries to lure God down to this world and "use" Him 
as a principle for solving the enigmas and contradictions of this present world. Any 
attempt, conscious or unconscious, to incarcerate God in the framework of ideologies 
(theological or otherwise) is bound to find itself at an impasse, for the reality of the 
world under the lordship of the inscrutable God cannot be elucidated by human 
ideology or rational speculation. Rather, it is the task of the theology "normed" by 
the Gospel to bring the reality of the world under the love of a sovereign and 
redeeming God and to make the world known as the place of God the Creator's work. 
In other words, evangelical theology is to bring up a fallen humanity into the sphere 
of faith, as fiducia sub specie contraria, and to let man see his reality in the light of 
faith. For this task, Luther's doctrine of Deus absconditus is of crucial significance; - 
this doctrine of a hidden God, which leads men to abandon.any attempt to rationally 
elucidate the enigma of human existence in the world and teaches them to "let God be 
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God," this doctrine alone is capable of giving the unshakable foundation of hope and 
joy in the midst of a seemingly meaningless and enigmatic reality. 
In any evangelical theology, the dimension of God's judgment over things 
human or His negation of them is essential. Kitamori speaks of negation but it is a 
negation in the dialectic of ideas. His theology, in effect, does not include the 
dimension of God's negation of human things. He established a direct continuity 
between the Gospel and indigenous spirituality. Certainly, indigenous spirituality with 
its yearning for salvation is indispensable in the "preparation for the Gospel." But this 
preparation for the Gospel is of formal and negative significance. Formally, a 
yearning for salvation (with whatever content) is fully "natural" and without which no 
one seeks the Gospel even "erroneously." And, negatively, whatever salvation human 
beings naturally long for, it is first to be negated so as to be re-formed by the Gospel 
into an authentic yearning. The Lutheran paradigm of "killing first and then 
enlivening" applies here. 
In a land such as Japan where immanentic deities are legion and the 
distinction between gods and men are often blurred, it is particularly necessary to 
make clear the transcendental aspects of God, God sovereign and inscrutable even in 
His salvific will. Kitamori overemphasized the immanentic aspect of God, God's 
suffering in the Son, at the cost of God's eternal sovereignty and lordship. For this 
reason Kitamori's theology failed to represent the Lutheran and Biblical witness of 
God's holy love. God's transcendence and immanence can only be kept in a proper 
dialectic with a doctrine of God in which God's inscrutable mystery, or God's 
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Godness, is reverently maintained. 
With all this, however, it was Kitamori who first embraced the idea of 
Lutheran responsibility for an authentic unity of the Church, inspired by Article VII of 
the Augsburg Confession. Although there have been not a few outstanding 
Luther-scholars in Japan, again it was Kitamori who tried to indigenize Lutheranism in 
the Japanese spiritual soil. Directly and indirectly, Kitamori has inspired those people 
who are concerned with Lutheran issues to think systematically about the possibilities 
of the actualization of Lutheran relevance in a land where Christianity has had 
difficulty in taking root. Though having largely failed in its original intention, 
Kitamori's theology may be seen as a first step to develop an indigenous Lutheran 
theology in Japan. 
"The Luther-Rose, we hope, will blossom in Japan one day," Kitamori wrote 
recently. One sincerely shares this hope with the author of the Theology of the Pain 
of God. Because of all the criticisms launched against Kazoh Kitamori, this writer 
feels all the more obliged to follow in the theologian's footsteps, with a fresh look at 
the vital concerns of Lutheranism, for the actualization of the Gospel; this is, he 
believes, the very task assigned to him in the country at the end of the earth. 
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